RUSSIA STILL GETS IT WRONG ON UKRAINE

COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS: By Taras Kuzio Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 2, Issue 185 The Jamestown Foundation, Washington, D.C.

Russian leaders were delighted, even gleeful, when Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko was fired in early September. Their unabashed gloating confirms that Moscow still does not realize why its interference in the 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections failed so miserably (see EDM, September 23). Instead, Russian officials have continued to look wistfully toward Ukraine.

Russian leaders believe that the ongoing political crisis could lead to Ukraine's disintegration or civil war between eastern and western Ukraine. If the country divides, Ukraine might return to Russia and end President Viktor Yushchenko's pro-Western foreign policy. These scenarios are decidedly wrong.

The 2004 presidential elections proved that Ukraine has changed since Leonid Kuchma was first elected president in July 1994. The 1994 vote followed a far deeper crisis, when hyperinflation and strikes by miners forced then president Leonid Kravchuk to call early presidential elections.

Throughout the 1990s the central issue of Ukrainian politics was statehood; that is, would Ukraine survive as an independent state. This issue was resolved in the 1999 presidential elections when Kuchma defeated the Ukrainian Communist Party leader.

The defeat of the main domestic threat to independence (the Communists) and the end to an external threat from Russia (after it recognized Ukraine's borders) changed the central issue of Ukrainian politics to what kind of state would be built. This would, in turn, directly influence Ukraine's integration either with the Commonwealth of Independent States (as a corrupt, oligarchic, authoritarian state) or with "Europe" (as a democratizing state).

During Kuchma's second term in office Regions of Ukraine (RU) replaced the Communists (KPU) as the leading pro-Russian party. Although both the KPU and RU are pro-Russian, they differ in that only Regions of Ukraine favors Ukrainian statehood. Thus the party shift was a positive development for Ukrainian stability.

Russia strongly backed then prime minister Viktor Yanukovych to succeed Kuchma in 2004. Yanukovych, however, denied that Russian President Vladimir Putin "came to visit me personally, it was not a strategy of my election campaign" (Washington Post, December 17, 2004). After Yanukovych's defeat, the Unified Russia party signed a cooperation agreement with Regions of Ukraine.

The Ukrainian Communists have rapidly declined since the 1999 elections. Eastern Ukrainian voters have since shifted from the Communist Party, which now has only 11% support in this region, to Regions, which has 51.7% (Kyiv International Institute Sociology, September 2005).

Russian political commentators earnestly – but wrongly – believe that the current government crisis will re-orient Ukraine eastwards. The selection of Yuriy Yekhanurov as prime minister and Anatoly Kinakh as secretary of the National Security and Defense Council (NRBO) are cited as "evidence" for this argument.

A political expert with the Moscow INDEM think tank believes that Ukraine's foreign "re-orientation" was inevitable. "Russia is the country from which money, and lots of it, comes to Ukraine. There is no way around this. Ukraine's economy depends heavily on Russia. All the talk about ‘turning West' was euphoric. The fact is Russia and Ukraine have long and close ties that neither can do without" (Agence France Presse, September 27).

Russian political commentators have reached the wrong conclusions about Ukraine's crisis for three reasons.

First, their reliance upon Regions of Ukraine as their domestic ally gives them a regional, rather than national, view of domestic developments inside Ukraine. The Donetsk region, where RU has its main base of support, is different from the remainder of eastern Ukraine, let alone other regions of Ukraine.

Second, neither Kinakh nor Yekhanurov will re-orientate Ukraine's foreign policy towards Russia and the CIS. Nevertheless, Russian media claimed that Yekhanurov's September 30 visit to Moscow was tantamount to a "surrender" to Russia (Agence France Presse, September 30).

The Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya gazeta (September 30) wrongly concluded that Yushchenko was doing an about-face and returning to Russia. "This means de facto that the leaders of the ‘orange revolution' have abandoned their earlier ideals. The Yushchenko team has turned back to the principles and methods for conducting foreign policy that characterized the Kuchma regime."

Another Russian newspaper, Kommersant (September 30), believes that the Yekhanurov government will be "pro-Russian" because it "is closely linked to Russian capital."

Yekhanurov's ascent does not indicate a policy shift. He has been an ally of Yushchenko's since the latter was prime minister in 1999-2001. Moreover, the president, not the prime minister, formulates foreign policy. Two-thirds of the ministers in the Yekhanurov government are holdovers from the Tymoshenko government, including pro-Western foreign and defense ministers.

Interviewed on ICTV (October 2), NRBO secretary Kinakh continued to outline Ukraine's interest in only taking part in step one of the CIS Single Economic Space; that is, a free-trade zone. Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk reiterated this view during his September visit to the United States. While Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan support steps two (customs union) and three (monetary union), Ukraine continues to oppose both.

Third, Russia continues to get it wrong about Ukraine because it still sees the region as "Little Russia." According to new a poll by the Moscow-based Levada Center, 71% of Russians favor a unified state with Ukraine. Only 24% are against (UPI, September 28).

At the same time, the Russian population is more realistic than the ruling elites. Only 18% believe a union with Ukraine is realistic, with another 35% thinking it could take place in the distant future. Whereas 48% believed that a union was likely with Belarus, only 15% thought this was the case with Ukraine.

Many analysts suggest that Moscow might apply pressure to Kyiv using the threat of higher energy imports. But energy-supply discussions ahead of winter are a perennial problem that even pro-Russian states, such as Belarus, find difficult when dealing with Moscow. The same is true of Ukraine.

The September political crisis in Ukraine and change in government will not alter Ukraine's declared foreign policy goals of Euro-Atlantic integration. The success of this goal will be decided by the outcome of the March 2006 parliamentary elections. If pro-reform forces are able to overcome their personal divisions and create a parliamentary majority for Yushchenko, the country will support Euro-Atlantic integration.

For now, the U.S. administration supports Ukraine's movement from Intensified Dialogue on Membership to a Membership Action Plan for NATO. What parliament does from 2006 to 2011 remains to be seen.

NEW PRIME MINISTER RETURNS EMPTY-HANDED FROM MOSCOW

ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY: By Vladimir Socor
Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 2, Issue 185
The Jamestown Foundation, Washington, D.C.
Wednesday, October 5, 2005

Yuriy Yekhanurov paid his first visit abroad as Ukrainian prime minister to
Moscow on September 30, barely eight days after his confirmation by
parliament and only two days after the appointment of most of his
ministerial team.

The alacrity of the visit reflected -- as had President Viktor Yushchenko's
choice of Yekhanurov in the first place -- the president's ongoing
rapprochement with groups from the former regime and his decision to bid
for Moscow's support to a Ukrainian presidency in crisis.

Yushchenko and his new government urgently seek two major favors from the
Kremlin: First, guaranteed gas deliveries on the traditional barter scheme
this coming winter, which coincides with the parliamentary election campaign
in Ukraine; and, second, a visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin with
Yushchenko in Ukraine before the official start of the electoral campaign.
On both counts, Yekhanurov returned empty-handed.

The gas supply situation can crucially affect the parliamentary election's
outcome. Pro-presidential parties are especially vulnerable to this factor:
gas shortages could cost these parties heavily in terms of votes lost, while
normal supplies would hardly earn them any additional votes.

By the same token, the major opposition parties (despite and above their
current differences) stand to gain politically from any gas shortages. Thus,
Gazprom could potentially sway Ukraine's parliamentary elections either way,
depending on Kremlin political decisions.

At least since June, the Ukrainian government (under Yulia Tymoshenko as
prime minister until September 8) had insistently sought to negotiate and
sign the agreement with Gazprom for 2006 on the same non-market terms as
in the previous annual agreements.

Under these arrangements, Gazprom does not sell gas to Ukraine, but pays
Ukraine in gas -- some 25 billion cubic meters annually -- in lieu of cash
for pumping Russian gas to Europe through Ukraine's transit pipelines. In
this gas-for-service barter deal, both the Russian gas and Ukraine's transit
services are valued far below European market rates.

Given the international price dynamics for energy, Gazprom is missing out on
a windfall of profits by delivering that amount of gas to Ukraine on
price-controlled and barter terms, instead of selling that gas for cash at
European market rates to Ukraine or elsewhere in Europe. Thus, Gazprom
wants to switch its arrangements with Ukraine to commercial terms as early
as January 1, 2006.

It proposes to pay for Ukrainian transit services in cash and sell Russian
gas to Ukraine at European market prices. Ukraine, unable to afford those
prices, is asking Moscow to postpone any changes until 2007 and to move only
gradually afterward toward market-based arrangements.

Yekhanurov and the accompanying team of ministers were eager and anxious
for a start to discussions on gas deliveries, transit, and payments during
their Moscow visit. Putin, however, seemed to circumvent the gas issue
altogether when receiving the Ukrainian delegation at his Novo-Ogarevo
residence.

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov prevented any meaningful discussion
on gas in the intergovernmental meeting by informing the startled Ukrainians
that the relevant Russian ministers -- Viktor Khristenko, German Gref, and
Alexei Kudrin -- could not attend because they were otherwise engaged.

The excuse seemed particularly lame considering that this was the first
visit by a Ukrainian prime minister to Russia since the December 2004
regime change in Ukraine, as well as a major fence-mending visit from Kyiv's
perspective.

At the concluding briefing, Fradkov announced that the gas issue is being
referred back to ministers for discussion, as "there will be enough time for
exchanging views on this … Naturally, these complex issues require more
thorough discussions." (Russian Television Channel One, UNIAN, Inter TV,
September 30).

Apparently, the Russian side intends to drag out the talks into the cold
season, and as close to January 1 as possible, in order to raise the anxiety
level in Kyiv. At the same time, Moscow seeks to inject the issue of joint
ownership of Ukraine's transit pipelines into the discussions on Russian
annual gas supplies to Ukraine. By raising the prospect of cuts in supplies,
Moscow aims to pressure Kyiv into turning Ukraine's gas transit system into
a Ukrainian-Russian consortium.

Further complicating Kyiv's situation, Turkmenistan -- the leading gas
supplier to Ukraine -- demands reimbursement of Ukrainian debts worth $500
million in barter goods, before negotiating the gas supply agreement for
2006. Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov has for that reason postponed
a scheduled visit to Kyiv.

The possibility of a Putin visit to Ukraine was not publicly mentioned
during Yekhanurov's Moscow visit, although it must have been part of his
mandate. Yushchenko has publicly as well as privately invited Putin to visit
Ukraine with growing insistence since August, against the backdrop of a
deteriorating political and economic situation in the country and with an
eye to the twin problems of fuel supply and the parliamentary election
campaign this coming winter.

In recent weeks, Yushchenko has publicly invited Putin variously to join the
Ukrainian, Georgian, and Lithuanian presidents for the 80th anniversary of
the Soviet pioneers' camp in Artek, Crimea (an embarrassing rationale that
the other presidents had the common sense of rephrasing as a visit with
Artek children); or to attend a vaguely defined summit in Yalta of the
Community of Democratic Choice (thus altering the CdC's agenda and its
brand); or a summit of Black Sea countries' presidents (instead of the
"Yalta-2" summit proposed by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili to
mark the demise of the 1945 Yalta system); or finally a bilateral visit with
Yushchenko in Ukraine.

Yushchenko is evidently weakening his own position by casting himself as a
persistent petitioner. For his part, Putin is playing hard to get by
ignoring almost demonstratively the Ukrainian president's entreaties.

Once Ukraine's electoral campaign begins officially (it is already underway
unofficially), Yushchenko's entreaties to Putin will inevitably provoke
comparisons with former President Leonid Kuchma's orchestration of
supportive visits by Putin during Ukraine's 2004 campaign season.

However, Moscow has yet to decide who and in what forms to support in
Ukraine in the upcoming elections and beyond, and at what price.

(Interfax-Ukraine, Russian Television Channel One, UNIAN, Inter TV,
September 30, October 1)

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.