Thank you, Publius, for clarifying this. I'm grateful to you.
In recent times, the Clerk of the House and the National Archivist have been directed, by legislative resolution, to "compare notes" closely, to use a common "spreadsheet" to tally valid State Applications WRT the invocation of an Article V COS.
The probable reason for this is that the 27th Amendment passed completely under Congress' radar screen, without any notice, let alone any active help from them at all.
It's not a terrible amendment, in terms of constraining congressional power. It only says that Congress cannot vote itself a pay raise effective during the term of its sitting. Though members of the next Congress would be eligible for such a pay raise.
But what the 27th Amendment does is to nip around the borders of Congressional privilege and power, to place a limit on it, in even such a really inconsequential way. Congress is jealous of its institutional powers, and will defend them down to the nonce.
If Congress was surprised by the ratification of the 27th, we just have to chalk it up to congressional sloth: They should have known this was brewing.
Which is why, in a darker mood, I wonder whether Congress' sudden interest in the current tally of State COS Applications is because of their fear of a Balanced Budget Amendment coming from the States. I am reminded of the history of the Seventeenth Amendment, calling for direct election of State Senators. I gather that some 32 States had filed Applications on this "single subject" amendment, with another two States on the verge of doing so.
So, Congress co-opted the States, deciding to propose what would become the Seventeenth Amendment within its own body, thus to give a federal resolution of the problem, neatly obviating the necessity of CALLING an Article V Convention of the States. Thus retaining power "in Washington," and not in the several States, working together for a common purpose.
The issue of a balanced budget amendment to me looks ripe for a repeat of this process of Congressional co-optation of State powers. So far, there are 26 State Applications that have survived the culling of the Clerk of the House/National Archivist. That means another 8 States to go.
Question, dear Publius: Do you think there is a snowball's chance in Hell that the four most recent State Applications, on the "Georgia model," are "aggregatable" with the 26 States with valid Applications for a BBA?
The Georgia model application (my characterization) addresses three main subject areas in what I call its "mission statement": (1) the distribution of powers as between the federal government and the several States; (2) federal fiscal responsibility; and (3) term limits for federal officers.
Question: Is (2) above "aggregatable" with State Applications for a Balanced Budget Amendment, when the Georgia Application clearly puts such an amendment within its legitimate scope?
At this point, my best sense in answering this question is: NO. Congress will strain every gnat to hold onto its current powers and privileges, and this means the States' role in our constitutional order will be tenaciously obviated by Congress as much as possible.
So, the BBA still needs another 8 States to make the Congressional CALL for an Article V COS effective. If the history of the Seventeenth Amendment is any reliable guide, I would expect Congress to wait until the last possible moment to act on a BBA, under the pressure of State Applications (resolutions); and then, on the brink of confrontation of federal and State powers, will take it upon itself to pass a BBA, and send it out to the States for ratification. Thus to take all credit for it, with no thanks whatsoever to the States who brought the issue to the forefront of public concern in the first place.
Thus to maintain the fiction that all power resides in Washington, and not in the States where We the People live.
Dear Publius, you are a treasure of reason and historical knowledge. Thank you so very much for all your excellent work hereabouts, at FR!
For years, the House passed an amendment providing for the direct election of senators, but the Senate always balked. Senators liked the cozy arrangement they had with the corporate interests that owned their states. So state legislatures escalated by applying to Congress for a Convention of the States to formulate such an amendment. In 1912, the two thirds threshold was reached.
What senators feared was that a Convention would write the amendment to require immediate implementation, i.e., the entire Senate would have to be elected under the new paradigm all at once. The Senate wrote the amendment to phase in election by the people once ratification was complete. The House quickly passed the same wording, and the amendment was sent out to the states for ratification. It was ratified in record time.
But the two thirds threshold had been reached. Congress was under compulsion to call a Convention to consider this topic. How Congress got out of it was quite clever.
Several states had “discharge clauses” in their applications. This clause stated that if Congress wrote its own amendment on the topic, the application would be considered discharged. Enough states had discharge clauses in their applications that the threshold now dipped below two thirds, thus absolving Congress from calling a Convention. Without those discharge clauses, Congress would have been in a major bind.
...26 states...
Actually it’s 28 now. Two more states piled on this year. Six more states, and Congress will have to call a Convention to consider a balanced budget amendment.
Concerning your question about aggregation, Congress will not aggregate the 4 applications with the Georgia language with the 28 applications for a balanced budget amendment. They won’t be aggregated in either direction but will be considered separate topics for tabulation purposes.
As long as we possess the world’s reserve currency, a balanced budget amendment would be a bad idea. Vast and increasing numbers of dollars are needed every day to support the $4+ trillion per day that changes hands in the world’s money markets. We have waged endless war and increased entitlements so that those dollars can be created to fill the world’s money pool. If we were back on the gold standard, we wouldn’t need a balanced budget amendment because the gold standard itself imposes an iron discipline. Only if we lose the status of possessing the world’s reserve currency would we require an amendment to end our profligate behavior.