Did the CIA Build a "Bridge to Nowhere" ?

We’ve heard the mantra: “Bush lied-people died !” – so many times and in so many ways, a high percentage of the American people have actually come to believe it.

One of the key issues was whether Iraq was seeking uranium to resume its nuclear weapons program. ( A previous attempt , which had progressed rather far, had been interrupted by an Israeli bombing raid on Saddam’s nuclear facilities,and by Gulf War 1.)

It is my considered belief a small ,politically partisan “cabal” in the CIA furnished misleading intelligence to the White House and the Congress: in effect, building a “bridge to nowhere” that could be yanked out from under the feet of the Administration , just in time to affect the 2004 Presidential election.

The CIA did make just such an attempt , via document leaks to The NY Times, the Washington Post, and anyone else willing to quote the “unnamed sources” they supplied. These “document leaks” contain information that was never previously furnished to the White House or to Congress : information that might have made all the difference in the world prior to the launch of Iraqi Freedom.

When we look at the casualty figures from Iraq, it might be well to reflect they are (at least in part) a direct result of a cynical attempt to bring about the political defeat – or , failing that , the actual impeachment of the President.

The Senate Intelligence Committee investigated the CIA’s performance prior to the opening of Operation Freedom in Iraq. This is a partial report of the bi-partisan committee’s findings.

(U) Conclusion 12. Until October 2002 when the Intelligence Community obtained the forged foreign language documents9 on the Iraq-Niger uranium deal, it was reasonable for analysts to assess that Iraq may have been seeking uranium from Africa based on Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reporting and other available intelligence.

(U) Conclusion 13. The report on the former ambassador's trip to Niger, disseminated in March 2002, did not change any analysts' assessments of the Iraq-Niger uranium deal. For most analysts, the information in the report lent more credibility to the original Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports on the uranium deal, but State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) analysts believed that the report supported their assessment that Niger was unlikely to be willing or able to sell uranium to Iraq.

(U) Conclusion 14. The Central Intelligence Agency should have told the Vice President and other senior policymakers that it had sent someone to Niger to look into the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal and should have briefed the Vice President on the former ambassador's findings.

(U) Conclusion 15. The Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Directorate of Operations should have taken precautions not to discuss the credibility of reporting with a potential source when it arranged a meeting with the former ambassador and Intelligence Community analysts.

(U) Conclusion 16. The language in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that "Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake" overstated what the Intelligence Community knew about Iraq's possible procurement attempts.

(U) Conclusion 17. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) dissent on the uranium reporting was accidentally included in the aluminum tube section of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), due in part to the speed with which the NIE was drafted and coordinated.

(U) Conclusion 18. When documents regarding the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting became available to the Intelligence Community in October 2002, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analysts and operations officers should have made an effort to obtain copies. As a result of not obtaining the documents, CIA Iraq nuclear analysts continued to report on Iraqi efforts to procure uranium from Africa and continued to approve the use of such language in Administration publications and speeches.

<(U) Conclusion 19. Even after obtaining the forged documents and being alerted by.a State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) analyst about problems with them, analysts at both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) did not examine them carefully enough to see the obvious problems with the documents. Both agencies continued to publish assessments that Iraq may have been seeking uranium from Africa. In addition, CIA continued to approve the use of similar language in Administration publications and speeches, including the State of the Union.

(U) Conclusion 20. The Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) comments and assessments about the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting were inconsistent and, at times contradictory. These inconsistencies were based in part on a misunderstanding of a CIA Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) Iraq analyst's assessment of the reporting. The CIA should have had a mechanism in place to ensure that agency assessments and information passed to policymakers were consistent.

(U) Conclusion 21. When coordinating the State of the Union, no Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analysts or officials told the National Security Council (NSC) to remove the "16 words" or that there were concerns about the credibility of the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting. A CIA official's original testimony to the Committee that he told an NSC official to remove the words "Niger" and "500 tons" from the speech, is incorrect.

(U) Conclusion 22. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) should have taken the time to read the State of the Union speech and fact check it himself. Had he done so, he would have been able to alert the National Security Council (NSC) if he still had concerns about the use of the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting in a Presidential speech.

(U) Conclusion 23. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Humint Service (DHS), or the Navy should have followed up with a West African businessman, mentioned in a Navy report, who indicated he was willing to provide information about an alleged uranium transaction between Niger and Iraq in November 2002.

( ) Conclusion 24. In responding to a letter from Senator Carl Levin on behalf of the Intelligence Community in February 2003, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) should not have said that "DELETED of reporting suggest Iraq had attempted to acquire uranium from Niger," without indicating that State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) believed the reporting was based on forged documents, or that the CIA was reviewing the Niger reporting.

(U) Conclusion 25. The Niger reporting was never in any of the drafts of Secretary Powell's United Nations (UN) speech and the Committee has not uncovered any information that showed anyone tried to insert the information into the speech.

(U) Conclusion 26. To date, the Intelligence Community has not published an assessment to clarify or correct its position on whether or not Iraq was trying to purchase uranium from Africa as stated in the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). Likewise, neither the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) nor the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which both published assessments on possible Iraqi efforts to acquire uranium, have ever published assessments outside of their agencies which correct their previous positions.

It’s worth noting a new CIA director, Porter Goss has been appointed, and that he has been “cleaning house” at the CIA. (We know this from the former CIA officials , who complain – bitterly and regularly – about the “poor effect” Director Goss’ housecleaning is having on CIA morale.)

...from the looks of the identity cliques the problems came from, it was more likely another "council" than a "cabal."

2 posted on 12/02/2005 4:27:30 PM PST by familyop ("Let us try" sounds better, don't you think? "Essayons" is so...Latin.)

Note Conclusion paragraph 22. George Tenet receives a medal for outstanding work at the CIA. Why?

And BTW, putting posts in Iraq is a good tactical move. Iraq is in the center of problem solving over there. It will save a lot of revenue and a world of hurt for many in the long fight to put terrorism down. And to heck with the propaganda from the likes of Buchanan, Sobran, Triflovic,...

5 posted on 12/02/2005 4:42:15 PM PST by familyop ("Let us try" sounds better, don't you think? "Essayons" is so...Latin.)

The most significant aspect of the Niger connection is not whether Saddam was attempting to obtain radioactive material from Niger but is the CIA's unprofessionalism displayed by the apparent partisan meddling associated with the deployment of that unqualified stooge - Joe Wilson.

6 posted on 12/02/2005 4:51:22 PM PST by etradervic (Able Danger, Peter Paul Campaign Fraud, Travelgate, Whitewater, Sandy Berger...demand answers!)

Assume that Tenet knows that GWB knows that Tenet tried to screw the White House over.

If this is true, honoring Tenet was a way of making it hard for those he works for to trust him.

But that speaks of politics on a level one doesn't expect from Americans. In fact it is down right reminiscent of court politics in less civilized times.

7 posted on 12/02/2005 5:40:57 PM PST by coconutt2000 (NO MORE PEACE FOR OIL!!! DOWN WITH TYRANTS, TERRORISTS, AND TIMIDCRATS!!!! (3-T's For World Peace))

If this is true, honoring Tenet was a way of making it hard for those he works for to trust him.

Keep your friends close. Keep your enemies closer.

8 posted on 12/02/2005 5:53:17 PM PST by Bernard Marx (Don't make the mistake of interpreting my Civility as Servility)

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.