Replies

“All of these measures have been reactive–in response to both successful and failed terrorist plots from the past. Such is the nature of our bureaucratic counter terror apparatus. The enemy watches what we do and dreams up more methods to exploit holes and vulnerabilities in the defensive security measures. And, of course, once the enemy tries a new method, successful or otherwise, the TSA modifies its policies to defend against the last attack.”

See my tag line for an airliner attack vector which is not being adequately defended to date. (search for term “runway kill zone”) The Runway Kill Zone blog has been up for a year and has produced a total yawn from the Secret Service, the Air Force, DHS, FBI and FAA who have all been sent the link to the blog, so they do not appear to regard it as “loose lips”.

Reactive policies are inevitable and supported because the public will demand protection after each new type of attack and agree to fund the protection.

Failure to anticipate and defend against attacks that are clearly visible to terrorists is tragic and foolish. Think of how relatively inexpensive it would have been to armor the cockpit doors. This has effectively preempted future “airliner as guided missile” attacks (except by terrorist or deranged pilot employees of airlines...see Egyptian airliner crash) and left terrorists limited mostly to “blow up the plane” tactics with explosives i carry-on, on the person or in cargo.

Note that the attacks to date on crowds in terminals mentioned in the article failed to freeze and airline passenger or freight traffic. The London subway attack was much more effective. Crowds can be found anywhere and blowing up a crowd doesn't seem to gratify the Islamist terrorist desire for a “spectacular” attack in the West.