New Report Provides Insights into Saddam Hussein Regime

American Forces Press Service ^ | 3/24/06 | Donna Miles

[bnelson44]

New Report Provides Insights into Saddam Hussein Regime

By Donna Miles
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, March 24, 2006 – Former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein was so convinced that the United States was unwilling to accept casualties that he never believed the country would invade Iraq, and was far more worried about an internal revolt, a new, unclassified version of a Defense Department report issued today reveals.

The "Iraqi Perspective Project" views military operations in Iraq from March through May 1, 2003, through the eyes of senior Iraqi civilian and media leaders.

It depicts a country ruled by fear, deception and in some cases, delusion, where information was so compartmentalized that neither Saddam nor anyone within his regime had a clear understanding of their true military capabilities or the threats they faced, Army Brig. Gen. Anthony Cucolo III, director of U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Center for Operational Analysis, told Pentagon reporters today.

The two-year research effort, conducted by Cucolo's directorate, provides insights into what the enemy was thinking in the run-up to and early days of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Through dozens of interviews with senior officials and an extensive review of captured documents, the research team pieced together a study of the mindset of the Saddam regime, Cucolo explained.

Their product - the results of which are already being incorporated into professional military education programs - provides "a substantive examination of Saddam Hussein's leadership and its effects on the Iraqi military decision-making process," Cucolo said.

It also goes a long way toward revealing the inner workings of a closed regime from the insider's point of view, something that will prove highly valuable in developing lessons learned of the Iraqi conflict, he said.

The report reveals that Saddam never believed such a conflict would ever occur, Cucolo said. "Saddam believed that the United States was casualty-averse to an absolutely incredible degree," Cucolo said.

Saddam based that on several factors: the fact that he received only a diplomatic note after Iraqi Mirage fighters fired on the USS Stark in 1987, that the United States left Somalia after losing 19 troops, and its failure to commit ground troops early on in Kosovo, the team's research revealed.

In addition, Saddam believed that Russia and France would protect their own economic interests by blocking any United Nations Security Council authorization of an invasion, the report notes. "He was counting on other members of the international community to assist him in any way that he saw fit," Cucolo said.

In reality, Saddam was far more concerned about an internal revolt than a coalition invasion, Cucolo said. "That was the No. 1 security threat to this regime," he said. "In Saddam's mind, the uprising of 1991 was the closest thing to almost ending his regime. It was much more important to him than the Iran-Iraq War, Desert Storm and all the sanction periods, ... because according to his own calculations, he lost control of all but one province, Al Anbar."

Meanwhile, Saddam had a distorted view of his military capabilities, the report shows. Following an after-action review of Operation Desert Storm, Saddam corrected his senior military leaders' assessments, declaring Desert Storm a victory, project leader Kevin Woods told reporters. "Standing up to 33 nations, not backing down in the face of the world and the world's superpowers was seen as a great victory," Woods said.

Despite this assessment, the regime experienced serious weaknesses following that war, the report shows. Years of UN sanctions and coalition bombing had reduced the Iraqi military forces' effectiveness and usefulness. Other decisions further eroded this capability, from irrelevant guidance from political leaders to the appointment of Saddam's relatives and cronies into key leadership positions.

Despite these concerns, military and ministry leaders lied to Saddam about the true state of their capabilities, and he and his inner circle began to believe their own propaganda, the report reveals. Even Ali Hassan al-Majid, Saddam's cousin who became known as Chemical Ali after ordering the 1988 chemical attack on Kurds, was convinced Iraq no longer had weapons of mass destruction. Yet many of his colleagues never stopped believing in them, the report shows.

Cucolo acknowledged that some of the viewpoints and decisions revealed in the report seem unbelievable. "Some of Saddam Hussein's decisions may seem incredibly absurd to a Western military thinker, but if you take in the context of this closed regime, they make eminent sense to the Iraqis," he said. "And that is the value of this."

The report's findings provide something a standard after-action report from the "blue," or friendly, view simply can't: the "red," or enemy, perspective of the situation, he said.

Navy Adm. Edmund P. Giambastiani, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who originated the Iraqi Perspective Project when he served as commander of JFCOM, explained the benefit of that insight to Pentagon reporters during yesterday's news briefing.

"The goal of this effort was to determine how our own coalition operations were viewed and understood by the opposing side, and what insights such analysis offers for future operations," Giambastiani said. "This report provides insights into the nature of Saddam's regime, the regime's strategic calculus, operational planning, military effectiveness and execution of the Iraqi defense."

These insights weren't always what the researchers expected. "We learned things we didn't expect," he said. "There were some surprises there."

Results of the Iraqi Perspective Project are helping DoD develop important lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom that provide what Giambastiani called "a balanced, holistic view of the battlefield cause and effect."

The report represents the most extensive project of its kind to understand the views of an enemy military force since a similar project conducted just after World War II, Giambastiani noted. That effort involved a comprehensive review of recovered German and Japanese documents, along with interviews of key military and civilian leaders during the war.

Biographies:

Adm. Edmund P. Giambastiani, USN

Brig. Gen. Anthony Cucolo III, USA

Related Sites:

Iraqi Perspective Project

U.S. Joint Forces Command

Related Article:

Report Provides Iraqi Leaders' Perspective of War

News Archive

http://www.dod.mil/news/Mar2006/20060324_4608.html

[bnelson44]

Report is here:

http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2006/ipp.pdf

[Williams]

I've read a lot of this report, it is very facinating and highlights how much of a danger Sadaam was, in part because he was surrounded by yes men and lived in a fantasy world regarding his own capabilities.

It is also VERY revealing that Sadaam interpreted all American threats as signs of weakness, even limited attacks were ridiculed. He only respected the severest application of force.

For example, he ridiculed America because Iraq lost as many soldiers in ONE BATTLE with Iran, as the USA lost in ten years in Vietnam.

[bnelson44]

Command releases JCOA-produced Iraqi perspectives report

U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Center for Operational Analysis has completed the unclassified historical report of military operations conducted in Iraq, reflecting the Iraqi civilian and military leadership’s perspective of events.

• Read the whole report

---

By Jennifer Colaizzi
USJFCOM Public Affairs

(SUFFOLK, Va., - March 24 , 2006) –- Can history be wrong? Not exactly, but history can be distorted if data is provided by only one side’s perspective.

U.S. Joint Forces Command has released an unclassified historical report of military operations conducted in Iraq. The twist is that this historical report reflects the Iraqi civilian and military leadership’s perspective of events.

“Opinions are not facts; one data point is not a trend, and a group of data points from a single perspective isn’t going to convince anyone,” said Army Brig. Gen. Anthony Cucolo, U.S. Joint Forces Command’s (USJFCOM), Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) director.

So, how do you find “ground truth” in battle analysis? There are multiple options, but only one good answer, according to Cucolo.

“Ground truth is getting the red side, or enemy’s, perspective from red,” said Cucolo. “Looking at the enemy’s actions through American military eyes,” or even through the eyes of an expert trained in the enemy’s battle and culture, is valuable, “but it’s still a friendly’s view of red.”

The overthrow of Saddam’s regime during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) provided an opportunity to study an adversary.

“It’s the first time since World War II, we had an opportunity to evaluate military events from both our own perspective and the perspective of the opposing political and military leadership,” Cucolo said.

“This means reading their documents, reading their orders, interviewing their commanders and civilian leaders and asking what happened.”

This two-year project of delving into the decision-making processes of the former adversary, started in 2003 and became known as the Iraqi Perspective Project (IPP).

The Iraqi military leaders wanted to tell their side of the story.

“Military professionals like to explain their actions, talk tactics, talk strategy, and give their view of what happened and why,” the general said. “You get in a room, roll out a map in front of a former Iraqi general and say, ‘hey sir, we understood you were here when this happened, what were your actions?’”

According to Cucolo, in terms of lessons learned, the historical approach implemented during the IPP provided excellent results.

“If I want to capture the most accurate history I can, I want to hear what you did and how you made decisions. I’ll get more through dialogue than if I go about it and say, ‘Where were you on the night of April 6?’ It makes interviewees inhibited,” said Cucolo.

The IPP team conducted more than 100 interviews; 23 with senior members of the former regime.

Interviews conducted by the IPP team included: Saddam’s personal secretary, Ali Hassan al-Majid, known as Chemical Ali, the secretary of the Republican Guard, both Republican Guard corps commanders, the commander of the Special Republican Guard, the director of military intelligence, division commanders and others.

To augment the interviews conducted in Baghdad, the IPP team also reviewed thousands of captured documents and the transcripts of hundreds of hours of secret regime recordings. They also mined hundreds of existing interrogation transcripts.

The initial classified report has been used in a variety of Department of Defense training courses, including Capstone, Pinnacle, and courses at the Joint Forces Staff College.

According to USJFCOM officials, the IPP report provides useful lessons learned that can be factored into ongoing and future operational planning against a similar closed regime.

Noteworthy items mentioned in the unclassified IPP report include:

• Iraqi regime belief that Russia and France would act on behalf of their own economic interests in Iraq to block any UN Security Council actions to authorize an invasion.
• Fedayeen Saddam planned for attacks in Europe (including London) and the Middle East
• Saddam was more concerned about internal revolt than a coalition invasion; therefore bridges were not blown, oil fields were not torched, and the south was not flooded – all part of the inadequate and ineffective military planning done prior to the invasion.
• Saddam and his inner circle believed their own propaganda
• Chemical Ali was convinced Iraq no longer had WMD, but many colleagues never stopped believing in them.
• Years of UN sanctions and coalition bombing had reduced the military effectiveness and usefulness of the Iraqi military forces.
• Military and ministry leaders lied to Saddam about the true state of their capabilities.
• Iraq military capability was also eroded by irrelevant guidance from the political leadership, creation of “popular” militias, prominent placement of Saddam relatives and sycophants in key leadership positions, and an onerous security apparatus.
• The regime ordered the distribution of ammunition around the country to support a prolonged war with the coalition, but not to support the insurgency or a guerilla war.

The IPP report is just one example of the work JCOA does on a daily basis.

“We fill a void. While services do a great job of tactical and component lessons learned and the Joint Staff does strategic lessons learned, we do the operational level,” said Cucolo.

Cucolo stated the IPP is a step in the right direction, but the directorate is still studying documents to further expand picture of regime.

 

[rfp1234]

"In Saddam's mind, the uprising of 1991 was the closest thing to almost ending his regime. It was much more important to him than the Iran-Iraq War, Desert Storm and all the sanction periods, ... because according to his own calculations, he lost control of all but one province, Al Anbar."
If that's accurate, then it's shameful that the Bush 41 and Clinton Admins. didn't do more to support the uprising in 1991, and other aborted attempts to topple Saddam in the 90s. It could have saved much blood and treasure. For starters, Saddam's assassination attempt on Bush 41 in Kuwait was in itself a casus belli, and Clinton's response (bombing an empty Iraqi intelligence building) was pathetic. It's no wonder that Saddam regarded the US as a paper tiger: for much of that decade, it was true.

[Philistone]

It will be interesting to apply these lessons to both Iran and North Korea.

I think both Libya and Syria (for backing out of Lebanon) are also instructive as to what happens when the US does what it says it's going to do.

Unfortunately, too many on the left believe that simply carrying a big stick is sufficient. It's not. If you're going to talk softly, you also have to leave no doubt that you are willing to use it.

[He Rides A White Horse]

I've read a lot of this report, it is very facinating and highlights how much of a danger Sadaam was, in part because he was surrounded by yes men

I suppose telling Saddam that he was wrong didn't exactly enhance life expectancy.

[Williams]

Read pages 26-27 of the report.