NY Times’ Latest McCain Hatchet Job

Special to FreeRepublic ^ | 28 February 2008 | John Armor (Congressman Billybob)

[Congressman Billybob]

About half the time when the press falls down on the job, I attack the whole press. But sometimes, I attack the New York Times in particular. Especially on so-called investigative journalism, when the Times prints a piece on a new subject, other media will run with it, assuming that the Times has done its homework.

Therefore, when the Times butchers its homework and produces a biased article, it is important to attack the Times and do so right away. That way, perhaps a few of the following media will get the message, and not run off the information cliff following the Times.

This morning (28 February, 2008) the New York Times ran an article by Carl Hulse, entitled, “McCain’s Canal Zone Birth Prompts Queries About Whether that Rules Him Out.” The article spends 21 paragraphs getting sweaty palmed over whether John McCain is eligible to be elected President, since he was born outside the mainland United States.

The article begins, of course, with the requirement in the Constitution that to be President a person must be a “natural born Citizen.” The Constitution also requires that President be “thirty five Years” old, and “fourteen years a Resident within the United States.” The Times left out that last requirement, which makes clear that citizenship and residency are not the same thing.

The article quotes various experts who claim McCain might not be eligible. Only three paragraphs from the end does the article mention that Congress passed a law to deal with this precise matter. That law defined children of US citizens born in the Canal Zone after 1904, as US citizens “at birth.” The Times also misses a law passed in 1790, written by many of the same people who wrote the Constitution, which provided “citizenship at birth” to children born to US citizen parents, outside the country.

The story which the Times also ignores the power of Congress to pass laws defining citizenship. The original authority is in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, which gives Congress the power to “establish an (sic) uniform Rule of Naturalization.” More recent and more important, the 14th Amendment begins, “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof....” That Amendment ends with, “The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”

Note the critical phrase, “and subject to the jurisdiction thereof....” Jurisdiction is a legal matter, which is defined in this instance by federal law, not by accidents of geography.

The bottom line is clear. The 14th Amendment gives Congress the power to define a child of US parents born outside the US, as nonetheless a “natural born citizen.” Therefore the Act of Congress to include children born to US parents in the Canal Zone is plainly constitutional.

So, by doing incomplete homework, perhaps deliberately, the New York Times has created another hatchet job on John McCain, to benefit either Barack Obama or Hillary Clinton, either of whom the Times prefers. The Times has also, again, damaged its reputation as a newspaper that supposedly seeks and publishes the facts.

But the Times has also done an accidental public service with this article. It has drawn public attention to Congress’ authority to define, by law, the circumstances which make a child a “natural born” American.

If Congress has the power to declare that a child of American parents, but born overseas, is an American, then Congress has the equal power to declare that a child born of Mexican parents in the United States is NOT an American citizen. That would apply only if the Mexican, or Canadian, or any other nationality, parents were not legally in the US at the time of the child’s birth.

Long before I became a candidate for Congress, I was writing that the problem of “anchor babies,” children of illegal immigrants who were “US citizens by birth,” could and should be solved by Congress. As I pointed out months ago, it is routine federal law that children of embassy personnel in D.C. are citizens of their parents’ nations, not of the US, even when they are born in US hospitals. This is not rocket science.

Those who say that only a constitutional amendment can solve the “anchor baby” problem, including the Times, are incompetent in doing their homework.

What is the application of this (somewhat) tedious discussion of law to the race for Congress? Anyone who seeks to serve in Congress ought to have a basic understanding of how the federal government works, including the Constitution. The New York Times has just displayed its ignorance about citizenship law. How many candidates for Congress were able to spot the errors in this article, immediately?

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About the Author: John Armor practiced in the US Supreme Court for 33 years. John_Armor@aya.yale.edu He is running for the 11th Congressional District of North Carolina.

- 30 -

[ovrtaxt]

Aw man. We don’t want to hear about McCain’s birth canal.

[rolling_stone]

I have previously read you links, but unfortunately “a citizen at birth” may or may not be “natural born”, a judge could decide it anyway they want. True it is a weak argument, but it is an issue nevertheless.

Historically the first Congress passed legislation stating....”and the children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens:”....

The second Congress has different language:

“and the children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits or jurisdiction of the United States shall be considered as citizens of the United States:”...

The seventh Congress has even different language:

“and the children of person whow now are or who have been citizens of the United States, shall, though born out of the limits and jusrisdiction of the United States, shall be considered as citizens of the United States:”...

it goes on further..”And be it further enacted, that all acts heretofore passed respecting naturalization,be,and the same are hereby repealed.”

The important question is why did the first Congress include the term ‘natural born citizen” and then not use it again? Was it on purpose or was it by error? Where else in US law is the term ‘natural born citizen” used other than in the requirements for the President? When Congress passed other laws relating to citizenship at birth including in the Canal Zone why did they say citizen at birth instead of natural born citizen?

[billva]

This is SO over-the-top egregious, and will create such a huge wave of sympathy for McCain, that I’m starting to wonder if the NYT is actually rooting for him - or are they that stupid?

Arrogant or stupid!

[PGalt]

BTTT! Thanks to all contributors to this thread exposing the outrageous behavior by the NY Times.

[Congressman Billybob]

Carl Hulse and the New York Times have just doubled down on this story, and come up stupid squared. The follow-up story in tomorrow's newspaper cites a Democrat Member of Congress who intends to "introduce a bill, to clear this up once and for all."

Helloooo. If there IS a constitutional defect, a mere law passed by Congress cannot clear it up. That's the very function of a Constitution, ours or anyone else's. It has to be "supreme Law" by definition, or it is no law at all. Alexander Hamilton wrote that in a New York newspaper. But it wasn't the Times, you can bet.

Congress has already passed a law, under the authority of the 14th Amendment, that solves the problem.

Doesn't anyone at the Times even know how to find anyone who has read and understood the Constitution? [Crickets.]

John / Billybob

[DaveTesla]

§ 1401. Nationals and citizens of United States at birth

The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth:
(a) a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof;
(b) a person born in the United States to a member of an Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian, or other aboriginal tribe: Provided, That the granting of citizenship under this subsection shall not in any manner impair or otherwise affect the right of such person to tribal or other property;
(c) a person born outside of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents both of whom are citizens of the United States and one of whom has had a residence in the United States or one of its outlying possessions, prior to the birth of such person;
(d) a person born outside of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is a citizen of the United States who has been physically present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year prior to the birth of such person, and the other of whom is a national, but not a citizen of the United States;
(e) a person born in an outlying possession of the United States of parents one of whom is a citizen of the United States who has been physically present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year at any time prior to the birth of such person;
(f) a person of unknown parentage found in the United States while under the age of five years, until shown, prior to his attaining the age of twenty-one years, not to have been born in the United States;
(g) a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than five years, at least two of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years: Provided, That any periods of honorable service in the Armed Forces of the United States, or periods of employment with the United States Government or with an international organization as that term is defined in section 288 of title 22 by such citizen parent, or any periods during which such citizen parent is physically present abroad as the dependent unmarried son or daughter and a member of the household of a person
(A) honorably serving with the Armed Forces of the United States, or
(B) employed by the United States Government or an international organization as defined in section 288 of title 22, may be included in order to satisfy the physical-presence requirement of this paragraph. This proviso shall be applicable to persons born on or after December 24, 1952, to the same extent as if it had become effective in its present form on that date; and
(h) a person born before noon (Eastern Standard Time) May 24, 1934, outside the limits and jurisdiction of the United States of an alien father and a mother who is a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, had resided in the United States.

[DaveTesla]

February 13, 1996

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

____________________
No. 92-1735

No. 95-1558

ROGER F. ALEXANDER, ETC., ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,

Respondent.

____________________

ERRATA SHEET

The opinion of this Court, issued on January 31, 1996, should be amended as follows:

On cover sheet, line 1 of attorney listings, replace “ William A. Maganiello “ with “ William A. Mangiello “.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

____________________

No. 92-1735

No. 95-1558

ROGER F. ALEXANDER, ETC., ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,

Respondent.

____________________

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF

THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

____________________

Before

Boudin, Circuit Judge ,

Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge ,

and Stahl, Circuit Judge .

____________________

Michael G. Hillinger with whom William A. Mangiello was on briefs for petitioners.

Carl H. McIntyre, Jr. , Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, Department of Justice, with whom Stuart M. Gerson , Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Frank W. Hunger , Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, and David J. Kline , Assistant Director, were on briefs for respondent.

____________________

January 31, 1996

____________________
BOUDIN, Circuit Judge . Petitioner Roger Alexander, named Roger Alexander Hobbs at birth, was born in Great Britain on February 13, 1945, son of Sarah Hobbs and, he alleges, Floyd Alexander, an American serviceman. Roger was unaware of his true father until 1968, when he discovered that the man whom he believed to be his father had died in 1943. His mother then told him that his father was in fact Floyd Alexander. Sometime after Floyd’s death in 1970, Roger established contact with his supposed American half-siblings. In 1984, Roger, his wife Anne, and their three sons moved to the United States.

In 1985, Roger filed an application for a certificate of U.S. citizenship which was denied the following year. Some months after Roger filed the application, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (”INS”) served an order to show cause on Roger and Anne, charging that they were deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2), on the ground that they had overstayed their non-immigrant visas. Roger contested this order by presenting a claim to derivative citizenship through Floyd.

The INS held three days of hearings on Roger’s citizenship claim in Boston in 1987 and 1988. On September 22, 1988, the immigration judge entered an order denying Roger’s claims, finding the Alexanders deportable, and granting their request for voluntary departure. That order was appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals; on June 9, 1992 the Board dismissed the Alexanders’ appeal, holding that Roger had not met the statutory requirements for derivative citizenship under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401 and 1409. The Alexanders filed a motion for reconsideration which the Board denied. The Alexanders then filed in this court a timely petition for review, which we now grant.

8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(5) provides that whenever a petitioner, who seeks review of an order of deportation,

claims to be a national of the United States and makes a showing that his claim is not frivolous, the court shall (A) pass upon the issues presented when it appears from the pleadings and affidavits filed by the parties that no genuine issue of material fact is presented; or (B) where a genuine issue of material fact as to the petitioner’s nationality is presented, transfer the proceedings to a United States district court . . . for hearing de novo . . . .

The government does not contest that Roger has alleged a viable theory of citizenship. The only question for our decision is whether there is a “genuine issue of material fact” for determination by the district court. Agosto v. INS , 436 U.S. 748, 754 (1978). This standard is analogous to that governing motions for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

If Roger has a statutory claim to U.S. citizenship, it is by operation of 8 U.S.C. § 1409(b), [1] which states in relevant part that

the provisions of section 1401(g) of this title shall apply to a child born out of wedlock on or after January 13, 1941, and before December 24, 1952, as of the date of birth if the paternity of such child is established at any time while such child is under the age of twenty-one years by legitimation.

18 U.S.C. 1401(g) provides that the foreign-born child of parents, one of whom is a U.S. citizen and one of whom is an alien, is “a citizen . . . at birth” if the U.S. citizen parent resided in the United States for a statutorily defined period prior to the child’s birth.

Thus, to show that he was a U.S. citizen at birth, Roger must prove that (1) Floyd was his father; (2) Floyd was a U.S. citizen who satisfied the physical presence requirements of section 1401(g); and (3) Floyd’s paternity was established prior to Roger’s 21st birthday. Enough evidence at the INS hearing indicated that Floyd was Roger’s biological father, and Floyd was admittedly a U.S. citizen who satisfied the physical presence requirements. So this appeal turns on whether there is also a genuine factual dispute as to whether Roger was legitimated prior to his 21st birthday.

At the hearing before the immigration judge, Roger offered the affidavit of David Klickstein, now deceased, a Maine attorney and notary public. According to the affidavit, in 1955 Floyd signed a document acknowledging that Roger was his son; Klickstein notarized the document but did not keep a copy, nor was any copy offered at the hearing. Roger also offered testimony by Floyd’s first wife that Floyd had told her that he had executed the alleged affidavit. Floyd’s alleged document, if made and acknowledged as described in Klickstein’s affidavit, legitimated Roger as Floyd’s son under Maine law in 1955, when Roger was under age 21. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(1) (providing that state law governs). [2]

To be sure, the Board found the Klickstein affidavit unconvincing, saying that Roger’s “claim that his father executed a purported document acknowledging paternity is not adequately supported.” But under the unusual statutory procedure already described, this court does not review that finding under a substantial-evidence or other customary standard. Once a genuine material issue of fact is posed, the statute entitles Roger to a trial de novo in the district court. 8 U.S.C. §1105a(a)(5).

On appeal the INS argues that the absence of the actual document is fatal to Roger’s claim as a matter of law. We disagree: there is nothing in the language of the Maine statute to indicate that the continued existence of the document is essential to legitimation, nor does the INS refer us to any Maine case law to support this view. To the contrary, the statute indicates that it is the creation of the document, not its preservation, that matters. Cf. In re Joyce’s Estate , 183 A.2d 513, 514 (Me. 1962).

Although it might surprise a lay person to see how little importance we attach to the preservation of the affidavit, no lawyer would be surprised. A will, for example, must be made and executed with startling formality, but if lost or misplaced may be proved by oral evidence. E.g. , In re Estate of Fuller , 399 A.2d 960, 961 (N.H. 1979). Indeed, the whole tendency of the law of evidence governing documents is to demand the original if available but to forgive its absence if explained. See Fed. R. Evid. 1004. Of course, Roger must prove that his legitimation occurred but this is a matter for the district court. [3] other more readily admissible evidence exists to show that Floyd’s statement was prepared and notarized.

The INS argues in the alternative that even if Roger became a “citizen . . . at birth” under section 1401(g), he lost his citizenship under the retention requirements of former section 1401(b). That section originally provided, with a qualification not here pertinent, that anyone who became a citizen under section 1401(g) lost his citizenship unless he came to the U.S. before age 23 and remained for at least five years. 66 Stat. 235 (1952). Roger admits that he does not satisfy this requirement, nor a slightly less rigorous version later enacted. See 92 Stat. 1046 (1972).

Although the retention requirement was repealed entirely in 1978, the repeal was by its own terms not retroactive. 92 Stat. 1046. We were therefore initially disposed to conclude that Roger’s section 1409(b) claim was barred by the retention requirement. However, in the course of preparing the opinion, the court encountered a 1994 amendment, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1435, that provides relief as follows:

A person who was a citizen of the United States at birth and lost such citizenship for failure to meet the physical presence retention requirements under section 1401(b) of this title (as in effect before October 10, 1978), shall, from and after taking the oath of allegiance required by section 1448 of this title be a citizen of the United States and have the status of a citizen of the United States by birth, without filing an application for naturalization . . . .

The effect of this language appeared to allow Roger to escape the retention requirement merely by filing an oath of allegiance. See 8 U.S.C. § 1448 (prescribing oath).

Confident that the INS would wish to see justice done, we asked the parties to address this provision in supplemental briefs. Roger replied that he had not yet taken such an oath but proposed to do so. The INS, in its reply, did not deny that the oath would erase the bar of former section 1401(b). But it argued that this court has “no jurisdiction” to consider the 1994 amendment issue because that would require consideration of evidence not appearing “upon the administrative record upon which the deportation order is based.” 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4).

Section 1105a(a)(4), like many counterparts, e.g. , 5 U.S.C. § 706; 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e) and (f), is intended to prevent a reviewing court from considering evidence not before an administrative agency, i.e. , to assure that agency findings are reviewed upon the record made before the agency. Cf. Camp v. Pitts , 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973). Nothing in such provisions prevents a reviewing court from applying correct legal principles to a dispute, whether or not previously identified in the agency proceeding. And if former section 1401(b) is now a hollow shell, the INS’ argument fails as a matter of law.

Of course, Roger did not rely upon the 1994 amendment (nor did the INS mention it to us in its brief). Failure to raise an argument in timely fashion means that a reviewing court is free to disregard it. Thomas v. INS , 976 F.2d 786, 789 (1st Cir. 1992). But the law that was overlooked (the 1994 amendment) is not disputed, Congress’ intent to preserve citizenship on condition is apparent, the condition can be mechanically satisfied, and the right in question—American citizenship—is one of the most precious imaginable.

We therefore transfer this case to the district court for trial de novo . 8 U.S.C. §1105a(a)(5). We do not at this time pass upon any alternative constitutional claims made by Roger. The district court may require Roger to present evidence within a reasonable time that he has executed the oath prescribed by 8 U.S.C. § 1448; if Roger fails to do so, the district court may dismiss on that ground alone. Otherwise, the court should proceed to the merits of his claim under section 1409(b).

It is so ordered.

---

FOOTNOTES
[1]
Roger argues that he qualifies for citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a), but it is clear that current section 1409(a) does not apply to individuals born prior to November 15, 1968. See 102 Stat. 2619 (1988). And former section 1409(a) applies only to individuals born on or after December 24, 1952. 66 Stat. 238 (1952).

[2] Under Maine law in 1955, “[i]f the father of a child born out of wedlock adopts him or her into his family or in writing acknowledges before some justice of the peace or notary public that he is the father, such child is . . . the heir and legitimate child of his or her father.” 4 Me. Rev. Stat. c. 170, § 3 (1954), repealed by 1979 Me. Laws ch. 540, § 24-C.

[3] The Board apparently considered the Klickstein affidavit at the hearing but found it insufficient. As the issue has not been raised by the INS, we have no occasion to consider whether the affidavit would be admissible in district court under a hearsay exception, e.g. , Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5), whether the rules of evidence would be strictly applied in a proceeding before the district judge, or whether

[DaveTesla]

“18 U.S.C. 1401(g) provides that the foreign-born child of parents, one of whom is a U.S. citizen and one of whom is an alien, is “a citizen . . . at birth” if the U.S. citizen parent resided in the United States for a statutorily defined period prior to the child’s birth.”

[Rocky]

many Members are dumb as a hoe handle about their own, legislative past

At least one of them thinks our astronauts landed on Mars. Here's hoping you win your election and reduce the number of hoe handles.

[DaveTesla]

Do I read this correctly,
TITLE 8 CHAPTER 12 SUBCHAPTER III Part I § 1401
Makes John McCain a citizen at birth i.e. a natural born citizen?

[HawaiianGecko]

The important question is why did the first Congress include the term ‘natural born citizen” and then not use it again? Was it on purpose or was it by error? Where else in US law is the term ‘natural born citizen” used other than in the requirements for the President? When Congress passed other laws relating to citizenship at birth including in the Canal Zone why did they say citizen at birth instead of natural born citizen?

This whole paragraph poses questions that have apparently stumped our greatest legal minds over time. If you believe the people that continue to bring the subject up at every chance they get.  The most simple answer I have is that our founding fathers weren't as divine and infallible as we like to believe. They thought it was clear, but as you point out just one year later in 1790 the 1st congress pass a law specifically to cover this, so they quickly realized they blew it.

Here's what I consider the final arbitrator of this subject. USC 8 Section 1401 says: "The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth:" And number one on the list is: "a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof"  Now, before you point out that it doesn't say 'natural born' consider the paradox created using your logic.

Since anyone born inside the US is a citizen at birth and your argument is that a citizen at birth does not mean natural born and therefore cannot be president... just how did 40 of our presidents become POTUS?

Personally, I think dropping that into the lap of any judge is a winning argument.

[rolling_stone]

Here's what I consider the final arbitrator of this subject. USC 8 Section 1401 says: "The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth:" And number one on the list is: "a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" Now, before you point out that it doesn't say 'natural born' consider the paradox created using your logic.

Since anyone born inside the US is a citizen at birth and your argument is that a citizen at birth does not mean natural born and therefore cannot be president... just how did 40 of our presidents become POTUS?

I think your argument and logic is very persuasive and would be hard to dispute.

[Paleo Conservative]

Since anyone born inside the US is a citizen at birth

Not true. The children of foreign diplomats born in the US are not US citizens by birth, because they are not subject the jurisdiction of the US.

[HawaiianGecko]

 " Not true. The children of foreign diplomats born in the US are not US citizens by birth, because they are not subject the jurisdiction of the US."

Your argument is petty. It was posted in response to my post #31 where I clearly type and in italics "a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof."   In the next paragraph I abbreviate the line for ease of reading.  Any sensible sensible person would understand that the conversation was about the paradox created with respect to previous presidents.  Most if not all of whom where not children of foreign diplomats and were subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, therefore, leaving off that caveat is perfectly acceptable.

[Paleo Conservative]

No it was not petty. It was an example of a class of persons born inside the US who are not US citizenz by birth. There are quite a few people who believe Congress has the power to also write laws that would make the children of illegal aliens noncitizens too.

[1L]

>>Since anyone born inside the US is a citizen at birth and your argument is that a citizen at birth does not mean natural born and therefore cannot be president... just how did 40 of our presidents become POTUS?<<

This isn’t a paradox if they were born in the actual 50 states or even territories. Who exactly wasn’t and which 3 are you excluding?

Not that you’re wrong, just that I’m not sure your statement here holds true.

[HawaiianGecko]

"This isn’t a paradox if they were born in the actual 50 states or even territories." 

I'm saying that born in the actual 50 states is precisely what makes it a paradox. 

First let me dispatch with the 3 I left out.  I didn't look up all the presidents, but only those born after the creation of the United States would fall in this category.  If I was being specific about the 40 (I wasn't) then your question about which 3 did I leave out should have asked which 2 did I leave out.  Only 42 men have been POTUS. Cleveland was both the 22nd and 24th POTUS. I simply plucked a number out of the sky and should have said  'most' or 'a whole bunch' but I just see no point in knowing exactly which Presidents don't fall in this category as it's not essential to make the point.  A whole bunch of them were born in a state, in the United States to parents that were born in the U.S. etcetera.

USC 8 Section 1401 starts off saying: "The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth:" Or these people are "citizens at birth". 

Paragraph (a) says: "a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof;"   (Like you said above)Therefore, people born in the United States like darn near all of us are "citizens at birth". 

Paragraph (c) of USC 8 Section 1401 states: "a person born outside of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents both of whom are citizens of the United States and one of whom has had a residence in the United States or one of its outlying possessions, prior to the birth of such person;"  This says a person born outside the U.S. and a person born outside its outlying possessions. Now this by itself suggests that a person born inside a U.S. possession is a citizen at birth, which would cover McCain by itself.

Paragraph (e) states:  "a person born in an outlying possession of the United States of parents one of whom is a citizen of the United States who has been physically present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year at any time prior to the birth of such person;"  This says McCain is a citizen at birth.

The logic I'm referring to and I seriously believe it would hold up in court is simple. George W. Bush, the 43rd President of the United States is a 'citizen by birth' according to USC 8, Section 1401, Paragraph (a).  John McCain is a citizen at birth the same as George Bush according to Paragraph (e) and maybe (c). Now, if a citizen at birth cannot hold the office, how can George hold it, but McCain cannot?  That is the paradox... to me anyway.  Most of our presidents are citizens at birth (not the ones born before 1776 or 1781 or 1789 whichever date one considers the legal birth of our nation)

Precedence holds a high position in the law.  We have had 200 years of citizens running for president that weren't born physically in the United States, but were never a citizen of any country except the United States, and that sets precedence. Think about it. What is the USSC going to do if this ever makes it to them.  What are they going to base their arguments and decision upon. The word 'natural' certainly doesn't have any definition remotely referring to geography, neither does 'born' so they're not going to claim that it means 'native born'. They are going to proclaim it means a citizen born the ole natural way. The same way a poor commoner as myself thinks of natural born.

Obviously our founders didn't want to say any citizen is qualified or they wouldn't have added natural born. Surely they didn't mean 'native' born, because Thomas Jefferson himself doesn't fit the definition.  He was born in Virginia, but not the United States.  Months were spent writing this so I'm sure if they meant 'native' they would have used it in place of 'natural' in this sentence.

It's reasonable to believe they didn't want some Norwegian, born to Norwegian parents, living his entire life in Norway coming to America, becoming a citizen and then President.  They wanted all presidents to be 'natural born' citizens.  In other words, citizens that became citizens the 'natural' way.  You know, never been anything but an American. 

There is a reason this hasn't been through the court system and it's not because the opposing party to the offending candidate is being magnanimous.  Barry Goldwater was born in a U.S. possession and is a citizen at birth.  I'm relatively positive that the GOP didn't just up and decide to perform an unconstitutional act and run Barry for president. George Romney was born completely outside the United States (Mexico), but his parents were both American citizens, hence, he was a citizen at birth.

Now, after boring you half to death, I'll summarize that while everyone is reading anything they can find that defines 'natural born' we have all been glossing over Paragraph (a) of USC 8, Section 1401, because it obviously refers to most of us, the plain ole normal born Americans.  [I said normal born, not natural born or native born :-)]  But it is the exact portion of the law that can be used against the argument that a 'citizen at birth' person is not eligible to be president.

This tortured logic is just my opinion mind you, and I might note that I have been called an idiot in FR more than once, so please feel free to tell me if you think I should post another debit to my I'm an idiot account journal.  :-)