New Iran nuclear crisis looms

It's summertime in much of the world right now — and if past experience means anything there will soon be a crisis over Iran's nuclear programme. This time things are much more serious than before. Relations between Tehran and the West are looking distinctly overcast in the wake of the presidential election victory of hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad.

But there are also deeper rooted reasons for the looming clash, which could lead to United Nations action against Iran, splits among Europe's biggest powers, and sabre-rattling (at the very least) in the US.

Just look back at the last couple of summers, both of which presaged stormy weather ahead.

In June 2003 the International Atomic Energy Agency announced that Iran had failed to come clean about its nuclear activities, which other countries feared were aimed at producing nuclear weapons. Tensions increased, with the US refusing to rule out military action, until October when French, German and British foreign ministers reached a deal with Tehran.

In July 2004 the deal fell apart as Iran started making parts for centrifuges that could be used to produce weapons grade uranium. Tehran later announced it had also started producing feedstocks for the nuclear cycle, while the "EU3" countries warned that unless Iran curtailed all such activities they would back calls to refer it to the UN security council.

That year's crisis came to an end in Paris in November when a new, tougher agreement between the EU3 and Tehran curtailed all Iranian activities linked to uranium enrichment for the duration of negotiations on the long term future of the nuclear programme.

The Europeans said they were looking for "objective guarantees" that Iran would not use nuclear technology to develop the bomb. In return they said they would help Tehran with technology, forge closer economic links, particularly trade, and even address the country's security concerns.

But the Europeans added that, given Tehran's history of subterfuge and concealment, the objective guarantees they were seeking were, in effect, the dismantlement of the entire Iranian infrastructure for uranium enrichment — the process that can produce both nuclear fuel and nuclear bombs.

Iran has consistently maintained it has a right to enrich uranium, which it says it needs to bolster its energy security (despite its reserves of oil and gas) and that it has no intention of giving it up. The country has always insisted its nuclear programme is wholly peaceful.

That difference in views has set the stage for the breakdown in negotiations that European diplomats now widely expect this summer. Indeed it was a triumph of European diplomacy, with behind the scenes US support, that a Geneva meeting in May managed to delay the denouement until after Iran's presidential elections.

The Europeans have promised to deliver a new package of proposals to the Iranians by early August — the betting is that they will now do so just after Mr Ahmadi-Nejad's inauguration. Next to no one can conceive of how they can come up with anything that Tehran will accept.

The EU will offer fuel guarantees to allay any Iranian need for enriched uranium, deeper economic links and a security dialogue to make Iran, a country traditionally bordered by enemies, feel more at peace in the world. But it is hard to see how any of it will make any difference, given Tehran’s consistent message on uranium enrichment and the widespread perception in European capitals that Iran's real desire is to be within arm's reach of nuclear capacity.

As a result European minds are turning to security council resolutions. The EU3 have already told the US that they would support a referral to the UN if Iran resumes its nuclear programme.

First, the EU3 themselves may not be united on vigorous action against Tehran — after all, Germany and France are by some counts the two biggest foreign investors in the country.

Second, any issue would have to be discussed at the IAEA, the UN's nuclear watchdog, before being referred to New York — and the fate of a hostile resolution put to the IAEA's 35-member board of governors is far from certain. And third, China is developing ever closer ties with Iran and may veto any UN vote.

So any initial stab at a UN resolution is likely to be diplomatically worded so that it can be agreed on by the EU3, make it through the IAEA and not be vetoed by Beijing. As a result, it is only likely to call on Iran to respect the Paris agreement. A later resolution, if things got that far, might seek to turn the Paris agreement into international law by denying Iran the right to enrich uranium. Any attempt to impose sanctions would be much further down the line.

The Europeans also hope that by winning over Moscow to their cause — Russia, as a neighbour of Iran's, has no interest in seeing a nuclear-armed Tehran — they will create a critical mass in favour of a resolution. With all four other permanent members of the UN security council agreed on a relatively inoffensive resolution, it may be difficult for China to wield its veto.

But just as the Europeans are seeking to deal with the imminent clash by drafting relatively soft resolutions, Iran is likely to try to defuse such a confrontation by resuming nuclear activity in a patchy and low-profile way. Tehran knows that if it starts its entire nuclear programme up again at one blow a security council resolution is more likely; as a result it is likely to resume the programme in dribs and drabs.

All of which means that the next few months are profoundly uncertain. European unity may prevail and bring a UN resolution in its wake. But there is also a risk that, even though the talks fail, the UN process will ground to a halt, which will be good news for two groups of people — the champions of Iran's nuclear programme and the partisans of an airstrike against Tehran.

This summer looks like it will be hot. But after that things could get even stickier.

The election of Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad signals that the mullahs of Theran feel they no longer even have to pretend they are 'reforming' and 'democratizing' the regime. Why do they believe this? The only logical answer is that they have or are very near to having deliverable nuclear weapons.

There has been a constant mutter from US policy makers that the Al-Quaidi will try to attack the US with a nuclear weapon. Where could they get an actual useable weapon. The answer is obvious.

Theran with nuclear weapons means that they can be used both covertly against the US and overtly against Israel. For years the CIA has taken the position that the Shia Iranians would never make common cause with the Sunni Osama Bin-Ladin Organization. Does anyone here believe this is so now?

Either Iran's nuclear capacity is destroyed and the delivery systems also or we face a nuclear attack on the US homeland and Israel faces another holocaust. A successful nuclear attack on the US would finish Constitutional liberties for a long time maybe for good. A nuclear attack on Israel could kill or main possibly a majority of Israelis. The retaliation by both the US and Israel could kill several million Muslims. The resultant chaos within those countries attacked could give the Islamacists their opening to seize power in several Arab states. Then after the debries settled a real global war war between the US led coaltion and much of Islam would grind on for a long time.

We had better stop Theran while we can.

Here is the official bio of Mahmound Ahmadi-Nejad. It should remove all doubts as to who we are dealing with:

Is the president-elect of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, one of the hostage-takers at the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979? The Northeast Intelligence Network called upon its Farsi-language resources to help determine the answer to this question. Sure enough, the answer is readily found on the official website of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, written entirely in Farsi, and complete with images. The website includes various documents from Ahmadinegad’s campaign where he claims "I Can Control the Americans - I Have Experience Doing It". In one particularly disturbing document, he claims that if elected, he will “bring the death that the Shi’ite are experiencing in Iraq to the streets of America with the volunteer martyr brigades that are ready to act.” READ MORE

Ahmadinegad claims that under his leadership “America will not stop Iran from its uranium programs. Iran has a right to defend itself against the Zionist sons of pigs and apes.” He says that he “knows how to control the US and will do so when the time is right.”

The website in fact boasts of his involvement in the Embassy takeover, even posting photographs of Ahmadinegad and his fellow students.

The website claims that this photograph was taken inside the US Embassy in Tehran in 1980.

The official biography on Ahmadinejad’s website leaves little doubt as to his involvement in the 1979 embassy takeover:

Born in Garmsar, east of Tehran in 1956
4th child of 7
Working class family
Father was a blacksmith
Family moved to south Tehran in 1957
Graduated high school
Enrolled Elm-o Sanaat University 1975 studying engineering
Became leave of student activist group at Elm-o Sanaat University
Founded the Islamic Students Association at Elm-o Sanaat shortly after fall of shah
1979 became representative from Elm-o Sanaat at the Office of Strengthening Unity between Students and Theological Seminaries (OSU) (OSU set up by Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, top confidant to Ayatullah Khomeini
Ahmadinejad and other members of OSU central councilincluding Ibrahim Asgharzadeh, Mohsen Mirdamadi, Mohsen Kadivar, Mohsen Aghajari, and Abbas Abdi regularly met with Khomeini
Mirdamadi and Abdi suggested to OSU that US embassy be stormed. Ahmadinejad recommended storming the Soviet embassy at the same time.
During 1980 “Islamic Cultural Revolution" Ahmadinejad and the OSU assisted in purging dissident lecturers and students - many arrested and later executed.
1980 - Ahmadinejad joined Revolutionary Guards
1980s, Ahmadinejad employed as interrogator and torturer the Internal Security department of Revolutionary Guard.
Iran government website Baztab, claims Ahmadinejad worked as an executioner in the notorious Evin Prison.
1986 became senior officer in Special Brigade. Revolutionary Guard, at Ramazan Garrison (Ramazan Garrison was the headquarters of the Revolutionary Guards' "extra-territorial operations", a euphemism for terrorist attacks beyond Iran's borders.)
Governor, Maku and Khoy (towns in NW Iran)
1993 appointed governor of Ardebil Province
1997 return to Elm-o Sanaat University to teach and organize Ansar el Hezbollah
2003 became major of Tehran; founded Abadgaran-e Iran-e Islami party
An opposition website claims the following:

In Kermanshah, Ahmadinejad became involved in the clerical regime's terrorist operations abroad and led many "extra-territorial operations of the IRGC". With the formation of the elite Qods (Jerusalem) Force of the IRGC, Ahmadinejad became one of its senior commanders. He was the mastermind of a series of assassinations in the Middle East and Europe, including the assassination of Iranian Kurdish leader Abdorrahman Qassemlou, who was shot dead by senior officers of the Revolutionary Guards in a Vienna flat in July 1989. Ahmadinejad was a key planner of the attack, according to sources in the Revolutionary Guards.

Of course, if you have doubts you can always contact him directly. The contact page on his website at http://mardomyar.com/aspx/contactme.asp lists his email address as: drahmadinejad@gmail.com

I wouldn't go quite that far, but it certainly indicates that they believe that nothing can stop them from obtaining them given Europe's dithering venality and the U.S.'s apparent unwillingness to engage the North Koreans unilaterally. And I believe their assessment is correct.

What we face is a nuclear-armed Iran held in check by the same Mutual Assured Destruction doctrine that kept the U.S. and the Soviets from blowing one another up and is, so far, doing the same with respect to Pakistan and India. And we know from experience that this only works when the potential aggressor is convinced (1) that he cannot win such an exchange and remain in good enough condition to exploit it, and (2) that the other party is resolute enough to make it stick. A fanatic or a madman or a catastrophically mistaken intelligence estimate can upset this equilibrium and always could. That was the game we played with the Soviets for half a century.

I am not in a position to estimate accurately the likelihood of success of a pre-emptive strike on Iranian assets but from a lay point of view it seems much less likely than that enjoyed in 1981 by the Israelis against Saddam. But signs that the new Iranian government may actually think it can win a nuclear exchange could well make a pre-emptive strike the most viable of a number of bad options. The closer they get to actual testing of a device the more they really need to keep that in mind.

Thanks for the response Bill. I concur. I have a somewhat related question for you. I have been reading a great deal about the EMP threat to the United States. Several Congressmen and Senators are openly discussing a new EMP treaty, possible retaliation scenarios, etc. If there were to be a Nuclear EMP strike against the United States or one of our allies wouldn't we just retaliate as if a Nuke had hit our country? Clearly the damage would be vast and possibly debilitating, would we just use MAD and retaliate massively? Do we have such a policy formally in place?

Regards,

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