A REBEL CRACK UP? (This Is How Al Qaeda In Iraq Will Be Defeated)

How splits among insurgents in Iraq are erupting in violence and putting al-Qaeda on the defensive

Even by the standards of al-Qaeda in Iraq, the suicide bombing in Ramadi on Jan. 5 was stunning for its audacity. The bomber had blended into the ranks of Iraqi police recruits outside the Ramadi Glass and Ceramics Works before blowing up his explosive vest, loaded with ball bearings for maximum devastation. The blast killed two U.S. service members and more than 70 Iraqi police recruits--but it also turned out to be a deadly miscalculation by the jihadis and their leader, Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi. Most of the victims were local Sunnis, and they were joining the police force under the protection of tribal chieftains who, with the U.S. military's approval, are trying to impose order over their violent swath of Iraq. After the Jan. 5 blast, according to insurgents, tribal chiefs in Ramadi notified al-Qaeda that they were withdrawing protection in the city for the group's fighters. The jihadis responded by gunning down several prominent Sunni clerics and tribal leaders. Now al-Qaeda fighters who once swaggered through Ramadi are marked men. "It's war," says an Iraqi intelligence officer with contacts among the insurgents.

For months, U.S. officials in Iraq have tried to exploit growing differences over tactics and aims among factions of the insurgency, a push first detailed by TIME in December. Although reports of clashes between Iraqi nationalist groups and religious extremists linked to al-Qaeda remain difficult to quantify, there are signs that at least in some parts of Iraq, the tension is boiling over. Iraqi security sources with contacts in the insurgency told TIME that fighting has erupted in several cities that have long been bastions of the resistance, including Fallujah, Samarra, Latifiya and Mahmoudiya. In one recent incident, according to an Iraqi security source, insurgents wounded a Palestinian member of al-Qaeda, tracked him to a Baghdad hospital and then kidnapped him from his bed and handed him over to U.S. forces. Some Pentagon decision makers believe that the feuding within the insurgency may help U.S. and Iraqi troops quell the terrorist attacks that have made parts of the country ungovernable. "We're starting to see a little bit more every day," says Army Lieut. General Ray Odierno, assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In places like Ramadi and Fallujah, Odierno says, "we've had some Iraqi insurgents' groups actually put up defenses to protect their people against al-Qaeda forces."

What's behind the rift? Even though some Iraqi insurgent groups have cooperated with jihadist fighters to battle U.S. troops, insurgent leaders say they have grown sick of al-Qaeda's killing innocent Iraqi Shi'ites, whom al-Zarqawi considers infidels. Cracks in al-Qaeda's alliance with the Iraqi groups became more pronounced after the Dec. 15 election. Al-Zarqawi saw the poll as a detour from his goal of turning Iraq into a base from which al-Qaeda could spread terrorism throughout the Middle East and Europe. Many Sunni resistance groups have a narrower focus: ridding Iraq of all occupation forces--U.S. troops and the pro-Iranian militias that slipped across the border. Sunni politicians managed to convince some key rebel groups that unless the Sunni minority voted, the elections would enhance the power of Kurdish and religious Shi'ite parties, some of which have ties to Iran. (Election results released last week showed that Sunni Arab parties will hold 55 seats in the new parliament, up from 17 in the previous one.) Abu Noor al-Iraqi, a leader of the Unified Leadership of Mujahedin, a new amalgam of four nationalist guerrilla outfits, tells TIME that "when al-Zarqawi's group threatened to attack the polling centers, we stood against them."

Since then, the fissures between the nationalists and al-Zarqawi have widened. U.S. political and military officers persuaded some Sunni tribal chiefs to send their youths into the security forces to ensure that Sunnis—not Shi'ite outsiders—would command their cities' police. But in recent meetings with various insurgent groups, says a nationalist field commander near Ramadi, al-Zarqawi's lieutenants made it clear that any Iraqi who joined the security forces was considered the enemy, thus drawing a battle line between the jihadis and their former comrades. In Latifiya, outside Baghdad, al-Zarqawi's fighters pressed Sunnis to desert a mixed Sunni-Shi'ite battalion under U.S. command. When the Sunnis refused, al-Qaeda shelled the camp with mortars. Local insurgents responded by hunting down al-Qaeda's chief for southern Baghdad and killing him and four Syrian fighters.

Al-Zarqawi's men, though, have shown few signs of backing down. In Latifiya last week, al-Qaeda fighters captured and murdered five members of the nationalist Islamic Army in Iraq and assassinated a Sunni colonel. After the backlash in Ramadi, al-Zarqawi's men supposedly retreated into the rocky western deserts but have continued to target local leaders. A senior security officer says jihadist fighters followed a Ramadi chieftain from the powerful Dulaimi tribe into Baghdad on Wednesday; handcuffed him, a nephew and a senior security officer for the western provinces; and executed each of them with a bullet through the head. In Samarra members of the Alboubaz tribe killed four foreign fighters and drove out 11 others after the assassination of a local police chief. After the tribesmen urged Sunni youths to join the local police, al-Zarqawi got his revenge. The instructors weren't going to make the same mistake they had made in Ramadi by allowing recruits to become an easy target for a suicide bomber, so they had them sign up in Baghdad. But al-Zarqawi's men were tipped off. Al-Qaeda ambushed the Sunnis' bus on the road and kidnapped the recruits. Their bodies have yet to be found.

Such clashes don't spell the end of the insurgency. U.S. officials believe that even if terrorist attacks subsided, many Sunni insurgents would continue attacking U.S. and Iraqi forces if they felt their interests were being shortchanged by a Shi'ite-led government in Baghdad. U.S. Senator Jack Reed, who was briefed on the insurgency during a visit to Iraq earlier this month, cautions against giddiness at reports of a backlash against al-Qaeda. "The center of mass of the insurgency is not the foreign terrorists," the Rhode Island Democrat told TIME. "They're a small band able to create spectacular attacks. But the real long-term danger is the Sunnis continuing to fight." The U.S. is still a long way from persuading them to stop.

With reporting by Mark Thompson/Washington, With reporting by Hussain Hamdia/ Baghdad

Zarqawi's psychotic extremism will be it's own undoing in Iraq. As he continues to over-step and to over-reach, he will continue to alienate Iraqis which will culminate in his being turned in eventually, and then to the eventual defeat of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Are best hope is that Iraq becomes more dangerous for Al Qaeda to operate than it is for Americans and that Al Qaeda will lose freedom of movement within Iraq making it an all but impossible situation there forcing them to eventually have to quit Iraq altogether. At that point hopefully we can negotiate with the Sunni insurgents to bring a peaceful solution to Iraq. If we can play these cards right of this increasing rift between Sunnis and Al Qaeda, we may see the seeds of victory in Iraq finally germinate. Fortunately we have a smart ambassador there who knows how to reach out to the Sunnis and to make this happen.

This is important because it shows the Sunnis instinctively thought of the situation in two terms (either be part of the politcal process, or ally with Al Qaeda and fight for who knows how long). There wasn't the ONE option of fighting the U.S. troops no matter what.

Whether or not this can be sustained after we leave Iraq is another question. I'm still not convinced this won't blow up into civil war a few years after we leave.

"Whether or not this can be sustained after we leave Iraq is another question. I'm still not convinced this won't blow up into civil war a few years after we leave."

A legitimate concern which makes the US Army's effort on the ground in Iraq to integrate Sunnis and Shiites into the same units in the new Iraqi military all the more important. If they can work in a cohesive manner in the military, that can go along way towards cementing ties between the broader communities. Nothing seals loyalty like the camraderie of battle. And in addition the brave efforts of Sunnis to protect Shiites from Zarqawi's mass murder attempts of Shiites will go along way towards building trust between the two communities.

The Shiite-lead govt. needs to work extra hard however to show deference to the Sunni legislators in the new parliament and to work with them to advance their priorities.

If this all happens, we can avoid civil war in Iraq. They've managed to surmount alot of obstacles so far to avoid civil war, I think they can continue to do so even after we leave. If nothing else, the Shiite leaders know it's in their interests to avoid that.

Time is a little late to the party on this one, and still managed to find a Democrat to disparage the whole thing, but it's getting too obvious to ignore. The locals want to end the occupation. The U.S. wants to end the occupation. Zarqawi wants to kill everyone in sight. It's kind of obvious who's the odd man out.

This tidbit is interesting:

Local insurgents responded by hunting down al-Qaeda's chief for southern Baghdad and killing him and four Syrian fighters.

Syrian "fighters" = Syrian intelligence. We've been fighting the intelligence arms of several neighboring states including Iran for some time now in this thing and it's one reason the insurgency has proven so intractable, at least up to now. They're professional, well-funded, and well-supplied, but they're also as much foreigners as the U.S. troops and they're killing a lot more Iraqis than we are. A stable Iraq is not in their interests, and now it is in the interest of the Sunni clans. That's what's changed.

the Shiite leaders know it's in their interests to avoid that

Perhaps. But one thing the Shiites have going for them is they know if the s- ever hits the fan, they can rely on Iran to help them. Iran would like nothing better than to step in and take control of the Iraqi oil fields.

On the other hand, I doubt we would let that happen.

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