America AFTER 9/11: None the Wiser

The US Government and many of its non-governmental experts are not any the wiser about the deficiencies in their intelligence apparatus, physical security infrastructure and policy-making towards rogue states, which led to the catastrophic terrorist strikes by Al Qaeda in US homeland, on September 11, 2001.

2. Mental blocks, which distorted their threat perceptions before 9/11, thereby enabling the jihadi terrorists based in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to spectacularly succeed in their long-stated (at least since 1993,often openly) objective of carrying the jihad to the US homeland, have not been removed even long after 9/11.

3. Consequently, their policy-making in the field of counter-terrorism continues to be marked by a lack of lucidity in analysis, a reluctance due to political reasons to come to terms with the ground reality that the war against jihadi terrorism cannot be won unless and until the terrorism triangle constituted by Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is totally rid of the spawning grounds of these terrorists and their protectors, if not sponsors, in these States are held accountable for the emergence of jihadi terrorism as the greatest threat to international peace and security and to democracies.

4. As a result, despite massive increases in budgetary allocations for counter-terrorism, additions of hundreds of extra manpower and revamping of the intelligence and physical security apparatus, the policy-making is as confused as ever. It is marked by wishful-thinking, a hesitation to call a spade a spade and unrealistic expectations that those responsible in the first instance for acting as mid-wives of jihadi terrorism for their own strategic (in the case of Pakistan) or religious ( in the case of Saudi Arabia) reasons could be made to behave and co-operate in the war against terrorism by playing down their culpability for the spread of this catastrophic terrorism and by playing up undeservedly the limited, but half-hearted co-operation extended by them after 9/11.

5. So long as this confusion persists, jihadi terrorism will continue to gather strength and spread across the world and the blood of the security forces and innocent civilians will continue to flow, not only in other countries, but in the US homeland itself. Despite the massive strengthening of homeland security in the US , another 9/11 in US homeland cannot be ruled out. In fact, it is a stark possibility. There is a serious likelihood of the jihadi terrorists ultimately prevailing over the USA, despite its military might, if it does not remove in time the blinkers clouding its vision.

6. These are my conclusions after a three-week-long lecture tour of the US from July 10 to 29,2003, during which I had an opportunity of interacting in seminars and discussions with a wide spectrum of experts concerned with counter-terrorism and observing the post-9/11 mindset, analytical methods and argumentation, which are disturbingly not markedly different from those prevailing before 9/11, which made 9/11 possible. During the last week of my stay, the report of the joint congressional committee into the intelligence lapses prior to 9/11 was released to the public except 28 pages reportedly relating to the role of Saudi Arabia. Before coming to my conclusions, I had the benefit of studying details of it as reported in the US media and watching the national debate on it in the US print and electronic media. I have returned from the US with gnawing doubts in my mind about the US ability to prevail over the jihadi terrorists.

7. 9/11 was not the first wake-up call to the US and the international community that a new brand of terrorism, which we in India have been calling jihadi terrorism for nearly a decade now, drawing its ideological motivation from the medieval and not the modern world, had made its appearance in the world and was seeking to take the world back by centuries. The New York World Trade Centre explosion of February,1993, and the accidentally foiled attempts of the jihadi terrorists connected with that explosion to organise a series of spectacular strikes on civil aviation in 1995 from their bases in the Philippines were the first wake-up call.

8. If only US analysts had collated all the jihadi terrorist incidents which had taken place in the world since February, 1993, and analysed them objectively, they would have noticed the following:

* First,many of the, if not the principal, dramatis personae in all these incidents were either Pakistani nationals or Pakistani residents of Arab and other foreign origin or had spent some time in Pakistan or had links with it. * Second, the jihadi ideology that inspired them and bonded them together was born in the madrasas of Pakistan. This ideology stressed pernicious ideas such as extra-territorial loyalty, recognition by Muslims of only the religious frontiers of Islam and not national frontiers and the religious duty and obligation of the jihadis to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction, if necessary, to promote their religious objectives. The concept of an Islamic bomb to counter what they projected as the Christian, Jewish or Hindu bomb was born in the madrasas and ruling establishment of Pakistan. These ideas ultimately became the cornerstone of Al Qaeda's ideology, but they were born in the soil of Pakistan and not in the mind of Osama bin Laden.

* Third, all the jihadis, who had participated in the post-February 1993 jihadi terrorist strikes in different parts of the world, were ideologically motivated in the madrasas of Pakistan and trained and armed in jihadi training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan run with the help of Saudi and Pakistani money and with the complicity of the Pakistani State.

* Four, the Taliban, which gave shelter to bin Laden since the middle of 1996 and allowed his terrorist infrastructure to function from Afghan territory, was the creation of the Pakistani ruling establishment in 1994 and its intelligence set-up was largely run by and with the help of the retired officers of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

* Five, all the post-1993 jihadi strikes, including those of 9/11, were conceived, planned and executed by this infrastructure. It was inconceivable that the ISI would not have been aware of the goings-on in the Al Qaeda camps of Afghanistan and in the other jihadi training camps of Pakistan.

* Six, at least since 1990, even according to the annual reports of the Counter-Terrorism Division of the US State Department called "Patterns of Global Terrorism", there was concrete evidence that the Jamaat-ul-Fuqra (JUF), a jihadi organisation of Pakistan, had set up its cells in the US homeland to spread its ideology. At least since 1995, there were reports in the Pakistani media that the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) was similarly creating secret cells in the US by training some Afro-American Muslims in its camps in Pakistan. The post 9/11 investigations by the USA's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have brought out that two other Pakistani jihadi organisations---the Pakistani branch of the Tablighi Jamaat (TJ), the headquarters of which are in India, and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET)-- had set up their secret cells in the USA. Even according to the annual reports of the Counter-Terrorism Division of the State Department, the HUM was a founding member of bin Laden's International Islamic Front (IIF). According to Pakistani sources, the LET joined it later.

* Seven, it was impossible that the ISI would not have been aware of the preparations being made in the training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan for 9/11.

9. One would have expected the congressional committee and the various think tanks, which have studied how 9/11 was made possible, to have drawn attention to these factors, traced the evolution of jihadi terrorism from the terrorism triangle and the role of the Pakistani State in it and tried to find answers to the following questions:

* What was the state of knowledge of the US intelligence, security and policy-making communities in these matters, drawn from secret as well as open sources, and was there an adequate attempt to analyse them? * Was the Pakistani establishment sharing with the US its knowledge of the activities of the jihadi elements from Afghan and Pakistani territory and, if so, how sincere and complete was such sharing?

* To what extent the gratitude of the US intelligence for the contribution made by the ISI in the war against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan blinded it to its culpability?

* Was the co-operation extended by the ISI in the arrest of Mir Aimal Kansi, the murderer of two officers of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in January,1993, Ramzi Yousef, a master-mind of the February 1993 World Trade Trade Centre explosion, Abu Zubaidah, supposedly No. 3 in Al Qaeda, Ramzi Binalshibh, an important Al Qaeda operative, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, allegedly a master-mind of 9/11, and Waleed bin Atash, a suspect in the attack on the US naval ship USS Cole in October 2000 sufficient ground for closing the US eyes to other acts of continuing culpability by Pakistan?

* Are there surviving secret accomplices in the US of the 19 terrorists, who perished while carrying out 9/11? Who and where are they and what are their links with the three Pakistani organisations having a presence in the US homeland?

* What are the future threats of jihadi terrorism to the US and the rest of the international community and how to deal with them? Do the new US Homeland Security Department and the re-organised intelligence and physical security apparatus have a strong analytical capability and a clear understanding of jihadi terrorism?

10. The fact that none of these questions has been addressed by the Congressional committee and that its report, as published in the US media, does not even refer to Pakistan does not speak well of the thoroughness of the enquiry. The enquiry has been based totally on a study of the secret intelligence available to the US intelligence before 9/11 and the use or non-use made of it. The wealth of open source intelligence available on this subject before 9/11 finds no mention and has not been studied. Similarly, there has been no comprehensive analysis of the various acts of jihadi terrorism since March,1993, in order to see whether they were adequately analysed by the agencies and the policy-makers and correct conclusions drawn. 11. There is a reference to jihadi terrorism, but indirect, in the following observation of the committee as reported by the "New York Times": " The FBI increased its focus on terrorism in the 1990s, but critics charge that it neither focussed sufficiently on radical Islamist activities in the United States nor properly aligned itself to counter the growing danger of terrorism domestically. As a result, the critics say, radical Islamists were able to exploit our freedoms and operate undetected within the United States. Several senior FBI officials, however, contend that countering terrorism at home was a top priority and that Islamic radicals simply did not present opportunities for the FBI to disrupt their activities."

12. Who are these Islamic radicals? Were they only the Arab members of Al Qaeda or did they also include the members of the Pakistani terrorist organisations? Why was the FBI not paying sufficient attention to them? Was it due to their role as the surrogates of the USA in the war against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan? Were they able to hoodwink the US agencies by projecting themselves as continuing allies of the US in its campaign against Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Slobodan Milosevic in Bosnia? Ramzi Yousef reportedly entered the US with an Iraqi passport posing as a hunted opponent of Saddam and fled from the US as a Pakistani citizen after participating in the World Trade Centre explosion. Did the HUM's role, found useful by the US, in training the jihadi opponents of Milosevic in Bosnia and Kosovo and participating in their jihad make the US agencies close their eyes to its burrowing into US homeland in preparation for taking the jihad to the US homeland? One looks in vain for answers to them.

13. The Congressional committee has lost a good opportunity to investigate in depth what led to 9/11 and how to prevent another. As a result, its report is full of generalities and jargon. However, it does draw attention to the need for action against States sponsoring terrorism in the following words: "State-sponsored terrorism substantially increases the likelihood of successful and more lethal attacks within the United States. This issue must be addressed from a national standpoint and should not be limited in focus by the geographical and factual boundaries of individual cases."

14. What are those geographical and factual boundaries? Which are the States sponsoring jihadi terrorism? It does not specify and hesitates to call names. It is said that it at least names Saudi Arabia in the 28 pages not released to the public, but it does not name Pakistan.

15. Will the report help in the successful execution of the war against terrorism? One will be happy if it does but one is doubtful if it would.

16. The various Marxist-oriented terrorist groups of the West withered away when the communist states of the USSR and other East European countries, which were their main sponsors and helpers, collapsed. There is little likelihood of jihadi terrorist groups similarly withering away unless their State sponsors and helpers are firmly acted against

My opinion is that it's unfortunate that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are given free passes for political reasons when they are major sponsors of terrorism (at least at some levels of their governments), but it's ridiculous to think that nothing useful has been done to protect the U.S. from terrorism after 9/11, or that nothing has been learned.

This article, while containing some truths, is overly negative and is incorrect in it's conclusions.

Prior to 9/11, terrorists could carry out attacks against U.S. targets frequently and with impunity, knowing that nothing would be done against them. Now, I believe that terrorists are too busy running to carry out attacks against the U.S., have had most of their funding cut off, and our intelligence is infinitely better. Just look at all those we've captured and interrogated.

It's easy to criticize. Anybody can do it. What's difficult is to do the job that the Bush administration has done in the wake of 9/11. They should be commended.

"Now, I believe that terrorists are too busy running to carry out attacks against the U.S., have had most of their funding cut off, and our intelligence is infinitely better."

I agree progress has been made.

The source is India, which is routinely hard on Pakistan (and every thing I've heard indicates Pakistan deserves it).

I happen to believe we've only scratched the surface, with funding. Same for intelligence.

With those two topics, we are too constrained, by follopwing rules.

The author names Pakistan, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabie. What about Egypt? Syria? Yemen? Sudan? Iran?

I see the problem as being Islam. The problem may only be a fraction of the whole, but the whole fronts for the bad faction.

It is plain that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are "unindicted" members of the "axis of evil". If it is true that the Taliban is an ISI creation, it is also a Saudi one. Saudi money and Saudi agents are behind every Muslim insurgency in Asia, perhaps without exception.

And the nexus of all of the Asian Muslim insurgencies was Bin Ladin and the Afghan training camps. If all of these insurgencies were funded by the Saudis, inspired by Saudi missionaries, and trained by Bin Ladin and the ISI, then it is a reasonable conclusion that Bin Ladin was, in effect, a Saudi agent as well.

So the war on the "axis" must obviously include a response to the two unmentioned members of the axis. To some degree, that has already happened. US forces have attacked Saudi-backed Abu Sayaf in the Philippines, they have ejected the Taliban from Afghanistan and continue to kill them as they cross the border from Pakistan, they are engaged in training and assisting police and military forces all across Central Asia, and there has been a fundamental shift in our stance toward Russia and the Chechens, reversing Clinton-era sympathy for the Chechen rebellion.

In Pakistan, despite their previous alliance for the Taliban, Musharraf has given us fairly free reign as our agents enter the country to chase bandits. We have a powerful point of leverage; our relationship with India. India stays its hand toward Pakistan because the US asks her to. India is the hammer that we brandish whenever the Pakistanis get uppity; our influence in Delhi is what has allowed us to develop and exploit divisions within the Pakistani government.

But it is not enough to attack Saudi operations outside of Saudi Arabia. At some point logic requires that Riyadh itself have a day of reckoning. With the fall of Baghdad, the Saudis now stand exposed and alone, and that day of reckoning, I believe, is now. It will be done very smoothly, very much behind the scenes, because whatever dirt Saddam's files may have on US leaders will be nothing compared to what the Saudis will have in their files. But it is undeniable, I believe, that we have been engaged in attacks on Saudi operations since 9/11, a war that has been one of the most bizarre ever, in which we slaughter the low-level trigger-pullers while smiling and hugging the princes on camera who fund them.

Yes, we all want to be 100% safe, 100% of the time but that's not possible. I do agree we have a long way to go to make us even say 20% safer than 9/11 but Bush has come a long way in such a very short time. Look back to where we were on 9/10 - innocent babes in the woods. At least now we've had an awakening. We KNOW bad things can happen. We KNOW hijackers aren't in it for a joy ride. We KNOW the borders need to be more secure. We KNOW we can't depend upon such friends as France, Germany, Mexico, and Canada. We KNOW we have to keep our infrastructers secure. We should also know that these things take time, especially when the cities claim they can't do anything without state funding and states whine because they can't do anything without government funds. Sometimes it takes individuals to get off their lazy rears and become productive citizens within their own communities and let Bush concentrate on the big evil doers across the pond.

How safe would we be if Gore were leading the country? Scary thought, huh.

For every illegal we stop, thousands more pour through. Terrorists know this. It's just a matter of time, but politicians of both parties would rather sell us out and hope for the votes of the illegals.

Just wait until the pandering gets on the big roll after the first of the year. The big-time treason hasn't even gotten started yet.

It's time for
a round-up!

It's just a matter of time, but politicians of both parties would rather sell us out and hope for the votes of the illegals.

Illegals from every country walk over the border every day, come in by carloads and truckloads every day. INS and border patrol agents indicate that the their agencies really aren't allowed to do their jobs, orders from headquarters. This free-for-all attitude comes right from the White House. If the White House wanted it to stop, it would.

What will it take for GWB to wise up, another 9/11?

a war that has been one of the most bizarre ever, in which we slaughter the low-level trigger-pullers while smiling and hugging the princes on camera who fund them.

And i believe that is what is tearing the country apart.

The paradox of having an unnamed enemy and ideology, whilst declaring a war on a tactic.

But all in all, a great post, as usual.

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