U.S. Soldiers, Iraqis open wells in Ninevah

KREIDI — U.S. forces joined local Iraqis to celebrate the opening of new water wells in Kreidi and Mualih Hasso, two villages near Forward Operating Base Qayyarah in the Ninevah province.

Soldiers with 5th Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery Regiment and Company B, 431st Civil Affairs (CA) Battalion participated in the ribbon cutting ceremony in Kreidi put on by leaders from both villages to commemorate the occasion.

“Today is a good day,” said Dr. Mohammed Ismael Ahmed, a local physician and a tribal liaison for multiple small villages in the area. “The water from these wells will be used for washing, cleaning, agriculture and livestock.”

“These wells are a part of the long-term solution, and will solve 30 percent to 40 percent of the water problems in the area,” Dr. Mohammed added.

These projects are a joint effort between the local Iraqi government and U.S. forces. Iraqi contractors and workers actually built the wells, with civil affairs Soldiers providing oversight and advice.

Ground was broken on the wells this past March with Company A, 403rd Civil Affairs Battalion. However, the wells were not completed by the time the unit was redeployed in April. The incoming CA team took up the projects about halfway through their construction, said Staff Sgt. Larry Slough, a team leader with the CA team.

For their part, the 431st Soldiers went to the villages to inspect the wells as they were being constructed to make sure they were being built to standard, as well as performing a final quality assurance inspection at their completion.

“Water projects are a really big deal for these villages,” Slough explained. “The only water they had before had been trucked in from the Tigris River, and deliveries could be unreliable, especially in the summer months. Our goal was to get the wells completed quickly so they could have access to water during the hot season, which we were able to do.”

The well systems consist of two 10,000 liter storage tanks, a filter system, a chlorine system and a sedimentary system to produce non-potable water, which can be used for cleaning and agriculture, but not for drinking.

Each location is set up for a reverse osmosis system to be installed in the future, which will make the water produced drinkable and will solve a majority of the water problems faced by those who live in the smaller villages in the countryside, Dr. Mohammed said.

With the completion of the wells, Slough and his team are stepping back and will not play an active role in obtaining the reverse osmosis systems for the wells in Kreidi and Mualih Hasso. It is up to the village leaders to pursue any improvements they want through their government, said Slough.

“Our goal is to get these villages to be independent from Coalition Forces,” Slough said. “The objective is to have the villagers maintain and improve the wells, so that they will continue to function after we’re gone.”

On this day, however, villagers and Soldiers are not thinking about the hurdles still to be overcome. Instead, there are smiles all around as the generator is turned on and water begins to flow from the pumps for the first time.

“Clean water affects their agriculture, their livestock and their health,” Slough said. “There are a lot of benefits to these wells, and they’ve got a huge impact on these villages.”

One reason why We’re digging wells.
We dig wells the terrorists dig graves.

Fighting the War on Terror
A counterinsurgency strategy
James S. Corum

http://www.amazon.com/Fighting-War-Terror-Counterinsurgency-Strategy/dp/0760328684

page 26
Counterinsurgency Theories
(snip)
The American and British counterinsurgency experts outlined the following basic principles of counterinsurgency warfare
1 The civilian population is understood as the center of gravity in an insurgency. One cannot fight insurgents effectively without winning the support of the population. Ideally the counterinsurgency strategy should be geared to driving a wedge between the population and the rebels.

2 Successful counterinsurgency requires a comprehensive strategy that combines military, political, and economic action. Since insurgencies grow out of large scale dissatisfaction with the government, the means must be found to address the social, political, and economic problems that provide the fuel for insurgency.

3 There needs to be a unity of effort by government forces, that is close coordination between the military and civilian agencies at every level.

4 Effectively fighting the insurgents, who usually live among and draw support from the civilian population, requires good intelligence. Military and police action without good intelligence is largely a wasted effort. To fight the insurgent one has to find him.

5 Military and civic action campaigns need to proceed simultaneously and be coordinated with each other.

6 The government needs to wage an effective media campaign to reassure the population and undermine support for the insurgent.

7 Military and police powers needs to be applied carefully and with discrimination. A heavy handed approach is wasteful and can cause discontent among the population.

______________________________________________________________________

In addition to the British/American theory of counterinsurgency some officers in the French army developed their own theory
(snip)
The French view, expressed by French army Colonel Roger Trinquier and published as Modern Warfare in 1961 was widely read in both French and English editions. The French model differed considerably from the British/American model. Trinquier, who had long experience in counterinsurgency, outlined some very useful tactics in dealing with urban rebellion, including discussions of how to seal off a city district, collect comprehensive data on the population and register the whole population as a means to identify the insurgents from outside the area, and limit the ability of the insurgents to move within the country.
Trinquier’s theory differed enormously from the Anglo-Saxon model on several key points.
First he saw counterinsurgency primarily in military terms. For Trinquier, establishing military presence and crushing the insurgents by force was the first priority. In contrast with the British and America view that military action had to be carried out simultaneously with civic action programs, Trinquier argued first for military action to crush the insurgents. While civic action programs were important, they would be carried out only after the insurgency had been crushed by force.
Whereas British and American theorists of the 1950’s and 1960’s believed that building up a legitimate government and supporting indigenous institutions were the key elements of counterinsurgency strategy, there is little of this in Trinquier’s work. Essentially, Trinquier believed in strong arming the population into compliance with French rule.

Trinquier’s approach could bring short team success. The most notable example was Algeria, where the French army essentially broke the back of the insurgent movement by 1960. However in the long run, by ignoring the need to build public support for the government, the French approach led to strategic failure. One illustration of the French approach’s lack of political considerations was to policy of torturing and abusing insurgent prisoners in Algeria. Trinquier advocated the widespread use of such means’s of obtaining intelligence information, although he did not advocate the widespread use of such means. He failed to understand the breakdown in army discipline that occurs when moral and legal boundaries are crossed.
(snip)

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