Posted on 01/25/2010 5:56:50 PM PST by rxsid
Yeah, I start laughing again, every time I see them... :-)
As you have stated previously “IMHO”...
worth what it costs, same as everybody.
As you have stated previously “IMHO”...
worth what it costs, same as everybody.
By the way, the attorney does not have to have standing, just the client. IMO they all have standing, especially Alan Keyes...now why does the court disagree? They have never explained, just made the pronouncement.
According to the definition of “Standing”, at the very least, Alan Keyes has standing....
IYO do you care to enlighten us all?
Duh. When you had asked why I wasn't filing any suits I assumed you meant on my own behalf. But Orly doesn't seem to be having any luck finding clients with standing to sue either.
IMO they all have standing, especially Alan Keyes...now why does the court disagree?
Maybe the judges don't have your creative imagination? Why do you think they all have standing to sue?
They have never explained, just made the pronouncement.
Read the decisions. The judges lay out their reasons there.
According to the definition of “Standing”, at the very least, Alan Keyes has standing....
I'm familiar with the definition of standing. Why do you think Keyes qualifies?
This was Carters Decision:
Judge Carter ruled that the non-candidate plaintiffs, which included various military personnel and a few state legislators, do not have standing. He was hesitant to rule that Alan Keyes lacks standing, because Keyes did run against Obama in the presidential election of November 2008. On the other hand, the judge emphasized that Keyes’ showing was so weak, that he could not possibly have been elected; he was only on the ballot in three states. The decision says, “It does seem highly unlikely that the replacement of President Obama with another Democratic nominee such as Hillary Clinton would have resulted in a victory for Plaintiffs Keyes, Drake of the American Independent Party.” But, the decision says, “The Court is troubled by the idea that a third party candidate would not have standing to challenge a major party candidate’s qualifications.”
The decision then decides not to decide the question of whether Keyes had standing, and instead rules that even if Keyes does have standing, his suit must fail because it was not filed until after Obama was sworn into office (the judge notes that the case was filed at 3:26 pm Pacific time, January 20, 2009). The decision then says that the power to remove a sitting president from office resides with Congress, not the Judicial Branch. The decision says, “There may very well be a legitimate role for the judiciary to interpret whether the natural born citizen requirement has been satisfied in the case of a presidential candidate who has not already won the election and taken office. However, on the day that President Obama took the presidential oath and was sworn in, he became President of the United States.”
It confuses me that Carter says Keyes MAY have standing, but that the date of filing is at issue. Standing is standing. Carter did not rule that he did not have standing.
Quote: By the way, the attorney does not have to have standing, just the client.
Duh. When you had asked why I wasn’t filing any suits I assumed you meant on my own behalf. But Orly doesn’t seem to be having any luck finding clients with standing to sue either.
Orly is so incompetent that she has posted an image on her webpage of the receipt she was given when she paid the filing fees for her latest appeal. That receipt has her 16 digit credit card number on it and she hasn’t blacked it out before posting it on the net.
Obot sites are already spreading it around. I mean what sort of moron posts their credit card number on their blog?
Did Judge Carter agree with the plaintiff and rule that Keyes had standing? No he did not. Losing candidates in elections have standing to sue if their opponent may be ineligible for the office they ran for. That's been established precedent for some time. McCain could sue and would be able to prove standing because a real argument could be made that but for Obama he might have won. But it is also not all encompassing. Keyes' candidacy was a joke. He was on the ballot in three or four states only and had absolutely no chance to win the election, and saying that if not for Obama he might have won is ridiculous in the extreme. So there is no way his chances were harmed by having Obama on the ballot, and no rational judge would have decided Keyes had standing. And as is evident by his decision, Judge Carter is a rational man.
......Ping... with links above to (some) docs.
New document filed in the Taitz v. Obama QW case in D.C.
BUMP
Like Holder is going to even respond???
Time to put a flak jacket on that pig.
Per DC Code (which is codified in Federal Code), you have to request the US Attorney General and/or the US Attorney for the District of Columbia to file quo warranto with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
Either one may accept or deny the request - but it only takes one affirmative to get the ball rolling.
If both decline the request, then an independent party can make the request to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
It is then up to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia whether to accept the request and grant ex relator status to the requestor. If the requestor is denied ex relator status by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the requestor can then take the request to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
If still denied, the request can then be made at the court of last resort - the United States Supreme Court.
If denied, the issue is dead - if accepted, then Obama has the burden to prove that he is entitled to the office.
Which, in this case, involves having to prove that he is a natural born citizen ...
It might be best if you read the relevant portions of the DC Code concerning Quo Warranto:
D.C. LAW 17-288, which became effective on DECEMBER 24, 2008, by D.C. ACT 17-602.
——————–
CHAPTER 35: QUO WARRANTO
SUBCHAPTER I — ACTIONS AGAINST OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES
SUBCHAPTER II — ACTIONS AGAINST OFFICERS OR CORPORATIONS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SUBCHAPTER III — PROCEDURES AND JUDGMENTS
SUBCHAPTER I: ACTIONS AGAINST OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 16-3501. Persons against whom issued; civil action.
§ 16-3502. Parties who may institute; ex rel. proceedings.
§ 16-3503. Refusal of Attorney General or United States attorney to act; procedure.
§ 16-3501. Persons against whom issued; civil action.
A quo warranto may be issued from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in the name of the United States against a person who within the District of Columbia usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises, a franchise conferred by the United States or a public office of the United States, civil or military. The proceedings shall be deemed a civil action.
(Dec. 23, 1963, 77 Stat. 602, Pub. L. 88-241, § 1; July 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 562, Pub. L. 91-358, title I, § 145(n); 1973 Ed., § 16-3501; 1981 Ed., § 16-3501.)
§ 16-3502. Parties who may institute; ex rel. proceedings.
The Attorney General of the United States or the United States attorney may institute a proceeding pursuant to this subchapter on his own motion or on the relation of a third person. The writ may not be issued on the relation of a third person except by leave of the court, to be applied for by the relator, by a petition duly verified setting forth the grounds of the application, or until the relator files a bond with sufficient surety, to be approved by the clerk of the court, in such penalty as the court prescribes, conditioned on the payment by him of all costs incurred in the prosecution of the writ if costs are not recovered from and paid by the defendant.
(Dec. 23, 1963, 77 Stat. 602, Pub. L. 88-241, § 1; July 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 562, Pub. L. 91-358, title I, § 145(n); 1973 Ed., § 16-3502; 1981 Ed., § 16-3502.)
§ 16-3503. Refusal of Attorney General or United States attorney to act; procedure.
If the Attorney General or United States attorney refuses to institute a quo warranto proceeding on the request of a person interested, the interested person may apply to the court by certified petition for leave to have the writ issued. When, in the opinion of the court, the reasons set forth in the petition are sufficient in law, the writ shall be allowed to be issued by any attorney, in the name of the United States, on the relation of the interested person on his compliance with the condition prescribed by section 16-3502 as to security for costs.
(Dec. 23, 1963, 77 Stat. 602, Pub. L. 88-241, § 1; July 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 562, Pub. L. 91-358, title I, § 145(n); 1973 Ed., § 16-3503; 1981 Ed., § 16-3503.)
SUBCHAPTER II: ACTIONS AGAINST OFFICERS OR CORPORATIONS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
§ 16-3521. Persons against whom issued; civil action.
§ 16-3522. Parties who may institute; ex rel. proceedings.
§ 16-3523. Refusal of United States attorney or Attorney General of the District of Columbia to act; procedures.
§ 16-3521. Persons against whom issued; civil action.
A quo warranto may be issued from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in the name of the District of Columbia against -
(1) a person who within the District of Columbia usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises, a franchise conferred by the District of Columbia, a public office of the District of Columbia, civil or military, or an office in a domestic corporation; or
(2) one or more persons who act as a corporation within the District of Columbia without being duly authorized, or exercise within the District of Columbia corporate rights, privileges, or franchises not granted them by law in force in the District of Columbia.
The proceedings shall be deemed a civil action.
(July 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 562, Pub. L. 91-358, title I, § 145(n); 1973 Ed., § 16-3521; 1981 Ed., § 16-3521.)
§ 16-3522. Parties who may institute; ex rel. proceedings.
The United States attorney or the Attorney General of the District of Columbia may institute a proceeding pursuant to this subchapter on his own motion, or on the relation of a third person. The writ may not be issued on the relation of a third person except by leave of the court, to be applied for by the relator, by a petition duly verified, setting forth the grounds of the application, or until the relator files a bond with sufficient surety, to be approved by the clerk of the court, in such penalty as the court prescribes, conditioned on the payment by him of all costs incurred in the prosecution of the writ if costs are not recovered from and paid by the defendant.
(July 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 562, Pub. L. 91-358, title I, § 145(n); 1973 Ed., § 16-3522; 1981 Ed., § 16-3522; May 26, 2004, Mayor’s Order 2004-92, § 4, 51 DCR 6052.)
§ 16-3523. Refusal of United States attorney or Attorney General of the District of Columbia to act; procedures.
If the United States attorney or Attorney General of the District of Columbia refuses to institute a quo warranto proceeding on the request of a person interested, the interested person may apply to the court by certified petition for leave to have the writ issued. When, in the opinion of the court, the reasons set forth in the petition are sufficient in law, the writ shall be allowed to be issued by any attorney, in the name of the District of Columbia, on the relation of the interested person, on his compliance with the conditions prescribed by section 16-3522 as to security for costs.
(July 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 563, Pub. L. 91-358, title I, § 145(n); 1973 Ed., § 16-3523; May 26, 2004, Mayor’s Order 2004-92, § 4, 51 DCR 6052.)
SUBCHAPTER III: PROCEDURES AND JUDGMENTS
§ 16-3541. Allegations in petition of relator claiming office.
§ 16-3542. Notice to defendant.
§ 16-3543. Proceedings on default.
§ 16-3544. Pleading; jury trial.
§ 16-3545. Verdict and judgment.
§ 16-3546. Usurping corporate franchise; judgment.
§ 16-3547. Proceedings against corporate directors and trustees; judgment and order; enforcement.
§ 16-3548. Recovery of damages from usurper; limitation.
§ 16-3541. Allegations in petition of relator claiming office.
When a quo warranto proceeding is against a person for usurping an office, on the relation of a person claiming the same office, the relator shall set forth in his petition the facts upon which he claims to be entitled to the office.
(Dec. 23, 1963, 77 Stat. 602, Pub. L. 88-241, § 1; July 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 563, Pub. L. 91-358, title I, § 145(n); 1973 Ed., § 16-3541; 1981 Ed., § 16-3541.)
§ 16-3542. Notice to defendant.
On the issuing of a writ of quo warranto the court may fix a time within which the defendant may appear and answer the writ. When the defendant cannot be found in the District of Columbia, the court may direct notice to be given to him by publication as in other cases of proceedings against nonresident defendants, and upon proof of publication, if the defendant does not appear, judgment may be rendered as if he had been personally served.
(Dec. 23, 1963, 77 Stat. 602, Pub. L. 88-241, § 1; July 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 563, Pub. L. 91-358, title I, § 145(n); 1973 Ed., § 16-3542; 1981 Ed., § 16-3542.)
§ 16-3543. Proceedings on default.
If the defendant does not appear as required by a writ of quo warranto, after being served, the court may proceed to hear proof in support of the writ and render judgment accordingly.
(Dec. 23, 1963, 77 Stat. 603, Pub. L. 88-241, § 1; July 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 563, Pub. L. 91-358, title I, § 145(n); 1973 Ed., § 16-3543; 1981 Ed., § 16-3543.)
§ 16-3544. Pleading; jury trial.
In a quo warranto proceeding, the defendant may demur, plead specially, or plead “not guilty” as the general issue, and the United States or the District of Columbia, as the case may be, may reply as in other actions of a civil character. Issues of fact shall be tried by a jury if either party requests it. Otherwise they shall be determined by the court.
(Dec. 23, 1963, 77 Stat. 603, Pub. L. 88-241, § 1; July 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 563, Pub. L. 91-358, title I, § 145(n); 1973 Ed., § 16-3544; 1981 Ed., § 16-3544.)
§ 16-3545. Verdict and judgment.
Where a defendant in a quo warranto proceeding is found by the jury to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised an office or franchise, the verdict shall be that he is guilty of the act or acts in question, and judgment shall be rendered that he be ousted and excluded therefrom and that the relator recover his costs.
(Dec. 23, 1963, 77 Stat. 603, Pub. L. 88-241, § 1; July 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 563, Pub. L. 91-358, title I, § 145(n); 1973 Ed., § 16-3545; 1981 Ed., § 16-3545.)
§ 16-3546. Usurping corporate franchise; judgment.
Where a quo warranto proceeding is against persons acting as a corporation without being legally incorporated, the judgment against the defendants shall be that they be perpetually restrained and enjoined from the commission or continuance of the acts complained of.
(Dec. 23, 1963, 77 Stat. 603, Pub. L. 88-241, § 1; July 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 563, Pub. L. 91-358, title I, § 145(n); 1973 Ed., § 16-3546; 1981 Ed., § 16-3546.)
§ 16-3547. Proceedings against corporate directors and trustees; judgment and order; enforcement.
Where a quo warranto proceeding is against a director or trustee of a corporation and the court finds that at his election either illegal votes were received or legal votes rejected, or both, sufficient to change the result if the error is corrected, the court may render judgment that the defendant be ousted, and that the relator, if entitled to be declared elected, be admitted to the office, and the court may issue an order to the proper parties, being officers or members of the corporation, to admit him to the office. The judgment may require the defendant to deliver to the relator all books, papers, and other things in his custody or control pertaining to the office, and obedience to judgment may be enforced by attachment.
(Dec. 23, 1963, 77 Stat. 603, Pub. L. 88-241, § 1; July 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 564, Pub. L. 91-358, title I, § 145(n); 1973 Ed., § 16-3547; 1981 Ed., § 16-3547.)
§ 16-3548. Recovery of damages from usurper; limitation.
At any time within a year from a judgment in a quo warranto proceeding, the relator may bring an action against the party ousted and recover the damages sustained by the relator by reason of the ousted party’s usurpation of the office to which the relator was entitled.
(Dec. 23, 1963, 77 Stat. 603, Pub. L. 88-241, § 1; July 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 564, Pub. L. 91-358, title I, § 145(n); 1973 Ed., § 16-3548; 1981 Ed., § 16-3548.)
Did you do all the html coding for that lengthy post, or was it fed to you ready for posting on the NET?
love it.
seems to state that Obama must refrain from acting in capacity of POTUS until it is resolved.
BTTT
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