Amateurs talk tactics, professional talk logistics.
Logistically, invading Russia in 1709 was a very bad idea. Napoleon and Hitler had massive difficulties logistically, even with much more advanced technology.
Strategically, his decision to turn his back on Russia and allow Peter to rebound while he flailed around in Poland for 10 years was also a serious mistake. You should always finish off your (at least potentially) more dangerous enemies before turning to secondary foes.
“Amateurs talk tactics, professional talk logistics.”
- Guess this is true in many ways.
“Strategically, his decision to turn his back on Russia and allow Peter to rebound while he flailed around in Poland for 10 years was also a serious mistake. You should always finish off your (at least potentially) more dangerous enemies before turning to secondary foes.”
- But was Russia really the most dangerous enemy? If Poland would have been allowed to recover after only having been partially defeated so to say, it’s likely they would’ve supported a new Danish attack on Skåne (the southernmost part of today’s Sweden, which Denmark lost to Sweden along with some other regions in the middle of the 17th century). The 1676 battle of Lund was still fresh in mind.
Such an invasion cold have led to disastrous consequences if the majority of the Swedish troops were tied up in Russia.
Charles XII’s idea could have been that as long as the Polish forces we’re hindered from supporting a major Russian OR Danish onslaught attack and furthermore that if he completely managed to crush Poland (which he did), he could deal with either Denmark or Russia.
Whether it was intelligent or not to spend as much time as he did in Poland, it’s possible that he should have attacked Denmark instead of Russia at the time when the ‘total’ defeat of Poland was a fait accompli?