Posted on 08/25/2005 10:01:56 AM PDT by swarthyguy
AUSTIN, Texas, August 27: Though the governments of the United States and Pakistan appear to be in sync with one another on the hunt for Osama bin Laden and militant Islamists, a crisis of relations is brewing just beneath the surface.
Despite expressions of unity in the war against Al-Qaeda, cooperation at the operational and tactical levels is nearly nonexistent -- and calculated interference by Pakistani intelligence and security elements is hindering US operations in the country.
This situation is further complicated by ongoing rivalries between government agencies, poor communications and general lack of cooperation by US intelligence and security agencies. All of which leaves counter terrorism operations in Pakistan -- or, more precisely, US efforts to capture or kill bin Laden and other top Al-Qaeda leaders -- stagnant.
At the broad political level, Washington and Islamabad are presenting a relatively unified front in the battle. Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who must balance his domestic political concerns against US pressure, continues to walk a fine line -- between cooperation with Washington (or with opposition forces within Pakistan), and capitulation.
On the surface, Musharraf and US President George W. Bush are in a state of cautious compromise -- with Washington continuing to express confidence in Musharraf's government and offering increased military assistance to Pakistan. For its part, Islamabad has been paying lip service to counter terrorism cooperation with the United States, while still professing its ability to carry out sweeps and all other anti-jihadist operations on its own.
The Musharraf government's attitude has been that it is doing all it can to get rid of terrorist sanctuaries, but it will not allow foreign forces to conduct operations on Pakistani soil. As Musharraf told US media earlier this year: "We are capable of" capturing bin Laden, and "if we get intelligence, we will do it ourselves."
Islamabad recognizes that US forces will operate in Pakistani territory -- with or without government permission -- and thus has struck a compromise so that US operations will be kept as low-key as possible by both sides. The Pakistanis have acknowledged the involvement of foreign forces in the counter terrorism offensive but claim joint efforts are limited to intelligence-sharing and logistics cooperation. In this way, Islamabad seeks to defuse both US pressure to act -- and domestic pressure to avoid acting.
But despite the political niceties, two key issues continue to impede efforts to dismantle Al-Qaeda's structure in Pakistan. The first is the professional rivalry between the CIA, Department of Defense and FBI, as well as other security and intelligence agencies, which continues to dog the post-Sept. 11 efforts to streamline intelligence-sharing. The second is the dismal performance by the Pakistani security and intelligence organizations.
It is true that a number of key Al-Qaeda operatives and leaders have been arrested by Pakistani authorities since their exodus from Afghanistan in late 2001. In March 2002, Abu Zubaydah, a senior Al-Qaeda member, was captured in Faisalabad. Ramzi bin al-Shibh, a deputy leader of the task force that coordinated the Sept. 11 attacks, was captured in Karachi in September 2002. And in March 2003, another task force leader, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, was picked up in Rawalpindi. Other prominent captures include those of communications expert Naeem Noor Khan, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani (linked to the 1998 US embassy bombings in Africa), and Abu Farj al-Libi, believed to be the head of Al-Qaeda operations in Pakistan.
Nevertheless, the progress made against the core leadership of Al-Qaeda remains an open question. First, how is it that Al-Qaeda's mostly Arab leadership is able to evade detection in a country with very few Arabs? More important, how can a foreign non-state actor evade detection -- when he is known to be in a certain region, with massive global search-and-destroy operations hunting him -- unless he is granted succor or protection from some members of the local security and intelligence organizations closest to the front?
While those at the topmost levels of US authority have been praising the Musharraf government as a crucial ally in the war against Al-Qaeda, certain US officials lately have been making a public issue of Islamabad's non-cooperation. Among these is CIA Director Porter Goss, who insinuated a few months ago that bin Laden is known to be in Pakistan and said outright that in order for him to be captured, certain "weak links" -- i.e., Pakistan -- must be strengthened.
Goss's comments are clearly echoed by US intelligence and defense officials now active in Pakistan and working with Islamabad. There is an ingrained distrust of US and other foreign services within Pakistan's intelligence community -- stemming from nationalistic instincts, a desire to hide links between intelligence services and Jihadis and their supporters, and sympathies on multiple levels with the Jihadis
One very senior Pakistani intelligence source engaged in a frank discussion about this atmosphere of distrust -- which is pervasive throughout the country's security organizations, even though most of Pakistan's law enforcement personnel are not personally Islamists. Some simply don't like the idea of US pressure against their government, while others dislike being told how to do their jobs. Still others see the United States as arrogantly pursuing its own interests at Pakistan's expense. We are told there is a great deal of resentment -- from the highest echelons down through the rank-and-file -- over what the Pakistanis perceive as Washington's failure to recognize the efforts, sacrifices, and cooperation they are providing.
And, not insignificantly, there are some who perceive that the Jihadis Washington is now pursuing were created by the United States' proxy war in 1980s Afghanistan -- and who believe that the US government, having abandoned Afghanistan after meeting its objectives there, will abandon Pakistan in similar fashion.
Resistance to US influence, therefore, has been both passive and active, with intelligence operatives telling local police and village chiefs directly not to cooperate with US operations on the ground. Sources in Pakistan tell us that the Inter-Services Intelligence and Military Intelligence agencies debrief all private Pakistani citizens who come into contact with US government, media and think tanks -- both before and after the interface -- in attempts to restrict contact between the two countries to official channels.
Additionally, certain high-level leaders of Pakistani militant Islamist movements have been declared off-limits as targets for security forces, thus leaving key segments of the international militant network unmolested. The United States is providing large amounts of supplies, money and training for Pakistani forces, but with few results.
Clearly, cooperation from the country's intelligence and security apparatus -- a major cog in the machine built to hunt down Al-Qaeda in Pakistan -- is not happening. There are four reasons for this:
1. The insistence by top leadership that US forces cannot operate any more prominently on Pakistani soil than they already are. Though there are many reasons behind this, as mentioned earlier, they boil down for some key government officials to mere survival: Islamist militants have made several attempts on Musharraf's life and others within the regime, at Al-Qaeda's behest. Nationalist sentiments and political opposition to Musharraf's government are considerations as well.
2. Calculated moves by influential figures at the middle and lower levels of Pakistan's intelligence and security apparatus to thwart offensives against the militants. Some of this reflects countermoves by Islamabad against American attempts to push the limits of tacit security agreements with the Pakistanis. However, it is also a sign that the Musharraf regime does not have tight control over its own intelligence and security services -- and of this, Islamabad is keenly and nervously aware.
3. The Pakistani military's desire to hide its past links with the militants and its current ties to certain Islamist groups -- which it views as assets of the state to be used in pursuit of Islamabad's geopolitical goals. For Islamabad, the Jihadis have long been both an internal threat to military/civilian rule and a useful form of leverage in its geopolitical maneuvers -- for example, gaining strategic depth with regard to Afghanistan and waging its proxy war against India in Kashmir. Pakistan is not willing to surrender this leverage lightly -- and, because the lines between those "useful" militant groups and Al-Qaeda members can be blurry, many on Islamabad's preservation list fall into both categories.
4. Recognition within Islamabad that Pakistan's importance as a US ally likely will dissolve if bin Laden is captured or killed. Washington has been attempting to strengthen its ties with India and is even attempting tentative negotiations with Iran, with the eventual goal of warmer relations. Should these efforts bear fruit, the Musharraf regime's geopolitical importance to the United States will diminish -- leaving Islamabad as a potential member of the "outposts of tyranny" rather than a close anti-terrorism ally.
Given these factors -- coupled with the potential for ineptitude and rivalries among the Pakistani and US security and intelligence agencies -- there is a crisis that has brought the search for Al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan to a virtual halt.
This situation cannot last indefinitely -- the breaking point will come either with a misstep by Musharraf that destroys the political balance he has tried to maintain within Pakistan, or a decision by Washington that delay, obfuscation and overt obstructionism will no longer be tolerated. If Islamabad doesn't act -- and it is questionable whether another pre-packaged capture of a mid-level Al-Qaeda operative by Pakistani forces will satisfy the Bush administration -- Washington will be left with little choice but to move on its own.
Islamabad's response to the pressure is predicated on one unanswered question: Is Musharraf lying to the United States, or is he being lied to by his own people? In other words, is he in control of the obstructionism, or is he a victim of it? We believe the reality is somewhere in the middle. Nevertheless, the outlook is troubling. - Courtesy stratfor.com
Not the Pakistanis fault, if they choose to prevaricate, and we believe them.....
A little from columna A, and a lot from column B.
If history is a guide...Id say he's lying.
ping to read later
Bingo.
Janus Musharraf.
Since he has two faces, does he have 18 lives?
Ah. Mushie is a tease...
We are nearing this point right now....it will be four years since we set out to kill or capture OBL and Zawahiri....this will no doubt be the last anniversary that passes without those two either dead or in US custody. It is becoming to much of a political liability ...and Bush will want it settled before he leaves office in '08..
>>We allow 500+ ISI and Pakistani military advisers helping the Taliban
Indian intel maintains that it was more in the thousands; entire units of the Pakistani army that had been seconded to the Taliban.
In Robin Moore's The Hunt for Bin Ladin, he describes how US SF forces, after reviewing many battle scenes where air power had devastated TalibPakiJihadi forces, were astonished to find many of the fighters in Paki Army uniforms with insignia ripped off - from miltary style sweaters, to certain equipment, and even Paki stationary and some comm equipment.
>>Bush will want it settled before he leaves office in '08..
I would think so. It's Legacy time. And not having those two will be forever contrasted with the statements made in the immediate aftermath of the Attacks.
Question is, have the jihadis and sympathetic generals grown stronger in the hiatus, or weaker.
For instance, HizbTahrir is making great inroads into erstwhile secular or moderate, educated, professionals in Pakistan.
Mushie is getting pushed to the cliffs edge...and will soon be asked to make a decision.
"I will not leave a problem for the next President...."
He won't either.
I was being "Conservative" in my numbers, I had heard between 600 - 1000. Your number does not surprise me. Is Moore's book any good?
Yes, I enjoyed it. The only comprehensive look at the successful campaign to overthrow the Talib, and the unsuccessful one to nail Osama. Perhaps a little dated now, since there are other efforts out there about that time period, specifically the one by Schoen and the one awaiting approval by the CIA, by Bernsten.
Some other reads that were useful:
AQ's Great Escape - Christopher Smucker
The Interrogators - Greg Mackey (Macky)
I also read SAAG.ORG for some, IMO, great backgrounders and updates on Pakistan and Jihad in general. Raman's archived articles are priceless.
The airspace over Kunduz was left clear and open for 24 hours plus.
Contrary to reports here, huge Ilyushins provided by Victor Bout, and contracted to the Paki Military (even they weren't cheeky enough to use Pakistani planes, apparently, and may not have had the airlift capacity required to evacuate thru their c-130's), with numerous flights landing and extracting Paki army personnel from Kunduz at the height of the US air umbrella over Afghanistan.
Thanks now I'll go get the book .... I believe your statement and I can only imagine the numbers evacuted on the GROUND ..... maybe the Indian number is low.
Musharraf cannot be trusted. Vajpayee learned the hard way during Kargil. (But you know this already.)
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