Task Force MacLean/Task Force Faith
On Nov. 27, 1950, X Corps, in what has been called “the most ill-advised and unfortunate operation of the Korean War,” ordered the First Marine Division and the Army’s Task Force MacLean to attack north from their positions west and east of the Chosen Reservoir. The operation was designed to take pressure off Eighth U.S. Army units 50-air-miles to the west, which was under heavy attack from the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) 130,000 man Thirteenth Army Group, which had just entered the war. Unbeknownst to those ordering the attack, the 120,000-man CCF Ninth Army Group was lying in wait.
Captured 31st Infantry Regiment Standard, on display in the Beijing Korean War Museum
Task Force MacLean, named for the commander of the U.S. Seventh Infantry Division’s 31st Infantry Regiment, Colonel Allan D. “Mac” MacLean, had been formed in mid-November, 1950, to relieve First Marine Division elements east of the Chosin Reservoir. It consisted of the Second and Third Battalions, 31st Infantry Regiment (2/31 and 3/31), and the M-26 Pershing tanks of the regiment’s heavy tank company; the First Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment (1/32), under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Don C. Faith; the 105-mm dusters from D Battery, 15th Antiaircraft Artillery (Automatic Weapons) Battalion.
By Nov. 27, 1950, the task force had relieved the Fifth Marine Regiment, which joined the rest of the First Marine Division farther north to the west of the reservoir. The force had taken up positions east of the reservoir with Faith’s 1/32 to the north, the 3/31 and two 105-mm batteries farther south and still further south at the village of Hudong, the rear command post and the tank company. The 2/31 and one battery of 105-mm howitzers was lagging far behind and had yet to arrive. Counting 700 attached Republic of Korea (ROK) troops; Task Force MacLean was some 3,200 men strong.
Soon after arriving at Hudong, MacLean had sent his I&R (Intelligence and Reconnaissance) platoon out to scout enemy locations. It disappeared without a trace. That night three CCF divisions struck the Marines west of the reservoir, and the CCF 80th Division struck Task Force MacLean. The battle of Chosin Reservoir had begun. Usually portrayed as a Marine epic, the travail of the Army’s Task Force MacLean has been largely ignored.
found that the regimental tank
company, which they believed
would prove to be their salvation,
had already been withdrawn
to Hagaru.”
CCF from 80th Division enter Inlet Perimeter after disorganized 1st Battalion begins breakout. Dead American soldier lies in foreground.
With his task force strung out north to south along the east bank of the reservoir and vulnerable to defeat in detail (having his battalions picked off one at a time), MacLean was hard pressed from the start. The 1/32 had suffered 100 casualties, and the 3/31 had also taken severe losses. The next day, when his tanks attempted to move up in support, they were attacked by Chinese gunners using American 3.5-inch antitank rocket launchers and were forced to retreat. When the CCF resumed the attack on the night of Nov. 28-29, MacLean withdrew 1/32 south into the 3/31 perimeters. In the process MacLean was gunned down and captured (he later died in captivity); and with the 3/31 commander, Lieutenant Colonel William R. Reilly severely wounded, Faith assumed command. Task Force MacLean had become Task Force Faith.
Again the regiment’s tank company at Hudong four miles to the south tried to break through, and again they were repulsed. On Nov. 30, 1950, Faith was ordered to fight his way south to the perimeter at Hagaru at the southern tip of the Chosin Reservoir, then under the command of the First Marine Regiment’s Colonel Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller. Hampered by some 500 wounded and by temperatures that at times reached 35-degrees-below-zero, Faith found his task force surrounded and abandoned. Transferred from Seventh Division to First Marine Division control, they were told by the hard-pressed Marines that they would have to fend for themselves. Under heavy CCF attack again on the night of Nov. 30, Task Force Faith suffered another 100 casualties. Knowing he could not survive another such attack, Faith put his 600 wounded on trucks and began to move south. Attacked not only by CCF mortars and small arms fire, but also by U.S. aircraft that mistakenly dropped napalm on his lead elements, Faith’s column was stopped by a series of CCF roadblocks and Faith himself severely wounded by a Chinese grenade. Finally reaching Hudong, they found that the regimental tank company, which they believed would prove to be their salvation, had already been withdrawn to Hagaru. It was the end of Task Force Faith. In the CCF final assault on the column, Colonel Faith (who was subsequently awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously for his actions during the withdrawal) was killed, as were most of the other wounded. Only 385 of the task force’s 3,200-man force survived.
Task Force Faith Survivors on ice of Chosin Reservoir, 12/1/50
“The fate that overtook Task Force Faith,” wrote Army historian Roy E. Appleman, “was one of the worst disasters for American soldiers in the Korean War.”
Irene L. Mandra
All the equipment and vehicles of two Infantry Battalions, the 57th Field Artillery Battalion and D Battery 15th AAA AW Battalion were lost in the fighting east of Chosin between November 27 and December 2, 1950. Not a single vehicle, artillery piece, mortar or machine gun of these units was saved. This debacle is in grim contrast to the withdrawal of the gallant Marine Regiments who successfully fought, and broke through, the same enemy, under the same conditions, bringing out most of their equipment and dead, and nearly all their wounded.
The reasons for this disaster, given the obvious heroism of many individual officers and men of 31 RCT, are still debated but must call into question the preparation of 31 RCT by X Corps command, training methods of Army Infantry in general, and command leadership of the US Army. Specifically, as compared to the USMC.
This Chinese photograph shows the Task Force Faith convoy destruction.
1st Marine Division C.O. General O.P. Smith and his battle-hardened Regimental Commanders had deliberately slowed their advance into the Taebecks in spite of demands for haste from X Corps commander Army General Almond. In their view, any advance must always be based on adequate preparation and support. This procedure subsequently allowed the 1st Marine Division to coordinate its infantry, artillery, armor and air units during the fight-out, even preparing a crude air-field at Hagaru-ri for logistical support. Among other activities, this airfield enabled evacuation of over 4,000 wounded and frost-bitten Marines and Soldiers during Dec 2-5. This included more than 1500 7th Division troops, with all 31st RCT survivors unfit for duty. Without the stubborn professional approach of the experienced Marine command staff and its veteran leadership at all fighting levels, the tragedy east of Chosin would have been a much more general disaster too terrible to contemplate.
As one veteran said, "Thank God for the Marines."
Additional Sources:
www.coalitionoffamilies.org
31rct.tripod.com
www.army.mil
www.rt66.com
