Posted on 02/26/2007 4:18:14 PM PST by DAVEY CROCKETT
No one to counter Chavez In a region where the leading ideology is Bolivarianism, there is not one leader positioned to offer a better idea for a brighter future.
Commentary by Sam Logan for ISN Security Watch (23/02/2007)
For over two decades, the prevailing ideology in Latin America was neo-liberalism, a Washington-born idea that claimed the power of open markets would lift the region’s poor from misery. It did not, and corruption ran rampant.
While democracy still remains strong, resentful voters ushered in a new generation of neo-populist leaders touting a new idea: a form of socialism, called Bolivarianism, that has slowly but surely become the loudest and most prevalent ideology.
Bolivarianism is anti-capitalist, supports nationalization, regional trade with like-minded countries and above all, suggests that a country should rely on itself or fellow socialist states, not imperialist powers, as a source of the economic growth that will lift all from poverty. It is a sort of refurbished socialism that is not a guiding light for the future.
Latin America cannot readily absorb the economic shock of open markets, nor can it get bogged down in the trappings of old socialist ideas. A blended ideology must be promoted, but the problem is that no one is strong enough to counter Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, the leader of Bolivarianism.
Chavez calls it Socialism for the 21st Century. Cuba's Fidel Castro passed him the torch. Leaders around the region pay homage to their own past as socialist upstarts through hugging and laughing with Chavez on the international stage while taking care of often pro-capitalist, neo-liberal business at home.
Brazilian President Luis Inacio “Lula” da Silva is a perfect example. He has the leftist background and eye for fiscal conservatism to become a great ideological counterweight to Chavez. His politics represent an ideal blend for the region. But his politically weak position at home and strong voices from his own left deter any would be shouting match with Chavez.
Within a week after winning his second term in office, Lula visited Chavez for a photo opportunity on a bridge linking both countries. That was in November, and it looks like Lula’s administration will remain bogged down until March as he struggles to get past his party’s sordid past and form a working cabinet willing to share the same table.
Argentina of the past could have been a counter weight to the Bolivarian ideology. But since Nestor Kirchner has come to power, Argentina has become a Venezuelan puppet.
Chavez has literally bought the support of his southern neighbor with over US$3 billion in purchases of Argentine debt. The most recent purchase occurred on 16 February, when Venezuela dumped another US$750 million into Argentine government coffers.
Colombian President Alvaro Uribe has the politics to promote an ideological battle with Chavez. Colombia has been a model of economic growth through a mixture of neo-liberal policies and social programs. But Uribe has serious problems.
Political allies are falling like dominos due to links with former paramilitary leaders. And if Uribe took the time to speak out for neo-liberalism and against Chavez, he would be dismissed as another of Washington's puppets. Colombia is a top recipient of US aid.
The only other leader who could take up an ideological fight with Chavez is Mexican President Felipe Calderon. He has the right politics and his country has a history of not blindly supporting the US. Voting against the US invasion of Iraq at the UN is a clear indication. But Calderon won on the thinnest possible mandate. His opposition controls enough seats in the Mexican Congress to block any unwanted initiative, and his focus is on Mexican organized crime, not on verbal sword play with Chavez.
Finally, the US has launched a diplomatic offensive in the region. This is to be a year of engagement, but the US president is clearly obsessed with the war in Iraq, not with putting a muzzle on Venezuela’s leader for the sake of the region’s future. Washington is doubly discredited, first for promoting an ideology that clearly did not work, and second for doing nothing about it.
Latin America needs an independent leader willing to stand up to Chavez, but that leader does not exist on the region’s geopolitical map. Bolivarianism will continue to seep into the minds and hearts of millions across Latin America. Chavez and his pool of allies will control the headlines until the next round of presidential elections tell the world how the region has embraced this new ideology.
As Chavez puts it, Socialism for the 21st Century is just getting started. If that is true, then he will continue to trumpet his ideology until Latin Americans learn, the hard way, that Bolivarianism did not carry them much farther from poverty than neo-liberalism. Disillusionment with reality may then spread faster than hope for the future.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sam Logan is an investigative journalist who has reported on security, energy, politics, economics, organized crime, terrorism and black markets in Latin America since 1999. He is a senior writer for ISN Security Watch based in Brazil.
The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author only, not the International Relations and Security Network (ISN).
April 5, 2007 Anti-Terrorism News
(Afghanistan) Two killed in Afghanistan violence
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/subcontinent/2007/April/subcontinent_April185.xml§ion=subcontinent&col=
(Afghanistan) Afghan Foreign Minister rejects call for talks with
Taleban
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/subcontinent/2007/April/subcontinent_April186.xml§ion=subcontinent&col=
American Taliban Seeks Reduced Sentence - Taliban soldier John Walker
Lindh - citing David Hicks case
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070405/ap_on_re_us/american_taliban_17
(Iraq) US helicopter ‘shot down’ in Iraq
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6528953.stm
(Iraq) Explosion strikes oil pipeline in Iraq - bomb
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070405/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_oil_2;_ylt=AtBjsn3VZ6Yf7KogfmZebY1X6GMA
(Iraq) 1 killed in Sunni TV station car bomb in Baghdad
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1173879254833&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(Iraq) Report: Five US soldiers killed in Baghdad — earlier this week
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1173879254441&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(Al-Qaeda) Al-Zawahiri Shuns Phones and Internet, Report Says
http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level_English.php?cat=Terrorism&loid=8.0.402160135&par=0
(Thailand) Grenade at Thai mosque wounds 16 - police suspected at least
five Muslim insurgents were involved in the attack
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070405/ap_on_re_as/thailand_southern_violence_2;_ylt=AhKpE7cANWkyntMQU5O2XgTuNREB
(Thailand) 13 hurt in attacks in Thailand’s Muslim south
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070405/wl_asia_afp/thailandsouthunrest_070405060241;_ylt=AjX01Jrypd1TWANhV039PiTuNREB
(Thailand) Suspected rebel ammunition stash found
http://www.bangkokpost.com/News/05Apr2007_news03.php
(Iran/UK) Iran hostages are back in Britain
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article1618003.ece
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/04/05/wiran1305.xml
(Iran/UK) British sailor to Ahmadinejad: “We are grateful for your
forgiveness”
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/04/04/iran.sailors/index.html
(Iraq/UK) Four British soldiers killed by Basra bombs - UK accused
Iranian agents of organizing and funding attacks on troops
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/04/05/wiraq105.xml
(Iraq/UK) Blair links Iran to attacks on British troops in Iraq as four
soldiers are killed
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/news/news.html?in_article_id=446883&in_page_id=1770
(Pakistan) New Al-Qaeda leaders emerging in Pakistan: US experts
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070405/wl_sthasia_afp/usattacksqaedaintelligence_070405063041;_ylt=AunMBIzrt_0N1ByllKaT5FAwuecA
(Pakistan) 60 dead in Pakistan border fighting
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070404/ap_on_re_as/pakistan_militant_fighting_5;_ylt=Aouw4L2er5Gs6kUHWJzI1VrzPukA
(Pakistan) Blitz Against Madrassa Not Imminent, Interior Minister
http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level_English.php?cat=Security&loid=8.0.402107534&par=0
Pakistan: Focus - The Game is up for Uzbeks in South Waziristan
http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level_English.php?cat=Security&loid=8.0.402153940&par=0
(Pakistan) Legal move to keep British airliner suspect Rashid Rauf in
Pakistan
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070405/wl_uk_afp/britainattacksairline_070405095547;_ylt=AvOHjxvSE60Dk8z66AWNkeLzPukA
(UK) Britain in first official talks with Hamas
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/04/05/wtalks105.xml
(UK) Police charge three 7/7 suspects
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6529643.stm
(UK) Court of Appeal overturns court order on Al Qaeda suspect
http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/article-23391597-details/Court+of+Appeal+overturns+court+order+on+Al+Qaeda+suspect/article.do
(UK) Radical clerics to receive ‘extremism’ Anti-Social Behavior Orders
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/04/05/npreach105.xml
U.S. to use al Qaeda suspect Jose Padilla’s words against him
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N04399769.htm
Jordanian under investigation in Albania for alleged ties to suspected
al-Qaida financier
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/04/04/europe/EU-GEN-Albania-Terror-Financing.php
(Ethiopia) U.S. officials question Islamists held in Ethiopia
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070405/wl_nm/somalia_conflict_usa_dc_2;_ylt=AvvO.G62_zy.DpMJ3V9uejOQLIUD
Southern Africa ‘fertile ground’ for terrorists
http://www.mg.co.za/articlepage.aspx?area=/breaking_news/breaking_news__africa/&articleid=303991
(Israel) Syria must stop supporting terror
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070404/wl_mideast_afp/mideastisraelsyria_070404165554;_ylt=Ajs79Mg_St9tnYC_cTiTwHfuyucA
Israel’s protests are said to stall Saudi and Gulf arms sale - over the
possible transfer of precision-guided weapons
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/05/africa/web-0405weapons.php
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2007/April/middleeast_April94.xml§ion=middleeast&col=
(USA) House Speaker Pelosi visits Saudi Arabia - after meeting with
Syria
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070405/ap_on_re_mi_ea/mideast_pelosi;_ylt=AtdVdfrv_pmfLsXXPNynSIYLewgF
Terrorists endorse Pelosi’s ‘good policy of dialogue’ - Militants call
House speaker’s visit ‘brave’ and hope for talks with Iran
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=55038
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=55041
(Syria) Report: Assad will mediate in release of captive Israeli troops
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1173879252315&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(Indonesia) Muslim meeting urges U.S. troops to leave Iraq
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070404/ts_nm/indonesia_iraq_dc_1;_ylt=AuGZI02v8qMvVIly_RPhFXDaHXcA
French anti-terror agents investigating threats against candidate
Sarkozy
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/04/05/europe/EU-POL-France-Sarkozy-Threats.php
(Sri Lanka) Seven killed in Sri Lanka violence
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070405/wl_sthasia_afp/srilankaunrest_070405082802;_ylt=AumfEmOxx78KcS6cUrMlW6YtM8oA
Other News:
US to keep ban on mobile use on planes
http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,21506641-1702,00.html
From: Jamestown.org
MOSCOW PRESSURING KAZAKHSTAN TO FRUSTRATE WESTBOUND ENERGY TRANSPORT PROJECTS
Kazakhstan is apparently facing Russian pressure to stay out of Western-supported energy projects and maximize the transit of Kazakh oil and gas via Russia. In recent days, President Nursultan Nazarbayev and other officials seem suddenly to be turning a cold shoulder to proposals for Kazakh participation in the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline’s extension from Ukraine into Poland, as well as in the planned trans-Caspian gas pipeline. Astana had recently given these projects favorable consideration. Its sudden cooling seems to reflect Russian backstage pressures as well as the need for a clear Western strategic commitment to these projects and to Kazakhstan itself
On March 29-30, Polish President Lech Kaczynski led a delegation to Astana with an offer for Kazakhstan to join the EU-backed Odessa-Brody-Poland oil transport project as a supplier and stakeholder. Since Moscow has blocked the access of Kazakh oil, via Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk (or any other route) to Odessa for the last five years, Poland now proposes routing Kazakh oil via Azerbaijan to Georgian Black Sea terminals, from there to Odessa and farther into Poland. In that case, the Poles would extend the pipeline to the port of Gdansk, a major potential gateway for Kazakh oil to the Baltic region.
To the Poles’ and their partners’ surprise, President Nazarbayev conditioned Kazakhstan’s participation on Russia’s participation in the pipeline project as an “obligatory condition” (obyazatelno). He also argued that Georgia’s maritime terminals do not have sufficient capacity for supplying the Odessa-Brody-Poland pipeline. This argument seems somewhat strained, given that pipeline’s relatively small capacity of 9 million tons annually and the current under-utilization of Georgia’s Supsa, Batumi, and Kulevi maritime terminals (the pipeline’s capacity can be expanded with modest investments as can be the terminals’ capacities). According to Nazarbayev, major rail and port construction over a five-year period would be necessary in Azerbaijan and Georgia for transporting Kazakh oil to Odessa. Meanwhile, he insisted, Kazakhstan intends to export its oil via Russia and seeks rapid expansion in the capacity of the pipeline to Novorossiysk — a line largely Russian-controlled (Rzeczpospolita, March 30; Interfax, March 29, 30).
This change of tone seems all the more surprising since Astana had previously evidenced frustration with Russia’s policy to block deliveries of Kazakh oil, not only to Ukraine and Poland, but also to Latvia and Lithuania. The Polish-proposed route to Gdansk could open those possibilities for Kazakhstan. On a more positive note, the Kazakh side expressed its interest in acquiring refining capacities in Poland and Ukraine and investing in the pipeline’s extension as a co-owner. But the Kazakhs insisted that such initiatives would have to depend on Russia’s participation in the project.
The initial reaction in Warsaw seems to be an erosion of Polish interest in the project. According to Energy Minister Piotr Woznyak and other Polish officials, Russian participation would deprive the project of its raison d’etre, which is diversification of oil supplies and transport away from dependence on Russia. Thus, Kazakhstan’s insistence on Russian participation is seen as depriving the project of its strategic significance and priority status. Some Polish experts, however, suggest involving Russia with a minority stake and, if possible, no veto rights in the project (Polish TV, PAP, April 2).
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov descended on Astana on March 30, the day on which the Polish delegation left for home. Members of Fradkov’s delegation took it upon themselves to tell the media that the Kazakhs were seeking a substantial expansion in oil exports via Russia: specifically, by expanding the Atyrau-Samara pipeline’s capacity from 15 million tons annually at present to 20 or even 25 million tons, as well as doubling the capacity of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) line to Novorossiysk from almost 30 million annually to some 60 million tons (Interfax, March 30, 31). Such expansion in those directions would render Kazakhstan heavily and permanently dependent on Russia.
Interviewed in the April 2 issue of Spain’s leading daily, El Pais, Nazarbayev seems to overstate the hurdles to the trans-Caspian gas pipeline project, almost to the extent of dooming it. A Russian translation (Interfax, April 2) has Nazarbayev insisting that the trans-Caspian pipeline has “no prospects because the legal status of the Caspian Sea remains unresolved,” its economic and technical possibilities remain unclear, and the key supplier “Turkmenistan has already signed contracts to sell all of its gas to Russia and China.”
Again, this seems a shift of position only two months after Kazakhstan had seriously begun negotiating the terms of its participation in the gas project. The “unresolved” legal status is a Russian hurdle that can almost certainly be circumvented short of confrontation. As the Kazakhs undoubtedly know, Turkmenistan’s alleged agreements with Russia and China are simply declaratory, with no binding provisions of any kind, leaving Turkmenistan’s future gas exports subject to specific agreements with any consumer countries, including European partners in the trans-Caspian project
Ambiguity also crept into Kazakh Energy and Mineral Resources Minister Baktykozha Izmukhambetov’s April 4 statements while conferring with Azerbaijani officials in Baku on energy transit issues. Izmukhambetov announced that the volume of Kazakh oil supplies to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline would depend on other export directions, of which he named the CPC pipeline to Russia and the Kazakhstan-China pipeline. He also announced Kazakhstan’s intention to buy a minority stake in the Russian-controlled Burgas-Alexandropolis pipeline project for the specific purpose of obtaining greater export access to the CPC pipeline. Regarding the trans-Caspian gas pipeline project, he acknowledged its merit — “the shortest route to European markets” — but deferred any detailed discussion until the EU completes a feasibility study and Russia gives its opinion: “Russia is Kazakhstan’s main strategic partner and we must respect its opinion in making decisions on the trans-Caspian gas project” (Turan, Trend, Interfax, Itar-Tass, April 4).
Nazarbayev has accepted Kaczynski’s invitation to participate in the Energy Summit planned to be held in Warsaw in May. It remains unclear whether Kazakhstan would participate there without Russia or would condition its participation on Russia’s. The only quasi-certainty is that Russia is leaning on Astana to drop out of westbound energy transit projects, which Kazakhstan undoubtedly continues to regard as answering to its national interests.
—Vladimir Socor
http://www.jewishtelegraph.co.uk/world_4.html
Hezbollah aims to get nukes
THERE is a growing threat that terrorist groups such as Hezbollah will
acquire nuclear technology, a senior US State Department official said
this
week.
He indicated that there are a “large number” of nuclear smuggling
incidents
each year, some of which are “substantial”.
“You have this environment of material, expertise and supporting
equipment
[for weapons of mass destruction] being more widely available than
before,”
he added.
“You have that coupled with the demonstrated interest of some terror
groups
to acquire these capabilities, and that is a real concern to us.”
“It’s a bigger threat than it was in the past. They are working to
acquire
the means. Countries, including Islamic states, have a common vision,
working together.”
The official said that that Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad “are
terrorist groups that the United States is very concerned about”.
Meanwhile, Greenpeace exposed the “dangers of Israel’s nuclear
reactors”
at a press conference in Tel Aviv as part of a campaign to clear the
world
of nuclear facilities.
The organisation said that a heavy water plant producing plutonium or
tritium, facilities for reprocessing plutonium and uranium for the
production of nuclear fuel, and facilities both for enriching uranium
and
for storing uranium waste were all found at the campus for nuclear
research
in Dimona.
Gaddafi calls for African continental army Web posted at: 4/5/2007
2:42:32
DAKAR . Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi urged Africa yesterday to form a
unified continental army to defend its interests, and he said former
colonial powers should pay compensation for the raw materials they had
extracted.
In a fiery speech at a military parade in Dakar marking Senegal’s
National
Day, Gaddafi said African nations had the right to demand reparations
from
their former colonial masters for the diamonds, gold and other
resources
they had “pillaged”.
Military and political unity would help Africa resist any attempts to
re-colonise it, the Libyan leader said.
“If we manage to unify all of Africa’s armies in a single army, Africa
will
have such power,” Gaddafi said, wearing a double-breasted white jacket
with
medal ribbons pinned on the left and a green outline of Africa
emblazoned on
the right. “We must be strong so as not to be an easy prey for the
colonisers,” said the Libyan leader, standing beside Senegalese
President
Abdoulaye Wade who was sworn in for a second term in office on Tuesday
after
winning elections last month.
While Gaddafi advocated a mighty African army, a top African Union
official
in Sudan appealed for better logistical support and weapons for the
struggling, overstretched AU peacekeeping force serving in Sudan’s
violence-torn Darfur region.
Gaddafi, who often portrays himself as a champion of African unity,
said the
thousands of Africans who tried to migrate to Europe each year were
merely
following the route of the natural riches shipped out of Africa by
European
ex-colonial powers.
“Today, they contest our departure for Europe, they say it’s illegal
migration ... after they came from Europe and elsewhere to occupy
Africa ...
was that legal?” he added, speaking through an interpreter.
“They have left us in poverty. They have carried off our resources and
raw
materials to their countries ... so we want to go after them, or they
should
send them back ... in the form of compensation for their colonisation
of
Africa,” Gaddafi said.
Suggesting that racism coloured Europe’s view of Africa, the Libyan
leader
added: “Who says white is better than black?”.
Somali pirates demand 20,000 dollars ransom for seized ship
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200704/05/eng20070405_364027.html
16:06, April 05, 2007
Somali pirates demand 20,000 dollars ransom for seized ship
Somali pirates who hijacked an Indian-flagged cargo ship as it was
preparing
to dock at Mogadishu port early this week are demanding a ransom of
20,000
U.S. dollars before releasing the freighter.
Kenya’s maritime official said on Thursday the pirates reduced the
ransom
from 40,000 dollars earlier demanded for the release of MV Nimatullah,
which
was seized with 14-member crew while delivering 900 tons of cargo off
the
Somali coast.
“The vessel has been brought to coast off Haradheere, the well- known
pirates’ nest in central Somalia,”Andrew Mwangura, head of the Kenyan
chapter of the Seafarers Assistance Program (SAP) said in a statement.
The freighter whose owner Issa Bhata is based in Dubai was hijacked by
pirates armed with assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades in a
speedboat in Somali waters on early Monday.
This is the second vessel to be hijacked in the Somali waters in six
weeks.
The International Maritime Bureau has described the Somali waters as
one of
the dangerous ones in the world.
“WFP (World Food Programme) and SAP are very concerned with this second
hijacking of a vessel in Somali waters within six weeks, as vessel
owners
will become very reluctant to transport goods to Somali ports because
of
that,”said Mwangura.
“This will endanger the lifeline of food aid by ocean transport, as WFP
plans to transport urgently needed food aid for some 850,000 vulnerable
population especially the displaced and women and children, in
impoverished
and war-torn Somalia,”he said.
“Any disruption in this lifeline will cause immediately hunger among
this
target group. We appeal for the immediate safe return of the 12 crew
members
of the MV Rozen and the 14 crew of the MV Nimatullah.”
The latest seizure followed the hijacking of a United Nations chartered
ship, the Rozen, with its crew of six Kenyans and six Sri Lankans in
late
February. The vessel had just delivered food aid in northeastern
Somalia.
Waters off the unpatrolled 3,700 km Somali coastline saw scores of
pirate
attacks between March 2005 and June last year, when Islamists seized
Mogadishu and then moved into much of southern and central Somalia.
Last month, Kenyan maritime officials monitoring the pirate- infested
east
African coast said raiders had returned to the Somali settlement of
Haradere,about 300 km north of Mogadishu.
Venezuelan Jews fear for future
Hal Weitzman
Venezuela’s well-established Jewish community has lost up to
one-fifth of its members, prompted by an increasingly hostile
environment under the government of left-wing radical President
Hugo Chavez.
CARACAS (JTA) — The floor of the small synagogue in the center
of Coro, the oldest Jewish house of prayer in Venezuela, is
covered in a thick layer of sand intended to recall the Children
of Israel’s time in the Sinai Desert.
It is also, however, a symbol of the transience of Jewish
settlement in South America.
Jewish settlers arrived in Coro, a small town in western
Venezuela that was the county’s first capital, from Curacao in
1827. In 1855, nearly the entire community left after a mob
ransacked Jewish homes and shops.
Venezuelan Jews say that was the last time anti-Semitism flared
up in the country. But in the past few years a community that
had considered itself among the most well-established in South
America has lost up to one-fifth of its members, prompted by an
increasingly hostile environment under the government of
President Hugo Chavez, a radical leftist who has been in power
since 1999.
“People have left, but there hasn’t been a massive exodus as
some people have said,” said Jacqueline Goldberg, editor of
Nuevo Mundo Israelita, the community’s weekly newspaper.
Goldberg was referring to rumors in Caracas that up to half of
the city’s Jews had moved out of Venezuela since Chavez took
power.
Accurate figures are hard to come by, but estimates suggest the
community now numbers between 15,000 and 20,000. The vast
majority are based in the capital, with small communities in the
cities of Valencia and Maracaibo, and on the Caribbean island of
Margarita.
A principal factor keeping them in Venezuela is quality of life.
The community is mostly middle and upper class, and while it has
suffered from living under a regime whose president routinely
accuses the wealthy of undermining his “21st century socialist
revolution,” the government’s policy platform also allows
business opportunities.
“When you have a president who’s massively expanding public
spending, there’s a lot of money to be made,” said a Jewish
businessman who asked not to be named. “A lot of Jews are
involved in construction, which is booming, what with the
government building more schools, hospitals, housing and roads.”
Another economic reason not to leave: The Chavez government
introduced foreign exchange controls in 2003, making it
difficult for Venezuelans to take their wealth out of the
country.
Another attraction is the strength and cohesion of the
community. Given its small size, the Jewish infrastructure in
Caracas is impressive: There are five synagogues, and the
community carries out its own kosher slaughter. The centerpiece
is the Club Hebraica, a large complex in Los Chorros, an
upmarket residential neighborhood in the eastern part of the
city.
The Hebraica comprises a well-equipped Jewish school and a
sports and social club with a large swimming pool; tennis,
basketball and squash courts; soccer pitches; and even a bowling
alley.
Hebraica”’s tranquility feels a world away from the social and
economic revolution gripping Venezuela, and symbolizes how the
Caracas Jewish community has protected itself from some effects
of that upheaval.
“If you’re not involved in politics, you don’t really feel the
regime,” said Rabbi Pynchas Brener, head of the Ashkenazi
community.
Nevertheless, Venezuelan Jews feel a tangible discomfort.
“We’ve never had anti-Semitism here in Caracas, so this
situation is something new,” community member Moises Nessim
said. “I would say there is worry and concern, but not yet fear
- more uncertainty about what’s going to happen.”
Although Chavez - a former army officer and coup leader known
for his fiery anti-American rhetoric - has never been much
favored by Venezuelan Jews, relations between his government and
the community started to deteriorate in earnest in 2004.
In November of that year the Club Hebraica was raided by police
under a search warrant issued by a local pro-Chavez judge. The
warrant, which came after the murder of public prosecutor Danilo
Anderson, suggested that the Hebraica was being used to store
weapons.
That accusation apparently sprung from rumors that Anderson had
been killed with equipment from Israel”’s Mossad spy agency.
After searching the school and the club, police left
empty-handed.
Incredulous that authorities might think the Jewish community
was storing weapons in its school, some observers concluded that
the raid really was intended to intimidate the community.
“Chavez must have known about” the raid, one community member
said.
“In this society, nothing happens without his permission,” this
member said. “There was a feeling that the government wanted to
send a sign that no group was immune from its control.”
The situation deteriorated further a month later, when Chavez
said in a speech that “the descendants of those who killed
Christ” and “the descendants of the same ones that kicked
Bolivar out of here” had “taken possession of all the wealth in
the world.”
Though the Christ-killer comment clearly appeared anti-Semitic,
some commentators said Chavez actually was referring to global
capitalism. Indeed, when Jewish leaders soon afterward met with
the president at Miraflores Palace, his official residence, he
assured them that he had not been referring to the Jewish
community.
That meeting in January 2006 brokered an uneasy peace, but the
official reaction to Israel’s war with Hezbollah in Lebanon last
year unleashed what Freddy Pressner, head of CAIV, the Jewish
community”’s umbrella organization, calls “an explosion of
anti-Semitism in Venezuela.”
Chavez repeatedly compared Israel’s behavior to that of the
Nazis, a stance that locals say encouraged a wave of similar
slanders. Sammy Eppel, a Jewish journalist in Caracas,
catalogued a host of violently anti-Israel and anti-Semitic
writing and cartoons in the local government and pro-government
media.
In one article, which appeared last September in Diario de
Caracas, a pro-government newspaper, journalist Tarek Muci Nasir
wrote of the “Jewish race” that “the only resource they have
left to stay united is to cause wars and genocide.”
A cartoon that ran last year in Diario VEA, a state-owned
newspaper, depicted Hitler saying, “How they’ve learned from me,
these Israelis!”
One worrying trend is the extent to which these sentiments
appear to be approved and encouraged by the government. The
Ministry of Information last year organized a demonstration
outside the main Sephardi synagogue in Caracas, an act that
Pressner called “insensitive and imprudent.”
After the demonstration, the wall outside the synagogue was
daubed with “Jews, killers - leave” and “Zionist baby-killers. “
At other times, graffitti has appeared there with slogans such
as “Jews go home” and “Here are the murderers of the
Palestinians. “
A more worrying development was the appearance of a
Venezuela-based Web site claiming to be the local branch of
Hezbollah. The site warned, “Hizbolla Latin America is analyzing
placing explosives against a U.S. ally in Latin America. This
would indicate the launch of Hizbolla Latin America.”
Another concern is over Chavez’s increasingly close economic and
political ties to Iran. As the world has condemned Tehran’s
nuclear ambitions, Venezuela has emerged as one of Iran’s few
solid allies in the world.
At the same time, Chavez effectively cut all diplomatic ties
with Israel last year by withdrawing his charge d’affaires. He
had recalled his ambassador three years earlier.
Pressner said Chavez’s comments could trigger more extreme
activists to feel they”’re acting with his blessing.
“We fear what he has sowed,” he said. “We fear what could happen
if there is another conflict. If there were a conflict with
Iran, for example, we don’t know what the consequences would be
for our community.”
Nevertheless, most Jews in Caracas do not feel that anti-Israel
sentiment will provoke physical attacks.
“They’re not burning synagogues or persecuting people on the
streets, but there is officially sanctioned anti-Semitism, “
Eppel said. “The Venezuelan people aren’t anti-Semitic. This is
being directed by a few activists.”
A more immediate concern is over the government’s plans for
education. Chavez’s stated aim is to spread “21st century
socialist values” via the school system - and to extend this
through private schools as well. While it”’s not clear how this
would work, many Jews find the proposal troubling.
“Their education plan is a big worry,” said Guillermo
Schmidmajer, whose daughter teaches Hebrew at the Jewish school.
“Chavez is putting his brother in charge of education reform,
and he might base it on the model in Cuba, where he was a
student.”
On a more positive note, the community can take heart not only
from its own unity but from the solidarity and support it has
received from across Latin America and the world. Last weekend,
CAIV celebrated its 40th anniversary in a spirit of hopefulness
and achievement.
To coincide with CAIV’s anniversary, the Latin American Jewish
Congress held a two-day meeting in Caracas attended by some 70
Jewish leaders from Latin America, the United States, Canada,
Europe and Israel.
The highlight of the weekend was a commemoration at the Hebraica
attended by some 1,200 people featuring Cristina Fernandez de
Kirchner, first lady of Argentina and a senator there, as the
keynote speaker.
In what seemed to be a swipe at Chavez, she told the meeting,
“Each and every one of us who has the responsibility of being
part of an elected institution in Latin America should not only
raise our voices but act in a concrete way against any sign or
glimpse of anti-Semitism. “
The audience responded with spontaneous, wild applause.
Fernandez is widely expected to launch a bid to succeed her
husband, Nestor Kirchner, in Argentina’s presidential elections
in October.
At a time of great concern over the actions and attitudes of its
own president, the Venezuelan Jewish community is happy to have
such influential friends.
http://www.jta.org/cgi-bin/iowa/news/print/20070326VenezuelanJews.html
http://www.jta. org/cgi-bin/ iowa/news/print/20070326VenezuelanJews.
html
http://www.jta.org/cgi-bin/iowa/news/print/20070326VenezuelanJews.html
http://www.jta.org/cgi-bin/ iowa/news/print/20070326VenezuelanJews.
html
French fight against PKK just beginning
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=107487
French fight against PKK just beginning
Contrary to what is widely assumed to be the case in Turkey, a French
investigation into the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has not
come
to a close and is in fact deepening.
“The real operation has just now started. If it finishes well, it will
be
the first decisive move made in Europe against the PKK,” French sources
close to the investigation said.
The French investigation, dubbed “Ýmralý” — a reference to the island
off
Ýstanbul where PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan is serving a life sentence
— began last July when two members of the terrorist group were
captured
trying to change 200,000 euros into dollars at an exchange bureau in
France.
It later culminated into a crackdown on the group in February when the
French police detained 16 people, including some suspected to be the
senior
leaders of the group in Europe. But initial contentment in Turkey later
subsided, to be slowly replaced by disappointment when each and every
one of
the suspects detained as part of the crackdown, including a few sought
on
Interpol “red bulletins,” were eventually released.
French sources indicate it could be too early to lose hope. “Though
circles
watching this terror group in Turkey think the operation here has
finished
already, it has not. It is continuing and deepening,” said one source.
The
same sources noted if the PKK members were brought to trial and
convicted,
it would also be the first time in Europe that the PKK had been
punished,
something that would set a precedent for the continent.
According to the French sources, the questioning of the PKK members,
including senior figures Rýza Altun, Nedim Seven and Canan Kurtyýlmaz,
has
started anew in recent days. The PKK members remain free pending trial
for
the moment, though they are forbidden from traveling outside of Paris.
They
have also been officially forbidden from meeting with one another and
from
going to Kurdish group meetings.
As part of the deepening investigation, a French delegation will also
be
traveling to Turkey. The delegation will have meetings in Ýstanbul,
Ankara
and Diyarbakýr. Sources report the investigation also has active
contacts in
Germany and other EU countries.
Ankara had already requested the French government extradite to Turkey
some
of the PKK members caught in Paris. There have been no developments,
however, on this front, which sources note is ultimately connected to
“political will” in France and the interior minister may be moved to
make a
decision on this matter. Investigators and judges can only make
suggestions
on the matter of extradition.
Decision to let them go free was surprising
The unexpected freeing of the 16 suspected PKK members in France led to
questions on whether this controversial decision was tied to political
pressure in connection with the upcoming elections in France.
The decision by the Paris Appeals Court to free the PKK members caught
at
the end of an eight-month-long special operation by anti-terror units
was of
the greatest surprise to the anti-terror commissioners directing the
investigation. The three commissioners and one prosecutor who appeared
in
court all requested that the PKK members remain imprisoned.
At this point, anti-terror unit members in France had characterized the
court’s decision as “inexplicable” and as a “baseless decision.”
In the case presented before the court, it was pointed out that not
only is
the PKK on the list of terror groups kept by EU countries, but some of
the
suspects arrested in the operation were at that time being sought by
Interpol “red bulletins.”
A top level authority from the French Ministry of Justice, who did not
want
his name to be revealed, said the freeing of these suspects centered
around
two separate reasons. The most important reason for the freeing of the
16
was the disclosure, following the arrests, that the PKK had relations
with
the French domestic intelligence agency, the Direction de la
Surveillance du
Territoire (DST). It was similarly revealed that during the
investigation
PKK members had met at least once a month with the DST and offered
information about their activities.
Authorities note that PKK lawyers “played” this secret cooperation
between
the DST and the PKK “very well” while in court. Interestingly, this
connection, a topic in the French press, was never officially denied by
the
DST.
Another important aspect to this operation underscored by French
officials
is the statement made by US Ambassador to Ankara Ross Wilson, following
the
raids in Paris, when Wilson asserted that the US too had played an
effective
role in the operation. This, according to French officials, “had a
negative
effect” on the operation. Authorities involved in the investigation
note
that there was an attempt by PKK lawyers, following the US ambassador’s
comments, to assert that the operations had occurred because of
pressure
from the US. This, they say, was an attempt to “politicize” the matter.
They
note that at the time the US knew nothing time about the operation,
which
had begun in July of 2006, saying, “These statements left us in a
difficult
position in front of the court.”
Meanwhile, Ministry of Justice sources say that PKK lawyers “tried to
pull
the case out of the arena of terror and into the political arena by
asserting that the questioned PKK members were working for the Kurdish
cause
in Turkey and that all Kurds in Turkey supported the PKK.”
Sources also indicate that in the coming days, certain political names
and
state authorities who had been quoted in this case may be called to
“give
testimony.” After the PKK arrests, it was noted in the press that
presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy’s right-hand man, ethnic
Armenian
politician Patrik Devejian, had had long standing contacts with certain
Kurdish groups in France.
‘Schizophrenic’ view
French authorities assert that the entire problem at this point stems
from
contradictions in the stance shown by EU countries toward the PKK as a
whole. The PKK is in fact on the official EU list of terror groups.
Despite this, most EU countries continue to ignore PKK activities
within
their own borders. What the EU has made clear is while this terror list
is
important for political and symbolic reasons, it holds no legal value.
France, which has signed this list, has already given Rýza Altun, a
leading
member of the France-based PKK group, the legal right to residency. It
was
only with Altun’s capture that it was discovered that he had an illegal
status. Perhaps it is due to all this that one top level French
official
referred to the current situation involving the PKK as “schizophrenic.”
05.04.2007
ALÝ ÝHSAN AYDIN PARIS
http://africa.reuters.com/top/news/usnBAN523552.html
Somali Islamists’ withdrawal “tactical”- former chief Thu 5 Apr 2007,
5:32
GMT
DUBAI (Reuters) - The retreat of Islamists fighters from Mogadishu late
last
year in the face of an Ethiopian and Somali government offensive was a
“tactical” move, a former Islamist leader said in remarks aired on
Wednesday.
“We cannot say that there was a defeat. It was a tactical withdrawal,”
Sheikh Sharif Ahmed told Al Jazeera television.
When asked if the Somalia Islamic Courts Council was involved in the
recent
fighting in Mogadishu, which aid agencies have called the worst in 15
years,
Ahmed indicated it was.
“The resistance which is taking place on the Somali arena is a popular
resistance against occupation, aggression and annihilation ... the
Islamic
Courts are part of the great Somali people,” he said.
Since being driven from Mogadishu in late December, after controlling
Somalia’s anarchic capital for six months, the Islamists scattered to
southern Somalia and hardline elements vowed a long guerrilla war.
“The (Islamic) Courts have achieved large successes ... bringing
security
and stability,” he said. “Ninety-five percent of the Somali people
support
the Islamic Courts.”
The Islamists during their brief heyday were quick to claim victories,
but
they often could not be independently verified.
The superior Ethiopian firepower backing the Somali government made
quick
work of their poorly trained fighters over a two-week offensive that
began
in late December.
Washington has said it views Ahmed as a moderate who could help with
national reconciliation in Somalia.
But Ahmed charged that the United States helped Ethiopian and
government
troops in their military campaign at the end of 2006 to rout the
Islamists.
The United States “did not have a positive role ... they offered
intelligence and took part in the bombing,” he said.
“In the final hours our forces were achieving one victory after another
then
we were surprised with heavy bombing,” he said.
“We decided to withdraw and we also learned that there was a
conspiracy, in
other words there was help from major countries.”
Ahmed, who lives in exile in Yemen is seen by many diplomats as a
potential
player in helping with reconciliation in Somalia.
But security experts say he may have little influence over the hardline
Islamists, who are trained in insurgency and are suspected to be
involved in
ongoing guerrilla attacks against the government in Mogadishu.
Ahmed surrendered to Kenyan authorities on the border in January and
met
with U.S. diplomats in the African country before leaving for Yemen in
February.
Ahmed said U.S. officials have asked the Islamists to take part in
national
reconciliation talks scheduled for April 16 in Mogadishu but as
individuals
and not as an organisation.
Schism in Islam: Myths and Continuing Misconceptions Regarding the Sunni-Shi’i Split
http://www.aljazeerah.info/Opinion%20editorials/2007%20Opinion%20Editorials/
April/4%20o/Schism%20in%20Islam%20Myths%20and%20Continuing%20Misconceptions%
20Regarding%20the%20Sunni-Shi’i%20Split%20By%20Abbas%20J.%20Ali.htm
Schism in Islam: Myths and Continuing Misconceptions Regarding the
Sunni-Shi’i Split Al-Jazeerah, April 3, 2007 Editor’s Note:
In Arabic, the two main Islamic schools of thought are Sunna and Shi’a,
followers of these schools are Sunni and Shi’i, respectively. The
author
here uses the term Shi’a in reference to followers of that school.
***
Just before the invasion of Iraq, President George W. Bush and Prime
Minster
Tony Blair appeared confident that once Saddam Hussein was deposed,
most of
the Middle East problems would dissipate. Both leaders made a powerful
argument that the invasion of Iraq would facilitate profound change
especially in democratizing the region and in solving its protracted
Palestinian-Israeli question. Sadly, the outcome has been tragic for
Iraqis
and the region has experienced the worse calamity in recent history.
Indeed, the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq has been a
disappointment,
especially for the people there. The region is on a verge of total
chaos and
suddenly it has been infected with social diseases that, until
recently,
have been alien to the majority of the people. In the midst of newly
unfolding events, Middle East and international affairs experts have
been
puzzled by the dramatic down turn and many have hopelessly attempted to
map
what the future holds for the strategically vital region. One of the
most
frightening scenarios is the “potential” civil war that is looming
between
the two major Muslim communities, Sunni and Shia. These communities
have
generally lived in harmony with each other for centuries.
In particular, throughout history, Iraq has experienced minor forms of
sectarian tension (e.g. in the eleventh and twelve centuries
demonstrations
or heated religious debates took place). But it has never reached the
magnitude and scale which has evolved since the invasion.
For many decades, sectarianism was almost an alien concept for the
majority
of Iraqis. Following the invasion, sectarian terminologies have become
conspicuously common in daily political discourse. Unfamiliar with
Iraqi
history and culture, senior officers of the occupational authority and
the
invasion forces have frequently issued sectarian statements, in a
society
that was mostly sectarian adverse. Worse, these statements have been
perceived as an invitation to stimulate Shia-Sunni tension. Alienated
and
insecure, Iraqis have gradually fallen victim to sectarianism and some
have
started to espouse sectarian identity.
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in July 2006 and its fierce fighting
with
the Lebanese resistant movement, where Lebanese Shia constituted the
majority, has further helped to infuse Shia-Sunni terminology into the
Bush
administration regular political discourse. Since President Bush and
Secretary of State Rice have treated the Lebanese crisis, not as a
political
problem, but as a security challenge to their design for the Middle
East,
media outlets in the U.S. and the rest of the World have incorporated
Shia
-Sunni terminologies in their daily reporting without even a vague
understanding of the terms and their historical or political
underpinnings.
Western media, however, is not alone in misunderstanding and misusing
Shia-Sunni terminologies. Arab and Muslim reporters, across the world,
have
found the sectarian subject alluring and have shown a conspicuous
interest
in perpetuating certain myths. These myths have poisoned the minds of
unsophisticated individuals and deepened misunderstandings and social
tensions. Arab governments and dictators, in particular, have seized on
this
opportunity and capitalized on the Shia-Sunni spilt to divert the
attention
of their own public from pressing issues pertaining to power abuse,
lack of
democracy, wide-spread corruption, economic and social inequality, and
chronic economic crises. This destructive diversion appears to be
working
and the Middle East has become more than ever a boiling volcano.
Those who are intimately familiar with Islamic thinking and historical
Arab
politics argue that the Shia-Sunni split should be understood as a
sociopolitical development that is associated with the early formation
of
the city state in Arabia before and immediately after the arise of
Islam. In
fact, those who objectively trace the evolution of the Shia-Sunni spilt
point out two fascinating aspects that often stand out.
These do not revolve around how a clannish struggle for power and
influence
evolved gradually and persistently into political aspirations expressed
in
religious beliefs. Rather, these two aspects are linked to the fact
that
unchallenged myths often emerge as powerful force and, accordingly, are
often treated as reality. The first aspect is the blind acceptance of
certain myths by intellectuals, including reporters, both in the West
and in
Muslim dominated countries, and how they subsequently have failed to
formulate a reasonable knowledge-driven outlook to comprehend this
historical development. The second aspect is the never-ending utility,
for
politicians, of employing this spilt as a means to optimally serve
their
political aspirations and consolidation of power. In this regard, an
attempt
is made in this paper to briefly deconstruct the most widely held
myths.
These myths are outlined below:
1. Schism in Islam between Shia and Sunni began immediately after the
death
of the Prophet Muhammad around 632 as Muslims were divided into two
groups;
those who supported Abu Bakr as the first successor (Caliph) of the
Prophet
Mohamed and those who believed that Mohamed’s son-in-law and immediate
cousin, Ali, should be the Caliph. 2. There was a bloody civil war
between
the two communities immediately after Abu Bakr became the caliph. 3.
The
sectarian spilt and conflict between the two Muslim communities
intensified
after bin Umayyad came to power as Maawiya Ibn Abu Sufyan became Caliph
in
661. 4. Unlike the Shia, the Sunni communities uniformly condone all
caliphs.
The article begins by framing the evolution of the Shia - Sunni spilt
into
five general stages. These stages briefly capture the most significant
factors including tribal, political, and religious which have shaped
the
nature of the division in Islam and ultimately changed the course of
action
in Islamic polity. The outline offers a better understanding of the
progression of the spilt across centuries. More importantly, the
presentation, at each stage and collectively, helps to deconstruct the
preceding myths without underestimating the historical value attached
to the
emergence of the division or compromising the integrity of its key
actors.
1. The Family Feud (Mid 400 to 610)
The Arab historian, Ibn al-Athir, (d.1210, p. 193) traced the origin of
the
rivalry in Islam to family feuds and jealousies long before the
inception of
Islam. He reported that when the great-grandfather of the Prophet
Mohamed,
Abd Manaf (mid 400), died, his son Hashim rather than Abd Shams assumed
the
responsibilities of hospitality (a cherished value and a source of
prestige)
and of providing water to pilgrimages to Mecca in Arabia (for a brief
outline of the most important figures in the evolved conflict, see
Figure
1). Abd Shams’s son, Umayya (the father of the Umayyad dynasty), sought
to
project himself as generous as his uncle but could not deliver and
could not
uphold his reputation among the elite of Mecca. This further infuriated
him
and subsequently he challenged his uncle to a duel. The elite of Mecca
set
conditions for the duel: in the event of a defeat, Umayya had to
provide 50
camels for a feast and had to go into exile for ten years in al-Sham
(Syria). This first incident deeply embittered the Umayyad dynasty. In
fact,
after the revelation of Islam to the Prophet Mohamed in 610, most
members of
the Umayyad dynasty were determined to force the defeat of Mohamed and
the
suppression of his message. At the time, Abu Sufyan, the patriarch of
the
Umayyad declared, “We competed with them [the family of Mohamed] . .
. like two race horses. As soon as we were equal in all fronts, they
announced they had a prophet with a revelation from God. When will we
be
able to attain the same? I swear to God, we will never believe him or
his
faith.”
Most historians have overlooked the significance of the forced exile
into
Syria for the Umayyad dynasty. In fact, this development turned out to
be a
blessing as it enabled Umayya to position himself as a trade chief for
commercial relations between Arabia and Syria. More importantly, it
allowed
him to enlarge his network with tribes along the trade road which
provided
protection for trade caravans. This latter allowed his dynasty to gain
military power and prestige. While members of the Hashim dynasty were
famed
for their generosity and prided themselves on being morally
responsible, the
Umayyad dynasty accumulated military and economic power and eventually
became an undisputed player among the aristocracies of Mecca and its
Quraesh
tribe.
2. The Ideological Demarcation (610-661)
The emergence of Islam was a major challenge to the established
aristocracy
and its most influential figures such as Abu Sufyan of the Umayyad
dynasty.
Those individuals saw the new message of equality and prohibition of
usury,
trade monopoly and abuse of power, as a threat to the established
political
and social order and a gathering storm that would end their monopoly on
trade. So for almost twenty years, every effort was made to weaken
Islam and
defeat Mohamed. However, as the prophet Mohamed conquered Mecca around
630
and defeated its aristocracy, its members came to accept Islam.
Two of the senior members of the Meccan aristocracy and the most
influential
members of the Umayyad dynasty, Abu Sufyan and his Son Maawiya,
espoused
Islam as well. This event, while it militarily strengthened Muslims,
reinfected the new Muslim community with the old but undying Arab
tendency,
with clan rivalry and a fierce loyalty
(asabya) to tribe. The Prophet Mohamed denounced these pre-Islamic
attitudes
and instead promoted an all-inclusive spirit, a loyalty to faith only,
and a
rejection of differences based on color, tribe, or ethnicity. It should
be
mentioned that while Mohamed vigorously denounced asabya, he equally
stressed the importance of accepting differences in perspectives among
learned members declaring that “The differences [of opinion] among the
thinkers of my community are a blessing.” Muslims, however, deferred to
his
judgments in religious affairs. And Muslims, regardless of their views,
rallied behind Mohamed’s inclusive message.
After the death of the prophet Mohamed, differences in opinion and
rivalry
sprang to the surface. The selection of Abu Bakr as successor to the
Prophet
Mohamed caused ill-feelings among a few senior leaders of the Muslim
community e.g., al-Abbas, Ali, al-Zebar ibn al-Awam, Talha Ibn
Abeidallah,
and Saad Ibn Abada. However, with the exception of the last one, the
rest
accepted the leadership of Abu Bakr. In fact, Ali was a close adviser
to the
first and second Caliphs; the second Caliph
(Omer) was his son-in-law. This by no means suggests that differences
were
completely eradicated and ill-feelings uprooted. Rather, it testifies
to the
fact that there was a disagreement on who should be the Caliph which,
had it
not been managed on a timely basis, could have gotten out of hand and
endangered the newly established State.
Early Arab historians documented that alliances among elites in Medina,
after the death of the Prophet Mohamed, were constructed along two
major
fronts: ideological and tribal. The tribal front was led by Abu Sufyan.
This charismatic tribal chief was not about to accept marginalization
and
had the capacity to sabotage the political process to his advantage.
He challenged the rising influence of Abu Bakr and Omer (who became
first
and second caliph respectively) and questioned their qualifications to
assume leadership due to what he believed was the low social status of
their
tribal lineage within Quraesh. Arab historian, al-Andelesy, (p. 245)
quoted
Omer saying to Abu Bakr, “He [Abu Sufyan] is coming and he will do
evil,”
and demanded that he should be co-opted.
Abu Bakr found Omer’s preposition pragmatic. This strategic move
enabled the
Muslim community to defuse a serious threat.
The second front was ideological and manifested itself in differences
in
opinion regarding the nature and appropriateness of the process that
led to
the selection of Abu Bakr as a Caliph. That is, those who voiced
opinions
acted within the boundaries of Islamic polity and had in their minds
what
was perceived as the most preferred approaches to secure the safety of
the
community. Al-Masudi (d. 968, Vol. 2, p. 307) quoted the first Caliph
Abu
Bakr stating that there was discontent and that ill feelings were
evident
among members of the Prophet Mohamed’s family, but this was not a civil
war.
Similarly, Ibn al-Athir, (p. 278) documented that Caliph Omer asserted
the
same. Ibn Abed Raba al-Andelesy (d.985, Vol. 4, p.265) reported that
Caliph
Omer stated the reason why the Prophet Mohamed’s family did not obtain
the
Caliph’s position was because Quraesh thought if the Hashim dynasty
held
both the prophecy and the Caliphate, nothing would be left for others
and
that the gift of prophecy which was bestowed on the Prophet’s family
gave it
a great prestige.
It should be mentioned that despite the fact that Ali had considerable
influence among the many senior followers of the Prophet Mohamed and
that
there were a significant number in the Muslim community, among the
intellectuals and the poor, who appreciated his knowledge, leadership,
and
contributions to the newly established State, he appeared to give
priority
to the continuity and unity of the Muslim community but not to tribal
solidarity. Ali declined the offer by his uncle, al-Abbas, to declare
allegiance to him as Caliph. More importantly, historians al-Andelesy
(p.
245) and Ibn al-Athir (p. 277) report that when Abu Sufyan informed Ali
that
he would gather a great army to remove Abu Bakr from the leadership and
restore it to Ali, the latter refused stating, “Your objective is to
create
discontent. We have no use for your input as you have always sought to
harm
Islam.”
Analysts and Islamic affairs experts often overlook the fact that Abu
Bakr,
Omer, and Ali viewed the position of Caliph as secular with a
responsibility
to civic duty, not divine responsibility. This is evidenced by
historical
records of their sayings and actions. According to al-Masudi (d. 968,
Vol.
2) neither Abu Bakr nor Ali aspired for the position of Caliphate.
Moreover,
Ali declined to name a successor before he died. His advice was that
people
should select who they thought was the most capable (p. 425). His
reasoning
was that people are entitled to elect their ruler, stating, “If the
presence
of the entire people was necessary for the validity of the selection of
the
Caliph, then there should be no other way. However, since it is
impossible
to command such gathering, then those who are eligible should represent
those who are absent.”
3. Tribal Demarcation and the Deepening of the Feud (661-750)-the
Ascendancy
of Asabya
After Ali assumed the Caliphate in 656, Maawiya declared war on the
Caliph
as Ali declined to retain him as governor of Syria. The war was costly
and
led to serious divisions among Muslims. Subsequent to the death of Ali
in
661, Maawiya secured the Caliphate for himself.
Al-Masudi (Vol. 2, p. 351), along with other Arab medieval historians
reported that, around 644, Abu Sufyan told members of his dynasty to
take
over the State stating, “O Sons of Umayyad, pick it like a ball. In the
name
of He whom I swear by, I have been yearning to get the reign for you
and to
your offspring, a hereditary.” This goal eventually came to fruition
when
Maawiya became Caliph in 661. This development constituted a turning
point
in the history of Muslims and the evolution of Islam. This is not only
because it set the stage of hereditary tradition for governance in the
Arab
and Muslim world, but because it also revived the Arabs’ fierce tribal
solidarity (Asabya) and enabled the Umayyad to use expeditions and the
infrastructure of the State in the service of commerce.
Maawiya’s seizure of the Caliphate angered some members in the Quraesh
tribe
and devout Muslims because of his past history before joining Islam.
Maawiya, however, was an outstanding politician who based his power
strictly
on his family’s prestigious Arab lineage, military strength, and vast
wealth. He compromised when it was essential and used force when the
rewards
outweighed the cost. Nevertheless, Maawiya was driven by his fierce
loyalty
to members of his dynasty and was fascinated by the events that
dominated
the rivalry between the two dynasties. Al-Andelesy (d.985, Vol. 1, pp.
334-348) recorded, on different occasions, a debate between Maawiya and
several visiting noble Arab women. In all his arguments, Maawiya again
and
again revisited the battles of Badr, Auhed, Sufien (in the first the
Prophet
Mohamed and the Muslims defeated Maawiya’s father and his army, in the
second, the latter achieved semi-victory over the Prophet, and the last
was
the war between the armies of Imam Ali and Maawiya) while the women
reminded
him that the Prophet and Imam Ali had built the foundation of Islam.
None of the early Arab historians (e.g., al-Masudi, d. 968;
al-Andelesy,
d.985; Ibn al-Athir, d.1210) recorded that members of the Umayyad
dynasty
used religious virtue or religion, in general, to justify their
ascendancy
to power. In fact, according to al-Masudi some Umayyad Caliphs never
internalized Islamic faith. In particular, he quoted Caliph al-Walid II
(743-4) stating (Vol. 3, p. 229) that Prophet Mohamed fabricated his
message
“A Hashimi [Prophet Mohamed] enjoyed his reign, thought there was no
revelation or a book from God.”
According to recorded history of the time, tribalism and Asabya, rather
than
sectarianism, were the common forms of division among Muslims during
the
Umayyad era. That is, sectarianism in the form of the Shia-Sunni split
did
not appear. In fact, the word Shia (supporters) was used to describe
both
Ali’s and Maawiya’s camps. In the agreement between the two during the
battle of Sufien,it was stated,”This is what is agreed on between Ali
Ibn
Abu Talib and Maawiya Ibn Abu Sufyan, the arbiter for Ali representing
the
people of Iraq and those who are their Shia among Muslims and the
arbiter
for Maawiya representing the people of Sham (Syria) and those who are
their
Shia among Muslims. . . . .”
Al-Masudi (vol. 3, p. 151), as well, used the term Shia to specify the
supporters of al -Hajaj (a brutal leader during the Umayyad era).
However, al-Masudi (vol. 3, pp. 102-3) also reported events and stories
in
which the supporters of Ali, during this era were called Turabyoon (in
reference to Imam Ali who Prophet Mohamed gave the nickname, Abu Turab,
because of his austerity and disregard of the material world).
It is commonly reported that the emergence of Shia as a political
movement
started after the killing of Imam Hussein at the hand of Umayyad in
680.
This may not be accurate. The slaughter of members of the Prophet
Mohamed’s
family, especially his grandson Hussein, was not condoned by any Muslim
sect. The killings, however, to this day, reinforce the belief that
illegitimate authority is more disposed to commit wrong doings than
legitimate authority. All Islamic schools of thought which evolved
later
agree on this. Even the most contemporary conservative “salafi”
theologian,
Abu al-Hassan al-Nadawy (1990, p. 189) has stated that those who
governed
after 661, including the Umayyad—except Omer Ibn Abdul-Aziz— and the
Abbasids, deviated from the spirit of Islam and were not qualified for
the
Caliphate.
4. The Ideological Articulation of the Division (754-1258)
Sunni theologian Jalaldeen al-Syuadi (d. 1491, 224) documented that the
division of the Hashim clan between two the families, al-Abbas and Ali,
took
place a few years after the Abbasids seized power from the Umayyad in
749.
Before that time both families had led the fight against the Umayyad
and
generally advocated the goal of restoring the Caliphate to Ali’s
family.
Historians report that during the last years of the Umayyad era,
Mohamed Ibn
Ali, the father of the first Abbasid Caliphs, claimed that Abdullah Ibn
Mohamed Ibn al-Hanafia before his death (a grandson of Ali, see figure
1)
had transferred the Imamate to his sons Abu al-Abbas al-Seffah and
al-Mansur, respectively and they had eventually regained the caliphate.
When
the first seized power in 749, he murdered members of the Umayyad
dynasty
who were directly or indirectly responsible for the killing of Imam
Hussein
and other members of his family. As al-Mansur assumed the Caliphate in
754,
he understood that a showdown with members of Ali’s family was
inescapable
and he feared that the majority of his base supporters who originally
rallied behind the message of restoring the Caliphate to Ali’s family
might
revolt against him. He understood too that, in addition to using force,
a
purposeful and concentrated religious indoctrination would serve the
goal of
sustaining the Abbasid’s power. Al-Mansur recognized that the senior
member
of Ali’s family, Jafar al-Sadiq, was a well-respected jurisprudent and
that
most doctors of law deferred to him in important religious matters.
Furthermore, al-Mansur discovered through his network of spies that
al-Sadiq
had been confirmed as the chosen Imam. This was a nightmare that deeply
disrupted and threatened his reign. In an effort to counteract the
threat,
Al-Mansur actively sought jurists to spread his views and to perpetuate
his
religious virtues by establishing schools of thought to legitimize the
Abbasids’ claim for power. He lucratively rewarded jurists and made
some of
them his confidantes, while others were appointed as judges in major
centers
in his vast empire. His primary objective was to gradually refute Ali’s
family’s claim for the Imamate. He approached Malik Ibn Anis (the Sunni
Maliki School is named for him) and Abu Hanifa al-Naman (the Hanafi
School
is named for him) to work for him and to declare their allegiance to
him.
The first initially refused and was punished severely by the governor
of
Medina. The fathers of the two major Sunni Schools of thought, Abu
Hanifa
and Malik, until their deaths, refused to swear allegiance to al-Mansur
or
the Abbasids. According to Jalaldeen al-Syuadi, Malik issued a fatwa
for all
to renounce allegiance to al-Mansur and to support Mohamed Ibn
Abdullah, a
grandson of Ali’s. Al-Mansur put Abu Hanifa in jail for his refusal to
renounce his allegiance to another grandson of Imam Ali. The
significance of
this is that the fathers of these two major Sunni schools, Abu Hanifa
and
Malik, seem to have differentiated between their political allegiances,
and
their judgments on matters of interpretation of issues under religious
domain. Probably, one of the most significant contributions of Malik to
the
theory of Caliphate and diversity of opinions is his proposition that
any
allegiance (such as the one to al-Mansur) which “was taken under duress
and
was declared under coercion [was] not valid.” Furthermore, Malik
declined
the request by al-Mansur to formally write his opinions and have them
made
into treaties and instructions to spread throughout the empire. The
third
founder of the Sunni schools al-Shafai (the Shafai School is named for
him)
was a deeply pious thinker and a devout and tolerant philosopher. He
was
quoted saying, “If we love Ali’s sons, we will be killed, but if we
dislike
them, we will go to hell.” Apparently, al-Shafai did not alleviate
differences in judgments and opinions on matters not addressed in the
Quran
or the Prophet Mohamed’s sayings on schism and conflict. The last
founder of
a major Sunni school is Ahmed Ibn Hanbal (the Hanbali School). Though
he
studied with al-Shafai, he displayed a disinterest in logic and
discounted
reason. Thus, unlike the previous three jurisprudents, he was not known
to
display tolerance or to support Ali’s family’s claim to the caliphate.
His
followers exhibited a strict interpretation of the Quran and readily
labeled
those who did not agree with them infidels. Wahhabism, which appeared
in the
eighteenth century in the desert of Arabia, subscribed to some of his
teachings.
For about 100 years after the death of al-Mansur, the Abbasids were not
able
to come up with sound religious justifications for their seizure of
power.
They were successful, however, in gradually steering the evolution of
the
preceding schools of thought to serve their political campaigns against
their rivals. It is during their era that Sunni and Shia thinking was
articulated. In fact, since the early years of Abbasids, the term Shia
has
been used exclusively to mean the supporters of Ali. It is more likely,
too,
that the term Rafdhia (those who rejected Caliphate) was introduced,
during
this era, to describe those who promised allegiance to the family of
the
Prophet Mohamed and followers of Ali.
The invasion of Baghdad by the Persian Buyid dynasty about 945 and then
by
the Turkish Saljuqi dynasty (1055), gave a religious dimension to what
emerged during the early Abbasid era as a politically motivated
conflict.
These dynasties espoused Shia and Hanafi schools of thought,
respectively.
Both dynasties, initially, had little understanding of Muslim
historical
precedents and viewed religion through their narrow political interests
and
rigid sectarianism. Various jurisprudents put their knowledge to the
service
of such dynasties’ political aspirations.
5. The Institutionalization of the Division (1258-1914)
The situation worsened after the Mongol dynasty captured Baghdad. This
led
to the fragmentation of the Muslim world and the end of the Abbasid
Empire.
Two developments took place during this period. The first is the
institutionalization of sectarian allegiance and partisanship
especially
among the various independent emirates which emerged after 1258. The
leaders
of these autonomous States publicly declared the adoption of a
particular
sect and expected their subjects to follow. The second development was
the
rise of dogmatic thinking among some religious scholars who exhibited a
zeal
and intolerance to opposition views.
The subsequent rivalry between the two Turkish dynasties, the Ottomans
(1281-1922) and the Safavi (1501-1732), enlarged the gulf between the
two
Muslim sects. The first espoused Hanafi and dominated Turkey and most
of the
Arab and Muslim world. The second adopted the Shia school of thought in
Iran
and areas that came under its control. At time of rivalry between these
Turkish dynasties, sectarianism was used as a means for legitimization
and
political ventures.
6. The Politicization of the Division (1914-)
Sectarianism, too, emerged as an instrument for subjugation after the
First
World War as new nation-states were established in the Arab and Muslim
lands. The new rulers used religion as an instrument to sustain their
power
and sectarian differences were highlighted when deemed necessary.
Independent thinking was prohibited and sectarianism and tribalism were
promoted. Western powers which controlled the Middle East and most of
the
Muslim countries used sectarianism selectively, and strictly to
perpetuate
their domination. For example, France gave the Alawis (part of Shia
Islam)
access to power in Syria, but marginalized the Shia community in
Lebanon.
The United States, until 1979, had equally strategic relations with the
monarchies in Iran and Saudi Arabia, which too had a strong alliance,
though
both countries have different governing sects. This was changed when
the
Shah’s regime was disposed in 1979 and Washington publicly and strongly
denounced the new regime. Recently in Iraq, the U.S. has played the
enabling
role in its relations with the Kurds who are mostly Sunnis, shown
indifference in dealing with Arab Sunnis, and subtly performs, at best,
a
constraining role in relations to the Arab Shia.
Because of cultural discontinuity, generations after generations,
especially
in the Arab world, have formed a vague understanding of how pre-Islam
tribal
rivalry for fame and prestige has manifested itself into political
struggles
and then acquired ideological differences and religious fervor. This is
not
to ignore that differences between Shia and Sunni, which were
articulated
during the Abbasid era, were also accompanied by competing views
relative to
family and personal affairs and the theory of government and justice.
With
few exceptions common among extremists, the schools within both Muslim
sects
agree on the pillars of Islam and the principles of worship.
Misunderstandings had taken place and foreign concepts incorporated,
but
these misunderstandings have never reached a level of wholesale
killings.
Fanatical elements existed in the tenth and eleventh centuries and
reappeared at the end of the nineteenth century. Recently, these
elements
have found fertile grounds especially after the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
In terms of current political developments, both advocates of Shia and
Sunni
schools espouse elements of economic and political liberation.
Reformers in all schools promote democratic transformation and
modernity.
The seemingly increasing popularity of the politicization of religion
is in
fact a manifestation of the frustration with political and economic
stagnation. As in Christianity and Judaism, the recent rise in
extremism in
some Muslim dominated countries is mostly a reflection of the deepening
state of hopelessness. Extremists, however, have shown an exceptional
zeal
for using sectarian factors, when appropriate, to strengthen their
cause and
poison the minds of the innocents.
In recent years, Arab and Muslims rulers have found religion and
sectarianism a useful tool for maintaining their grip on power and
effectively controlling the public discourse. Probably, these rulers
consider turmoil and instability an end state. Western leaders, who
have
little knowledge of what drives the Islamic world, would be well
advised to
acquaint themselves with the history of sectarianism in Islam before
making
uninformed judgments. Certainly, Western leaders’ fueling of the
sectarian
division plays into the hands of extremists and is welcome by ruthless
dictators. More importantly, it could eventually lead the Middle East,
and
probably the world, to a tragic destination.
Notes
Al-andelesy, Ibn Abed Raba (1996). Al-agid al-Fard, Dar Al-Maraf,
Cario.
Al-Masudi, A. A. (n.d.), Muroj Al-thahib Prairies of Gold, Vol. 5(2-3),
Dar-Almarifa, Beirut.
al-Nadawy, Abu al-Hassan (1990). What the World lost as Muslims Become
Backward. ElSoonna Bookshop, Cairo. Al-Syuadi, Jalaldeen (1996) History
of
Caliphs. Institute of Cultural Book, Beirut. Ibn al-Athir, Azaldeen
(n.d.) Al-Kamel in History. International Ideas Home, Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia.
SANE founded to ‘expose truth about the evils of Islam’
http://www.onenewsnow.com/2007/04/sane_founded_to_expose_truth_a.php
SANE founded to ‘expose truth about the evils of Islam’
Chad Groening
OneNewsNow.com http://www.onenewsnow.com/
April 4, 2007
Islamic_crescent_symbol
An organization formed last year is trying to get the word out about
radical
Islam and its aim to destroy America and create a Muslim-controlled
world.
Jewish scholar David Yerushalmi, president of the Society of Americans
for
National Existence (SANE), says his organization came into being
because its
founders recognized the reality of what had happened on September 11,
2001.
“We looked at Islam and the faithful members of Islam — those who
adhere to
shariah — and understood that this was a war, and there was no way
around
that,” Yerushalmi contends. “And as long as the American government
wasn’t
prepared to treat it as [a war], the Americans needed to begin to shake
the
tree.”
Americans must understand what radical Islam does to those who are not
Muslim, SANE
http://www.saneworks.us/
‘s spokesman asserts. According
to
Islamic tradition, he notes, the non-believer “must be converted by
persuasion, or he must be subject to submission [as a second-class
citizen],
or he must be killed. That is the legal pronouncement of the past 1,400
years.”
Yerushalmi says Americans need to recognize that there is within the
U.S.
Islamic community an enormous base of support for jihad against
America. He
says SANE was formally established in January of 2006 but has been in
development since September 11, 2001.
“I and other Americans who witnessed that horrific event realized
almost
immediately what we were up against,” the Jewish scholar notes. In the
aftermath of that tragedy, he says, he and his group looked at the
beliefs
and practices of radical Islam’s “faithful” and quickly came to realize
“that this was war” and would have to be treated as such.
All Original Content Copyright
http://www.onenewsnow.com/policies.php#01
2006-2007 American Family News Network - All Rights Reserved
Quebec firm to build world’s third-largest mosque
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/montreal/story/2007/04/04/qc-dessausoprinmosque20070404.html?ref=rss
Quebec firm to build world’s third-largest mosque Last Updated:
Wednesday,
April 4, 2007 | 10:36 AM ET
Quebec engineering firm Dessau-Soprin is reaping benefits from surging
oil
prices and a construction boom in Algeria, where the company has won a
bid
to build one of the world’s largest mosques.
The multimillion-dollar mosque will be built in Algiers as part of a
$9.3 billion complex that will include a hotel, convention centre,
Qur’an
house, three libraries, an amphitheatre, a laboratory and restaurants.
The sprawling mosque will include a 10-storey minaret and will house
120,000
worshippers at capacity, making it the third largest Muslim worship
centre
in the world.
Dessau-Soprin, based in Laval, stands to make $30 million from the
mosque,
which is the latest large-scale project in the North African country,
where
soaring oil prices have fuelled a construction frenzy.
“We were there at the right time,” said Dessau-Soprin CEO Jean-Pierre
Sauriol. “The Algerians, they do very much like working with Canadian
firms,
especially the ones from Quebec, because they speak French, and it’s
much
easier for them to negotiate and discuss projects.”
The mosque contract will create about 100 jobs in Algiers.
Dessau-Soprin
already employs about 150 people at its permanent office in the capital
city.
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1812626/posts
Iran’s Air Defense Can Repel U.S. Air Strikes - Russian Brass
RIA Novosti ^ | April 5, 2007
Posted on 04/05/2007 10:57:37 AM PDT by Fennie
MOSCOW - Iran has air defense systems capable of repelling possible United States air strikes, a high-ranking Russian military official said Thursday. “In line with my assessment, Iran’s air defense system is strong enough,” Colonel General Yury Solovyov, commander of the Air Defense Forces Special Command, said. “Currently Iran has our Russian air defense missile systems, which are capable of tackling U.S. combat aircraft. Iran also has French and other countries defense systems...
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1812129/posts?page=10#10
News of the emergence of Grand Mujahideen (UBL)
Muslm.net, via Renewal (Algerian forum) ^
Posted on 04/04/2007 4:37:26 PM PDT by harwood
Al-Qaida leaders recently release video containing bin Laden speech to the Islamic nation.
(Excerpt) Read more at 64.233.179.104 ...
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1812361/posts
Al-Sahab Expected To Release New Bin Ladin Video (Info coming From Central Command)
Central Command ^ | 4/5/07
Posted on 04/05/2007 5:07:14 AM PDT by areafiftyone
Al-Sahab Expected To Release New Bin Ladin Video
Terrorism: Al-Sahab Reportedly To Release New Bin Ladin Video Message
On 4 April, a jihadist website carried the following posting:
“After a long absence by the shaykh of mujahidin, whom we have missed as well as his speeches, some news is being leaked indicating that Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin, God protect and preserve him and make him a thorn in the throat of the enemies, will make an appearance. The news indicates that Al-Sahab Media Establishment, which specializes in publishing Al-Qa’ida leaders’ speeches, has recently finished producing a video featuring Bin Ladin’s speech to the entire Islamic nation. “
Furthermore, the poster of this note maintains that the speech includes several messages to the “mujahidin” in Iraq, the Palestinian People on “ the capitulation choice which HAMAS gave in to,” the Riyadh Arab summit, the “fears” of America and its allies of the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate state in Iraq, and the “good tidings of victory in Iraq and Afghanistan.”
[The station was jammed for 2 hours, nice decoy]
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/1812659/posts
4,000 flash mob dancers (with iPods) startle commuters at Victoria
This is London ^ | 04/05/2007 | Tim Stewart
Posted on 04/05/2007 11:51:21 AM PDT by Swordmaker
More than 4,000 clubbers danced through the rush hour at Victoria station in Britain’s biggest flash mob stunt.
Revellers responded to e-bulletins urging them to “dance like you’ve never danced before” at 6.53pm.
continued.
Davey Crockett and her husband need our prayers, for health and survival.
Please.
Officials: Disappearance of American in Iran routine
POSTED: 2142 GMT (0542 HKT), April 4, 2007
Story Highlights
. Former FBI agent said to be working on film on Iranian isle
. U.S. diplomat says several Americans go missing in Iran each year
. Iran says no reports of anyone missing on island
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/US/04/04/iran.missing.ap/index.html?eref=edition_us
Praying for them now, granny.
Turkey entitled to 150 Aegean islets, experts say
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=107485
Turkey entitled to 150 Aegean islets, experts say Two professors are
trying
to prove that Turkey has a historical claim to 150 islets currently
claimed
by Greece.
Within the context of its EU accession bid, Turkey is seeking
resolutions on
the Cyprus issue and Aegean maritime disputes. Diplomatic sources
indicate
the Turkish and Greek sides are involved in intense talks, and two
academics
showed that a decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)
legally
supports Turkey’s position concerning its disputes with Greece in the
Aegean
Sea.
Unlike its previously held position, Greece will be reportedly
reluctant to
resort to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for the settlement
of
long-standing disputes with Turkey as it now contends that the EU could
play
a constructive role between the parties.
That being said, international lawyers Sertaç Hami Baþeren and Ali
Kurumahmut, political science professors at Ankara University, have
recently
published research on the disputed islands in the Aegean Sea.
Baþeren and Kurumahmut proved that the PCA’s reference in its decision
regarding a dispute over the islands, islets and reefs in the Red Sea
to
Article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne provides a legal advantage for
Turkey.
In their book, based on international conventions and Ottoman archives,
the
two asserted that considering the PCA’s decision in question, Greece
has no
jurisdiction over the 150 islands whose sovereignty still remains
non-transferred. Baþeren and Kurumahmut recall that a consensus between
the
parties is needed to determine the future of those islands.
Once Greece’s lack of jurisdiction is legally grounded, the entire
Aegean
map will require significant alterations, which they illustrated in
their
book. In such a case, Turkey will gain striking leverage in the
long-standing bilateral disputes, including the issue of territorial
waters.
Given Greece’s unilateral action to extend its territorial waters from
six
to 12 miles, the issue of non-transferred islands is an important one.
The book examines the comment outlined in the decision of the PCA that
settled a maritime dispute between Yemen and Eritrea by making a
special
reference to Article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne. The authors
subsequently
conclude that the said decision treats the disputed islands as
territories
over which no certain jurisdiction was available.
Departing from this conclusion, the authors further assert that
international law clearly states Greece has no jurisdiction over the
Aegean
islands, islets and reefs.
Paragraph 165 of the court’s decision rules that “in 1923 Turkey
renounced
title to those islands over which it had sovereignty until then” on the
condition that the future of the islands in question would be
determined by
the parties. Recalling that this provision does not apply to the Aegean
islands, the authors allege that Greece is unable to claim sovereign
title
over the island territories. In their view, the islands are territories
whose sovereignty was not denounced by the Ottoman Empire and for this
reason they were transferred to Turkey as the heir of the empire.
A partial list of islands over which the authors believe Greece can’t
claim
sovereignty includes Gaidaros, Mandiraki, Farmakonisi, Pserimos,
Adelfia,
Plakhida, Sofrana, Astakidhapula, Kandhelioussa, Levita,
Zenari-Kinaros,
Liadi, Furni and Fimena. Baþeren and Kurumahmut underline that except
for
the islands whose transfer was made in accordance with international or
bilateral treaties, the undesignated ones in the Aegean Sea do not fall
into
any state’s jurisdiction as outlined in the PCA’s Eritrea vs. Yemen
arbitration ruling.
The new argument based on recent scholarly inquiry suggests that
inclination
to resolve the Aegean maritime disputes within the EU context is not
healthy, as the said disputes concern international legal rules and
could be
settled through the rights and obligations under the respective rules
and
provisions of public international law.
Therefore, this approach implies that Turkey should resort to its
entitlements under international law rather than political means to
resolve
the disputes in the Aegean Sea.
Dr. Erdem Denk, also a political science professor at Ankara
University,
said Greece should be convinced that there are disputes other than the
rift
over the continental shelf. Noting that the Aegean disputes could be
resolved through a mutually agreed approach that allows give and take,
Denk
recalls that the settlement of the disputes should start with
determining
naval authority areas, which will depend on to whom the islands, islets
and
reefs belong.
Denk said the dispute is a fairly recent one, adding that only by
determining the legal status of the disputed islets will there be
further
action toward a comprehensive resolution of the rift between Turkey and
Greece. He noted that the parties have been holding secret negotiations
and
meetings to resolve the disputes, drawing attention to the Greek
media’s
coverage on the deadlock in the Aegean maritime disputes.
Following the EU’s Helsinki summit, Greece and the Aegean disputes have
acquired a special place and attention in Turkish foreign policy, which
has
become more focused on fulfilling its long-standing goal of
Westernization.
The EU has for some time served as the indirect mediator and
facilitator in
the disputes between the parties. Even though it seems uncertain what
this
tripartite relationship will bring in the near future, Turkey should be
more
demanding in regards to Greece. Recalling that the Turkish population
in the
Aegean region alone is twice as large as Greece’s population, Professor
Bayram Öztürk underlines that Greeks should understand the Aegean Sea
is not
exclusively a Greek lake.
Although the Aegean Sea has been generous to both Turkey and Greece,
the
latter has acquired extensive benefits from this generosity. Given
Turkey’s
dependence on the Aegean Sea through food security and the fertility of
the
islands’ adjacent waters, it is clear Turkey should pay attention to
the
resolution of the disputed islands and islets issue.
In the region, there are other risks in addition to the jurisdictional
issues. For instance, 100,000 tons of Russian and the Caspian oil is
sent to
world markets through the Marmara and Aegean seas. Any major accident
near
the islets and islands would likely destroy them, resulting in enormous
financial losses associated with tourism, fishing and other activities.
Öztürk said that obtaining 5-6 percent of the Aegean Sea, which
essentially
includes the disputed island territories, would earn Turkey new
economic
resources. Describing Turkey’s foreign policy regarding Greece as
excessively romantic, Öztürk draws attention to Greece’s continuous
expansion since its foundation.
Retired Adm. Çetinkaya Apatay notes that the Eritrea vs. Yemen decision
may
reveal the justification of Turkey’s assertions with regard to the
islands.
He said the legal verdict implies that the parties to the dispute
should get
around the negotiation table for a comprehensive resolution.
Apatay also recalls that in a NATO meeting where an imminent dispute
between
Turkey and Greece was discussed, a young military officer asserted that
Gauda island belonged to Turkey. Apatay believes that a mutually
constructive approach toward the issue rather than resorting to the
binding
rules by the ICJ should be the basis for a viable resolution.
Some believe that the PCA’s Yemen vs. Eritrea ruling will most likely
exacerbate the deadlock in the Aegean Sea. Turkey’s former Ambassador
to
Athens Tuncer Topur said if Turkey claims sovereign right to these
islands,
there will be a strong reaction from Europe. In an effort to make
social
life in the islands more attractive and entertaining, Greece has been
investing heavily in the Aegean islands and islets. Financial
incentives
have been released to promote more inhabitants on these islands.
Despite the
enormous financial expenses involved, the Greek government has spared
no
expense in keeping the islands inhabited.
05.04.2007
FATÝH UÐUR ANKARA
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