from what I have seen they were both doing about what they should have been.
The threat of sabotage was very reasonable and there was in fact an active Japanese spy organization on the island.
Also McArthur got a bad rep in the Philippines for having his planes on the ground. He was going to great lengths to protect the planes and was expecting an attack. He had established outposts to report any Japanese planes. He was keeping as many as possible in the air.
Luck just was against them. They got a single report of Japanese planes and tried desperately to confirm it but were unable to do so. The outposts had just been formed and were giving a lot of false reports. The planes were low on fuel and they finally had to bring them down, just as the Japs attacked it turned out.
“He was going to great lengths to protect the planes”
Not so much:
“http://www.pacificwar.org.au/Philippines/Japanattacks.html";
What he was previously ordered to do was to send his B-17’s to attack Formosa.
Major General Brereton was aware of the Japanese propensity to launch surprise attacks at dawn, and he wanted to persuade MacArthur to mount a bombing attack on the Japanese airbases on Formosa. While waiting to see MacArthur on this morning, Brereton was informed by Admiral Hart that Japanese carrier aircraft had bombed the American seaplane tender William B. Preston in Davao Bay on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao. This was clearly a hostile “first overt act” by Japan of the kind referred to in General Marshall’s war warning of 27 November 1941. In response to this direct hostile act against an American warship in Philippine waters, Brereton again asked Sutherland to permit him to see MacArthur or approve bombing of the Japanese airbases on Formosa himself. Sutherland refused both requests.
Fearing that his aircraft would be caught on the ground by the Japanese and destroyed, Brereton finally ordered them aloft to circle their airfields. Shortly after 9.00 a.m., Brereton was told that Japanese aircraft had attacked southern Luzon, and he pressed Sutherland again for permission to attack the Japanese airbases on Formosa. Again Sutherland refused. It was not until 11.00 a.m. that MacArthur finally approved a bombing attack on the Japanese airbases. Brereton ordered all of his aircraft to land so that they could be refuelled and the bombers armed.
The book and movie contain dialogue about being "caught in the vacuum between a peacetime Navy and a wartime Navy. ... reacting to the Pearl Harbor disaster, and punishment is order-of-the-day", and so on. Bassett had some close familiarity with the people in this drama; his opinions and writings were very likely colored by things he heard from Halsey and other high-ranking officers.
Overall, Admiral Kimmel has not been judged that harshly by history.
The recent new book, A MATTER OF HONOR Pearl Harbor: Betrayal, Blame, and a Family's Quest For Justice by Anthony Summers & Robbyn Swan basically proves that Kimmel and Short were doing even more but couldn't overcome the the actions of bureaucratic asshats in Washington who denied them the tools they required to protect the base. Kimmel and Short were not only denied access to critical intelligence but were fed misleading information which left them totally in the dark. They were scapegoated by their immediate superiors who had undeniable proof the Japanese were planning the attack including how and when the action was to take place. Kimmel and Short had to bear the weight of guilt for the rest of their lives. The record has to be changed to reflect the truth and the guilt passed on to those ultimately responsible.
There was more than just their wrong headed deployment. Kimmel was warned two weeks before that war was imminent and was told to deploy his fleet accordingly. One can disagree with that or not. But a worse problem was that the Army general responsible for protecting the fleet when it was in Pearl Harbor and Kimmel had almost no communication.
And as for MacArthur, he was beyond incompetent. He had 8 hours warning of pearl harbor. Jap weather planes were detected over the area 12 hours before. And incredibly the Jap raid was detected 130 miles out from Clark field and they were still able to surprise them.
Even more fun, MacArthur then took his force of 120k plus and put them on the Bataan peninsula where they were pinned down by the Jap force of 75k.
Bataan was about the only place they could have been pinned down by a small force, so Doug put then there and holed up in Corregidor fortress. That might be partially explained by his air force being wiped out, but he had a hand in that anyway.
In any case, MacArthur was barely adequate and was left in the pacific under the Europe first strategy.
The real test, can anyone imagine him lasting a week in WWII Europe?