Posted on 01/27/2010 11:42:02 PM PST by Jet Jaguar
With the FY2011 budget and QDR expected to be released next week, there is almost no point discussing the speculation beginning to pop up in draft versions the media has obtained. A good example is this Defense News article, which is certainly a topic worth diving into - if we weren't only a few days from seeing the real thing.
I am one of those who believes this QDR will end up prompting more questions than answers. Over the last several years, those in defense policy have continuously stressed the environment of uncertainty. It has left me with the impression the real uncertainty that exists is specific to the inability for anyone to articulate with any degree of credibility a matching of defense budget to global environment. I have serious doubts that the QDR will address this issue with enough credibility to steer budgets, once again leaving a disconnect between budget allocations and stated defense policy.
On Sunday, CDR Salamander, Eagle1, and I will be discussing the upcoming QDR release with Mackenzie Eaglen, Research Fellow for National Security at The Heritage Foundation on Midrats. Next week I'll be at AFCEA/USNI West in San Diego - which is also devoted to the QDR. With any luck, there will be some clarity in the QDR to guide debate... Luck is fleeting.
A few observations...
Aviation
It is absolutely clear the Joint Strike Fighter has lost popularity with Navy leadership over the last year. After reading the InsideDefense article from Tuesday titled CNO Downplays NAVAIR Ownership Costs Report where ADM Roughead responds to the NAVAIR JSF cost report conclusions that the F-35 costs will be 40% higher than F/A-18 fighters today with his "It will have no bearing on anything we're doing with our budget" comment; it is absolutely clear to me the F-35C will be kicked down the road a bit. When the CNO says a $100 billion cost increase of a program doesn't have any bearing on budget, something is up.
While kicking the F-35 has limited impact on the Navy at this time, it raises serious issues with the Air Force. The F-22 was basically dropped because the F-35 was going to come online sooner. Now the F-35 is having all kinds of problems that are leading to delays and higher costs. Do the math... Gates is going to end up not building F-22s in trade of not buying F-35s. For the wars, Gates has been a great source of leadership. When it comes to the long term direction of defense equipment budgeting for all of the services, I do not believe Gates will be remembered well.
The F-22 was canceled when production costs were stable for a program that is, by all definitions, a globally lobbied military-industrial complex on a scale beyond any program in history - ironically the same complex Gates pretended to stand up against with the F-22. The JSF program has become too big to fail, and the Air Force will very likely end up buying F-35s in a few years that cost as much as F-22s today.
It is unclear what his might mean for the Marines. The MV-22 makes a lot of sense when complimented with the F-35B, but without the F-35B the MV-22 is too expensive and beyond the needs of the Marine Corps. The F-35B is also a serious issue internationally, particularly to the British but one might imagine interest all over the world in the future. The stakes are high, but the cost continues to grow higher. While the F/A-18 represents a Plan B for the F-35C, there is no Plan B for the F-35B. This program needs good news, and none has come from the direction of Lockheed Martin in awhile.
Shipbuilding
Is there such a thing as a good investment in any ship built on the Gulf Coast right now? The LPD-17 problems are troubling. Everyone is to blame for the problems, and it is unclear where the solutions will come from. It is my impression that nothing short serious executive leadership will fix the shipbuilding problems of industry, and I have serious concerns if Ray Mabus is that executive. Congress does not inspire, the Navy does not inspire, and Northrop Grumman's reputation has been flushed in the shipbuilding toilet over the last decade.
It has been 2 years since the Navy had a shipbuilding plan, and every single "21st century" surface warship design has been a mess. DDG-1000, LPD-17, and two different Littoral Combat Ship designs have been less than inspiring, well over budget, or based on very questionable requirements. What will the Littoral Combat Ship do exactly? Which war is the DDG-1000 going to operate in the littorals during? Will the USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19) be the first of her class to complete a full 6 month tour without requiring a few weeks in a Middle Eastern seaport for repairs?
Congress has made it law that new ships require Nuclear power. The Secretary of the Navy wants a Great Green Fleet. The President of the United States advocated nuclear energy in his first State of the Union Address. The Navy is the only government department to field nuclear energy in several decades, and has spent the last year discussing a reduction of the two types of naval vessels that use nuclear power: aircraft carriers and submarines.
China
We are in a defacto cyberwar with China today, and China is conducting cyber espionage on virtually every major US business every day. I look forward to seeing the QDR address this, or not.
Nobody wants to discuss it, because nobody in the open source really knows what is happening, but there is work at every major Chinese shipyard right now and it is not clear what most of those shipyards are building. We do know a few things. We know orders for commercial ships have not been there over the last 12 months, and the shipyards are building something. We know that just as the Chinese have big plans to build aircraft carriers, they have big plans to build all kinds of escorts. We know the 988 is soon to be deploying to the Gulf of Aden, the first expeditionary ship to undertake a long deployment from China.
We know China is building lots of submarines. We know the Maritime Strategy never mentioned China. Will the QDR? In what context? Should we be calculating our force structure based on what China is doing? If we do, what does that say about us?
At what point does the economic relationship between China and the US rise to a QDR level national security strategy concern?
Marine Corps
Building amphibious ships has become very expensive, and the quality of the product produced is in doubt. The EFV almost has all of its problems worked out, but the mission it was designed for may not be applicable in the future maritime environment. The logistics of the EFV is completely unreasonable when examined against its operational profile. The MV-22 requires long range escort beyond that of available helicopters, but the F-35B is in doubt. The UH-1Y and AH-1Z programs have been slow going and has taken on cost increases, but are beginning to show signs of very positive results. The Harriers are old. Sea Basing was nothing more than a concept in PPT, until Haiti became the textbook Sea Basing operation right from the PPT presentation. The Marines are expanding manpower but losing expeditionary platforms to move Marines forward, and at the same time the Navy is reducing manpower on ships even as the Navy takes on more manpower intensive operations during peacetime. How will the Marines use the MRAP after Afghanistan when it is clearly too heavy for the ARG? Will the next Marine Corps vehicle be tracked or wheeled? What will the next generation heavy lift aviation platform look like?
Am I honestly supposed to believe the QDR is going to address these questions, or will it simply add more questions to the ones already being discussed? I've aimed my expectations low, and am ready to be pleasantly surprised.
My QDR Questions
Below I've outlined what I think are the pressing issues I expect the QDR to address:
How does the QDR measure force size and force structure? Under what scenario is the US expected to operate that leads to these force size and force structure measurements?
Does the QDR account for the frequency of using military power appropriately? We are fighting 2 wars in Asia, balancing power in the Pacific, standing up AFRICOM, supporting ballistic missile defense in the Pacific, Middle East, and Europe, and with excess capacity - responding to one of the largest natural disasters in my lifetime in Haiti. Other than BMD, this short list of priorities doesn't address national security concerns that might include Yemen, Somalia, North Korea, Israel, or Iran.
How is the issue above addressed from a joint perspective? How is the issue above addressed from an international cooperation perspective?
How does the QDR address modernization towards the future? Will it recommend building legacy systems in quantity, shifting towards new systems in quantity, or take an quantity R&D approach to systems instructing short builds in various trials of quality?
What does the QDR add and subtract?
How does the QDR treat ballistic missile defense? Is it a strategic priority like nuclear deterrence?
How does the QDR address acquisition reform and deal with increased costs in both manpower and equipment?
How does the QDR line up with the QDDR?
Looks like the POTUS will publish his National Security Strategy after the QDR is published.
Due in July 2009. A few months too late.
I’ll be the first to post on the thread. Obama is going to gut the defense department if he can get away with it.
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