Posted on 03/05/2003 3:22:33 PM PST by knighthawk
Ever since our independence, the general view in Ottawa has been that we do not need a foreign policy for dealing with the United States. The core belief in official circles has always been that we should deal with disputes with the United States on an ad hoc basis, each issue being addressed on its own.
In Pierre Trudeau's time, a massive review of foreign policy, remarkably, did not address Canada's relationship with the United States. A few years later, his government proclaimed the Third Option -- an ill-fated attempt to diversify our trade relations with other countries so as to reduce our U.S. dependency. The Third Option was not a policy for dealing with the United States, but for not dealing with it.
In the decades following the Second World War, there were few significant trade issues between us. An ambassador to Washington at the time, Arnold Heeney wrote that he had no economic disputes to deal with. The U.S. Division in External Affairs consisted of two people.
Several factors made the ad hoc management of disputes. a workable approach. During most of the Cold War, the United States would not let economic differences with its allies interfere with its geopolitical goals. The Imperial Presidency exercised great authority, while Congress was more disciplined than in post-Watergate-Vietnam years.
But as the U.S. economy suffered in the 1980s and confidence declined -- remember Japan as Number One? -- protectionism and trade actions against Canada exploded and virtually everything that came out of the ground fell under attack, even as our dependency on the U.S. market grew.
We began to ask ourselves how could Canada more effectively protect our interests? In different decades, sporadic attempts were made to set up some binational procedures to address disputes; joint cabinet committees, consultative mechanisms on energy, trucking, communications, the occasional arbitration, quarterly foreign ministers meetings, annual summits. Except for the International Joint Commission on boundary waters, few had traction.
In the grand scheme of things, the world's largest bilateral economic relationship was managed without the assistance of binational institutions and procedures.
Following the Free Trade Agreement of 1989, trade between us doubled and there has been much resort to the innovative binational panels established to address countervail and dumping actions. Nevertheless, the number and seriousness of trade disputes has remained high, the method of settling them relatively primitive and the cost to the relationship substantial. (Softwood lumber is the largest bilateral trade dispute in history.)
Were there other strategies to combat the rising protectionist forces in Congress, such as linkage? Canadian diplomats have long taken the position that, each conflict being difficult enough to resolve, connecting one to another would only complicate the negotiation. Another restraining factor has been the belief that the bigger power could easily out-link the smaller. When Congress showed a disposition to link (in the border broadcasting dispute), it was much to our disadvantage.
Some Canadians now urge we link forest products and energy exports -- a dangerous game. Canada has vigorously pursued U.S. energy markets for generations because they create wealth for Canadians. We could end up with two damaged sectors of our economy, not one. "Never play leapfrog with a unicorn," was the advice the head of the A.F.L. C.I.O. gave me when Canada contemplated retaliation over shingles and shakes.
But as protectionist forces in Congress made resort to diplomatic channels increasingly effective in combating trade harassment, Ottawa did break new ground. It decided to engage in direct lobbying of key players in Congress and resort to public diplomacy and public relations to reinforce our diplomatic efforts.
When I took up my assignment in Washington, it was still the general rule that Congress was off limits for Embassy officers. By the time I left, lobbying had gone from forbidden territory to a central focus of our activity. "Part pundit, part lobbyist, part saloon keeper," is how I described myself.
Now the business community and media are crying out for more public relations and lobbying. Big money is being spent. This is a welcome shift of attitude. No more boy scout.
But there is reason to be skeptical about how successful such efforts can be. Canadians have no domestic (i.e. ethnic) lobby in the United States. Americans of Canadian origin do not vote with any Canadian agenda in mind, and Canada does not contribute campaign funds. The best we can do is align ourselves with U.S. domestic interests favouring policies similar to our own. "Make it an American debate," I used to urge in Washington.
Moreover, it is difficult to play effectively in domestic political games. One can make a noise, but noise is not synonymous with results. There is often resentment of foreign lobbying. Direct involvement in the U.S. political process can backfire, (as I learned in advocating acid rain controls). It is defeatist to believe that this is the best way to protect our interests in the United States.
There are still other reasons why ad hoc diplomacy is likely to yield barren results, even when backed by lobbying and big money advocacy. On the Hill, the more narrow the interest the more deadly. A powerful Senator can be beholden to a small special interest. A single legislator can block a proposal favoured by a foreign power, even when supported by the administration. Hence a Washington truism (to which I lay claim): In the U.S. political process a foreign power is just another special interest and not a very special one at that.
So the most basic question of Canadian foreign policy remains: What can Canada do to better protect its interests in the United States?
If we fail to find an answer, the consequences for Canada could be higher than ever before. For a country generating some 40% of its annual income from exports to a single political destination, much of it requiring just-in-time delivery, and with millions of annual trans-border crossings, the disruptions that would follow new terrorist strikes could be intolerable.
For any initiative to succeed, it must meet a number of conditions. It must be bold, it must come from Canada and be espoused at the highest level. It must be comprehensive so as to allow trade-offs and broad constituencies to come into play. It must address the U.S. agenda as well as ours. Incrementalism won't work.
The Canadian political agenda is economic security; for Americans it is homeland security. Therein lies the potential elements of a grand negotiation.
The aim of Canada should be the creation of a North American community of law. It would substitute the rule of law for political discretion, arbitrary and discriminatory action. This may be the only way to establish restraints on unpredictable legislative behaviour which governments are often not in a position to resist. This is particularly true in the United States given the primacy of congressional powers over trade and immigration.
The North American community of law should be uniquely designed to meet the North American context, but it should borrow heavily from the Europeans. Their success in achieving a single economic space is one of the great accomplishments of our era and has great relevance for Canada.
We should establish 1) a common set of binding rules guaranteeing the free movement of people, goods, services and investment within the space; 2) a common security perimeter with common security rules for entering the space; 3) a common external tariff for goods entering the space; 4) common standards in drugs, nutrition and the like, or reciprocal recognition of standards, so as to avoid regulatory harassment; 5) abolition of anti-dumping, constitutional and all trade remedy laws against each other and substitution by competition and anti-trust law (a failed Canadian objective in the Free Trade negotiation); 6) closer collaboration in the defence of North America.
The establishment of a Canada- U.S. common security fence would require cohesion in all areas related to enforcement and intelligence, but it would not limit the sovereign right to determine the basic rules of immigration, e.g. how many people would be admitted annually to each country, where they come from, who belongs to the family class, what are the necessary qualifications of independents, the size of each class and so on. As for refugees, each country now accepts the same international definitions and obligations.
Crucial to the concept of a community of laws is that it be an open community, open to other states that want to become part of the common space and are willing to accept its laws. Mexico is an obvious example.
There seems to be no compelling reason to believe that establishing a community of laws in North America would require common political bodies. Although the Europeans have created such institutions, it has always been the objective of the European movement to create a political union. In North America, some joint institutions might help the smooth functioning of the common space, such as in anti-trust and competition, or updating common laws of the community for ratification. But there should be no requirement for any political super-architecture.
Would the U.S. be interested in negotiating a community of laws with Canada? In the area of national defence, national security, energy security and the movement of people, there are great American interests at stake. They stand at the summit of the concerns of the American people. At this historic conjuncture, Canada has the leverage to shape our destiny in a manner that may enhance our prosperity and security without significant loss of sovereignty. We should play our cards now, while we still have them.
Allan Gotlieb was Canada's ambassador to the United States from 1981 to 1989.; This column is based on a contribution to Canada Among Nations, to be published by Carleton University.
But thanks for asking.
As long as Canadians think that their security concerns are separate from ours vis-a-vis terrorism, there are going to be real problems between Canada and the United States.
BWAHAHAHAHAHA!!!
SHUT THE F**K UP
Why? Going south the stop is at US immigration, not Canadian.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.