Posted on 11/24/2005 2:55:33 PM PST by SBD1
Baghdad has refused since December 1998 to allow United Nations inspectors into Iraq as required by Security Council Resolution 687. In spite of ongoing UN efforts to establish a follow-on inspection regime comprising the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the IAEA’s Iraq Action Team, no UN inspections occurred during this reporting period. Moreover, the automated video monitoring systemsinstalled by the UN at known and suspect WMD facilities in Iraq are still not operating. Having lost this on-the-ground access, it is more difficult for the UN or the US to accurately assess the current state of Iraq’s WMD programs.
Given Iraq’s past behavior, it is likely that Baghdad has used the intervening period to reconstitute prohibited programs. We assess that since the suspension of UN inspections in December of 1998, Baghdad has had the capability to reinitiate its CW programs within a few weeks to months. Iraq’s failure to submit an accurate Full, Final, and Complete Disclosure (FFCD) in either 1995 or 1997, coupled with its extensive concealment efforts, suggest that the BW program hascontinued. Without an inspection-monitoring program, however, it is more difficult to determine the current status of these programs.
Since the Gulf war, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of its chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial use, as well as its missile production facilities. Iraq has attempted to purchase numerous dual-use items for, or under the guise of, legitimate civilian use. This equipment—in principle subject to UN scrutiny—also could be diverted for WMD purposes. Since the suspension of UN inspections in December 1998, the risk of diversion has increased. After Desert Fox, Baghdad again instituted a reconstruction effort on those facilities destroyed by the US bombing, including several critical missile production complexes and former dual-use CW production facilities. In addition, Iraq appears to be installing or repairing dual-use equipment at CW-related facilities. Some of these facilities could be converted fairly quickly for production of CW agents.
UNSCOM reported to the Security Council in December 1998 that Iraq also continued to withhold information related to its CW program. For example, Baghdad seized from UNSCOM inspectors an Iraqi Air Force document discovered by UNSCOM that indicated that Iraq had not consumed as many CW munitions during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s as had been declared by Baghdad. This discrepancy indicates that Iraq may have hidden an additional 6,000 CW munitions.
In 1995, Iraq admitted to having an offensive BW program and submitted the first in a series of FFCDs that were supposed to have revealed the full scope of its BW program. According to UNSCOM, these disclosures are incomplete and filled with inaccuracies. Since the full scope and nature of Iraq’s BW program was not verified, UNSCOM has assessed that Iraq maintains a knowledge base and industrial infrastructure that could be used to produce quickly a large amount of BW agents at any time. Iraq also has continued dual-use research that could improve BW agent R&D capabilities. With the absence of a monitoring regime and Iraq’s growing industrial self-sufficiency, we remain concerned that Iraq may again be producing biological warfare agents.
Iraq has worked on its L-29 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program, which involves converting L-29 jet trainer aircraft originally acquired from Eastern Europe. In the past, Iraq has conducted flights of the L-29, possibly to test system improvements or to train new pilots. These refurbished trainer aircraft are believed to have been modified for delivery of chemical or, more likely, biological warfare agents.
We believe that Iraq has probably continued at least low-level theoretical R&D associated with its nuclear program. A sufficient source of fissile material remains Iraq’s most significant obstacle to being able to produce a nuclear weapon. Although we were already concerned about a reconstituted nuclear weapons program, our concerns increased in September 2000 when Saddam publicly exhorted his "Nuclear Mujahidin" to "defeat the enemy." The Intelligence Community remains concerned that Baghdad may be attempting to acquire materials that could aid in reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.
Iraq continues to pursue development of SRBM systems that are not prohibited by the United Nations and may be expanding to longer-range systems. Pursuit of UN-permitted missiles continues to allow Baghdad to develop technological improvements and infrastructure that could be applied to a longer-range missile program. We believe that development of the liquid-propellant Al-Samoud SRBM probably is maturing and that a low-level operational capability could be achieved in the near term — which is further suggested by the appearance of four Al Samoud transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) with airframes at the 31 December 2000 Al Aqsa parade. The solid-propellant missile development program may now be receiving a higher priority, and development of the Ababil-100 SRBM – two such airframes and TELs were paraded on 31 December—and possibly longer range systems may be moving ahead rapidly. If economic sanctions against Iraq were lifted, Baghdad probably would increase its attempts to acquire missile-related items from foreign sources, regardless of any future UN monitoring and continuing restrictions on long-range ballistic missile programs. Iraq probably retains a small, covert force of Scud-type missiles.
Iraq’s ACW acquisitions remain low due to the generally successful enforcement of the UN arms embargo. Baghdad has acquired smaller arms and components for larger arms, such as spare parts for aircraft and air defense systems, primarily over porous land borders via a thriving gray arms market. Iraq also acquires some dual-use and production items through the Oil For Food program. Iraq continues to aggressively seek ACW equipment and technology.
SBD
Thank you.
The democrats know the truth they just lie anyway. The lie gets front page, the truth might, possibly, perhaps be found on page 24.
The VIPS can read just fine. And they and many others in the CIA know how badly they have screwed up on intelligence over the last 20+ years. Their goal is to distract away from themselves and put the heat on others (i.e. Administrations that dare to challenge them). They have problems spying on our enemies, but they have no problems leaking select pieces of classified info that tries to make other look bad.
I wonder how much serious consideration has been given to the Libyan contention that Libya and Iraq were involved in a joint nuclear program? Somebody in the intelligence establishment must have looked into it.
bump
1 January Through 30 June 2001
In 1988, Osama Bin Ladin stated that he considered acquiring weapons of mass destruction a “religious duty”, and recent press reports claim that Bin Ladin has nuclear weapons to use as a deterrent against the United States. A government witness—Jamal Ahmad Fadl-- in the trial of four men recently convicted of supporting the al Qa’ida bombings of the American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya testified last February that al Qa’ida had been trying to acquire fissile material since the early 1990s. More recently, we have uncovered rudimentary diagrams of nuclear weapons inside a suspected al Qa’ida safehouse in Kabul. These diagrams, while crude, describe essential components—uranium and high explosives—common to nuclear weapons.
_______________________________________________________
The CIA has known of this since 1988, they are a part of the enemy with-in.
Here's a January of 2003 (i.e. pre-war) news followup: http://www.satribune.com/archives/jan13_19_03/CIAReport_nuclear.htm
So President Bush was Not Lying! Wonder how much WMD made it's way to Syria?
Pray for W and Our Freedom Fighters
WOW- nice find.
What I am beginning to learn is that way too many of our congressman and senators never bother to read these reports.
After all of the fuss and whining about getting the NIE report only three days before actually having to vote for or against the war- we are are beginning to see the hundreds of documents that the congress had access too, but never bothered to read. In fact, many of them never bothered to read the NIE report.
Every time I hear a politician complaining that they did not have the necessary information to vote on this war, I am reminded of the hundreds upon hundreds of these documents that they should have read.
The moment these politicians found out that there might be a vote that would help take their country to war, it probably would have been prudent for these politicians to send their staffers to look for this kind of information.
We should start calling this the "Valerie Plame Report to Congress on Iraq WMD".
SHe is a senior expert on WMD and most likely had a lot of influence in its tone and content. She was obviously asked who to send to Niger to investigate Iraq connection to Yellow Cake and that recommendation was taken. She was the "go to" person in the CIA when it came to Iraq and WMD.
http://john-batchelor.redstate.org/story/2005/11/25/15825/422
What we do not know now about the Wilsons
By: John Batchelor · Section: Diaries
What we do not know now about the Wilsons.
1. Who at the CIA tasked Joe Wilson to go to Niger in February 2002? Was it Alan Foley, then head of the CIA's Weapons Intelligence, Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Center? Was Wilson tasked in coordination with the State Department's African Affairs Bureau or Bureau of Intelligence and Research?
2. What did Wilson tell US Ambassador to Niger Owens-Kilpatrick about his trip when he was in Niger? What are the ambassador's notes from the conversations? Did Wilson speak of Mrs. Wilson to the ambassador? Has Wilson communicated with the ambassador since February 2002? Does the State Department have contemporary diaries or notes from Wilson's communications with the Ambassador?
3. Who in March 2003 at the CIA interviewed Joe Wilson upon his return from Niger, and where is the report? Why wasn't Wilson asked by the CIA interviewers to sign a confidentiality agreement about his report?
4. Prior to President Bush's January 2003 State of the Union Speech, who did Joe Wilson tell about his February, 2002 Niger trip? What journalists? What former members of government? What officials at the Democratic Party?
5. Did Joe Wilson discuss his 2002 Niger trip with the editors of the San Jose Mercury priory to publishing an October 2002 piece warning of Saddam Hussein's WMD threat if Iraq is invaded? What notes do the San Jose Mercury editors have of the conversations?
6. Following the President's State of the Union Speech January 2003, Wilson says that he telephoned a complaint about the speech to William Mark Bellamy at the State Department's African Affairs Bureau: did Bellamy know at the time of Mrs. Wilson's employment?
7. Mr. and Mrs. Wilson attended a Senate Democratic Party Committee meeting in early May, 2003: Who invited Joe Wilson to speak on Iraq? Who did Wilson speak with in addition to Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times?
8. Wilson breakfasted with Nicholas Kristof of the NYT on May 3, 2003: Did Mrs. Wilson attend the breakfast? Did Mrs. Kristof attend the breakfast? Any other attendees? What was discussed? Where are Kristof's notes from the breakfast? Was this the first occasion Wilson and Kristof had discussed WMD, Niger, Iraq? If Mrs. Kristof was present, where are her notes? If Mrs. Wilson was present, did she discuss her employment at the CIA since 1985?
9. A year earlier, in Nicholas Kristof's May 14, 2002 column, he mentions mother-daughter day at the CIA and small African countries in the same light-hearted paragraph. Did Nicholas Kristof or his wife, the New York Times journalist Sheryl Wu Dunn, speak with either Mr. or Mrs. Wilson before May 2003?
10. At the May 3, 2003 breakfast, if Mrs. Wilson was not present, was her employment discussed? What did Wilson tell the Kristof(s) was the reason for his trip to Niger? Did Mrs. Kristof (a WMD reporter along with co-author Judy Miller for the New York Times in 1998) ever meet or communicate with Mrs. Wilson subsequent to Mr. Kristof breakfasting with Joe Wilson? Were there subsequent meetings or communications between May 3 and May 6, 2003? If so, where are Kristof's notes?
11. Prior to Nicholas Kristof's June 13, 2003 column about forged Niger documents, did Joe Wilson convey to Mr. or Mrs. Kristof evidence of his February 2002 Niger trip that support the column's since unproved conclusion that Wilson exposed the forgeries during his February 2002 Niger trip?
12. Wilson told the same falsehoods about discovering the forged documents in Niger (documents that did not come into CIA hands until October 16, 2002) not only to Kristoff, but also to Walter Pincus of the Washington Post, who published on June 12, 2003, and John B. Judis and Spencer Ackerman of the New Republic, who published June 30, 2003. Did Pincus, Judis or Ackerman speak to Wilson about his connection to the CIA, about his wife's employment? Did they research background on Wilson to substantiate his later proved false statements that the Vice President's office had sent him to Niger, that he had discovered the forgeries, that he knew the Vice President was deceiving the public about Niger and uranium?
13. Wilson appeared on Meet the Press on the day of his New York Times op-ed, July 6, 2003 in order to repeat falsehoods about his Niger trip: did host Andrea Mitchell know of Wilson's wife's employment at the time?
14. What editor handled Wilson for his op-ed at the New York Times for his July 6, 2003 article? Where are the editor's notes of communications before publication? Did the editor challenge the ambiguous suggestion in the piece that Wilson's February 2002 Niger trip exposed the forged Niger documents? Did Wilson communicate with Mr. or Mrs. Kristof prior to the publication of his op-ed? Did Wilson communicate with State or CIA prior to publication
15. What did CIA determine Mrs. Wilson status to be in February 2002, in May 2003, in June 2003, in July 2003?
16. Wilson has remarked that he has French mining and investment interest in Africa as playing clients of his consultations. Mrs. Wilson has said that Joe Wilson has French clients? What clients? Has Joe Wilson ever worked for or consulted for the French uranium mining firm Cogema? Do Wilson's present or past clients have interest in the two uranium mine locations in Niger? Wilson has mentioned he has had gold mining clients in Niger: what clients, what connection to other mining interests in Niger? What fees have these clients paid Joe Wilson coterminous with his 1998, 1999, 2002 visits to Niger?
17. Has Joe Wilson been under oath for the Fitzgerald investigators? Has he been questioned by the FBI investigators for Fitzgerald? Did he name the neighbors that the FBI questioned about Mrs. Wilson in October 2005? What neighbors?
18. The day of the Novak column, July 14, 2003, did Wilson communicate with State? With CIA? With French mining interests?
19. Has Mrs. Wilson been under oath about her contacts on the day of the first Novak column, July 14, 2003? Does she have a contemporary diary of events such as February and March 2002, such as the Kristoff breakfast on May 3, 2003? Or on May 6, 2003? Or on the day of the David Corn Nation blog mention, July 16, 2003?
20. Was CIA permission required to photograph the Wilsons for January 2004 Vanity Fair?
21. Who are Joe Wilson's paying clients since 2001? Any uranium mining interests in Gabon, Namibia, Canada, Russia, as well as Niger? And does Fitzgerald have the list? And has Wilson ever been in contact with clients who represent any of the following states looking to purchase yellowcake: Iraq, Iran, North Korea, PRC, Libya, Syria, Egypt, Pakistan, India, Saudi Arabia, especially with regard Niger or Gabon uranium mines?
Nov 25th, 2005: 01:58:25
Bump.
Bookmarked
Bump, thanks for the ping.
The prayers are constantly INCOMING. America will survive because of President Bush CIC and our people in country. God Bless Them All.
Thank you Joe and it is something the Dems never do.
Pray for W and Our Freedom Fighters
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.