Replies

The Saudis can turn Chechnya on and off like a spigot.

My take is that the Saudis feel a cold wind blowing from our direction, especially since the fall of Baghdad and the exposure of some of their double dealing, and they are looking for a counter weight. Russia fills the bill.

Consequently they are willing to temporarily sacrifice Chechnya in order to knit the alliance.

From Putin's side, he gets victory in Chechnya, and an invitation into Saudi's oil industry, which could be worth billions, and all he has to do is promise to "consult" with them on oil pricing and lend them a sympathetic ear when we threaten them. Its almost too good to be true, from his point of view.

Of course, the oil projects may or may not actually happen, and the oil consultations almost certainly will not restrain Russian oil production. But when two double-dealers get together, what do you expect?

The key thing from our point of view is whether or not Russia begins to squeeze us in Central Asia. So far we are more-or-less partners with Russia there, and they are whole-heartedly expanding production there, in counterpoint to their policy at the beginning of the nineties of obstructing production.

The Saudis need to obstruct oil production outside of their control, which besides Iraq might include PKK attacks on the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project, or other trouble-making in Central Asia. If Russia begins to cooperate in some of this troublemaking, we have trouble. If not, then the Saudi-Russia alliance may not mean much. But I worry just the same; the Saudis are used to purchasing heads of state, and I don't know why Russia's generals and secret police and foreign ministers would be any harder to buy than our own. They may even be cheaper.