Posted on 05/30/2007 1:56:00 PM PDT by PghBaldy
Former Congressman Bill Hendon’s compelling new book about American POWs in Southeast Asia stirs up memories of an earlier controversy – charges that American prisoners in Vietnam were tortured by Cuban agents.
In "An Enormous Crime – The Definitive Account of American POWs Abandoned in Southeast Asia," Hendon and co-author Elizabeth Stewart disclose that Fidel Castro was a key adviser to the North Vietnamese government during the Vietnam War. They report that Castro gave Hanoi a strategy for capturing GIs and then trading them for postwar reconstruction aid from the U.S., just as Cuba had done with the Bay of Pigs prisoners
(Excerpt) Read more at newsmax.com ...
All this time I thought they were tortured by Russian agents.
Why do you suppose that they never were returned. Were they too messed up or were they used as slaves by the locals?
Memorandum for: Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Prisoners of War and Missing in Action
From: John F. McCreary
Subject: Legal Misconduct and Possible Malpractice in the Select Committee
1. As a member of the Virginia State Bar, I am obliged by Disciplinary Rule DR-1-103(a) to report knowledge of misconduct by an attorney "to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violations." Under Rule IV, Paragraph 13, of the Rules for the integration of the Virginia State Bar, this obligation follows me as a member of the Bar, regardless of the location of my employment, for as long as I remain a member of the Virginia State Bar. Therefore, I am obliged, as a matter of law and under pain of discipline by the Virginia State Bar, to report to you my knowledge of misconduct and possible prima facie malpractice by attorneys on the Select Committee in ordering the destruction of Staff documents containing Staff intelligence findings on 9 April 1992 and in statements in meetings on 15 and 16 April to justify the destruction.
2. The attached Memoranda For the Record, one by myself and another by Mr. Jon D. Holstine, describe the relevant facts, which I summarize herein:
a. On 9 April 1992, the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee, Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, in response to a protest by other members of the Select Committee, told the Select Committee members that "all copies" would be destroyed. This statement was made in the presence of the undersigned and of the Staff Chief Counsel who offered no protest.
b. Later on 9 April 1992, the Staff Director, Frances Zwenig, an attorney, repeated and insured the execution of Senator Kerry's order for the destruction of the Staff intelligence briefing text. I personally delivered to Mr. Barry Valentine, the Security Manager for SRB-78, the original printed version of the intelligence briefing text. I also verified that the original was destroyed by shredding in the Office of Senate Security on 10 April 1992, along with 14 copies.
c. On 15 April 1992, the Staff Chief Counsel, J. William Codinha of Massachusetts, when advised by members if the Staff about their concerns over the possible criminal consequences of destroying documents, minimized the significance of the act of destruction; ridiculed the Staff members for expressing their concerns; and replied, in response to questions about the potential consequences, "Who's the injured party," and "How are they going to find out because its classified." Mr. Codinha repeatedly defended the destruction of the documents and gave no assurances or indications that any copies of the intelligence briefing text existed.
d. On 16 April, the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee, Senator John Kerry, stated that he gave the order to destroy "extraneous copies of the documents" and that no one objected. Moreover, he stated that the issue was "moot" because the original remained in the Office of Senate Security "all along."
e. I subsequently learned that the Staff Director had deposited a copy of the intelligence briefing text in the Office of Senate Security at 1307 on 16 April.
3. The foregoing facts establish potentially a prima facie violation of criminal law and a pattern of violations of legal ethics by attorneys in acts of commission and omission.
a. It is hornbook law that an attorney may not direct the commission of a crime. In this incident two attorneys, one by his own admission, ordered the destruction of documents, which could be violation of criminal law.
b. Neither the Staff Chief Counsel nor any member of the Select Committee made a protest or uttered words of caution against the destruction of documents, by admission of the Chairman, Senator Kerry. The Chief Counsel has an affirmative duty to advise the Staff about the legality of its actions, and, in fact, had earlier issued the general prohibition to the Staff against document destruction.
c. The Chief Counsel's statements during the 15 April meeting to discuss the document destruction showed no regard for the legality of the action and displayed to the Staff only a concern about getting caught. By his words and actions, he presented to the Staff investigators an interpretation of the confidentiality and security rules that the rules of the Select Committee may be used to cover-up potentially unethical or illegal activity.
d. The Staff Director's action in placing an unaccounted for copy of the intelligence briefing text in the Office of Senate Security on 16 April constitutes an act to cover-up the destruction. Throughout the 16 April meeting, all three attorneys persisted in stating that the document had been on file since 9 April. This is simply not true.
4. I believe that the foregoing facts establish a pattern of grave legal misconduct - possibly including orders to commit a crime, followed by acts to justify and then to cover-up that crime. Even absent criminal liability, the behavioral pattern of the attorneys involved plays fast and loose with the Canons of Legal Ethics and establishes that one or more of the attorneys on the Select Committee are unfit to practice law. I am obliged to recommend that this report be filed with the appropriate disciplinary authorities of the State Bars in which these attorneys are members.
John F. McCreary, Esquire
Memorandum for: Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Prisoners of War and Missing in Action
From: John F. McCreary
Subject: Possible Violations of Title 18, U.S.C., Section 2071, by the Select Committee and Possible Ethical Misconduct by Staff Attorneys.
1. Continuing analysis of relevant laws and further review of the events between 8 April and 16 April 1992 connected with the destruction of the Investigators' Intelligence Briefing Text strongly indicate that the order to destroy all copies of that briefing text on 9 April and the actual destruction of copies of the briefing texts plus the purging of computer files might constitute violations of Title 18, U.S.C., Section 2071, which imposes criminal penalties for unlawful document destruction. Even absent a finding of criminal misconduct, statements, actions, and failures to act by the senior Staff attorneys following the 9 April briefing might constitute serious breaches of ethical standards of conduct for attorneys, in addition to violations of Senate and Select Committee rules. The potential consequences of these possible misdeeds are such that they should be brought to the attention of all members of the Select Committee, plus all Designees and Staff members who were present at the 9 April briefing.
2. The relevant section of Title 18, U.S.C., states in pertinent part: Section 2071. Concealment, removal, or mutilation generally (a) Whoever willfully and unlawfully conceals, removes, mutilates, obliterates, or destroys, or attempts to do so, or, with intent to do so takes and carries away any record, proceeding, map, book, paper, document, or other thing, filed or deposited with any clerk or officer of any court of the United States, or in any public office, or with any judicial or public officer of the United States, shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 795)
3. The facts as the undersigned and others present at the briefing recall them are presented in the attached Memorandum for the Record. A summary of those facts - and others that have been established since that Memorandum was written - follows.
a. On 8 April 1992, the Investigators' Intelligence Briefing Text was presented to Senior Staff members and Designees for whom copies were available prior to beginning the briefing. Objections to the text by the Designees prompted the Staff Director to order all persons present to leave their copies of the briefing text in Room SRB078. Subsequent events indicated that two copies had been removed without authorization.
b. On 9 April 1992, at the beginning of the meeting of the Select Committee and prior to the scheduled investigators' briefing, Senator McCain produced a copy of the intelligence briefing text, with whose contents he strongly disagreed. He charged that the briefing text had already been leaked to a POW/MIA activist, but was reassured by the Chairman that such was not the case. He replied that he was certain it would be leaked. Whereupon, the Chairman assured Senator McCain that there would be no leaks because all copies would be gathered and destroyed, and he gave orders to that effect. No senior staff member or attorney present cautioned against a possible violation of Title 18, U.S.C., Section 2071, or of Senate or Select Committee Rules.
c. Following the briefing on 9 April, the Staff Director, Ms. Frances Zwenig, restated to the intelligence investigators the order to destroy the intelligence briefing text and took measures to ensure execution of the destruction order. (See paragraph 3 of the attachment.) During one telephone conversation with the undersigned, she stated that she was "acting under orders."
d. The undersigned also was instructed to delete all computer files, which Mr. Barry Valentine witnessed on 9 April.
e. In a meeting on 15 April 1992, the Staff's Chief Counsel, J. William Codinha, was advised by intelligence investigators of their concerns about the possibility that they had committed a crime by participating in the destruction of the briefing text. Mr. Codinha minimized the significance of the documents and of their destruction. He admonished the investigators for "making a mountain out of a molehill."
f. When investigators repeated their concern that the order to destroy the documents might lead to criminal charges, Mr. Codinha replied "Who's the injured party." He was told, "The 2,494 families of the unaccounted for US Servicemen, among others." Mr. Codinha then said, "Who's gonna tell them. It's classified." At that point the meeting erupted. The undersigned stated that the measure of merit was the law and what's right, not avoidance of getting caught. To which Mr. Codinha made no reply. At no time during the meeting did Mr. Codinha give any indication that any copies of the intelligence briefing text existed.
g. Investigators, thereupon, repeatedly requested actions by the Committee to clear them of any wrongdoing, such as provision of legal counsel. Mr. Codinha admitted that he was not familiar with the law and promised to look into it. He invited a memorandum from the investigators stating what they wanted. Given Mr. Codinha's statements and reactions to the possibility of criminal liability, the investigators concluded they must request appointment of an independent counsel. A memorandum making such a request and signed by all six intelligence investigators was delivered to Mr. Codinha on 16 April.
h. At 2130 on 16 April, the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee, convened a meeting with the intelligence investigators, who told him personally of their concern that they might have committed a crime by participating in the destruction of the briefing texts at the order of the Staff Director. Senator Kerry stated that he gave the order to destroy the documents, not the Staff Director, and that none of the Senators present at the meeting had objected. He also stated that the issue of document destruction was "moot" because the original briefing text had been deposited with the Office of Senate Security "all along." Both the Staff Director and the Chief Counsel supported this assertion by the Chairman.
i. Senator Kerry's remarks prompted follow-up investigations (See paragraphs 4 through 9 of the attachment) and inquiries that established that a copy of the text was not deposited in the Office of Senate Security until the afternoon of 16 April. The Staff Director has admitted that on the afternoon of 16 April, after receiving a copy of a memorandum from Senator Bob Smith to Senator Kerry in which Senator Smith outlined his concerns about the destruction of documents, she obtained a copy of the intelligence briefing text from the office of Senator McCain and took it to the Office of Senate Security. Office of Senate Security personnel confirmed that the Staff Director gave them an envelope, marked "Eyes Only," to be placed in her personal file. The Staff Director has admitted that the envelope contained the copy of the intelligence briefing text that she obtained from the office of Senator McCain.
3. The facts of the destruction of the intelligence briefing text would seem to fall inside the prescriptions of the Statute, Title 18, U.S.C., Section 2071, so as to justify their referral for investigation to a competent law enforcement authority. The applicability of that Statute was debated in United States v. Poindexter, D.D.C. 1989, 725 F. Supp. 13, in connection with the Iran Contra investigation. The District Court ruled, inter alia, that the National Security Council is a public office within the meaning of the Statute and, thus, that its records and documents fell within the protection of the Statute. In light of that ruling, the Statute would seem to apply to this Senate Select Committee and its Staff. The continued existence of a "bootleg" copy of the intelligence briefing text - i.e., a copy that is not one of those made by the investigators for the purpose of briefing the Select Committee - would seem to be irrelevant to the issues of intent to destroy and willfulness; as well as to the issue of responsibility for the order to destroy all copies of the briefing text, for the attempt to carry out that order, and for the destruction that actually was accomplished in execution of that order.
4. As for the issue of misconduct by Staff attorneys, all member of the Bar swear to uphold the law. That oath may be violated by acts of omission and commission. Even without a violation of the Federal criminal statute, the actions and failures to act by senior Staff attorneys in the sequence of events connected with the destruction of the briefing text might constitute violations
of ethical standards for members of the Bar and of both Senate and Select Committee rules. The statements, actions and failures to act during and after the meeting on 15 April, when the investigators gave notice of their concern about possible criminal liability for document destruction, would seem to reflect disregard for the law and for the rules of the United States Senate.
John F. McCreary
Memorandum for the Record
From: John F. McCreary
Subject: Obstruction of the Investigation
1. I am concerned that recent lines of investigation have been seriously compromised by leaks of sensitive information by the Committee Staff Director to the Department of Defense. Leaks to the Department of Defense or other agencies of the Executive Branch of my Memoranda for the Record are interfering with follow-up discussions with useful witnesses. Moreover, they are endangering the lives and livelihood of two witnesses.
Leak of Information on Jan Sejna
2. Irrespective of leaks outside the government, Bill LeGro, attended a meeting of the US-Russia Joint Commission group in Washington on 28 October 1992 at the Department of State. The discussion featured information provided by Sejna. LeGro stated that Ambassador Malcolm Toon called for his dismissal. DIA personnel defended Sejna as to his expertise on Central Europe, but not as to his information on other areas, particularly POW related.
3. Irrespective of leaks outside the government, Bill LeGro attended a meeting of the US-Russia Joint Commission group in Washington on 28 October 1992 at the Department of State. The discussion featured information provided by Sejna. LeGro stated tat Ambassador Malcolm Toon call for his dismissal. DIA personnel defended Sejna as to his expertise on Central Europe, but not as to his information on others areas, particularly POW related.
4. On 30 October 1992, I learned from Bill LeGro that he was directed to read a letter from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Select Committee that discredits Sejna's information. The letter reportedly indicates that Sejna's information has been checked and not been confirmed by his former government. At the time this letter was received, the Staff had decided to take Sejna's deposition but had not yet scheduled a deposition of Sejna. In addition, my MFR was written from memory, and did not do justice to all that Sejna stated, either in detail or in context. As of this writing, we do not know what Sejna knows or will say under oath, yet his testimony has already been written off. This anticipatory discrediting of a Select Committee potential witness is tantamount to tampering with the evidence.
Suspected Leak of Information on Le Quang Khai
5. The second issue of suspected misconduct concerns witness Le Quang Khai. Although Le made a public statement concerning POWs on 12 September 1992, no agency of the US government contacted him concerning his POW information. He told me on 26 October that some men who represented themselves as FBI agents contacted him to attempts to recruit him to return to Vietnam as a US intelligence agent for six months. After which his request for asylum would be favorably considered.
6. On 30 October, Mr. Robert Egan of Hackensack, New Jersey, who is a close friend of Mr. Le and the intermediary whereby the Committee Staff met Mr. Le, informed McCreary and LeGro that the FBI had again contacted Mr. Le. A person representing himself as an FBI person called on 30 October to set up a meeting with Le to discuss Le's working as an intelligence agent for the FBI's POW/MIA office.
7. So far informal checks indicate there is no such office. Secondly, this contact occurred three days after my return from taking Le's deposition in Hackensack on 26 October. I observed a copy of the MFR with apparent routing designators written in the top margin on the desk of Frances Zwenig on 28 October.
8. The contact with Le two days after preparation of my MFR, despite the passage of a month since his public declarations, is highly suspicious and more than coincidental. The circumstances of both contacts in which persons identifying themselves as FBI without showing credentials or other evidence of authenticity or authority and also making a pitch to recruit Le are also highly suspicious.
9. An internal Department of Defense Memorandum identifies Frances Zwenig as the conduit to the Department of Defense for the acquisition of sensitive and restricted information from this Committee. Based on the above sequences of events, I must conclude that Frances Zwenig continues to leak all of my papers to the Defense Department. Her flagrant disregard of the rules of the Senate and her oath of office are now jeopardizing the livelihood, if not the safety, of
Senate witnesses. In addition, the Department of Defense's continuing access to sensitive Committee Staff papers is resulting in obstruction of the investigations by the Senate Select Committee by various agencies of the Executive Branch.
John F. McCreary
Hmmmmm ..??
And .. wasn’t it McCain and Kerry who were heading the committee which was supposed to account for all of our POW/MIA in Vietnam and Cambodia ..??
Those 2 go back a long way and I don’t much care for the alliance .. because I don’t trust either one of them.
Lets not forget Senator Mccain was on the Senate Committee investigating POW-MIA’s also.
How either can face the American public is unknown,that they actually ran or are running for President should take away the breath of any right thinking American.
Jane Fonda must be smiling tonight.
DONAHUE, MORGAN JEFFERSON
Name: Morgan Jefferson Donahue
Rank/Branch: Major/US Air Force
Unit: 606th Special Operations Squadron,
56th Special Operations Wing
Nakhon Phanom, Thailand
Date of Birth: 02 May 1944
Home of Record: Alexandria, VA
Date of Loss: 13 December 1968
Country of Loss: Laos
Loss Coordinates: 170100N 1055900E (XD055824) Click coordinates to view (4) maps
Status in 1973: Missing In Action
Category: 2
Aircraft/Vehicle/Ground: C123K “Provider”
Other Personnel in Incident: Thomas M. Turner (rescued); Douglas V. Dailey; John S. Albright; Joseph P. Fanning; Samuel F. Walker, Jr.; and Fred L. Clarke (all missing);
RKS: MID AIR COL-1 PARA OBS
SYNOPSIS: Though it had been declared obsolete in 1956, the Fairchild C123 Provider, which was a converted WWII glider, became one of the mainstays of tactical airlift in the Vietnam War. In 1962 the Provider was fitted with special equipment to spray defoliants. Later, it was modified with a pair of J-85 jet engines which increased its payload carrying capability by nearly one third. The first of these modified C123s arrived at Tan Son Nhut on 25 April 1967, and this venerable old aircraft proved to be among the hardest working aircraft throughout Southeast Asia. The C123K differed from other C123 models in that it had the addition of auxiliary turbojet engines mounted in underwing pods. While this addition did little to increase the speed of the “Provider”, it added greater power for quicker climbing on takeoff, and power for maintaining altitude.
On 13 December 1968, 1st Lt. Thomas M. Turner, pilot; 1st Lt. Joseph P. Fanning, co-pilot; 1st Lt. John S. Albright, II, navigator; then 1st Lt. Morgan J. Donahue, navigator; SSgt. Douglas V. Dailey, flight engineer; TSgt. Fred L. Clarke, loadmaster and SSgt. Samuel F. Walker, Jr., loadmaster; comprised the crew of a C123K aircraft, call sign “Candlestick 44.” Their night Forward Air Control (FAC) mission was to guide several B57B bombers onto a convoy of enemy trucks traveling along Routes 911 and 912. These routes were cut through the rugged jungle covered mountains approximately 2 miles north of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), 14 miles northwest of Ban Namm, 18 miles southwest of Ban Loboy, 35 miles northwest of Muang Xepon and 26 miles southwest of the Lao/North Vietnamese border, Savannakhet Province, Laos. Additional data places the loss approximately 47 kilometers northwest of Xepon, 3 kilometers east of Ban Kok Nak and Route 411, and 1 kilometer southeast of Ban Pa Dong.
This area of eastern Laos was considered a major artery of the infamous Ho Chi Minh Trail. When North Vietnam began to increase its military strength in South Vietnam, NVA and Viet Cong troops again intruded on neutral Laos for sanctuary, as the Viet Minh had done during the war with the French some years before. This border road was used by the Communists to transport weapons, supplies and troops from North Vietnam into South Vietnam, and was frequently no more than a path cut through the jungle covered mountains. US forces used all assets available to them to stop this flow of men and supplies from moving south into the war zone.
Flying at an altitude of no more than 2000-3000 feet, the Provider crew’s mission was to spot enemy truck convoys traveling along the trail, then to drop flares to illuminate the area for the accompanying bombers to attack. As the navigator responsible for monitoring the infrared detection device, Morgan Donahue laid on his stomach in the underbelly of the Provider to observe the situation through an open hatch. Weather conditions at the time were clear with a half moon, ground fog, no wind and no cloud ceiling. At 0300 hours, as the crew of the C123K guided a B57B, call sign “Yellowbird 72,” onto an enemy convoy, the FAC was jolted by a blow to the top of their aircraft in the aft section by the overhead bomber as it approached the target. Major Thomas W. Dugan, pilot; and Major Francis J. McGouldrick, co-pilot; comprised the crew of Yellowbird 72. 1st Lt. Turner, stunned by a blow to the head and lost consciousness as his aircraft lost power. Because of its glider configuration, the C123K did not fall straight to the ground, but drifted lazily in a slow flat spin that lasted several minutes.
During his post-rescue debriefing, Thomas Turner reported: “Yellowbird 72 made either one or two passes over the target and received no ground fire while Candlestick 44 maintained position in our quadrant at altitude. While the bomber conducted its strikes, I began a run to our left in order to stay in our own quadrant, yet be able to scope to clear the previous strike (to observe the bomber’s attack pass and its pull off of the target). Just as we rolled out straight and level, I looked out the window and saw the strike area. The next moment there was an explosion and the aircraft was out of control. I was knocked unconscious for several moments. When I came to, I turned in my seat and could see the co-pilot’s seat was empty and fire was coming into the cockpit from the fuselage area. I turned to the left and opened the window, then unbuckled by seatbelt. I looked out at the wing tip and could see the wing tip and that the left engine was still running. The next minute I was out and clear of the aircraft. I pulled the “D” ring when clear to deploy my parachute. On my descent I saw another parachute below me and 2 or 3 fires on the ground. At that time I was unaware of the other aircraft’s fall, and didn’t know if it was one of the fires on the ground or not.” 1st Lt. Turner went on to say: “I landed safely in a treetop where I remained until search and rescue (SAR) personnel rescued me at dawn. I did not hear any of the other crewmen come up on the radio, and I understand that the only beeper the SAR aircraft heard was mine.”
Members of other aircrews provided additional information about this loss incident. One witness stated he saw a steady stream of enemy anti-aircraft artillery fire aimed in the direction of the aircraft just before the large explosion caused by the collision. Several other witnesses reported there was a large explosion that broke the aircraft into three parts shortly after the initial explosion.
After plucking Thomas Turner out of the tree, aerial SAR personnel continued to search for the other crewman in the rugged jungle covered mountains. Because this area was under total enemy control, no ground search was possible. At 0900 hours on 15 December, the formal SAR effort was terminated when no trace of the remaining crew could be found. At that time John Albright, Morgan Donahue, Douglas Dailey, Joseph Fanning Fred Clarke and Samuel Walker were listed Missing in Action. Likewise, no trace of the B57B crew was found and they were also declared Missing in Action at the same time.
Over the years numerous reports filtered through the intelligence community regarding the crew of the Provider including National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted enemy radio communications correlated to at least 3 of the missing men. In 1974 a Laotian refugee who escaped reported having observed an American prisoner thought to have been a member of this aircrew who had been moved to the caves near Tchepone where he was held during the 1968 to 1970 timeframe. This American was later transferred to another location unknown to the refugee. Another intelligence report received shortly after the loss incident indicated that Morgan Donahue suffered a broken leg in the mishap and was believed to have been taken to a communist holding area near Tchepone after capture. Several reports referring to “Moe-gan” or “Mr. Moe-gan” have been received by military intelligence since the end of the war. Frequently this prisoner is referred to as “the animal doctor” because he is being used as a veterinarian to treat sick and injured animals. These reports have come directly from refugees to the Donahue family as well as through US government agencies.
From 1981 to 1984, the Special Forces Detachment, Korea (SFDK) was charged by President Reagan with the responsibility of collecting live POW information throughout Southeast Asia. SFDK was commanded by Major Mark Smith, himself a returned POW from the Vietnam War. Through his efforts, and those of team Intelligence Sergeant Mel McIntire, an agent net of 50 agents was established, specifically in Laos. This intelligence net resulted in Major Smith compiling a list of some 26 American POWs by name and captivity location with Morgan Donahue being one of them. In April 1984, Major Smith received a message from one of his agents specifying that on 11 May three US Prisoners of War would be brought to a given location on the Lao/Thai border. The only prerequisite was that an American be on the Thailand side of the border to receive the men. When this information was reported up his chain of command, Major Smith’s team was ordered not to leave Korea, to destroy all documents pertaining to LIVE POWs and they were sent back to the United States 6 months early. According to Major Smith and SFC McIntire, they believe Morgan Donahue was one of those three Prisoners who could have been returned on 11 May 1984. This documented information was provided to the United States Senate Veterans Affairs Committee in sworn testimony on 28 January 1986.
In June 1987 and again in August of that year, the Donahue family was given intelligence reports tracking their youngest son’s movements from a POW camp in Kham Kuet, Khammouane Province, Laos in the spring of 1987, then to another camp in the Boualapha District of the same province that August. These reports were only a few weeks old at the time the USG obtained them, yet intelligence personnel marked them “routine” and made no effort to act upon the information. One of these reports stated that the POW had been a crewman aboard a C123K aircraft and gave its serial number. When government analysts finally evaluated the report, they discovered that the aircraft number was actually the missing navigator’s father’s home zip code instead of the aircraft’s number. The Donahue family believes this is clearly a message from Morgan Donahue.
The crew of the C123K are among the nearly 600 Americans who disappeared in Laos. Like this aircrew, many of these men were known to be alive on the ground. The Laotians admitted holding “tens of tens” of American Prisoners of War, but these men were never negotiated for either by direct negotiations between our countries or through the Paris Peace Accords which ended the Vietnam War since the Laotians were not a party to that agreement.
Since the end of the Vietnam War well over 21,000 reports of American prisoners, missing and otherwise unaccounted for have been received by our government. Many of these reports document LIVE American POWs remaining captive throughout Southeast Asia TODAY.
Aircrews in Vietnam and Laos were called upon to fly in many dangerous circumstances, and they were prepared to be wounded, killed or captured. It probably never occurred to them that they could be abandoned by the country they so proudly served.
Morgan J. Donahue graduated from the United States Air Force Academy in 1967.
Gone... but NOT FORGOTTEN!!!
Editorial Reviews:
From Publishers Weekly
Controversial former North Carolina congressman Hendon and attorney Stewart make the case that the U.S. knowingly left hundreds of POWs in Vietnam and Laos in 1973, and that every presidential administration since then has covered it up.
The main reason for the secrecy, say the authors, is the billions in war reparations demanded by the Vietnamese and promised by Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon at the Paris Peace talks. Hendon and Stewart provide a mountain of evidence, mainly intelligence reports of live sightings of American prisoners in Vietnam and Laos that make for less-than-scintillating reading. But riveting sections describe Hendon’s crusade on this issue in the early 1980s, including two meetings with President Reagan, pleading his case that the government free the live POWs. Hendon and Stewart directly accuse a long list of government officials of the coverup.
Among the most culpable: Kissinger, President George H.W. Bush, Senators John McCain and John Kerry, Gen. Colin Powell, former secretary of state George Schultz and former defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld. It’s a chore wading through the live-sighting reports and the massive, detailed endnotes, but the descriptions of Hendon’s unsuccessful personal mission provide an intriguing story—and carry the ring of truth. 36 b&w photos not seen by PW. (June 1)
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Book Description:
The dramatic history of living American soldiers left in Vietnam, and the first full account of the circumstances that left them there ‘An Enormous Crime’ is nothing less than shocking. Based on thousands of pages of public and previously classified documents, it makes an utterly convincing case that when the American government withdrew its forces from Vietnam, it knowingly abandoned hundreds of POWs to their fate. The product of twenty-five years of research by former Congressman Bill Hendon and attorney Elizabeth A. Stewart, An Enormous Crime brilliantly exposes
the reasons why these American soldiers and airmen were held back by the North Vietnamese at Operation Homecoming in 1973 and what these men have endured since.
Despite hundreds of postwar sightings and intelligence reports telling of Americans being held captive throughout Vietnam and Laos, Washington did nothing. And despite numerous secret military signals and codes sent from the desperate POWs themselves, the Pentagon did not act.
Even in 1988, a U.S. spy satellite passing over Sam Neua Province, Laos, spotted the twelve-foot-tall letters “USA” and immediately beneath them a huge, highly classified Vietnam War-era USAF/USN Escape & Evasion code in a rice paddy in a narrow mountain valley. The letters “USA” appeared to have been dug out of the ground, while the code appeared to have been fashioned from rice straw (see jacket photograph).
Tragically, the brave men who constructed these codes have not yet come home. Nor have any of the other American POWs who the postwar intelligence shows have laid down similar codes, secret messages, and secret authenticators in rice paddies and fields and garden plots and along trails in both Laos and Vietnam.
‘An Enormous Crime’ is based on open-source documents and
> reports, and thousands of declassified intelligence reports and satellite imagery, as well as author interviews and personal experience. It is a singular work, telling a story unlike any other in our modern history: ugly, harrowing, and true.
From the Bay of Pigs, where John and Robert Kennedy struck a
deal with Fidel Castro that led to freedom for the Bay of Pigs prisoners, to the Paris Peace Accords, in which the authors argue Kissinger and Nixon sold American soldiers down the river for political gain, to a continued reluctance to revisit the possibility of reclaiming any men who might
still survive, we have a story untold for decades. And with ‘An Enormous Crime’ we have for the first time a comprehensive history of America’s leaders in their worst hour; of life-and-death decision making based on politics, not intelligence; and of men lost to their families and the
country they serve, betrayed by their own leaders.
bump
Thanks for the ping!
Originally Published June 24, 2006
“My review of JCRC casualty files has surfaced several messages which list a total of nine American servicemen Vietnam has acknowledged were captured alive, all of whom are listed by DOD as having been declared dead while missing. None are officially listed as ever having been a POW. This information has come from Vietnamese officials a piece at a time over the past two years. I suspect we will learn about more such cases as time goes on. While the precise fate of the nine is not clear, it appears likely they died in captivity in southern Vietnam and this is the first admission from Vietnam that these nine were captured alive.” So reads a memo titled “Vietnamese reports about U.S. POWs not previously known by the Defense Department,” and dated July 22, 1992, prepared by Sedgwick D. Tourison, Jr. during his tenure as an investigator with the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs.
In the memo Mr. Tourison speculates on the reason this information was not discussed during the 24 – 25 June 1992 hearing before the Senate Committee in which General John Vessey, along with representatives of DIA and JTF testified. Mr. Tourison offers the following: “… two obvious explaination (sic) could be that (a) it would be irresponsible to discuss such information prior to investigating it fully, (b) they do not want to publicly discuss active cases still under investigation, and (c) they may not believe Vietnamese assertions.”
The memo continued; “A fourth explanation is that the Administration is too embarrassed at this point to even want to have this information made public. After all, it must be clear to the Administration that the Vessey/DOD-ISA “lists” have led to a relatively inflexible investigation schedule which is being directly controlled from Washington and with little seeming flexibility on the part of those on the ground to react to changing conditions. This is a direct repeat of the criticism levied at DOD/JCS/White House in its inept prosecution of the war two plus decades ago and it is evident that Viet Nam is well aware of these modalities and these new “POW” reports could well represent Viet Nam’s own effort to tie up the Administration.”
The nine servicemen acknowledged by the Vietnamese as “captured alive” are: Carlos Ashlock, James T. Egan, Jr., Robert L. Greer, Roger D. Hamilton, Gregory J. Harris, Donald S. Newton, Madison A. Strohlein, Robert L. Platt and Fred Schreckengost. Remains for both Greer and Schreckengost were recovered. Commenting on Greer and Schreckengost, Tourison notes; “During the recovery of their remains in 1990 Vietnamese officials acknowledged they had been captured alive and killed in captivity. The U.S. Marine Corps still does not list them as having died in captivity but to have died while in a MIA status.”
Of the 7 remaining “new POWs” Tourison offers the following information:
Carlos Ashlock – “Vietnam has now acknowledged that Corporal Aslock (sic) was captured alive in Quang Ngai Province. His eventual fate has not yet been determined.”
James Egan, Jr. -- – “Vietnam has now acknowledged that Lieutenant Egan was captured alive and has reported that he died in captivity in December 1968.”
[It should be noted that Egan’s name was not on the list of POWs who died in captivity presented in Paris in January 1973. Yet, based on this new information Egan survived in captivity for almost 3 years, from January 21, 1966 to December 1968. As no other POW reported seeing Egan in captivity, where was he held?]
Roger D. Hamilton – “Vietnam has now acknowledged that Lance Corporal Hamilton was captured alive in Military Region 5. His eventual fate has not yet been determined.”
Gregory J. Harris – “Vietnam has now acknowledged that Corporal Harris was captured alive. His eventual fate has not yet been determined.”
Donald Newton – “Vietnam has now acknowledged that Sergeant Newton was captured alive and taken to Hospital 102 of Military Region 5. His eventual fate has not yet been determined.”
Robert L. Platt – “Vietnam has now acknowledged that Private First Class Platt was captured alive. His eventual fate has not yet been determined.”
Madison Strohlein – “Vietnam has now acknowledged that Sergeant Strohlein was captured alive on June 22, 1971 in Quang Nam Province. His eventual fate has not yet been determined.”
Whatever the reason, this information was not made public during the life of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. Documents generated by that committee including its investigators were turned over to the National Archives where they remain today… Hidden in plain sight.
We immediately contacted the family of M/Sgt. Gregory J. Harris, acknowledged by the Vietnamese as “captured alive.” The family was shocked by the information contained in the Tourison memo. Sadly, it came as little surprise to us, and the Harris family that they were never told of this information. Nor, does it seem as if U.S. investigators have factored this stunning information into ongoing efforts to locate M/Sgt. Harris. Instead, investigators continue to search for M/Sgt Harris at the loss area, when in fact the Vietnamese admitted, sometime prior to at least 1991, that he had been captured.
A word about this document, this and other documents were found within the Sedgwick Tourison Collection housed at Texas Tech University in Lubbock Texas, in mid March. With the discovery of this document the National Alliance of Families and Mary Reitano, cousin of Greg Harris, joined forces to download and review the documents within the Tourison Collection. Through our efforts, many additional documents of value were located, and passed to family members.
Among them a memo dated August 1, 1992 titled “Individuals Reported Died in Captivity and not listed on current DOD/Vessey/SSC priority lists.” In this memo, Mr. Tourison states: “My review of POW/MIA case files disclosed DIA/JTFFA message traffic referring to individuals DOD now has information survived into captivity.”
This memo appears to be a follow-up to the July 22nd memo. In the 13 cases cited, representing 19 servicemen, 9 are named in the July 22nd memo. The additional servicemen added to the list of men who “survived into captivity” are: Richard C. Bram, John F. Dingwall, Fredric M. Mellor, Charles J. Scharf/ Martin J. Massucci, John F. O’Grady, Thomas A. Mangino, Paul A. Hasenbeck, David M. Winters, Daniel Nidds, and John T. McDonnell.
Tourison then provided a breakdown of the cases “not currently listed as having died in captivity.”
4 individuals (MIA-KIA/BNR) killed in captivity. Two of their remains have been recovered and identified (Greer/Schreckengost) and two have not (Egan/Newton).”
6 individuals (MIA-KIA/BNR) who may have been captured alive and later killed. The period of their captivity appears to have been brief. (Bram/Dingwall/Mangini/Hasenbeck/Winters/Nidds).
4 individuals (MIA-KIA/BNR) died in captivity of wounds suffered in combat. (Platt/Mellor/McDonnell/O’Grady.)
1 individual (MIA-KIA/BNR) survived into captivity, was wounded and precise fate unclear. (Ashlock)
1 case involving 2 airmen from the same loss incident (MIA-KIA/BNR), one parachute was reportedly seen by a wingman, witnesses in Vietnam have testified that a shootdown correlating to this case involved two bodies seen a the crash site. (Scharf/Massucci)
2 individuals (MIA-MIA/BRN,) wartime reporting possibly captured. Vietnamese witnesses testimony appears to indicate killed in combat. (Hamilton/Harris.)
In 1987, General John Vessey as special emissary for President Ronald Regan presented the Vietnamese with a list of 80 individuals representing 62 cases on which the U.S. Government believed the Vietnamese would have knowledge. Sometime between 1987 and 1991 the Vessey list expanded with the addition of 39 individuals representing 32 cases. This new or Vessey II list became known as the 119 Discrepancy List. It is important we look at these additions to the list as they compare to the 19 individuals named in the Tourison memos.
All nine individuals named in the July 22nd memo acknowledged by the Vietnamese as “captured alive” were added to the Vessey II list. Of the additional names included in the August 1st memo, only Tom Mangino, Paul Hasenbeck, Danny Nidds, David Winters, Richard Bram and John Dingwall were not added to the list of 119 Discrepancy cases. They would eventually be added to the Last Known Alive List of 135. This Last Known Alive list was based on revisions to the 119 Discrepancy list based on the addition of names and removal of names based on remains recoveries.
To put the importance of the List of 119 in perspective we need only to look at the testimony of Kenneth Quinn, Chairman of the POW/MIA Interagency Group before the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on Asia and Pacific Affairs given April 25, 1991. In discussing the 119 discrepancy cases Mr. Quinn stated:
“In terms of actually conducting investigations on the ground, General Vessey has focused on 119 discrepancy cases, which is to say those cases, which represent, from looking at all the information we know about them, represent the greatest possibility that the men involved might still be alive. We had evidence that they were alive after the incident occurred where the plane was shot down or they were lost on the ground and we don't know what happened to them and what their fate was. So those represented to General Vessey the possibility where it is most probable or most likely that they might still be alive.
Going back even further, we can look to the “Project X” study completed in 1976 to "evaluate the possibility of any of the unaccounted for being alive.” The conclusion reached stated; “there is a possibility that as many as 57 Americans could be alive, although it is highly probable that the number is much smaller, possibly zero.” Among the 57 individuals named in the “Project X” study, Robert Greer, Fred Schreckengost, Frederick Mellor,Gregory Harris, John O'Grady, Tom Mangino, Paul Hasenbeck, Danny Nidds, David Winters, and John McDonnell were all, according to the Tourison Memos, acknowledged as captured by the Vietnamese.
The Vietnamese acknowledgement of capture of these men should have come as no surprise to U.S. officials. One has only to look at the rationale for their selection as a "Project X" case.
Of Greer and Schreckengot, the Project X rationale stated; " Both individuals were reported in the custody of VC forces by many sources subsequent to their disappearance on June 1964. PFC Schreckengost was seen alive and in good health by both U.S. and Vietnamese sources on occasions as late as October 1974. No correlated reports of death have been received for either individual."
The rationale for Frederick Mellor states: "After he had made a successful landing, search and rescue aircraft were able to make voice contact with Capt Mellor. He indicated at that time that he was all right, although later attempts to locate him either by voice or electronic contact was unsuccessful. No reports of Capt Mellor's death have been received since the date of the incident."
The inclusion of Greg Harris in the Project X study is based on the fact that "Two Vietnamese who were wounded during the same action from which CPL Harris disappeared reported his capture by Viet Cong Forces. Although there are no reports confirming CPL Harris as a Prisoner, there have been no subsequent reports of his death
The rationale for inclusion of John O'Grady in the Project X study is less clear. In describing is incident of loss, the study reads; "After ejection from his stricken aircraft, Major O'Grady's parachute was seen twice in the air and once on the ground by a wingman of his flight. However, search and rescue aircraft were unable to re-locate his position."
The case rationale for Mangino, Hasenbeck, Nidds and Winters reads; " When last seen, all of the men were alive and unhurt in a sampan, and all could swim. An extensive search found nothing. One informant report indicates possible capture, but there have been no subsequent reports of death for any of the individuals in this incident."<
Lastly, perhaps the most compelling of the Project X cases is that of Army Captain John T. McDonnell. The rationale for including McDonnell in the Project X study reads; "The other crewmember survived the aircraft crash and was subsequently found and medically evacuated. All signs indicated CPT McDonnel left the aircraft under his own power. No correlated reports of Capt McDonnel's death have been received since the incident date."
In spite of the Vietnamese acknowledgement of capture and survival into captivity of these 19 individuals none were ever considered for a status change to Prisoner of War. In fact, Mr. Tourison recommended against such a consideration but did state that one case that of L/Cpl Carlos Ashloch (sic), must be of priority interest.
Yet, the 19 individuals named as “captured” and “survived into captivity” are not the only unacknowledged POWs, held by the Vietnamese named within the Tourison documents. This assessment of POW status is not based on opinion. It is based as the notes state; “SRV acknowledged capture.”
Of the names listed on the July 22nd and August 1stmemos, six are very familiar to the National Alliance of Families, as their cases have been written about a number of times in this newsletter. They are: Greg Harris Tom Mangino, Paul Hasenbeck, Danny Nidds, David Winters and John McDonnell. We were not at all surprised to find their names within memos, stating they “survived into captivity.” as we have long and loudly stated that very fact.
Greg Harris was a radio operator serving with the 5th Battalion of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, on June 12, 1966, when his unit was attacked by the Viet Cong. They suffered heavy losses. Friendly forces were able to retake the area on June 13th, recovering the wounded and dead. Greg Harris was not among them.
Two wounded Vietnamese Marines reported seeing Harris. One said he saw Harris was moving out of the area, toward the jungle. The other said the Viet Cong captured him. Some 25 years later, the Vietnamese admitted they captured Greg Harris. Now, 40 years later, we still wait for Greg Harris to come home.
We can not speculate how long Mangino, Hasenbeck, Nidds and Winters survived in captivity. We only know by Vietnamese admission that they survived into captivity.
A CIA report states that the 4 were captured and there were plans to move them to a western area. This report was dismissed by DPMO. Some 8 years after the Vietnamese admitted to capturing the 4, the Defense POW/MIA Office in a February 22nd, 2000 memo, to Jeanie Hasenbeck, stated: "to further comment on the CIA report, the first portion of the document does not relate to Refno 0646 loss. Nevertheless, the Field Comment analytical data in paragraph two relates to 0646 but the informant(s) incorrectly reported it to the collector. The informant apparently knew that something happened to four Americans, but was wrong in claiming their capture. Not only do we not know the source of the data reported in the field comment, we do not know the number of people the information was filtered through before the informant reported what is obviously hearsay."
The memo continued: "the person who obtained the information related in the field comment portion of the report most likely had access to JPRC (Joint Personnel Resolution Center, predecessor of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center which proceeded the Joint Task Force Full Accounting, now known as Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command or JPAC) files in Vietnam that detailed U.S. losses. Based on the date of the "capture," the location, and the number of men, the report writer probably made his own correlation to incident 0646. Again, his correlation of that portion was accurate. It was the information reported by the source in claiming that the men were captured as opposed to killed, which was inaccurate."
Ignored is the fact that the information was "evaluated possibly true” and that one source was rated “fairly reliable," indicating that he or she probably provided accurate information to U.S. forces in the past. Based on the Vietnamese admission of capture, it would seem that information contained in the CIA report was very accurate.
Ms. Hasenbeck forwarded a copy of the DPMO response to the National Alliance of Families, along with a cover note venting her frustration. “... I simply cannot comprehend how the rule of "credibility" is applied. Without confirmation, it sometimes is creditable and it sometimes is hearsay. Just how does that work? When it doesn't confirm their determination of fate, it becomes hearsay, when it does confirm their determination it is creditable. This is truly an ART as any rule of SCIENCE is thrown out the window.... It truly is an amazing logic they apply - most unique and never experienced anywhere else in my world.
There is also a May 5, 1967 report of 4 POW with a group of NVA correlated to Mangino, Hasenbeck, Nidds and Winters. There are two possible photo identifications (dismissed by DPMO) of Danny Nidds in captivity and one possible photo identification of David Winters on which no judgment has been made. None of this information is included in either the Project X rationale for selection or case summary. Additionally, we have documentation which indication that David Winters may have survived for over 1 year in captivity.
With the Vietnamese admission that Mangino, Hasenbeck, Nidds and Winters “survived into captivity,” we must ask why U.S. investigators continue to maintain, based on Vietnamese witness statement that the four were ambushed and immediately killed by the gun fire and grenade blasts. Nor, do we understand how the four “survived into captivity” yet were immediately killed, their bodies submerged along a river bank in an effort to hide them from U.S. forces searching the village 2 hours after the 4 disappeared.
The discrepancies between the Vietnamese witness statements and contemporary U.S. records are too numerous to detail. Add these discrepancies to the facts the Vietnamese acknowledged their “survival into captivity,” and the Project X study included them among the 57 American who could “Possibly …. Be alive” one is left to wonder….. What exactly happened to Mangino, Hasenbeck, Nidds and Winters.
Another case very familiar to the National Alliance of Families is that of Army Capt. John T. McDonnell. Listed as Missing in Action and eventually declared Killed in Action/Body Not Recovered. There is no doubt that John McDonnell was a Prisoner of War. The only question open to debate is if John McDonnell died in captivity or survives today.
The Vietnamese have provided varying stories on McDonnell's fate. The first; McDonnell was injured in the crash of his Cobra helicopter, was immediately captured and died the next day. The second version has McDonnell shot while attempting to evade capture and dying of his wounds the next day. Still a third story states the wounded McDonnell was carried on a stretcher. While crossing a river, McDonnell fell off the stretcher, hit his head and died. The problem with the first version of the Vietnamese story is that there is absolutely no evidence that McDonnell was injured in the crash, as no blood was found at his position within the aircraft. Nor, was any blood found on his helmet, found outside the helicopter. As for the second and third versions, much of the statements provided by the Vietnamese were acknowledge hearsay. Only one witness was located who claimed to have actually participated in McDonnell’s burial. The area was excavated. No remains were found. According to a JTF-FA field report the witness insisted that the area excavated was the burial site, “but bombing during the war and subsequent heavy rains and flooding completely wiped out all evidence or remains or a grave site. Consequently, the witnesses claimed it would be impossible for them to more accurately locate the burial site."
However, dismissed by U.S. investigators and analysis within DPMO are the two live sighting reports correlated to Capt. McDonnell putting him alive and in captivity as late as February of 1973. The first report was a firsthand observation, on three different occasions, between May and July of 1971, in Laos. Based on sources description, a member of the Joint Casualty Resolution Centers stated in the "Field Comment" --< "Records indicate that source probably observed Capt. John T. McDonnell, USA (JCRC Nr. 0176).... There is an indication that McDonnell may have been captured.... McDonnell's description follows: age in 1971 was 31, height: 1.77 meters; weight 75 kilos' hair; brown; race; Caucasian; wears white silver Seiko watch and large ring on left hand."
The second and far more detailed sighting of Captain McDonnell came during the period August 1972 – February 1973, in the Ba To area of Quang Ngai Province, South Vietnam. On four occasions the source saw and spoke with “a captured American Artillery Officer... who was captured (estimated 1968-1969).” The source described the captured American as approximately 75 inches tall, with blue eyes and blond hair. He had a high bridged nose and was thin but had a large frame. The artillery Captain had a small mole on the upper portion of his left lip and a scar approximately 1 1/2 inches long behind his left ear. Subject had two tattoos- one on his right forearm (Dragon approximately 20 CM) and the other on his upper left arm (Nude Woman with two words probably in English). The American was married and had one girl 11 and one boy aged 5. Source states that on the four occasions he conversed with this Captain, a Sr. LT. Hinh, MR-5 (Military Region 5) interpreter, assisted him. Source states the Captain was from Texas, the same place where President Johnson lived, and from source's imitation of the sound of his name it may be inferred that the officer's first name was John (sic)....
How does the description of Capt. McDonnell stack up against the description provided by the source? You decide.
|
Category |
John McDonnell |
Ba To POW as described by source |
|
First Name |
John |
John |
|
Rank |
Capt./Arty |
Capt./Arty |
|
Captured |
March 6, 1969 |
Captured 1968 - 1969 time frame |
|
Loss Location |
Thua Thien |
Binh Dinh |
|
Height |
70" |
75" |
|
Weight |
175 lbs |
described by source as thin |
|
Hair |
Light Brown |
Blond |
|
Eyes |
Hazel |
Blue |
|
Scars |
behind left ear |
behind left ear |
|
Tattoos |
unknown |
2 |
|
Home of Record |
Texas |
Texas |
|
Married |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Number of Children |
3 |
2 |
|
|
Son 11, Son 9, Daughter 8 |
Daughter 11, Son 5 |
In reviewing this material one must remember that all four conversations between the Source and the Army Captain were conducted through an interpreter. Minor errors of translation may have occurred regarding the
The report, in 1973, of a captured American with a dragon tattoo, was but the first. In the early 1980’s another source provided a limited description of an American Prisoner seen in Hanoi in 1977, who had a dragon tattoo on his forearm. This second report of a dragon tattoo had U.S. investigators, once again looking at the case of Capt. McDonnell. All this leaves us asking…. What are the odds of two sources reporting an American in captivity with a dragon tattoo on his forearm?
19 New POWs cases…. Captured alive….. Survived into captivity…. Yet none of the 19 were acknowledged as captured or died in captivity by the Vietnamese in January of 1973. Today, 17 of the 19 remain unaccounted for, still listed as Missing in Action in spite of the fact that the Vietnamese have acknowledged their captivity.
We hear, in glowing terms, of Vietnamese full cooperation on the POW/MIA issue. Yet, we continue to negotiate for new levels of that cooperation, while waiting for the Vietnamese to return men they admit were captured.
But the documents quoted here are not Vietnamese documents. They are U.S. documents generated by the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, based on reports from the Vietnamese, and real time intelligence. Yet, these documents and other remain largely ignored by DPMO.
How much more information on our unaccounted for service personnel remains available and ignored?
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