9/11 Commission Report

The 9/11 Commission Report thanks to Michael Smerconish ^ | 2003 | The 9/11 Commission members

[Edit35]

The Desert Camp, February 1999

Early in 1999, the CIA received reporting that Bin Ladin was spending much of his time at one of several camps in the Afghan desert south of Kandahar.At the beginning of February, Bin Ladin was reportedly located in the vicinity of the Sheikh Ali camp, a desert hunting camp being used by visitors from a Gulf state. Public sources have stated that these visitors were from the United Arab Emirates.151

Reporting from the CIA’s assets provided a detailed description of the hunting camp, including its size, location, resources, and security, as well as of Bin Ladin’s smaller, adjacent camp.152 Because this was not in an urban area, missiles launched against it would have less risk of causing collateral damage. On February 8, the military began to ready itself for a possible strike.153 The next day, national technical intelligence confirmed the location and description of the larger camp and showed the nearby presence of an official aircraft of the United Arab Emirates. But the location of Bin Ladin’s quarters could not be pinned down so precisely.154The CIA did its best to answer a host of questions. 138

THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT about the larger camp and its residents and about Bin Ladin’s daily schedule and routines to support military contingency planning. According to reporting from the tribals, Bin Ladin regularly went from his adjacent camp to the larger camp where he visited the Emiratis;the tribals expected him to be at the hunting camp for such a visit at least until midmorning on February 11.155 Clarke wrote to Berger’s deputy on February 10 that the military was then doing targeting work to hit the main camp with cruise missiles and should be in position to strike the following morning.156 Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert appears to have been briefed on the situation.157 No strike was launched. By February 12 Bin Ladin had apparently moved on, and the immediate strike plans became moot.158 According to CIA and Defense officials, policymakers were concerned about the danger that a strike would kill an Emirati prince or other senior officials who might be with Bin Ladin or close by.Clarke told us the strike was called off after consultations with Director Tenet because the intelligence was dubious, and it seemed to Clarke as if the CIA was presenting an option to attack America’s best counterterror-ism ally in the Gulf.The lead CIA official in the field, Gary Schroen, felt that the intelligence reporting in this case was very reliable;the Bin Ladin unit chief, “Mike,” agreed. Schroen believes today that this was a lost opportunity to kill Bin Ladin before 9/11.159

Even after Bin Ladin’s departure from the area,CIA officers hoped he might return, seeing the camp as a magnet that could draw him for as long as it was still set up.The military maintained readiness for another strike opportunity.160 On March 7, 1999, Clarke called a UAE official to express his concerns about possible associations between Emirati officials and Bin Ladin.Clarke later wrote in a memorandum of this conversation that the call had been approved at an interagency meeting and cleared with the CIA.161When the former Bin Ladin unit chief found out about Clarke’s call, he questioned CIA officials, who denied having given such a clearance.162 Imagery confirmed that less than a week after Clarke’s phone call the camp was hurriedly dismantled, and the site was deserted.163 CIA officers, including Deputy Director for Operations Pavitt,were irate.“Mike”thought the dismantling of the camp erased a possible site for targeting Bin Ladin.164

The United Arab Emirates was becoming both a valued counterterrorism ally of the United States and a persistent counterterrorism problem.From 1999 through early 2001,the United States,and President Clinton personally,pressed the UAE, one of the Taliban’s only travel and financial outlets to the outside world, to break off its ties and enforce sanctions, especially those relating to flights to and from Afghanistan.165 These efforts achieved little before 9/11.

In July 1999, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Hamdan bin Zayid threatened to break relations with the Taliban over Bin Ladin.166 The Taliban did not take him seriously, however. Bin Zayid later told an American diplo-

[Edit35]

Thanks to Michael Smerconish, the talk show host on WPHT 1210am, Phila.

Check out page 138 of the 9/11 Commission Report whereby the UAE leaders seem a little too chummy with Osama bin Ladin for comfort.

[yoe]

"Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert appears to have been briefed on the situation."

I don't think Hastert was speaker when this was going on....what is the date? (1999?)

[Edit35]

The point is that, in the 9/11 Commission Report, leaders (a Prince and others) of United Arab Emirates were visiting Osama Bin Ladin at a "hunting camp" in Afghanistan in 1998 (Page 138) when they were spotted by CIA satellites.

The satellites identified official UAE planes at bin Ladin's camp, and became concerned given the fact that money for terror was being funneled through UAE.

They thought about sending cruise missiles into get bin Ladin, but didn't want to kill the UAE prince.

Then, (astonishingly), Richard Clark contacted the UAE and expressed worry that the UAE was hanging with bin Ladin at the hunting camp in Afghanistan!!!!

The UAE leaders then RATTED OUT the CIA, and told bin Ladin that he was being monitored at the hunting camp.

Needless to say, the hunting camp was suddenly dismantled, thereby ruining any chance to get bin Ladin before the 9/11 attacks.

READ THE COMMISSION REPORT. It is astonishing that our leaders in WashDC haven't read their own report.

[jeremiah]

It is amazing that this hasn't been mentioned more along with the port deal. After all, our "good allies" tipped Bin Laden to a possible strike, when Clark treasonously mentioned we were concerned about them being chummy.

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The CIA denies giving Clark 'permission' to contact the UAE sheiks about that country's chummy relationship with Usama bin Ladin.

I firmly believe Clark simply contacted the UAE sheiks on his own because, by then, Clark arrogantly considered himself to be smarter and shrewder than everyone else.

If the CIA had any balls, they would have immediately fired or demoted Richard Clark for ruining the US's best chance ever to kill the alQaeda leader.

But no, they left Clark continue his high powered position in the Clinton administration, which ultimately came back to haunt the Bush Administration due to Clark's major incompetence and arrogance in the WOT.