Negotiating with Baghdad (Kurds)

Kurdish Aspect ^ | January 21, 2007 | Dr Denise Natali

[TexKat]

Recent discussions between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad are part of a larger process of negotiating and non-negotiating Kurdish autonomy in Iraq. They reflect the erratic trajectory of Kurdish-state relations that has fluctuated between compromise and hostility, and the gap between political promises and reality.

That is, during regime-threatening periods successive Iraqi leaders made special efforts to co-opt and control Kurdish communities. They promised Kurdish autonomy, offered privileges to Kurdish tribes, and created dependency through generous state handouts and social welfare programs. However, negotiating Kurdish autonomy was nothing more than a time-gaining tactic used by weak central governments to consolidate power. Even when Iraqi officials signed the so-called 1970 Autonomy Agreement they continued to militarily repress and discriminate against the Kurds. Compromise turned to conflict, terminating any possibility of negotiating with Baghdad.

This pattern of center-periphery behavior has been reinvigorated in post-Saddam Iraq. Like its predecessors, the state elite is unable or disinterested in institutionalizing real Kurdish autonomy, or more specifically, crossing the threshold of Kirkuk. To be sure, the recent rounds of negotiations between the KRG delegation, led by prime minister Nechirvan Barzani, and Iraqi elite in Baghdad have focused on four unresolved and sensitive issues; 1) finances, 2) peshmerga affairs, 3) the petroleum law, and 4) article 140 of the Iraqi constitution. Although initial discussions largely failed the last round that ended in mid December 2006 brought some concessions between the two parties.

Specifically, of the 486 million US dollars demanded by the KRG as part of their unpaid seventeen percent budget allocation, Baghdad has agreed to pay 364 million US dollars in three installments (the remaining amount has been spent by the central government on programs in the north). The Kurdish delegation and Iraqi elite also agreed on the role and mission of the peshmerga forces and joint-sharing of oil revenues in the disputed territories until 2007.

Iraqi premier Nuri Al Maliki even agreed to move forward on implementing article 140, leaving the Kurdish delegation optimistic about the prospects of real Kurdish autonomy in a federal Iraq. Still, important disagreements remain. Even though Baghdad wants Kurdish peshmerga forces incorporated into the Iraqi army and deployed to southern and central Iraq, it has not consented to Kurdish demands that the peshmerga be equipped and trained at the same level as Iraqi troops and paid for as part of the eight billion dollar central government defense budget.

The petroleum law may permit revenue-sharing in the disputed territories until 2007; however, it does not recognize the right of the KRG to independently negotiate its own petroleum contracts after a future referendum, particularly in Kirkuk. Further, even though Maliki has promised to implement article 140 of the constitution there is no guarantee that the Iraqi central government will actually pursue the normalization of Kirkuk, or that the outcome of a referendum will be respected by the majority of non-Kurdish Iraqi populations.

Indeed, current negotiations between the Kurds and central government differ from previous periods, and there is good reason to remain positive about political compromise. Since 2003 Kurdish autonomy has been legitimized in the Constitution, which established the legal framework in which the territorial boundaries of the Kurdistan region will be defined or redefined. The more expansive political space created in the federal Iraqi state has opened the negotiation processes to include a diverse network of legal organizations, including the Committee for Implementing Article 140, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Ministry of Extra Regional Affairs, the Kirkuk Council, and the Iraqi Property Claims Commission (IPCC), to name a few.

The KRG has also gained greater leverage in making its nationalist claims; particularly as south and central Iraq remain mired in political instability and economic deterioration. Even then, most non-Kurdish populations have no commitment to article 140. Sunni Arabs regard Kirkuk and its oil revenues as part of Arab Iraq and not Kurdistan. The Turcoman Front, backed by Turkey, has threatened to boycott the future referendum on Kirkuk. Radical Shi'a communities supported by Moqtada Al Sadr groups are being encouraged to stay in Kirkuk and destabilize the region.

While the vast majority of Kurds want Kirkuk and other disputed territories to become legally part of Kurdistan, others, including Sunni Arabs, Turcoman, and small group of Kurdish Kirkukis, want to create an independent Kirkuk province with special status from Iraq and Kurdistan. Given the constraints to negotiating Kirkuk the Kurdish elite must prepare for non-negotiation as well as compromise. Should the Iraqi elite fail to cross the threshold of Kirkuk then the relationship between the Kurds and Baghdad is likely to follow the same pattern of violence that it has in the past.

Kurdish officials should re-examine the realities of unilaterally implementing a referendum and assuming control of Kirkuk and other disputed territories. They will have to reconsider the political and economic consequences of a conflict with Baghdad or Turkey over Kirkuk and the impact on local populations, economic development, and the legitimacy of their government. Threats to ‘annexing or occupying’ Kirkuk are meaningless if the Kurds have no real leverage to implement or sustain such measures.

Finally, the Kurdish elite must realize that de-institutionalizing Iraqi borders is not the opposite of institutionalizing Kurdish ones. If a referendum is implemented per article 140 of the constitution and the disputed territories become part of the Kurdistan region, then Kurdish officials will have to engage in their own process of realigning these areas to the rump of Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurds will have to make their own concessions among competing local and regional stakeholders, as well as to develop a cohesive plan for decentralized administration, power-sharing, and resource allocation in the region.

[a_Turk]

In fact such a move may be just the thing for them to do. Quick flash in the pan while Iran and Syria are still enjoying less than favorable status with a somewhat politically viable US position.

Kurds annex Kirkuk and get intimate with daily car bombers. Sounds like a typical progression.