DielectroKinetic Laboratories (DKL) brought out its LifeGuard, with models ranging from $6,000 to $14,000.
DKL claimed its device could identify a human heartbeat 500 yards away, through concrete, earth, or water. The DKL LifeGuard was tested by Sandia Labs in April, 1998. The device failed to perform any better than expected by chance. In October 1998 Sandia took a DKL LifeGuard apart and found that the electronic components could not possibly function as advertised.
It's a con.
http://skepdic.com/refuge/graphics/model3.gif
From the Sandia NL site
Murray says the DOE request was related to his responsibilities as project leader for Sandia's and DOE's entry-control project. "We work in the area of access control, and other departments in our center deal with intrusion-detection sensors," he said.
The device tested consists essentially of a black rectangular box about 3 inches tall, 1 inch thick, and 8 inches long. When a handle that comes out the box is used, the box swings freely. There's also an antenna, a small laser similar to those in lecture pointers, and a red LED light. There are some electronics inside.
The Sandians first established a formal test protocol, then conducted the test March 20 in a remote Sandia area on Kirtland Air Force Base. Five large plastic packing crates were set up in a line at 30-ft. intervals. The goal was to see if a test operator, using the instrument, could detect someone concealed inside only one of the five crates. The operator was provided by the DielectroKinetic Laboratories and was a high-ranking member of its management.
The test was double-blind and random. Neither the instrument operator nor the three Sandia investigators knew which crate contained the human test subject until after the test results were tabulated.
The test set-up manager used a sealed, randomly generated test schedule to direct the test target (the human) into one of the five containers. Using the device, the test operator then attempted to determine which container the human was in. The DKL operator "scanned" the crates from a distance of 50 feet, well within its stated capabilities.
First, a baseline evaluation was done to see if the instrument appeared to be "operating correctly." The operator and the investigators were all allowed to see which container the human test subject entered.
Under this noncontrolled condition -- when the instrument operator already knew which crate contained the human -- he was quickly successful 10 times in 10 trials. The same was true, of course, for everyone else present.
All subsequent tests were controlled. The test operator did not see which crate the test subject entered. Nor did the Sandia investigators. No one learned the full results until the entire set of tests was completed.
A one-in-five probability of success
For each trial, one human test target was inside one of the five crates. The operator had a one-in-five probability of success by chance alone. Under these conditions, say the Sandians, the test operator began taking a much longer time to "scan" the crates.
The tests were spread over about four-and-one-half hours of set-up and test time. The DKL operator had just six successes in 25 trials.
A third test series was similar but a little more complicated. Multiple human targets could be randomly hidden in crates. But, again, the results were consistent with random chance.
The Sandians say the test operator offered several rationalizations for the difficulty of detecting the test subject and for the chance test results under controlled conditions. He said, for example, that the "sharp edges" of the crate were distorting the field and were interfering with the detection. However, the Sandia investigators point out that the manufacturer's published capabilities for the device include statements such as "penetrates all forms of camouflaging" and "no known countermeasures."
Although the empirical test was the core of the analysis, the Sandia team also briefly examined DKL product literature about the advertised physics behind its operation. The product literature says the instrument antenna detects the electrical field generated by the beating human heart, but the Sandian team found the idea put forth for that process "clearly wrong."
The Sandians point out that the heart beats at a rate of 1.2 to 2.0 hertz and the wavelength of two hertz is 93,150 miles. "The 15-inch antenna on the LifeGuard is entirely inadequate for receiving signals of that wavelength," they report.
Thanks for the update. It sounded as though it would be too good to be true.
Thanks for the update. When I read: The LifeGuard device detects the electrical impulses emitted by the human heart. I began to smell a rat. And ever were it so, one would think a Faraday cage would be an effective countermeasure.
