Posted on 12/30/2001 7:00:19 AM PST by Pharmboy
December 30, 2001
Missed Signals
This is the last of three articles. The first report examined Saudi Arabia's policies toward militants who left home to wage holy war. The second looked at how Muslim militancy took root in Europe and how European governments failed to understand its danger and depth.
Inside the White House situation room on the morning terrorism transformed America, Franklin C. Miller, the director for defense policy, was suddenly gripped by a staggering fear: "The White House could be hit. We could be going down."
The reports and rumors came in a torrent: A car bomb had exploded at the State Department. The Mall was in flames. The Pentagon had been destroyed. Planes were bearing down on the capital.
The White House was evacuated, leaving the national security team alone, trying to control a nation suddenly under siege and wondering if they were next. Mr. Miller had an aide send out the names of those present by e-mail "so that when and if we died, someone would know who was in there."
Somewhere in the havoc of the moment, Richard A. Clarke, then the White House counterterrorism chief, recalled the long drumbeat of warnings about terrorists striking on American soil, many of them delivered and debated in that very room. After a third hijacked jet had sliced into the Pentagon, others heard Mr. Clarke say it first: "This is Al Qaeda."
An extensive review of the nation's antiterrorism efforts shows that for years before Sept. 11, terror experts throughout the government understood the apocalyptic designs of Osama bin Laden. But the top leaders never reacted as if they believed the country was as vulnerable as it proved to be that morning.
Dozens of interviews with current and former officials demonstrate that even as the threat of terrorism mounted through eight years of the Clinton administration and eight months of President Bush, the government did not marshal its full forces against it.
The defensive work of tightening the borders and airport security was studied but never quite completed. And though the White House undertook a covert campaign to kill Mr. bin Laden, the government never mustered the critical mass of political will and on-the-ground intelligence for the kind of offensive against Al Qaeda it unleashed this fall.
The rising threat of the Islamic jihad movement was first detected by United States investigators after the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. The inquiry into that attack revealed a weakness in the immigration system used by one of the terrorists, but that hole was never plugged, and it was exploited by one of the Sept. 11 hijackers.
In 1996, a State Department dossier spelled out Mr. bin Laden's operation and his anti-American intentions. And President Bill Clinton's own pollster told him the public would rally behind a war on terrorism. But none was declared.
By 1997, the threat of an Islamic attack on America was so well recognized that an F.B.I. agent warned of it in a public speech. But that same year, a strategy for tightening airline security, proposed by a vice- presidential panel, was largely ignored.
In 2000, after an Algerian was caught coming into the country with explosives, a secret White House review recommended a crackdown on "potential sleeper cells in the United States." That review warned that "the threat of attack remains high" and laid out a plan for fighting terrorism. But most of that plan remained undone.
Last spring, when new threats surfaced, the Bush administration devised a new strategy, which officials said included a striking departure from previous policy an extensive C.I.A. program to arm the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan. That new proposal had wound its way to the desk of the national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, and was ready to be delivered to the president for final approval on Monday, Sept. 10.
The government's fight against terrorism always seemed to fall short.
The Sept. 11 attack "was a systematic failure of the way this country protects itself," said James Woolsey, a former director of central intelligence. "It's aviation security delegated to the airlines, who did a lousy job. It's a fighter aircraft deployment failure. It's a foreign intelligence collection failure. It's a domestic detection failure. It's a visa and immigration policy failure."
The Clinton administration intensified efforts against Al Qaeda after two United States Embassies in Africa were bombed in 1998. But by then, the terror network had gone global "Al Qaeda became Starbucks," said Charles Duelfer, a former State Department official with cells across Europe, Africa and beyond.
Even so, according to the interviews and documents, the government response to terrorism remained measured, even halting, reflecting the competing interests and judgments involved in fighting an ill-defined foe.
The main weapon in President Clinton's campaign to kill Mr. bin Laden and his lieutenants was cruise missiles, which are fired from thousands of miles away. While that made it difficult to hit Mr. bin Laden as he moved around Afghanistan, the president was reluctant to put American lives at risk.
But a basic problem throughout the fight against terrorism has been the lack of inside information. The C.I.A. was surprised repeatedly by Mr. bin Laden, not so much because it failed to pay attention, but because it lacked sources inside Al Qaeda. There were no precise warnings of impending attacks, and the C.I.A. could not provide an exact location for Mr. bin Laden, which was essential to the objective of killing him.
At the F.B.I., it was not until last year that all field offices were ordered to get engaged in the war on terrorism and develop sources. Inside the bureau, the seminars and other activities that accompanied these orders were nicknamed "Terrorism for Dummies," a stark acknowledgment of how far the agency had not come in the seven years since the first trade center attack.
"I get upset when I hear complaints from Congress that the F.B.I. is not sharing its intelligence," said a former senior law enforcement official in the Clinton and Bush administrations. "The problem is that there isn't any to share. There is very little. And the stuff we can share is not worth sharing."
Officials at the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency said that they had some success in foiling Al Qaeda plots, but that the structure of the group made it difficult to penetrate. "It is understandable, but unrealistic, especially given our authorities and resources, to expect us to be perfect," said Bill Harlow, a C.I.A. spokesman.
Maybe; I just thought he was too consumed with this-wordly pleasures in addition being chicken.
Don't you think he would have revelled in his "chance for greatness?" This would have been a narcissistic apotheosis for him. But I think he knew he simply could not muster the kind of trust that is essential to having the moral authority to put men in harm's way. We are learning the terrible danger of putting a frivolous, feckless man of no character in office. I think once the cold war was over and the gulf war was easily one, people came to regard the presidency and presidential campaigns as a form of popular entertainment. Clinton was more like the late night hosts than was Bush Sr. or Dole, so they voted for him. It never occurred to them that a president can be called on at any time to deal with serious matters, and that all our lives are literally in his hands.
We have a mild disagreement on a technicality:
I sincerely believe that x42 felt so self-confident in controlling the ultimate spin that he did NOT have to risk his life to appear as a winner against terrorism. His behavior fit well into his worldview. He was (is) narcissistic to the Nth degree. This man would be the absolute LAST one to hold that character was important to the presidency. General Washington would be the first.
Dick Morris said he will break a series of exclusives (about Clinton being AWOL in the terror war) over the next 5 weeks on Hannity and Colmes
Morris says the usually communicative Clinton clammed up and was unresponsive when recommendations were made on terrorism. I think Clinton whose political instincts were always sharp, knew that he could not go down the road of fighting terror. His style of politics had badly polarized the country so that about half the population could never support him - the trust was gone. He had squandered the moral authority inherent in the office, and knew any effort to call on the people for support in a difficult course of action was unlikely to succeed.
Don't you think he would have revelled in his "chance for greatness?" This would have been a narcissistic apotheosis for him. But I think he knew he simply could not muster the kind of trust that is essential to having the moral authority to put men in harm's way. We are learning the terrible danger of putting a frivolous, feckless man of no character in office. I think once the cold war was over and the gulf war was easily one, people came to regard the presidency and presidential campaigns as a form of popular entertainment. Clinton was more like the late night hosts than was Bush Sr. or Dole, so they voted for him. It never occurred to them that a president can be called on at any time to deal with serious matters, and that all our lives are literally in his hands.
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Q ERTY6 bump! (FOR ANOTHER POST: Note The Times' attempt to draw an equivalence between Bush's first 8 months of acclimation and clinton's lack of inaction for 8 years despite numerous attacks during his tenure by bin Laden et al.) |
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See also:
11-30-01
2-27-01 Will its own vulnerability to terrorism (and worse) finally impel LA-LA LAND to reject "through the looking-glass for real" clinton ineptitude and depravity? |
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