Mack and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)
Scalia refers to the “dual sovereignty” established by the U.S. Constitution that federalism is built upon. His opinion states that the Framers designed the Constitution to allow Federal regulation of international and interstate matters, not internal matters reserved to the State Legislatures. The majority arrives at the conclusion that allowing the Federal government to draft the police officers of the 50 states into its service would increase its powers far beyond what the Constitution intends.
The Court also offered an alternative basis for striking down the provision: it violated the constitutional separation of powers by robbing the president of his power to execute the laws; that is, it contradicted the “unitary executive theory”. The Court explained
We have thus far discussed the effect that federal control of state officers would have upon the first element of the “double security” alluded to by Madison: the division of power between State and Federal Governments. It would also have an effect upon the second element: the separation and equilibration of powers between the three branches of the Federal Government itself. The Constitution does not leave to speculation who is to administer the laws enacted by Congress; the President, it says, “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” Art. II, §3, personally and through officers whom he appoints (save for such inferior officers as Congress may authorize to be appointed by the “Courts of Law” or by “the Heads of Departments” who with other presidential appointees), Art. II, §2. The Brady Act effectively transfers this responsibility to thousands of CLEOs in the 50 States, who are left to implement the program without meaningful Presidential control (if indeed meaningful Presidential control is possible without the power to appoint and remove). The insistence of the Framers upon unity in the Federal Executive—to insure both vigor and accountability—is well known. See The Federalist No. 70 (A. Hamilton); 2 Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 495 (M. Jensen ed. 1976) (statement of James Wilson); see also Calabresi & Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L. J. 541 (1994). That unity would be shattered, and the power of the President would be subject to reduction, if Congress could act as effectively without the President as with him, by simply requiring state officers to execute its laws.
Finally, the majority cited previous rulings by the Supreme Court in similar situations. In New York v. United States, the Court invalidated a provision in a bill that “coerced” states to comply with a federal radioactive waste-disposal regime, holding “[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program”. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
The irony is this case was over gun control....
Thanks for the relative case history.
That, of course, presumes that the President faithfully executes. When that doesn't happen, the solution is not for Congress to take upon itself executive powers but instead to impeach the _resident.