Even the original naval bombardment, by the battleships and cruisers, missed most of the targets.
What turned the tide that morning was the destroyers and D/Es charging in as close as they dared to the beach, turning broadside and hitting the beach fortifications with everything they had.
Some of the escorts that provided impromptu fire support for the troops that day returned to England that night with their magazines literally empty.
D-Day plannes had recognized early on that ABSOLUTE CONTROL of the air space over the Channel, landing beaches, and for about 100 miles inland MUST be accomplished if the invasion had any chance of success. To that end, they set out to compeltely destroy all German fighters based in western France.
The bombers were in effect, BAIT. And the plan was successful. Bomber losses were horrendous, but virtually all the German fighter strength was eliminated. Not one German fighter mad a sortie over the Normandy beaches.
The Nazis had considerable fighter strength left, but Hitler had long agoordered that they be based around berlin, to protect the capital, an d thus were not able to take part in D-Day operations.
Regarding the effectiveness of the Allied bombing campaign, after the war, the combined US-Brit assessment team reported that bombers struck their targets less than 15% of the time. Most bombs were wasted.However, in looking back at the real capability of the Norden bombsight, the heavy flack, Nazi fighters, often rotten weather with low visability, it quite remarkable that they managed to put bombs on target 15% of the time.
After D-Day, the Allies were first able to start inspecting their bomb hits in FRance, and they began to understand how ineffective they were. That knowledge was a major factor in the decision to switch to the strategy of carpet bombing cities. IT supposedly was to defeat German morale, but that didn't happen until very late in the war. Rather, at least the bomber crews were this way accomplishing something for their sacrifices.
D-Day plannes had recognized early on that ABSOLUTE CONTROL of the air space over the Channel, landing beaches, and for about 100 miles inland MUST be accomplished if the invasion had any chance of success. To that end, they set out to compeltely destroy all German fighters based in western France.
The bombers were in effect, BAIT. And the plan was successful. Bomber losses were horrendous, but virtually all the German fighter strength was eliminated. Not one German fighter mad a sortie over the Normandy beaches.
The Nazis had considerable fighter strength left, but Hitler had long agoordered that they be based around berlin, to protect the capital, an d thus were not able to take part in D-Day operations.
Regarding the effectiveness of the Allied bombing campaign, after the war, the combined US-Brit assessment team reported that bombers struck their targets less than 15% of the time. Most bombs were wasted.However, in looking back at the real capability of the Norden bombsight, the heavy flack, Nazi fighters, often rotten weather with low visability, it quite remarkable that they managed to put bombs on target 15% of the time.
After D-Day, the Allies were first able to start inspecting their bomb hits in FRance, and they began to understand how ineffective they were. That knowledge was a major factor in the decision to switch to the strategy of carpet bombing cities. IT supposedly was to defeat German morale, but that didn't happen until very late in the war. Rather, at least the bomber crews were this way accomplishing something for their sacrifices.
Absolutely correct about the big ships missing most of their targets. They fired their funs at too high an elevation so they missed the key beach fortifications which wreaked the most damage on our landing troops.
If someone had set up a decent Forward Air Controller spotting system, they could have corrected the guns angles and blown the German fortifications right off the cliffs, and save a lot of American lives.
Also, most bombings of these forward fortifications missed or couldn’t penetrate the thick concrete buildings.
All you have to do is to watch a B-52 raid on the North Vietnamese troops outside of the Khe Sanh perimeter to see what a good FAC/bomber coordinationg can to to the enemy.
Granted that the WW2 FAC system was very primitive, it still worked (You saw “Patton” , didn’t you?). Even Gen. Pershing used it in Mexico and WW 1.
Also, it was a couple FAC pilots at the Bay Hap River incident that provided some evidence that John Kerry’s account of the event was full of shit> See Scott Swett & Tim Zieglar’s “To Set the Record Straight” for details.
The destroyers and other small fire-support boats that attacked the cliff fortifications head-on and in-close were magnificent but have never had the public awareness of their deeds that they deserved.