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Comparison-Iraq Inspections & Treaty Versailles 1919 by former Deputy UNSCOM Dir Charles Duelfer
The World on PRI ^ | 2-17-03 | Lisa Mullens

Posted on 02/18/2003 2:27 PM PST by Kay Soze

Welcome to PRI's The World: your daily international news magazine.

Question: Ray Paulie was curios about something- “How the weapons inspections carried out by the UN and Iraq compare to the inspections carried out in Germany by France under the Peace Treaty of Versailles of 1919?” Comparison of Current Iraq Inspections and the Peace Treaty of Versailles 1919 by UNSCOM former Deputy Director Charles Duelfer

Mullens: “French and other international inspectors did try to disarm Germany after the Treaty Of Versailles.”

”Who in the World turns to Charles Duelfer for a comparison with Iraq. For seven years Mr. Duelfer was deputy chairman for UNSCOM that’s the UN commission that inspected Iraq in the 90’s.”

“He said the inspectors in Germany after WW1 ran into the same problems UNSCOM did after the Gulf War.”

Duelfer: “While the Germans gave up certain things they also tended to hide certain things for example; they had a large number of forces which they were supposed to demobilize. Well at the same time they were demobilizing army units the inspectors found that mysteriously there were a very large number of police units being created. In the area of weapons production is the famous Krup arms firm building things and moving them to civilian sectors so that the production capacities were hidden.”

“All the same techniques were applied and same problems ensued.”

Mullens: “And so what was the immediate parallel there, I mean why can we see Iraq and Germany just post WW1 as being kind of two of a kind. What was happening with in the country at the time?”

Duelfer:“Well it was a defeated Nation and what was being asked by the country was to give up something which it considered vital to its national security.”

Mullins: “And you’re saying that’s the case in both cases.”

Duelfer: “I think that true with respect to Germany I mean they the German nation was only recently kind of solidified and a lot of the unity depended upon the Reichstag or the army and what the international community was demanding was that they give up that unifying element. Same thing like wise is taking place with Iraq. Where I think we under estimated the just how important weapons of mass destruction were to the regime in Baghdad.”

Mullins: “So the weapons of mass destruction because they define Saddam Hussein at least in his eyes then the inspections are pretty much doomed to fail- would you say?”

Duelfer: “I think there doomed yes because the international community has asked Iraq and in the case in 1918 Germany to give up something which is existential from their calculation and yet there is no existential threat or reward to cause that to happen. Germany was not occupied after the first WW similarly Iraq was not occupied.”

“I think one of the lessons Saddam learned early on in 1991 when they very seriously blocked inspectors, was that the council was not going do anything which would threaten the existence of his regime.”

Mullins: “OK Lets go back to Germany just post WW1. I mean obviously you could consider it a failure but the inspectors did manage to reduce the size of the German army and they did force Germany to destroy some stock piles of weapons at least while the inspectors were there, I mean they seem to be able to neutralize the German threat.”

Duelfer: “That’s true, the problem is in both of these cases is benefit of the inspectors sustainable?

Mullins: “Well is not a short term gain worth something?

Duelfer: “It is, certainly Iraq now has fewer weapons than it would’ve had UNSCOM not done its work. But the question is; Is it sustainable?

“Even now when Iraq is being much more cooperative than they have been in the past there doing so because there is a huge array of forces around them at great expense. And I dare say that’s not going to be sustainable over the long haul.”

Mullins: “Let me bring in South Africa here I mean Colin Powell the secretary of state has cited it as something of a blueprint for how inspections could work and just for some background here South Africa had begun a nuclear weapons program sometime in the 1970’s because it wanted to deter its neighboring states who were against the apartheid system at the time.
Then it was around 1993 that South Africa’s president said basically we have dismantled pls inspectors come and see for your self.

Duelfer: “I think its an interesting example but it not very close to the circumstances in Iraq. South Africa was acting in their own interests when it decided to disarm we’re talking about coercive disarmament with respect to Iraq. They clearly don’t believe getting rid of these weapons is in their interests.”

Mullins: “So if South Africa wanted to be welcomed into the international Community is there any kind of possible parallel that could be offered to Iraq I mean isn’t that even conceivable?”

Duelfer: “Well there is if you begin to think about Saddam and his top leaders leaving , I mean if Saddam and his top two or three dozen people left I think the UN could do a tremendous job of assuring the region and the world that the programs were gone and that would be the first step towards addressing the issue more strongly with Iran and some of the neighboring states which are thought to have weapons programs like this.”

Mullins: “Given the fact that inspections have been around for so long why do you think there haven’t been better lessons learned, I mean with the exception of places like South Africa?

Duelfer: “Well there haven’t been that many inspection systems which are based on non cooperative arrangements. Most of the inspections which you see are pursuant to some sort of arms control agreement and this is steadfastly not arms control its coercive disarmament and those are two very separate circumstances.”
”That is why the analogy with the Versailles Treaty number one is very interesting because it is a case like the one we face with Iraq. But the inspections and verification systems that you’re familiar with from the nuclear talks the SALT and the START arrangements and the things in Europe those are based on two parties or more acting in what they believe to be their mutual self interests. And that a different case than what we face in Iraq.”

Mullins: “The work that we are talking about as inspectors is work that you took part in yourself, that you managed for a considerable amount of time as the deputy chairman of UNSCOM. Do you feel it was a waste of time or something just short of that?”

Duelfer: “No it was not a waste of time at all. We did a lot of very good work but the question was, you know what were the objectives of our manager we worked for the security council which is a group of fifteen nations and its a bit like having a Cybil for your boss. “In other words somebody with multiple personalities and each of those members of the Security Council I think had really other objectives and agendas which they were pursuing.

”Some people were interested in containment some people were interested in other aspects of their relationships with Iraq we did a lot but ultimately we could not cause a nation state with all the massive resources that it had to fully cooperate and fully comply.”

Mullins:“Charles Duelfer Thank you.”
”Charles Duelfer was Deputy Director of UNSCOM from 1993 to March of 2000. He is now with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.”