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A turning point for Palestinians

Denver Post, The (CO) - Thursday, November 18, 2004

Author: Paula D. Broadwell

The fate of the failing nascent Palestinian state - and, by default, the fate of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process - lies in the hands of the successor to Yasser Arafat. Is there a potential successor who could effectively unite the Palestinians and somehow maintain legitimacy with Israelis, Arab neighbors and the West? Can a steely new leader emerge to lead the Palestinians toward a functioning state and viable two-state solution? Given the all-but-impotent peace process, it seems there is nowhere to go but up.

The Palestinian Authority that Arafat led is widely perceived by Palestinians as corrupt and incompetent. Despite this, he has undeniably been the most popular Palestinian politician and the figurehead of the Palestinian national cause. Many Palestinians acknowledge that he spearheaded the revolution that eventually focused the world’s attention on their troubles.

With continuing disorder in the occupied territories, the international community may question whether the situation may deteriorate further with Arafat no longer serving as a magnet of loyalty for diverse groups. On the other hand, Arafat’s death may be a turning point toward renewed hope for peace in the Middle East.

It is important not to ignore the debilitating toll taken by the 35-year Israeli occupation that has strangled Palestinian self-government, free enterprise and education. However, there is no doubt that the chaos that exists in the occupied territories is also the result of entrenched Palestinian nepotism, corruption and incompetence. Arafat succeeded in creating overlapping bureaucracies precisely to prevent subordinates from challenging his power, playing them against each other.

Wearing three hats, Arafat was the president of the Palestinian National Authority (also known as the Palestinian Authority), chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and head of Fatah (with its Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade and the Tanzim - the paramilitary counter-balance to the military wings of the Palestinian opposition groups, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad). These three centers of political authority - the PA, PLO and Fatah - have all sent players into the political arena to replace Arafat.

From 1994 to his death, Arafat presided over this collapsing Palestinian economy. He was given billions in aid from individual donors, states, the United Nations and non-government organizations. In spite of this aid, Palestine’s gross domestic product is down nearly 70 percent and Palestinians have seen their collective national net worth reduced by more than two-thirds. Public infrastructure has disintegrated. Public health standards, in 1993 the highest in the Arab world, are now among the lowest.

Much has been written about Arafat’s reticence toward grooming a prodigy. He clearly had a problem sharing power with legitimate candidates. The first Palestinian Authority prime minister resigned after only four months in office out of frustration with Arafat’s oversight. In July 2004, the current prime minister stepped down in protest of Arafat’s rigid oversight, and then withdrew his resignation after Arafat promised to give him more powers.

Because there is no entrenched democratic system with political legitimacy within the Palestinian regime, the rules of succession were not institutionalized, giving credence to the potential for violent struggle. Fear of usurpation and the violent pitting of mainstream candidates against each other have threatened Arafat for decades. Perhaps another of Arafat’s fears was that designating a successor would have played into the hands of Western efforts to sideline him. Because Arafat only had a 10-year-old daughter, the heir approach to succession was clearly out. Appointing a weak candidate might have stimulated potential rivals to try to eliminate the designee.

So, who are the players in this political arena?

The PLO. In 1964, the Arab League, a confederation of Arab countries, met in Cairo and established a Palestine Liberation Organization to deal directly with the problem of the Palestinian Arabs. Its charter called for the destruction of the Zionist state and for the establishment of a Palestinian entity. In 1994, the Oslo peace process helped transform the PLO into the born-again Palestinian Authority, contributing to the legitimization of the Arafat regime. The PLO and PA’s senior leadership come overwhelmingly from those who were 1948 refugees from lands that became part of Israel. Interestingly, few of the current “old guard” figures in the PLO originated in the West Bank or Gaza, the lands where a Palestinian state is taking shape.

Fatah. The Palestinian political and military organization was founded by Arafat in the mid-1950s to work toward the creation of a Palestinian state. Fatah carried out numerous acts of international terrorism in Western Europe and the Middle East in the 1970s, but it is now considered the PLO’s governing party. Fatah is still by far the most important political movement in the PA and has a strong interest in uniting around a single candidate for the leadership. The jailed Fatah leader, Marwan Barghouti, could be a unifying force, but he will most likely never be released from the Israeli prison where he is serving five life sentences. Dominated by an older generation, Fatah has seen considerable turmoil as the new guard demands a greater say in the party.

Palestinian military. The past and current heads of security in the West Bank and Gaza have proven themselves to some extent and could produce several key contenders. Most of these individuals favor order and discipline and have resisted terrorist units that act on their own and ignore the dictates of the central government. However, few of them have the political clout, especially with Israel and the international community, to replace Arafat.

Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). The Palestinian Islamist paramilitary and political organizations are considered terrorist organizations by Israel and Western countries. Both are ostensibly dedicated to the destruction of Israel and the creation of an Islamic state in Palestine. Part of Hamas’ legitimacy with the PA rests on its provision of welfare and charity for the Palestinian poor. Hamas and PIJ are not united around a single leader, but even independently, they could both present strong opposition to Arafat’s successor, should that successor threaten their existence.

Final contenders. Fortunately, the Palestinian leadership has moved swiftly to press for national elections in January 2005 and to designate interim leaders. Mahmoud Abbas will control the PLO and the Fatah institutions. He has impeccable PLO credentials, serving as the secretary and third Fatah member of its executive committee and former prime minister of the PA. Unlike many Palestinian exiles, Abbas has been able to transform himself by returning to the West Bank, becoming the chief Palestinian negotiator with Israel. Abbas is respected by the international community because of his truculent effrontery toward Arafat and his support of the Oslo and Geneva peace measures.

The current prime minister, Ahmed Qureia, will be responsible for the PA government and the National Security Council, including oversight of the PA’s finances, bureaucracy and security services. Rauhi Fattouh, the speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council, took Arafat’s official position as interim president of the PA. According to Palestinian law, this position should go to Fattouh, who would lead for 60 days until presidential elections are held. It is doubtful, however, that the whole transitional leadership will be able to translate its formal authority into real power. Indeed, little policy change is likely in the near future, since significantly altering Arafat’s path would invite mass Palestinian uprisings from Islamists and Arafat loyalists.

It appears that most of the surfacing candidates are pragmatists, determined to continue the diplomatic process and ready to make peace with Israel. Psychologically, they are less flighty than Arafat; operationally, they are more realistic and are less entrenched in Palestinian or Islamic ideology. With this in mind, the successors might distribute power more widely, leading to a more efficient decision-making process. They will likely retain the goal of an independent Palestinian state, with east Jerusalem as its capital.

Like Arafat, they might be willing to make small concessions on territory and other matters, but only if their main aim can be achieved. If the “old guard” manages to move the peace process forward, it could potentially forge an important coalition with the next generation of nationalists and weaken these Islamists. It would behoove them to form this alliance while preparing for elections, and this is precisely one of Abbas’ goals. Unless legitimately addressed, the young guard nationalists and Islamists will present a persistent strategic threat - not only to the dominance of the nationalist old guard but also to the future of the peace process, which they ardently oppose.

The Palestinian problem has been a recruiting tool and a symbol for terrorists from Morocco to Indonesia. Though it is too idealistic to think that an absence of the nefarious Arafat would lead to an immediate final settlement and reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians, it is true that new Palestinian leadership could be a step in the right direction. At a minimum, perhaps the social welfare and human rights of the Palestinian citizens would become more important than regime survival.

The Bush administration needs to affirm its commitment to a viable Palestinian state and present a fairly detailed permanent status package, outlining a more engaged policy that pays more attention to Palestinian - not only Israeli - concerns. We should collectively embrace this opportunity and press for transformation from Arafat’s defunct rule to a just and legitimate democratic system recognized by Palestinians, Israelis, the greater Arab populace and the international community.

The end of an era with Arafat should be viewed by the second Bush administration as a window of opportunity to address one of the root issues in the global war on terrorism and to promote reconciliation between the U.S. and the greater Muslim world. Let us maintain some sense of idealism that a new generation of leadership - both in the Middle East and America - will emerge to effectively move the peace process forward.

Paula D. Broadwell , an Army captain with the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, has been assigned to the Middle East and is pursuing degrees at the University of Denver’s Graduate School of International Studies.