Posted on 01/03/2003 7:59:47 PM PST by RCW2001
A documnentary was aired here in Alberta...and Canada wide on CBC.
Members of PPCLI present at Tarnak were interviewed.
Film stock of Tarnak was shown...the incident was re-created as per time roll.
The PPCLI were not in one spot..but spread out over a distance of 50 yards seperation if not more...where teams fired different weapons.
They fired in intervals....alligned to agreed upon time values.
One position was near a ditch..others were near mud walls.
also...the PPCLI wear reflectors on their helmets and backs..allong with strobes.
With the varying levels of darkness at differing levels as per the pilots perspective...they would see light enhanced by the values of darkness and refraction.
the muzzle fire of an M-16 or equivilent could be magnified when light values reached angular walls..creating a glowing dome effect...walls also block light depending on what angle you are adjacent to them.
I viewed the recreated footage..the PPCLI were firing prone..beside walls..over walls..over hills..from ditches.
as the F-16's approached they may have seen light flashing and building..then subsiding..with tracers and bursts happening on a wide field of vision.
as they approached..they may witnessed a pause in fire..to them it would appear the enemy was waiting to get allignment on them..as they drew closer..more light began to flash in multiple locals within their field of view..it may have appeared to the pilots that they were being re-engaged again.
The reflective light of the PPCLI soldiers helmets and their strobes would add to the spectacle.
On yesterdays news it was revealed that there had been incidents in that sector..the measure not revealed to the public..but a value of +10 whatever was said to have occured recently.
The Pilots were not briefed during step or chop of Tarnaks live fire training....they approached and saw lights..they believed themselves to be engaged...their protocals actually enable them to comit to targeting an agressor on the ground..its their choice as the event unfolds.
Knowing ahead of time there was a possiblity of contact in that sector..the volume of perceived threatcould have weighed heavily on the one pilots mind to engage.
In the end..one could say.."You had to have been there" to know.
I have not read any reports as per their experience in similar scenarios...it could be that the volume of light and its movement prompted the one pilot to engage.
From what I saw during the Canadian documentary..when PPCLI were firing..they were emptying the box for sure.
To detail in a pre-flight briefing every possible allied activity and location around Kandahar would have taken quite a bit of time and muddled the situation and, in the case of an unexpected firefight on the ground between our Army forces and enemy forces, would have been impossible.
It sufficed to say in the pre-flight briefing that friendlies were so numerous in the area that the ROE specified "No fratricide.....100% release clearance". It's the Keep It Simple principle.
Pasted below is what the DoD Investigative Report said about the self defense call:
It is seen that COFFEE Flight:
1. Was in no danger as they reported they were above what they perceived was burn out altitude of the fire allegedly directed at them.
2. Took no evasive action.
3. Circled the area slowly above what they percieved was the burn out altitude of the fire allegedly directed at them.
4. Put themselves in greater risk by descending to an altitude that would have put them in danger of AAA in violation of Air Force instructions.
5. Took no measures to ensure that they were not about to commit fratricide.
6.Disboeyed the "100% release clearance" rules of engaement.
7. Disobeyed direct orders from the control tower to “Stand by” and subsequently, “Hold fire.”
In short, they behaved in a manner that indicated that their main concern was not "self defense" but "getting a kill".
Here is what the DoD Investigative Report had to say about their self defense call:
******************************
Analysis of COFFEE Flight's Self-Defense Call
The issue of COFFEE flight's compliance or noncompliance with the Standing and OEF ROE is of great significance to this investigation. Whether or not the actions of COFFEE 51 flight constituted a proper exercise of their right to self-defense is of substantial importance in determining the cause or causes of this incident. Therefore, a careful analysis of facts and circumstances leading to COFFEE flight's use of force follows.
i. Necessity. Numerous F-16 pilots interviewed by the Board stated that if they had found themselves in similar circumstances to those confronted by COFFEE flight on the evening of 17 April 2002, their immediate course of action would have been to accelerate to greater airspeed, climb in altitude, and leave the immediate area to evade and avoid the threat. COFFEE flight took none of these actions. Neither COFFEE 51 nor COFFEE 52, both of whom stated they believed they were being targeted at some point by the ground fire, aggressively maneuvered their aircraft in the face of what they presumably believed was a surface-to-air threat. Throughout the entire engagement, COFFEE 51 maintained a slow rate, level right-hand turn approximately five miles from the source of the ground fire, almost completely circling the Tarnak Farms range. COFFEE 52 turned back toward the SAFIRE and descended below recommended altitude to take a mark. Later, he turned back toward the SAFIRE again and slowed to well below tactical airspeed. He never appeared to maneuver defensively. Finally, both COFFEE 51 and 52 stated they believed the ground fire was burning out around 10,000 feet AGL, well below their initial transit altitude, they later stated their belief that projectiles continued to climb after burn out. COFFEE 52 descended close to what he perceived to be the burn-out altitude and remained there during the entire sequence.
ii. Proportionality. Although COFFEE 52 ultimately released a 500 lb. bomb, he had requested use of a lesser amount of force when he requested clearance to use his 20mm cannon prior to declaring self-defense. However, COFFEE 52 did not engage in any non-lethal means of self-defense (i.e., maneuvering away from the threat) before making the decision to use lethal force.
iii. Reasonably available information. There are several examples of reasonably available information apparently not considered or actively pursued by COFFEE flight in making their decision to employ weapons against what they perceived to be a AAA site. For example, COFFEE 51 stated to COFFEE 52 early in the sequence of events that they should be sure there were no friendly forces in the area, but neither COFFEE 51 nor 52 actively queried their controlling AWACS, for information on possible locations of friendly forces in the vicinity of Kandahar. COFFEE 51 and COFFEE 52 had dissimilar and incomplete special use airspace, notably AOs, on their maps and charts. The 170 EFS did not maintain a master map depicting the ACO.
iv. Imminent. Objective reasons for COFFEE flight to believe they were in imminent danger must be assessed from all information reasonably available to them at the time. Some guidance is available to aid in making this determination. The OEF SPINS state, "[A]ircraft should not deliberately descend into the effective range of AAA to engage and destroy AAA units which fire well below their altitude." AFTTP 3-1.5, Tactical Employment F-16 C/D states,
The pilot always retains the right of self-defense and the defense of other friendly assets unable to protect themselves. This right, however, should not be used as a planned work-around for solving poor tactics and decision trees. The F-16 pilot must make a conscious decision that the immediate threat outweighs the risk of fratricide. In situations where there is not an immediate threat, i.e., outside of abort range or nobody is spiked, or when SA on friendly positions is unknown, maintain a conservative, defensive approach to the situation until certain of compliance with the ROE.
v. Retaliation/lawful purpose. There was no evidence that weapons employment was motivated by retaliation or any other purpose prohibited by the laws of war.
vi. ROE restrictions. COFFEE 52 descended and slowed his aircraft in the vicinity of the SAFIRE site and requested permission to fire on the site with his 20mm cannon, a request denied by AWACS in the form of a reply, “Stand by” and subsequently, “Hold fire.” The employment of the 20mm cannon would have placed COFFEE 52 in greater jeopardy due to the descent to lower altitude and closer approach to the suspected SAFIRE site this move would require. In addition, this action would have required COFFEE 52 to descend well below the altitude floor imposed by the ROE. In addition, OEF SPINS directed that aircraft should not descend into the lethal range
Its gotta be a scary reality having so much protocal to consider..then the insertion of ones mental assay in the moment of such said dramatics.
I do not envy any pilot who has to fly with so many variables...then to have your carreer and life ruined..because you made a mistake under the weight of so many things.
AirCommand needs to get their Shit together..this is way too much for an individual to process.
The system failed over Tarnak..it failed and they desire to fry the pilots for its failure.
If they intend to keep this command flow ..they should go robotic..take humans out of the loop.
Humans make mistakes everyday..and repeatedly..
Air command seems to be thinking Binary too much.
Have you seen the Sleepless?
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