The War in Abkhazia (1993 Russian Forces Ethnic Cleansing Campaign)

The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and the Silk Road Studies Program ^ | 2002 | Svante E. Cornell

[JerseyHighlander]

Autonomy and Conflict
 
Ethnoterritoriality and Separatism in the
South Caucasus – Cases in Georgia

Svante E. Cornell
 
Uppsala 2002
 

Excerpt, pp. 167-170

6.6.3. The War in Abkhazia
As mentioned earlier, the Abkhaz and Georgian leadership had managed in late 1991 to
agree, though with difficulty, on a consociational scheme for the Abkhaz parliament. And
indeed, Abkhazia had been surprisingly calm during the rule of Gamsakhurdia; the fact
that the latter, who by late 1991 had shed most the little will to compromise he possessed,
agreed to a scheme that granted the Abkhaz heavy over-representation, adds to the
peculiarity of the situation. Some observers have drawn the conclusion that there was a
shady ‘deal’ between Gamsakhurdia and the Abkhaz leadership; Gamsakhurdia’s spectacular but ill-fated return to Georgia in 1993 took place through Abkhazia, which
has compounded these speculations.
Events nevertheless turned for the worse as the Soviet Union collapsed, the
Gamsakhurdia government fell, and Abkhazia’s position increasingly fell into a
constitutional limbo. The new parliament never got a chance to function properly and was
soon deeply divided along ethnic lines. Abkhazia was now led by Vladislav Ardzinba, a
historian, former member of the USSR congress of people’s deputies, and member of the
right-wing groups in Moscow that were responsible for the August 1991 coup. Having
been a close associate of Congress Chairman Lukyanov, Ardzinba had been the polar
opposite to Shevardnadze in Union politics. Shevardnadze had been among the most
liberal proponents of Perestroika, whereas Ardzinba had been a member of the most
reactionary forces in Moscow.
Ardzinba soon moved to assert control over Soviet military units in Abkhazia, though
Russia in practice retained control over them. Instead, Ardzinba created a National Guard
that was mono-ethnically Abkhaz. Further, a practice of replacing ethnic Georgians in
leading positions with Abkhaz was initiated. This was partly in response to the practice of
ethnic Georgian representatives to consult with Tbilisi, thereby appearing in the Abkhaz
eyes to represent not the local Georgian population but the government in Tbilisi.
96 But
compromise was still being sought, and delegations shuttled between Tbilisi and Sukhumi
to try to achieve a compromise on the relationship between Abkhazia and Georgia.
Ardzinba proposed a draft treaty in June that would have safeguarded Georgia’s territorial
integrity but restructured the relationship  in a confederative way. As Georgia’s State
Council rejected this proposal and talks led nowhere, tensions increased.
97
In July, the Abkhaz parliament, though  lacking its ethnic Georgian component,
adopted a resolution to restore the rather anachronistic 1925 constitution. This document
described the ‘Abkhaz Soviet Socialist Republic’ as independent but ‘United with the
Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic on the basis of a special Union Treaty’.
98 Meanwhile,
Ardzinba’s rhetoric mounted, as he claimed in ate July that ‘Abkhazia is strong enough to
fight Georgia’,
99 a somewhat absurd statement given the disparity in size and military
power between the two. The legality of the resolution adopting the constitution was also
highly doubtful, given that the necessary quorum of two thirds was not present in the
absence of the ethnic Georgian representatives. Two weeks later, loosely organized
Georgian forces under Kitovani entered Abkhazia and drove straight for Sukhumi. The
Abkhaz leadership retreated to Gudauta in the North of Abkhazia, where a Russian
                                                

military base is located. Kitovani’s forces took Sukhumi on August 18 in a bout of killing
and looting characteristic of the undisciplined militias, and then moved north along the
Black Sea coast. 
Shevardnadze seemed to have been caught unaware by Kitovani’s invasion, but failed
to force him to withdraw. Meanwhile, the Abkhaz prepared a counter-offensive. As they
retreated toward the Russian border, they were met by Chechen and Circassian volunteer
units representing the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, whose capital
was Sukhumi.
100 By late September, their force had further swelled, and when the Abkhaz
counter-attacked on October 1, they were equipped with T-72 tanks, Grad rocket
launchers, heavy artillery, unidentified naval vessels, and air support, including Sukhoi
fighter planes that bombed Sukhumi.
101 Evidence of Russian military support for
Abkhazia increased after Georgian forces had shelled a Russian military laboratory at
Eshera.
102 As the Abkhaz counter-offensive gathered strength in spite of several abortive
cease-fires, Russian involvement grew as acknowledged by Russian experts: ‘Moscow was
clearly held responsible for what was accurately described as a purposeful and
purposefully one-sided military intervention on behalf of Abkhazian separation. …
Russian planes bombed Sukhumi in February 1993, [and] a Russian army unit participated
in an Abkhazian attack on Sukhumi a month later.’
103 By July 1993, only Sukhumi and the
southwestern part of Abkhazia remained in Georgian hands when a Russian-brokered
cease-fire came into effect. The agreement provided for withdrawal of both sides forces
from the conflict area. Georgian forces were moved by ship to Poti further South; and the
Abkhaz arms were handed over to Russian forces in Abkhazia. At this point, Zviad
Gamsakhurdia spectacularly returned from exile to Mingrelia, claiming to be Georgia’s
legal President. Over a third of the Georgian forces deserted to support him, and the
Abkhaz took this opportunity to resume their offensive. On September 26, Abkhaz-led
forces entered Sukhumi, forcing Shevardnadze to flee the city by air, narrowly escaping an
Abkhaz missile. The front in Abkhazia collapsed, and Abkhaz forces captured the entire
territory of Abkhazia with the exception of parts of the mountainous Kodori gorge in the
borderland between Abkhazia and Svaneti. An estimated 200,000 Georgians were evicted
from the Gali region and other parts of Abkhazia by the advancing Abkhaz forces. The
rebellion in Mingrelia grew, threatening to plunge Georgia into total chaos. Shevardnadze
                                                
 In March 1993,
Georgian artillery shot down a Suhkoi-27 aircraft carrying Soviet Air Force identification marks over
the boundary between Abkhazia and Georgia, whose  deceased pilot was positively identified as a
major on active duty in the Russian Air Force. For a detailed treatment of Russian intervention in the
war in Abkhazia, See Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, pp.344-353.

acquiesced to Russian demands of joining the Commonwealth of Independent States, and
accepted the presence of Russian troops on its territory and to have its border with
Turkey patrolled by Russian troops. In exchange, Russian forces now moved to quell the
‘Zviadist’ (as Gamsakhurdia’s forces were called) insurgency in less than two weeks.
Gamsakhurdia himself died in mysterious circumstances in a remote area of western
Georgia around New Year’s eve.
By early 1994, Georgia’s independence had been a complete disaster, with two ethnic
wars and two civil wars decimating the country. It had failed to retain its factual
independence, and seemed to have returned to Russian domination. It now controlled
only half of South Ossetia and had completely lost control over Abkhazia, including over
half of the country’s coastline. It had a large refugee population which gradually became a
hotbed of nationalism. Shevardnadze was now left with the arduous task of putting
Georgia back together.

96 Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, p. 117.
97 BBC Monitoring Service, 18 June 1992.
98 Gueorgui Otyrba, ‘War in Abkhazia: the Regional Significance of the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict’,
in Roman Szporluk, ed., The International Relations of Eurasia vol. 1, Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1994.
99 ‘Georgia: Abkhazia “Strong enough to fight Georgia”’, BBC Monitoring Service, 30 July 1992.

100 Reuters, 14 August 1992, 18 August 1992, 19 August 1992.
101 For a detailed treatment of the war see Svante Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, pp. 170-174.
102 Viacheslav Chirikba, ‘The Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict and its Aftermath’, in Mehmet Tütüncü, ed.,
Caucasus: War and Peace, Haarlem: SOTA, 1998.
103 Evgeniy M. Kozhokin, ‘Georgia-Abkhazia’, in Jeremy Azrael and Emil Payin, eds., U.S. and Russian
Policy-Making with Respect to the Use of Force, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1996.

[JerseyHighlander]

This is an excerpt from a Dissertation for the Degree of Doctor in Philosophy in Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala
University in 2002. 

Today, 12 August 2008, Russia accuses Georgia of ethnic cleansing, while in reality there are 300,000 Georgians, Armenian-Georgians, and Mingrelian-Georgians that are internally displaced inside Georgia and Armenia due to Russia's invasion and ethnic cleansing of Abkhazia in 1993, and through the one sided "peacekeeping" in South Ossetia in the years following. "An estimated 200,000 Georgians were evicted
from the Gali region and other parts of Abkhazia by the advancing Abkhaz forces."

The pdf file is 260 pages, so be warned.

  http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/publications/0419dissertation.pdf

[Steve Van Doorn]

thanks bookmarked

[1rudeboy]

I posted this earlier--additional historical perspective:

CRACKDOWN (The 1991 Vilnius Massacre Revisited).

[Tailgunner Joe]

As they retreated toward the Russian border, they were met by Chechen and Circassian volunteer units representing the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, whose capital was Sukhumi.

Among the Chechen muslims who waged jihad against Georgia with Russian help was Shamil Basayev. In 2004, in Beslan, North Ossetia, Basayev's Chechen terrorists slaughtered hundreds of Ossetian children to reward Russia for supporting the genocide and ethnic cleansing of hundreds of thousands of Christian Georgians.