“The principal military lesson of the Global War on Terror affirms what ought to have been the principal military lesson of the Cold War: Force held in readiness has far greater political utility than force expended. Armies are well suited to defending and containing. But invading and occupying countries are fraught with risk. “
How did that work out for the French in 1936? They chose to held their force in readiness, and instead of executing an invasion and occupation when they enjoyed overwhelming force, they waited and suffered a catastrophic defeat in 1940. Hitler's very own words are haunting:
“If France had then marched into the Rhineland, we would have had to withdraw with our tails between our legs.”
The idea that wars are always won quickly and cleanly is a false concept that cannot be shown from history. The Indian wars were a protracted conflict that lasted over a hundred years, just for the United States.
I never served in the military, so perhaps my views don't count. But I can read a history book. Perhaps the author is right, and a smaller Army is just fine. But this writing seems to be totally backward looking, the old canard of “fighting the last war.” Some British tank designers were creating tanks to span shell cratered trenches even as the German army was rolling across France in 1940. It's easy to use your last experience as a guide and miss the tasks coming up, which may be quite different.
The appropriate size of U.S. forces should be based on projecting the jobs they will be expected to do in the future, not regret over recent operations.
One last point, that I have already posted on another thread. Per capita, the Army should have 650,000 troops to be the same size relative to the population as it did in 1940. Massive welfare spending and support for the bureaucratic state prevents that.
Bacevich’s policy recommendations are not based on protecting the US, but on forever diminishing its capacity to act, as some form of perverse penance for its collective sins.