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Moreover, it is noted that the four Japanese aircraft carriers were protected by a dedicated force of two battleships, three cruisers and twelve destroyers, but such a force “certainly could not provide an effective screen for four aircraft carriers” against air and submarine attack from multiple vectors.

The only US submarine of note at the Midway battle was the Nautilus, regardless of Admiral Nagumo's fears. Plus, American torpedoes were pieces of crap the first two years of the war. They seldom hit anything, and many sub patrols came back to base having the same performance that the pre-1020 bomber/attack/torpedo planes had on Japanese ships that day, which is to say hapless, worthless, and dealing no damage whatever. American expertise in carrier battle tactics were not in the same league as the Imperial Navy's co-ordinated assaults.

Additionally, Japanese battle doctrine was weighted strongly to offense, not defense, which worked with great success pre-Coral Sea, but ultimately doomed them.

Another mistake pointed out in this piece is that the Japanese carrier strike force had two contradictory missions at Midway, both supporting the invasion of the island and also destroying the U.S. Navy forces in the area, so that at a critical juncture, the Japanese Navy was “chasing two rabbits at the same time”

They also lost a carrier at Coral Sea that should have been part of the MI attack, in addition to the carrier forces sent to attack the Aleutian Islands which was a silly game for a silly reward. These two albatrosses were foisted on Yamamoto as conditions for approving the MI attack, but he made little objection. Rather than concentrate massed forces, which Japanese military doctrine dictated, this "shotgun" approach diluted the Main Force was another massive mistake.

In the end, the conclusion is that Japan might have succeeded in bringing about a negotiated settlement with the US if only it had more cautiously sought out battles that were advantageous in time and space to the Japanese Navy.

This never would have happened. Had Midway been lost, Japan could never have invaded and occupied Hawaii. They did not have the transport ability to keep such a captured garrison supplied, especially having to bring the supplies from half a world away in a submarine infested ocean.

Additionally, the most powerful nation on the planet with unmatched productive capacity would never negotiate with a smaller country which had launched a sneak attack such as Pearl Harbor.

There is a good website called combinedfleet (iirc) that details the production of our Essex fleet carriers combined to the Japanese carrier production.

Even if we'd lost all three carriers at Midway we would have equaled the Japanese in late 43 and surpassed them in 44. This does not count the escort carriers.

And consider we began to slow carrier production in 45 as we knew we were going to win the war.

Another mistake pointed out in this piece is that the Japanese carrier strike force had two contradictory missions at Midway, both supporting the invasion of the island and also destroying the U.S. Navy forces in the area, so that at a critical juncture, the Japanese Navy was “chasing two rabbits at the same time” (同时追两只兔子).

In fairness to Japan, I don't know about that.

If you're going to take your enemy's fortified island, you're also going to have to take on his naval assets protecting said island. How else could you achieve your invasion goal? Ignore his counter-attacks sinking your transports?