In the section titled Considering a Response starting at PDF-Page 211 of the 911 Commission Report, (page 193 of the actual report) we find: On November 25, Berger and Clarke wrote President Clinton that although the FBI and CIA investigations had not reached a formal conclusion, they believed the investigations would soon conclude that the attack had been carried out by a large cell whose senior members belonged to al Qaeda. Most of those involved had trained in Bin Ladin–operated camps in Afghanistan, Berger continued. So far, Bin Ladin had not been tied personally to the attack and nobody had heard him directly order it, but two intelligence reports suggested that he was involved. When discussing possible responses, though, Berger referred to the premise—al Qaeda responsibility—as an “unproven assumption.” Secretary Albright’s advisers warned her at the time to be sure the evidence conclusively linked Bin Ladin to the
Boy if that isn't classic Clintonian foreign policy. We have 100% proof it's Al Qaeda, but are only 90% sure that Bin Laden is involved so we don't attack them because of the Arab street. He [Clarke] thought they were “holding back.” He said he did not know why, but his impression was that Tenet and Reno possibly thought the White House “didn’t really want to know,” since the principals’ discussions by November suggested that there was not much White House interest in conducting further military operations against Afghanistan in the administration’s last weeks. He thought that, instead, President Clinton, Berger, and Secretary Albright were concentrating on a last minute push for a peace agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Some of Clarke’s fellow counterterrorism officials, such as the State Department’s Sheehan and the FBI’s Watson, shared his disappointment that no military response occurred at the time. Clarke recently recalled that an angry Sheehan asked rhetorically of Defense officials:“Does al Qaeda have to attack the Pentagon to get their attention?”