Hitting the Jackpot in the War on Terror

CAMP BAUTISTA, Philippines -- It was one of the largest payouts ever in the State Department's Rewards for Justice program: $10 million to a handful of brave Filipinos who had the fortitude to stand up to terror. On Thursday, four of them courageously appeared at the nearby district governor's office with U.S. Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney and Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, chief of staff of the Philippine Armed Forces, to collect their share of the reward. The brief public ceremony may well mark the beginning of the end for the notorious Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), a radical Islamic terror organization affiliated with Al Qaeda and responsible for kidnapping and killing scores of Americans and Filipinos.

Information provided by the reward recipients -- whose identities were kept secret to prevent reprisals -- resulted in successful military operations by the Philippine military, in which two notorious ASG kingpins -- Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu Solaiman -- were killed. Two years ago, when our FOX News "War Stories" team was last in the Philippines, it was unthinkable that private citizens on this Muslim majority island would aid the Manila government in tracking down radical Islamic terrorists. But that was then and this is now -- and a lot has changed in those 24 months.

The Rewards for Justice cash handed to four brave Filipinos is only part of the story. In fact, the rewards program dates back to the 1980s, when Ronald Reagan was president. But critics of paying rewards for information leading to the death or capture of terrorists have claimed that with Islamic extremism, tribal and religious loyalties trump the desire for financial gain. That may be true in some places, but it's not the case now in the Philippines.

What changed here aren't the motives or methods of the terrorists. The ASG and Jemaah Islamiyah -- an organization that originated in nearby Indonesia -- are both still committed to the tenets of radical Islam, to jihad and autonomous states governed by Sharia law. Their adherents take the lives of "infidels" with the same brutal violence as the followers of Osama bin Laden. Just three weeks ago, seven construction workers were kidnapped and beheaded. A good number of the terrorists here trained in Afghanistan back in the 1990s.

What has been altered is the approach being taken by both the Philippine and U.S. governments. Decisions in Washington and Manila -- to wage this fight not simply as a military campaign against terrorists, but primarily as a battle for the hearts and minds of the people -- are paying big dividends. As one Philippine officer put it: "Today we are making a difference in the lives of the people. It has taken time, but now they know they can trust us. That's why they cooperate with us against the terrorists."

When I asked Maj. Gen. Ruben Rafael, the commander of Joint Task Force Comet and the senior military officer in this remote part of the Philippine archipelago, for the secret to this success, he replied, "Patience, persistence and perseverance. Last Christmas none of my soldiers, sailors, airmen or Marines took leave because we needed to keep the pressure on the terrorists. It was hard on the troops, but it proved to the people we were here to protect them and that we are here to stay."

U.S. Army Col. David Maxwell, who commands Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines, fully supports that sentiment -- for the Filipinos. But of the Americans under his command, he says: "We're here on a temporary basis to help them put us out of work." Then the veteran Special Forces officer quickly added, "But none of us want to leave before the job is done."

The "job" for less than 160 U.S. Special Operations personnel here at what they call "Advanced Operating Base 150" is to "advise and assist" the Filipinos in their fight against the ASG. For these Americans from the most elite units in the U.S. military -- who are used to doing the fighting themselves -- this is a very tough mission.

The U.S. troops here live and work side-by-side with their Filipino counterparts in what they call an "austere environment." That's putting it mildly. This close to the equator, it is incredibly hot and humid. Among the 620,000 people who reside on this 345-square mile island are known and wanted terrorists. Yet, in the process of helping Gen. Rafael's troops hunt down killers, the Americans are building schools, holding medical, dental and veterinary clinics, paving roads and helping police solve crimes.

Maj. Matt Whitehead, the commanding officer of AOB 150, put it best when he described events like this week's Rewards for Justice payout: "All of us here, from the State and Justice Departments, the Agency for International Development and our troops work through, by, and with our Filipino counterparts. These successes make it all worthwhile."

What has been altered is the approach being taken by both the Philippine and U.S. governments. Decisions in Washington and Manila — to wage this fight not simply as a military campaign against terrorists, but primarily as a battle for the hearts and minds of the people — are paying big dividends. As one Philippine officer put it: “Today we are making a difference in the lives of the people. It has taken time, but now they know they can trust us. That’s why they cooperate with us against the terrorists.”

Fighting the War on Terror
A counterinsurgency strategy
James S. Corum

page 26
Counterinsurgency Theories
(snip)
The American and British counterinsurgency experts outlined the following basic principles of counterinsurgency warfare
1 The civilian population is understood as the center of gravity in an insurgency. One cannot fight insurgents effectively without winning the support of the population. Ideally the counterinsurgency strategy should be geared to driving a wedge between the population and the rebels.

2 Successful counterinsurgency requires a comprehensive strategy that combines military, political, and economic action. Since insurgencies grow out of large scale dissatisfaction with the government, the means must be found to address the social, political, and economic problems that provide the fuel for insurgency.

3 There needs to be a unity of effort by government forces, that is close coordination between the military and civilian agencies at every level.

4 Effectively fighting the insurgents, who usually live among and draw support from the civilian population, requires good intelligence. Military and police action without good intelligence is largely a wasted effort. To fight the insurgent one has to find him.

5 Military and civic action campaigns need to proceed simultaneously and be coordinated with each other.

6 The government needs to wage an effective media campaign to reassure the population and undermine support for the insurgent.

7 Military and police powers needs to be applied carefully and with discrimination. A heavy handed approach is wasteful and can cause discontent among the population.

______________________________________________________________________

In addition to the British/American theory of counterinsurgency some officers in the French army developed their own theory
(snip)
The French view, expressed by French army Colonel Roger Trinquier and published as Modern Warfare in 1961 was widely read in both French and English editions. The French model differed considerably from the British/American model. Trinquier, who had long experience in counterinsurgency, outlined some very useful tactics in dealing with urban rebellion, including discussions of how to seal off a city district, collect comprehensive data on the population and register the whole population as a means to identify the insurgents from outside the area, and limit the ability of the insurgents to move within the country.
Trinquier’s theory differed enormously from the Anglo-Saxon model on several key points.
First he saw counterinsurgency primarily in military terms. For Trinquier, establishing military presence and crushing the insurgents by force was the first priority. In contrast with the British and America view that military action had to be carried out simultaneously with civic action programs, Trinquier argued first for military action to crush the insurgents. While civic action programs were important, they would be carried out only after the insurgency had been crushed by force.
Whereas British and American theorists of the 1950’s and 1960’s believed that building up a legitimate government and supporting indigenous institutions were the key elements of counterinsurgency strategy, there is little of this in Trinquier’s work. Essentially, Trinquier believed in strong arming the population into compliance with French rule.

Trinquier’s approach could bring short team success. The most notable example was Algeria, where the French army essentially broke the back of the insurgent movement by 1960. However in the long run, by ignoring the need to build public support for the government, the French approach led to strategic failure. One illustration of the French approach’s lack of political considerations was to policy of torturing and abusing insurgent prisoners in Algeria. Trinquier advocated the widespread use of such means’s of obtaining intelligence information, although he did not advocate the widespread use of such means. He failed to understand the breakdown in army discipline that occurs when moral and legal boundaries are crossed.
(snip)

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.