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I often successfully resist, but occasionally I post this essay about the Iraq war being about possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In fact statements that WMD stockpiles and programs did not exist before resuming the war in 2003 are both wrong and irrelevant rendering this persistent allusion untrue. It is a shame such information never seemed to appear in Op-eds, or was emphasized effectively by the Bush Administration. The text is similar to the post, but I like including the links.

Concerning the presence of WMD’s, David Kay reported Hussein was developing missiles with ranges in excess of UN limitations, saying they were the center pole of the tent under which Hussein would rebuild his WMD’s as the sanction regime further deteriorated. He found Hussein retained the scientists and technology to restart production of mustard and VX gas. Hussein was also currently developing an indigenous precursor for VX and a stimulant for freeze-drying anthrax. Kay reported Hussein was rebuilding infrastructure and staff for nuclear weapons. Mahdi Obeidi maintained in the New York Times that when the world looked the other way, the knowledge of hundreds of scientists could be applied to existing designs and a centrifuge prototype to jump start the operation. Iraq already had 500 tons of yellow cake in the country under U.N. seal, which was confirmed to have no meaning after the North Korean experience. The regime just needed a latter day Albert Speer or Leslie Groves to replace Hussein Kamel.

The idea Hussein did not have stockpiles of WMD’s is not a creditable assumption. One has to believe that a fracturing, Oriental dictatorship of several competing and self-interested spheres of influence achieved an unparalleled intelligence deception. The sophisticated intelligence services of U.S.A., Britain, France, and Germany had independently determined Iraq had stockpiles of WMD’s.

These intelligence professionals apply different methods using different resources, and jealously guard their insights and prerogatives. As an example the Butler Commission still maintains Hussein’s people went to Niger to acquire yellow cake contrary to the amateurish assertion of Joe Wilson. Common sense tells you his dictatorship would never allow valuable people to leave the country just to collect a few local crafts from a country whose leading export is uranium. All four of them were not wrong. The most reasonable assumption, for which much evidence exists, is that Syria and Russia received inventories in trust for the regime.

The evidence was sufficiently creditable that not only Bush, but Congress believed the stockpiles were present. I quote, “We have known for years Saddam Hussein is seeking and developing WMD’s. Iraq’s search for WMD’s has proven impossible to deter and we should assume it continues as long as Saddam is in power. He has systematically violated, over the course of the past 11 years, every significant UN resolution that demanded he disarm and destroy chemical and biological weapons, and any nuclear capacity. The last UN weapons inspectors left Iraq October 1998. We are confident Hussein retains some stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, and that he has since embarked on a crash course to build up chemical and biological warfare capabilities. There is unmistakable evidence Hussein is working aggressively to develop nuclear weapons, and will likely have nuclear weapons within the next five years. That is why we must be prepared to use force, if necessary, to disarm Hussein and eliminate Iraq’s WMD’s once and for all.”

The above quotes compile statements respectively by Ted Kennedy, Al Gore, Henry Waxman, Robert Byrd, Jay Rockefeller, and John Edwards. These quotes were uncontested points in 2002, and formed a basis for legislation enabling Bush to follow U.N. resolutions to use military force to remove Hussein’s regime, and the threat posed by his material breach of obligations to prove abandonment of WMD’s and terrorist support.

Concerning the irrelevance of WMD’s, the ceasefire ended and war began in 1991 was resumed, because Hussein behaved in material breach of international obligations as reaffirmed in Resolution 1441. Nowhere in Congressional resolutions of 1991, 1998 and 2002, or U.N. Resolutions 678, 687 and 1441 can one see possession of stockpiles of WMD’s as a reason for confronting him with military action. Behavior in terms of threats, evasion, intimidation, and past use, not possession, was always the key. He was to unconditionally accept destruction or removal of all stocks and programs for WMD’s and for all missiles over 150-kilometre range. He was enjoined from committing, supporting or providing safe haven for international terrorism. I was continually frustrated by Bush Administration spokesmen and media advocates, who would not craft sound bites emphasizing that behavior and the resultant uncertainty was central to resuming the war.

Resolution 687 incorporated 678 and 19 previous resolutions without amendment, and offered Hussein a conditional ceasefire in 1991. Instead he ignored the responsibility to submit a comprehensive declaration of all WMD stockpiles and programs, and missiles with greater than 150 kilometre range. He thwarted the program envisioned by menacing, eluding, and deceiving inspectors. The U.N. resorted to surveillance, analysis, and investigation to destroy material and disrupt programs until Hussein expelled them in 1998. He also continued forbidden involvement in international terrorism. In response, Bush #1, U.N. and Clinton ignored their responsibilities to deal with Hussein’s ongoing material breaches.

None of these resolutions were cobbled together like a middle schooler’s term paper. Diplomats and politicians laboriously parsed each phrase for clear focus on actions instead of nouns; behaviors not stockpiles. The key words were guarantee, reaffirm, accept, submit, declare, yield, forgo, agree, inform, comply, cooperate, lie, omit, and thwart. The U.N.’s ultimatums in Resolutions 678 and 1441 authorized disarming Hussein’s regime through military operations in Iraq “to restore international peace and security in the area”, and did not instruct the coalition to merely expel Hussein from Kuwait.

U.N. precedent from the Korean War ensured the above phrase intended invasion of Iraq. The term “in the area” used phraseology, confirmed by the U.N. and Congress, authorizing military action above the 38th parallel to disarm North Korea. Everyone in the Security Council and Congress understood that a further material breach required ending the ceasefire, and resuming the war authorized by Resolution 678.

The war against Saddam Hussein was resumed because Bush #2 finally obeyed U.N. and confirming Congressional mandates. Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill envisioned re-establishment of collective security when founding the U.N. in San Francisco. Finally in 2003 the United States, heading a coalition exceeding that Churchill and Roosevelt assembled to confront Hitler’s Germany, toppled Hussein’s regime, and forced the U.N. to confront the reason for its’ existence.

Text U.N. Resolution 678
http://www.casi.org.uk/info/undocs/gopher/s90/32

Text U.N. Resolution 687
http://www.casi.org.uk/info/undocs/gopher/s91/4

Text U.N. Resolution 1441
http://www.casi.org.uk/info/undocs/scres/2002/res1441e.pdf

David Kay Interview
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?r108:S28JA4-0018:

Saddam, the Bomb and Me
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/26/opinion/26obeidi.html?pagewanted=print&position

CIA World Fact Book: Niger
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html

Ted Kennedy Sept. 27, 2002; http://kennedy.senate.gov/~kennedy/statements/02/09/2002927718.html

Al Gore Sept. 23, 2002: www.commonwealthclub.org/archive/02/02-09gore-speech.html

Henry Waxman October10, 2002; http://www.house.gov/waxman/news_files/news_statements_res_iraq_10_10_02.htm

Robert Byrd October 3, 2002; http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/archive/2002/byrd100302.htm

Jay Rockefeller October 10, 2002; http://rockefeller.senate.gov/news/2002/flrstmt0102002.html

John Edwards October 10, 2002; http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?r107:7:./temp/~r107pqkqkf:e858562:

Korean War Resolution 84 (1950) of 7 July 1950
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f1e85c.html

Butler Commission: Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction
http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Politics/documents/2004/07/14/butler.pdf