In the rear-view mirror - on Osirak, Chirac and IAEA under Hans Blix

I was somewhat surprised to see on the live thread on Hans Blix's latest statement to the UN that several posters had not yet understood that Mr Blix is a dangerous man. This was stated by no less than Mr Blix’s old party chairman Per Ahlmark (previous head of the Liberal party and Swedish vice-premier in the mid 70s), who has written a couple of op/ed articles in WSJ.

The gist of the articles has been that Mr Blix may be a very genial person, but he is totally out of his depth dealing with Saddam Hussein. I have tried to find them on FreeRepublic but without success.

Although I doubt Mr Blix's geniality (The episode with the Iraqi scientist who tried to contact the weapons inspectors in an “inelegant” way and Blix’s visit to Tibet to inaugurate a Chinese nuclear power station under his period as chairman of the IAEA makes me think of him more as a typical “Pilgrim”. Those of you who remember Paul Hollanders excellent book Political Pilgrims will know what I am talking about.) I have no doubt that the West should never put its trust in this man.

I have posted a few excerpts from the book “First Strike” by Shlomo Nakdimon (Summit Books, Simon & Schusters Inc. NY, 1987) retelling the story of the Israeli raid on Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981. There are other books who describe the actual raid in more detail, but Mr Nakdimon’s book is probably the best recounting of the diplomatic and political play before and after the successful destruction of Saddam’s weapons plant.

To wet your appetites I have included two short excerpts about that great, great statesman Jacques Chirac (sarcasm!). Then follows a description of a senate hearing after the raid, with an unsung American hero and some people that the most Freepers will recognise (in their usual roles I might add).

Remember that Mr Blix was president of the IAEA during this period. The description of the activities of the IAEA makes one wonder - any likeness to the UN inspections? Well, in the following excerpt the UN and IAEA are shown in their true colours.

No comments are necessary, except our prayers for the safety of the Allied troops, and to wish them Good Hunting.

During the frenzied election campaign, the most prominent figure alongside Giscard was Jacques Chirac, a tough and gifted young Gaullist. Pompidou had nicknamed Chirac “the Bulldozer”, evidently considering him a potential president. But at the age of forty-one he had to settle for the number two slot. On May 27, 1974, he took up his duties as premier. Six months later, on December 1, 1974, he set off for a visit to Iraq, at the invitation of Vice-President Saddam Hussain.

On his arrival at Baghdad airport, the guest was greeted by the entire Iraqi leadership, headed by President Bakr. Chirac and his companions were treated with lavish Eastern hospitality, both sides going out of their way to highlight their friendship.

Hussain soon won the heart of the French Premier. The Bulldozer was much taken with Iraq’s strongman, who impressed Chirac as an imposing leader with a good grasp of his country’s problems and clear ideas on how to solve them. In spite of having read intelligence reports detailing the savagery of Hussain’s policies, Chirac did not appear overperturbed thereby; on the contrary, rumors in the Parisian diplomatic community related that on returning home Chirac began to take Arabic lessons so as to be able to converse with his new friend directly, with no need of interpreters.

Chirac himself depicted his efforts in the following terms: “I cultivated ties with Iraq within the framework of the policy laid down by the President of the Republic.... it was in no one’s interest to leave [Iraq] in the exclusive orbit of the Soviet Union...In that regard the action taken was effective...” That was not an accurate presentation. It will be recalled that, irrespective of external blandishments, Baghdad itself sought ways of terminating an alliance with Moscow reluctant to meet Iraqi expectations. [That is to supply them with nuclear capability. My comment.]

Be that as it may, Chirac outdid his President in the earnestness of his efforts toward fostering relations with Iraq. He personally took a hand in wording the joint statement which affirmed that his talks with the Iraqis “were held in an atmosphere of profound friendship and confidence.”

Hussain could pat himself on the back over his success in including the French Premier to sign a statement which included a call to Israel to withdraw from all the occupied territories. “The Iraqi side appreciated the French attitude toward the Palestinian problem and toward all the Arab issues,” the statement said. The two leaders expressed gratification over “the development of the economic, industrial and technical relations between their two countries.” The statement concluded: “ Jacques Chirac and the delegation expressed their satisfaction and extreme pleasure for the warm welcome accorded them.”

At a joint press conference with his guest, Hussain spoke of “equal relations between France and Iraq... for the sake of the two countries’ independence.” Chirac, going all out to flatter his host, referred to Hussain as “the great statesman who enjoys the qualities of willpower and competence to lead the people toward progress and national prosperity.”

Giscard insisted that no party - “Israelis included” - had brought it to France’s attention that the Iraqi reactor was to be used for military purposes. Ben Porat did not relent: “Did French intelligence, or someone else, deliberately conceal the information from you?” The ex-President flung up his hands. “I don’t know, I don’t know.”

“It was my impression,” Ben Porat observed, “that he did know more; but, for obvious reasons, he preferred to remain silent.”

Giscard’s defense was astounding. Foreign Minister Shamir discussed the Iraqi reactor with him on two occasions, as did Shimon Peres. France’s intelligence services knew perfectly well what was on going on at al-Tuweitha, and where Iraq was headed. Did all this evade Giscard’s memory? Apart from an uneasy conscience, did he have any specific reason for denying the undeniable?

Giscard’s former colleagues in office were in no haste to relieve him of responsibility. Chirac said he had operated within the guidelines laid down by the President, but the agreement was signed by his successor as premier, Raymond Barre. As for Barre, he explained: “True, I did sign the agreement, but I received it complete from my predecessor, Jacques Chirac.”

All claims for the efficacy of IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] supervision would be refuted finally and utterly by the next witness. Roger Richter, up till a month previously an IAEA inspector, was the sole American representative in the agency’s department responsible for nuclear installations in Iraq, Israel, Pakistan and India.

A graduate of metallurgic-engineering faculty at the Polytechnic Institute of New York and with a masters’s degree in nuclear engineering from the University of Maryland, Richter had been employed by the US Atomic Energy Commission and the Energy Research an Development Administration. In this work he acquired familiarity with almost all technological aspects of nuclear-fuel engineering, reactor irradiations and nuclear waste disposal.

In February 1978, Richter took up a three-year contract as inspector for the IEAE. In view of his training and skills, he was requested to submit a preliminary feasibility estimate for construction of a safeguards system at the Osirak complex, and an assessment of IAEA procedures governing installation inspections. Being free of political constraints, he experienced no inhibitions in drawing his conclusions, which he claimed, “caused great consternation in the IAEA bureaucracy.” His colleagues concurred with Richter’s assessment that Osirak, with its extensive potential for production of weapons-grade material, constituted a terrifying threat.

Judging this to be too grave a matter to be left within the framework of the IAEA, Richter proceeded to present his findings to his former colleagues - senior officials at various Washington agencies and the U.S. delegation to the IAEA. “I was advised that my concerns were shared by the U.S. nuclear nonproliferation establishment, and that they were attempting to work with the IAEA to improve the level of planned safeguards on the Osirak. It was, however, acknowledged privately by those intimately involved in that effort, that no matter what arrangements were negotiated with the government of Iraq, it would be a rather simple matter for scientists to circumvent IAEA safeguards and clandestinely produce enough plutonium 239 to support a weapons-production program in their nondeclared nonsafeguarded facilities.”

Realizing that “prospects were bleak for an honest IAEA determination of the safeguard problems of the Osirak”, Richter drafted a number of letters on the matter, to be sent to Senator John Glenn. Ultimately the letters were not dispatched, because members of the U.S. delegation to the IAEA repeatedly assured Richter that many of the problems troubling him were undergoing comprehensive study. Furthermore, they advised Richter to exercise his influence from within, while doing nothing to weaken the IAEA. Consequently, he persisted in his efforts to boost safeguards program; but meanwhile events unfolded rapidly and the Israeli Air Force bombed the Iraqi reactor.

Senator [Alan] Cranston prefaced Richter’s testimony to the committee with the following tribute: “...the witness is performing a remarkable act of conscience. He telephoned me last Friday, one week ago, from Vienna, to express his concerns about the inadequacies of the inspection system in which he was involved. We had further discussions, and as a result from that, he resigned from the International Atomic Energy Agency so that he could fly here, at a considerable personal sacrifice, to state his views and give us his knowledge as a basis for our deliberations.”

Senator Glenn, who exhibited a rigidly anti-Israeli position throughout, tried to impute questionable motives to Richter. This sparked off a fierce argument between Glenn and another committee member, Senator Boschwitz. When tempers cooled, Richter commenced his testimony.

He began by inviting the committee members to put themselves in the shoes of an IAEA inspector called upon to conduct an inspection of the Iraqi nuclear facility. Such an inspector, the witness stressed, would without doubt be Russian, or from the Soviet bloc, or French: since 1976, all inspections of Iraqi facilities had been conducted by Soviet or Hungarian inspectors, and the sole French inspector authorized by the Iraqis had yet to take part in an inspection. This reflected a most salient fact: countries had the right to veto the choice of IAEA inspectors, and that right was exercised regularly.

An inspector, Richter continued, must remember that if he reaches a conclusion offensive to Iraq, it is liable to have a detrimental effect upon its relations with his own country.

The inspection would come as no surprise. The Iraqi government had to be notified several weeks ahead of time of the intention to hold the inspection, and it could either agree to the proposed date or - as recently - suggest a postponement. Such a “suggestion” could not be disregarded.

Richter went on to relate that preliminary Iraqi information did not include Italian hot cells. As long as Iraq insisted that these facilities were not used for refining plutonium or reprocessing spent fuel, they were off limits to IAEA inspectors. Furthermore, Iraq’s stock of natural uranium in its oxide form (U3O8) known to scientists as “yellowcake” was subject to no form of control - in spite of the ease with which it could be converted into raw material for the production of plutonium.

Their duties are limited to verifying the amounts of material declared by Iraq and France; they have to establish that the balance of the material declared is correct. They have no authority to check on undeclared material. IAEA does not investigate clandestine activity; it merely “keeps the books.” Resuming his colorful account, Richter stated:

“You as an inspector, know that Iraq has in its position some one hundred tons of uranium oxide. You know well that the fuel-processing equipment supplied by Italy - which is under no safeguard - enables Iraq with relative ease to convert that oxide to uranium metal. You also know that it will be possible subsequently to convert that uranium, by means of neutron bombardment in the reactor core or in its blanket, into plutonium. The mixture produced - uranium with plutonium - is identical with the used fuel which must be declared, and which can be reprocessed in the hot cells. The material accountance balance will not show that material has been withdrawn. And you, as an inspector, have no recourse but to limit your inspection to the declared inventory.

Furthermore, since the current agreement between Iraq and the IAEA permits only three annual inspections, there is no difficulty in rapidly clearing the reactor of any element secretly introduced for irradiation. By the time the inspectors reach the reactor, they will find only those fuel rods which have been declared.

In addition, the agreement does not provide for Osirak to be fitted with photographic or TV surveillance systems to monitor the operation of the reactor. True, even a system of that nature could not prevent clandestine plutonium production, but it could at least detect accelerated withdrawal of specimens from the reactor prior to inspection, and this point to the possibility of illegal irradiation in the reactor.”

A year earlier, Richter revealed, he had written a report, portions of which he now proceeded to read out:

“The available information points to an aggressive, coordinated program by Iraq to develop a nuclear weapons capability during the next five years. As a nuclear safeguards inspector at the IAEA, my concern and complaint is that Iraq will be able to conduct this program under the auspices of Non-Proliferation Treaty and while violating the provisions of the NPT. The IAEA safeguards are totally incapable of detecting the production of plutonium in large-sized material test reactors under the presently constituted safeguards arrangements. Perhaps the most disturbing implication of the Iraqi nuclear program is that the NPT agreement has had the effect of assisting Iraq in acquiring the nuclear technology and nuclear material for its program by absolving the cooperating nations of their moral responsibility by shifting it to the IAEA. These cooperating nations have twarthed concerted international criticism of their actions by pointing to Iraq’s signing of NPT, while turning away from the numerous, obvious and compelling evidence which leads to the conclusion that Iraq is embarked on a nuclear weapons program.”

Senator Cranston’s bold statement, immediately succeeded by Richter’s testimony, left committee members dumbfounded. Equally stunned, the State Department that same day drew up a reply whose main trust was that there were numerous reactors far more suitable than Osirak to the production of plutonium - implying that, were this what Iraq desired, it would not have purchased Osirak. Chairman Charles Percy posed a question along those lines to Dr. Selden and to Dr. Kouts, chairman of the nuclear energy department at the Brookhaven National Laboratories in New York State. Both men confirmed that there were reactors far superior to Osirak in plutonium production. But the “chirade” was disrupted when Richter requested permission to speak, commenting acidly:

“I think the Government of Iraq would agree with Dr. Kouts and Dr. Selden. They also wanted a graphite reactor from France, but France recognized that this particular type of reactor, a graphite reactor, had very large capability for plutonium production. And France said: “ No way are you going to get that reactor.” In a typical Middle East bargaining fashion, Iraq said, “Well, if you are not going to give us that reactor, what will you give us?” and they said, “Well, we can give you the Osirak.” So it is not that Iraq did not want the best system possible. They just could not get it.”

Richter’s charge was borne out by Dr. Kouts. When Richter put it to him that “given the very small industrial base, the very small research base that the Iraqi establishment has, it [Osirak] may be far beyond the needs of such a small, relatively undeveloped state for doing materials and irradiation testing,” Kouts conceded, “Yes, I believe that.”

In the course of the hearing, Richter revealed further that indications as to Iraq’s ability to use the Osirak to produce significant amounts of plutonium caused such concern at the IAEA that the director general sponsored an informal investigation, The investigator, Professor Kazia Almenas of the University of Maryland, reached the conclusion that these fears were indeed well founded.

Richter disclosed further that on March 10, 1981, nine IAEA inspectors sent a memorandum to the agency’s deputy director general in which they warned expressly that under the current IAEA inspection procedures, the limitations under which we operate, the fact that those key facilities are outside the scope of safeguards, we are going to have a very difficult time guaranteeing that the material has not been diverted.”

The impression made by the testimony of Richer and other experts is reflected by the statement by Senator Pressler when the committee concluded its hearings: “I began these hearings to be somewhat of a critic of Israel. But as time has passed, I have come to believe, based on the information israel had, it probably did the only thing the country could do, and probably something our country down the road will do at some point.”

On June 25, the House Foreign Relations Committee held an additional hearing. The first witness was Dr. Albert Carnesale, Harvard professor of public policy, who specialized in nuclear-energy policy and was member of the U.S. delegation to the Geneva nuclear-disarmament talks. In a detailed and complex testimony awash with hypothetical questions and answers, Carnesale argued: “... I can understand why Israel would assume the worst of Iraqi intentions ... Israel had to much at stake to assume that Iraqi’s intentions were benign and would have remained so ... They would foresee the possibilities of Iraq obtaining bomb quantities of highly enriched uranium and plutonium.” All the same, he felt that “Israel should have deferred the raid and pressed as hard as possible for an alternative solution to the problem. If these efforts had failed, and if the Iraqi nuclear program had continued unabated, then and only then might the Israelis be “justified” in resorting to military force to neutralize the potential threat to their survival.” The witness admitted, however, “This, of course, is a subjective judgment and probably reflects my personal values more than anything else.”

Carnesale was followed by Richter, who repeated the gist of the testimony before the Senate committee. He added critical comments about the IAEA’s lack of earnestness about the Iraqi reactor, whose potential from the viewpoint of nuclear proliferation he accused the agency of ignoring.

The anti-Israeli faction within the Administration recognized that Richter’s testimony was dynamite. There was even a bid to have it classified as confidential, in spite of its remoteness from U.S defense interests. There were also attempts to discredit Richter by smear tactics. Congressmen told of calls from s State Department official eager to tell them that Richter’s wife was Israeli. The story was repeated by Time and the Viennese Courier; in both cases Richter reacted sharply. The matter also came up in a gruff exchange between Ambassador Evron and Undersecretary Veliotes and other Administration officials.

The IAEA director general announced Richter’s dismissal for “conduct unbecoming his post and status”. Richter claims to have resigned voluntarily in protest against “IAEA publicly stating what it privately knew to be untrue, and wantonly disregarding the facts for political expediency.”

After their diplomatic victory in the Security Council, the Iraqis now zeroed in on an objective both technical and diplomatic: the International Atomic Energy Agency, where they sought support for Israel’s expulsion. But here they ran into an unequivocal U.S. response: in that event, the United States would immediately halt its support to the agency, of whose budget it finances one third.

After fierce diplomatic wrangling, the Iraqis realized they had no hope of a majority for their expulsion proposal, whereupon they watered down their draft, which affirmed in brief that Israel should comply with the Security Council resolution by subjecting its nuclear facilities to international inspection. Should Israel decline to do so, the IAEA conference would consider suspending Israel’s membership. The resolution also denied to Israel IAEA study bursaries, annual aid to the tune of $100,000, and participation in IAEA symposiums, these sanctions to be in effect for one year.

In effect the resolution changed nothing. The Arabs had made frequent efforts in the past to enforce international supervision of Israel’s nuclear facilities, and Israel had never put up much of a fight to block such resolutions. To any sober observer, it was obvious that matters would go on as before.

Meantime, Baghdad hastened to invite IAEA inspector to visit its own reactors, so as to refute Israel’s allegations about its plans to produce nuclear weapons. The inspection, held on June 18, did not include the devastated reactor: the Iraqis insisted on the inspectors signing a waiver releasing them from any responsibility for any injury incurred in the event of an unexploded bomb going off. The IAEA officials naturally reused, whereupon they were permitted only to inspect the small Soviet research reactor, and the stores of natural uranium (which were not subject to IAEA supervision). The inspectors, it goes without saying, found no evidence of nefarious Iraqi designs. However, they were not permitted to inspect the Italian laboratories which were such an important component of Iraq’s nuclear program.

The IAEA lost no time in publishing its report, which affirmed that “the inspection thus revealed no non-compliance with the Safeguards Agreement concluded between Iraq and the IAEA.” This finding seemingly refuted the testimony submitted to the congressional hearings by IAEA Chief Inspector Roger Richter, who claimed that the agency could do nothing to hinder Iraq’s advance toward construction of an atomic bomb.

On November 10, the UN General Assembly, referring to the IAEA report, approved a resolution harshly critical of Israel’s attack on the reactor. One hundred nine states supported the resolution; Israel and the U.S. voted against it, thirty-four states abstained and eleven were absent. In view of the balance of power prevailing in the Assembly, it was significant diplomatic success for Israel. The abstentions included almost all the states of Western Europe and several Latin-American delegations.

Nine o’clock in the morning of Sunday, November 3, 1985: The conference chamber at the Prime Minster’s office in Jerusalem. The Israeli Cabinet is convening for the final session before the impending Eleventh Knesset elections. The seat at the head of the table is occupied by the Prime Minister Menahem Begin, bespectacled and ascetic, wearing his customary business suit.

The cabinet secretary, Dan Meridom, a handsome young man of great promise, glances up impatiently as the Prime Minster’s military aide, Colonel Azriel Nevo, hastens into the conference room. “What the hell does he want? the secretary growls.

Nevo, his goatee carefully trimmed, approaches Begin. “The Commander in Chief is on the line, “he flusters. It’s urgent, he says.”

Begin rises and strides to the neighbouring room, where he picks up the phone. On the other end, the familiar voice of Major General Moshe Levy is edgy in spite of an evident effort to conceal his nervousness. “Prime Minister,” he mutters, “we have a problem. An unidentified Boeing 727 is approaching Tel Aviv from the sea. We have sent up interceptors who have signalled the pilot to follow them, but he isn’t responding. I request permission to shoot him down. We can’t afford any risks.”

Begin hesitates, recalling the tragic results of the 1972 downing of a Libyan airliner in Sinai. “Is there no other option?” he demands.

Abruptly, the receiver in the Prime Minister’s hand falls silent. The call has been cut off. “Hello! Begin calls. “Moshe!” But there is no reply. “Strange”, Begin mumbles. He feels a sudden stab of anxiety. Turning to Nevo, who is standing beside him, he snaps, “Get him on another line!” In the meantime, he returns to the conference room to apologise to the ministers.

High over Tel Aviv, two F-15 pilots make strenuous efforts to convince the captain of the Boeing to follow them without further delay. There is no response from the airliner. Transmitting on the international frequency, lead pilot Major Yakov Tzur spells out a final warning:

At that precise moment, a large dark object suddenly tumbles from the belly of the Boeing. “It’s a bomb!” cries Tzur, simultaneously blazing away with his canon. His shooting is accurate: the airliner bursts into flames. The air-to-air missile dispatched by Tzur’s partner has been fired needlessly.

9.02 A.M. The whole of Tel Aviv is illuminated by a blinding flash of lightning brighter than a thousand suns. In the Kirya governmental complex, the industrial quarter and the area bordered by Dizengoff Street to the west, Yigal Alon Street to the east, Jabotinsky Street to the north and La Guardia Street to the south, seventy thousand persons die within one millionth of a second. Along with the buildings, cars and threes about them, they dissolve into gaseous mass whose initial temperature soars to several hundred thousand degrees Centigrade.

9.45 A.M. The conference room. All present stare, pale and speechless, at the radio. A few minutes earlier, Iraqi President Saddam Hussain let it be known that he is about to make a declaration of world-shattering significance. The announcement will be broadcast in Arabic initially, and then in English and Hebrew translation.

The radio, tuned to Baghdad, emits cheerful military marches. Suddenly the music fades and the announcer’s voice proclaims: “The declaration of the President of the Republic of Iraq, Field Marshal Saddam Hussain.”

Since most of the ministers do not understand Arabic, the Prime Minister resolves not to wait for the Iraqi radio to offer its translation. A seat is placed at the table for a senior official of Iraqi origin, who translates the statement as it comes over the airwaves.

“My hundred twenty million Arab brethren! In the whole of Arab history, this is the greatest day since the battle of Karnei Hittin eight hundred years ago, when Saladin defeated the Crusader invaders and drove them out of Palestine. Today, Iraq has devastated Tel Aviv - the bastion of the Zionist canker which has lodged for a century within the Arab nation, devouring it from within. Tel Aviv has been wiped off the face of the earth.

Over the past four years, working in utmost secrecy, we have developed atomic weapons which our foes did not believe us capable of acquiring. Aided by France and Italy, our Tammuz-17 reactor has enabled us to build up an arsenal of nuclear arms, adequate for the utter destruction of Israel - and that is what we shall achieve, if necessary.

We demand of Israel a declaration, given freely and voluntarily, that she has now ceased to exist as a Zionist entity. An Arab committee over which I shall preside will pronounce upon the fate of the Jewish inhabitants of the former state of Israel. If the Jews reject our terms, we shall annihilate them, leaving no surviving remnant. This is a sacred cause, in pursuit of which we are prepared for any sacrifice. The law of Mohammed is the sword.”

Begin’s voice is soft, but there is something in his tone which makes his listeners’ blood run cold.

“Gentlemen, we have much to do today, and we will disperse shortly. Saddam Hussain will pay, of that there can be no doubt. But first there is something I must say.

I take upon myself full responsibility for this new Holocaust which has overtaken our people forty years after the Nazi massacres in Europe. I am to blame! Five years ago, we possessed the military means to destroy the Iraqi nuclear reactor before it ever went into operation. Several of you who served under me at that time will recall the prolonged deliberations my Cabinet held to that end. You will remember our doubts and hesitations. Ultimately, out of concern for the diplomatic repercussions, I bowed to the views of the experts and ministers, and we decided against bombing the reactor. But I blame no one! The responsibility rests upon me. I am guilty. Regrettably, I do not see how any mortal being ever can discharge such a staggering culpability.”

The Prime Minister terminates his statement and gazes around the table surveying the faces of his colleagues. Then he bursts into heartrenderering sobs.

That is the scenario which might have been. But the train of events unfolded differently. More than four years earlier, during the afternoon hours of June 7, 1981, Israeli Air Force planes bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor, reducing it to rubble and bringing Baghdad’s nuclear program to a resounding halt. That bombing raid, and the long months of debate and soul-searching that preceded it, constitute the subject of this book.

I heard David Kay last night on Joe Scarborough's show and he left me with the impression that Blix had his own agenda and it did not match ours.

In fact, Kay's comments about Blix gave me the creeps! Now I read this!

Thanks for posting!

Inspector Blix: A Dangerous Sort of Swede (WSJ article by Per Ahlmark).
As a side-note, Per Ahlmark himself is perhaps not dangerous to the world, but dangerous to Sweden.

// Freeper@Sweden

Bump for later

Saddam (second from left) and Chirac (right)
tour French nuclear reactor prior to
the construction of Osirak.

4 posted on 03/07/2003 2:17:32 PM PST by gridlock (This tag-line is printed with soy-based electrons on 100% post-consumer ether.)

Thanks for your comment. I like your pun, but I think it is worse than that - it is not ignorance.

Hans Blix considers himself a good man, better than most, and therefore he thinks he has the right to lie or obfuscate to avoid what he sees as the ultimate evil: war! That he may be wrong, and that leaving Saddam Hussein in place with his WMD would cause much, much more harm in the long run (or not so long run) does not enter his mind. (...and that is stupidity coupled with hubris.)

The news in The Times about the Iraqi drone that Blix hid in his report is typical of his MO.

(Of course there is a certain amount of self-interest as well... )

ScaniaBoy

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