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The actual interview had some goodies for ya.
http://www.upi.com/International_Security/Emerging_Threats/Analysis/2008/02/08/interview_lee_kuan_yew_—_part_1/1475/

UPI: How do you see Iraq?

Lee: I do not want to say anything that would hurt President Bush because I believe he went in with the best of intentions. He put his trust in Dick Cheney. And I had trust in Dick Cheney as the voice of experience — oil business executive, defense secretary during the first Gulf War (1990-91). But I don’t know what happened to Dick Cheney. He allowed himself to believe with Richard Perle and the neocons you could change Iraq. How could you change Iraq, a 4,000-year-old society that is not malleable? Everybody knows the troubles the British had during and after World War I. Ideology should have no place when making geopolitical assessments.

George W. Bush, whatever his faults, is not walking away from what was started, which is just as well otherwise further damage will be done.

Q: And the next president?

A: Of all the candidates who will inherit the problem, I prefer John McCain. He will see this thing through. Walking away from it would also have disastrous consequences. If Afghanistan is a failed state, it’s not your fault. No one has ever made sense out of it. But if you leave Iraq in its present state, you will have even bigger problems throughout the entire Middle East. The Shiites will get together. The Iraqi Shia will become dependent on Iran, and the Iranians will have mastery of that critically important Gulf area.

Q: So what is your recommendation about Iran’s nuclear ambitions?

A: Is it now unstoppable. They are a very old civilization. Unlike the Arabs, apart from Mesopotamia valley, they rank with the Chinese, as history’s two principal civilizations worth talking about. And I think the mullahs and others want to go back to the days of empire.

Q: So should we be talking to them at the highest level, the way Henry Kissinger went to China?

A: (Chuckle) But you haven’t got a Kissinger or a Brzezinski to do that anymore. Where is the successor generation of geopoliticians?

Q: In fact, democracies don’t produce great statesmen anymore. Why?

A: You now have, and I don’t know how long this phase will last, mass media domination, owned by a group of media barons who want constant change for their balance sheets.

Q: So the power of mass media has made it impossible for a great statesman or woman to emerge and last any length of time?

A: I’m not sure. It depends on the nature of the crisis that must be faced. When a real crisis sets in, a matter of life and death, opinion formulators realize this is no time to be pontificating, but a time to stay the course with someone who understands what this is all about. Short of that, the media help put a leader on the pedestal and then start chopping away at the pedestal until he/she falls in disgrace. That’s part of the cycle of constant change. Watch Sarkozy in France. They hoisted him up to prominence and now they’re already attempting to bring him down through his personal life.

Q: So we’re doing the right thing?

A: No. Iraq was a mistake. I’ve said this before and I said this in the presence of Paul Wolfowitz, one of the architects of the invasion, at an IISS conference two months after the fall of Saddam Hussein, when someone asked me what will happen in Iraq. In October 2002, I was in Washington and became quite convinced an invasion would take place. On the way home, I stopped in London and asked Tony Blair to brief me. After 45 minutes, I said, “Look I accept the argument that with British and American military capabilities it would be a walk over, but then what do you do the day after? Blair replied, “That’s up to the Americans.” I then said to Blair, “If you were in charge, what would you do?” His political adviser then stepped in and said, “We would appoint the strongest pro-Western general and then get out quickly.” So I repeated all that at the IISS conference and explained this reflected the institutional memory of what the British had been through in Iraq in the early 1920s. Paul Wolfowitz stood up in high dudgeon. So to placate him, I said, “Of course the British don’t have the resources you have.”

Q: Did Wolfowitz ask anything of you?

A: Yes, he came to my office to ask that Singapore send police trainers to Iraq. I had known Paul since his days as an ambassador at the State Department. I said, “Paul, do you realize how long it takes to train a policeman in Singapore? And that’s only in one language, English, and it still takes two years. And you want me to teach Iraqis how to do it in three months in English? No, he replied, we’ll supply translators. This is an emergency, he said, and many nations are helping us. So I replied OK, but we’ll do it in Amman, Jordan, not Baghdad, where we would become the targets of suicide bombers. When he told me they had disbanded Saddam’s police force, I became very nervous. Because when the Japanese came down here in World War II, 20,000 of their troops captured 90,000 British, Indian and Australian troops. They sent them into captivity, but they left the local police in charge, and kept all the other positions of the British administration intact — from power management to the gas board — and simply put Japanese in charge of each British position. And 20,000 Japanese troops moved on to Java. But in Iraq, you disbanded everything, and tried to run things without the former Baath party officials who had been in charge of civil administration. You created an ungovernable vacuum.

Q: Why do you think this was so?

A: From Day One, the idea of remaking Iraq, without the civil service in place and without recalling Saddam’s army to service, showed a frightening lack of understanding of local conditions and elementary facts of political and economic life in Iraq. In ancient days, those who invaded and conquered China on horseback got off their horses and applied themselves to the more difficult job of governing.

Q: Did Iraq have anything to do with al-Qaida?

A: Of course not, as became clear in the daily sessions the imprisoned Saddam spent with his Arabic-speaking FBI interrogator over several months before his execution. But U.S. authorities were convinced Saddam was secretly supporting al-Qaida with weapons and training and maybe even WMD. So therefore the imperative became the elimination of Saddam.

Q: Switching to Pakistan, most terrorist trails in the United Kingdom and most recently in Germany via Turkey, track back to training camps and madrassas in the tribal areas that straddle the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

A: We even had a terrorist of Pakistani descent here in Singapore.

Q: So what’s your view of what should be done about the Pakistan-terrorist nexus?

A: (Laughs for several seconds) We should learn to live with it for a long time. My fear is Pakistan may well get worse. What is the choice? (President) Musharraf is the only general I know who is totally secular in his approach. But he’s got to maneuver between his extremists who are sympathetic to Taliban and al-Qaida and moderate elements with a Western outlook. We forget that right after Sept. 11 he was given a stark choice by President Bush: either you abandon your support of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan or face the disintegration of Pakistan. There is an interesting study of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency that says 20 percent of the Pakistani army’s officer corps is fundamentalist.

Q: So what do you feel the United States can do there now?

A: There is very little, if anything, the U.S. can do to influence the course of events in Pakistan that wouldn’t make matters worse. Any U.S. interference in Pakistan would result in Pakistan’s four provinces becoming four failed states. And then what happens to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal? It’s a horrendous festering problem. The Feb. 18 elections may bring a little clarity and hopefully democratic stability to Pakistan, but I am not holding my breath.