Number three stinks badly. No matter how attractive it might look on its surface, it actually embeds judicial supremacy, which is the opposite of the constitutional form of representative self-government given to us by the founders. Bad court opinions, and bad laws, are already null and void, according to the fundamental natural law principles laid down by men like Cicero, and Aquinas, and Blackstone, and Hamilton.
Glaringly missing from his list is any amendment to protect marriage, or innocent human life in the womb. A pretty big oversight, considering where the country is right now.
In any case, the calling of a constitutional convention at a time when our political class is rank with those who won’t even keep their oaths to support and defend the Constitution we’ve already got, and who lack the most basic principles upon which our Constitution is premised, is a supremely bad idea.
Levin is not proposing a Constitutional Convention.
Repeat: Levin is not proposing a Constitutional Convention.
I think an amendment is needed to clarify the relationship between judicial precedent and law, as well as what constitutes "good faith". One of the major causes of the erosion of liberties is the fact that a finding that a dubious action from government does not merit a remedy is regarded as a finding that the action in question was legitimate, and a belief that any finding that an action was illegitimate would necessitate a remedy, even if any conceivable remedy would almost certainly be unworkable. Along with this, the fact that someone makes an effort to avoid acting in such patently illegitimate action as to merit censure is deemed sufficient to regard the person's actions as having been done in "good faith".
To stop this erosion of liberties, I would make clear that for a person to be acting in good faith, the person must be attempting to behave in such fashion as to be beyond reproach. It may be that a person's actions don't end up being perfect shouldn't imply that they're illegitimate, if the person was genuinely trying to abide by the Constitution perfectly, but if the person can be shown to have deliberately acted contrary to the Constitution, such intent would render the actions illegitimate even if the Constitutional breaches involved would otherwise be too small to be actionable.
As a simple example, I would hold that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments would require that any police officer who is conducting a search must make a reasonable effort to avoid any unnecessary damage to the property being searched. That does not mean that property won't sometimes get damaged either by accident or necessity, but it would forbids any deliberate property damage, no matter how slight. If a cop is somewhat negligent while handling a person's property and causes $15 worth of damage, such negligence may be too small to be actionable, but if a cop deliberately causes $1 worth of damage, the fact that such action was deliberate should merit action, including possibly regarding that the search was illegitimate.
Another thing I would include in an amendment would be a rule stating that defendants have the right to have the jury consider essentially all matters of fact which they deem relevant to their case. Among the matters the defendant would be allowed to put before the jury would be whether all those involved bringing the case have acted in good faith, and whether any particular statements made by the defendant should be deemed credible (at present, if a suspect makes a statement to the police, the police may testify for the prosecution as to what the defendant said, but the defendant has limited ability to question the police about anything the defendant said which would bolster the defense [e.g. showing that a defendant offered a justification for his actions before he would have had time to determine what evidence might contradict it]. If prosecution evidence is grossly illegitimate, it's right and proper for a judge to exclude it, but a defendant should also be allowed to ask the jury to discount any evidence which in its judgment was not gathered in good faith, even if a judge wouldn't find evidence of bad faith sufficiently compelling as to justify excluding the evidence. In effect, a judge should base admissibility of evidence upon whether it might have been gathered in good faith, but a jury should decide whether it believes it actually was.