Posted on 06/01/2005 2:55:30 PM PDT by P_A_I
A Libertarian Constitution
A review of Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty by Randy E. Barnett
By Nelson Lund
This review appeared in the Spring 2005 issue of the Claremont Review of Books.
Randy Barnett is one of the legal academy's leading libertarian theorists. His latest book is an exceedingly ambitious effort to show that the United States Constitution, rightly understood, protects individual liberty to a far greater extent than the Supreme Court has ever recognized.
Through a complex series of arguments, Barnett attempts to demonstrate that the Constitution requires courts to adopt what he calls a "Presumption of Liberty," which should lead them to nullify every law abridging any of an open-ended class of natural rights unless the government can demonstrate that the law meets stringent criteria of necessity and propriety.
Restoring the Lost Constitution advances three main theses. First, Barnett presents a theory of legitimacy, arguing that laws are "binding in conscience" only if there is a sufficient reason to believe that they do not unnecessarily, or improperly, violate the natural rights of the governed.
Second, he maintains that the Constitution requires courts to protect these natural rights by invalidating all federal laws that unnecessarily or improperly abridge them.
Finally, he contends that the Constitution also requires the same aggressive judicial approach to state laws that it requires with respect to federal laws.
Because I shall criticize some crucial elements in Barnett's argument, I should emphasize at the outset that this intelligent, thought-provoking book deserves to be read carefully by anyone who believes that the Constitution is a higher form of law than Supreme Court decisions.
As the Declaration of Independence announces, and as other evidence confirms, there was a broad consensus among the founding generation that the principal purpose of human government is to secure certain inherent or natural human rights.
The most obvious reflections of this consensus in the Constitution itself are the limited grant of enumerated powers to Congress, the separation of powers, and the enumeration of several individual rights.
In addition, Barnett believes, the judiciary has been commanded to identify and protect a vast, unenumerated body of natural rights by the 9th Amendment, which provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
Because he thinks this provision establishes a constitutional Presumption of Liberty, Barnett vigorously objects to the Supreme Court's consistent refusal to rely on the 9th Amendment in deciding cases.
The 9th Amendment is a companion to the 10th Amendment, which provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
As the 10th Amendment affirms that the Constitution's enumeration of powers is exhaustive, so the 9th Amendment affirms that its enumeration of rights is not exhaustive. This makes perfect sense because individual rights and government authority are correlative: if a government does not have the authority to issue certain commands to its citizens, they have a right not to be subjected to those commands by that government.
Thus, the 9th and 10th Amendments together serve as an emphatic, and indeed justiciable, reminder that the Constitution protects a vast number of unenumerated rights from infringement by the federal government, namely all those rights that the federal government is not authorized to abridge in the exercise of its enumerated powers. Some of them may be natural rights, some are positive rights established by state law, and some are political rights exercised in the course of establishing state law. The language of the 9th Amendment does not give a privileged status to any one of these categories of rights.
Two principal sources of the vast expansion of federal power have been the Commerce Clause and the so-called Sweeping Clause: "The Congress shall have Power…. To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes," and "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
The Supreme Court has interpreted these provisions to allow Congress to regulate or prohibit virtually any commercial activity, including wholly intrastate activities, and a vast range of non-commercial activities as well. The Court's theory, in a nutshell, is that such activities may "affect" commerce among the several states and that it is therefore necessary and proper for Congress to control them.
Barnett provides a detailed demonstration that this theory is a departure from the original meaning of the Constitution, and he offers a number of thoughtful and generally plausible suggestions about how best to construe and apply the Commerce and Sweeping Clauses. If the Court were to accept something reasonably close to the original meaning of these provisions, the federal government would have a lot less power than it exercises today, and the people would correspondingly have much more freedom from federal interference in their lives.
* * *
The most radical thesis in Barnett's book is that judges are charged by the Constitution with protecting a vast range of unenumerated natural rights from interference by state law.
Barnett also has a different, and somewhat more plausible basis for concluding that the Constitution commands judges to protect natural rights from state interference.
The 14th Amendment provides: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States…." Barnett argues that these privileges and immunities are the very same natural rights that he thinks are also protected by the 9th Amendment, a conclusion that he rests primarily on evidence from the legislative history of the 14th Amendment.
He vigorously attacks the Supreme Court's contrary interpretation, and especially the landmark 1873 Slaughterhouse decision, which held that the only privileges and immunities protected by this clause are those peculiarly attributable to national citizenship, like the right to travel to the national capital.
Even if one accepted Barnett's claim that the 14th Amendment was meant to authorize judges to nullify state laws that abridge certain unenumerated substantive rights, one would still have to ask how judges are supposed to identify these rights.
Barnett's answer is that everybody has a presumptive right to engage in any conduct that does not interfere with the rights of other persons, unless the government can show that a specific regulation is needed to facilitate everyone's exercise of the right.
The privileges and immunities protected by the 14th Amendment, Barnett maintains, can be identified by looking at state common law. This cannot be right.
The common law is a collection of rules adopted by judges in the course of deciding cases that are not covered by a state constitution or statute. These rules vary somewhat from state to state, and they can be altered or abolished in any state by its legislature. Because the 14th Amendment expressly imposes a restriction on state law, the substance of what it protects cannot possibly be determined by state law (unless the Privileges or Immunities Clause is only an anti-discrimination provision rather than a substantive guarantee, an interpretation that Barnett implicitly rejects).
While Barnett notes, accurately enough, that state common-law judges constantly make decisions distinguishing rightful from wrongful conduct, he neglects the significance of the fact that they are always doing so in the shadow of the state legislature's plenary authority (which is frequently exercised) to alter or preempt those decisions by statute. If these common-law decisions were suddenly to become the unalterable determinants of the rights protected by the 14th Amendment, state judges would be elevated to the role of philosopher-kings.
Yet, if the distinction between rightful and wrongful conduct were defined by the common law as altered or preempted by state statutes, the Privileges or Immunities Clause would place no constraints at all on state governments, which would make an absurdity of the 14th Amendment provision.
* * *
Elsewhere, the book takes a different approach to identifying the relevant privileges and immunities. Courts and commentators have long assumed that the Constitution leaves largely intact something called the "police power" of the state governments, which is a general authority to regulate and govern the citizenry. Barnett suggests that 14th Amendment privileges and immunities are those rights not subject to this power.
But what exactly is the police power's scope? It is never mentioned, let alone defined, in the Constitution. Barnett articulates and embraces what he calls a Lockean theory of the police power, but his only authorities for imputing this theory to the Constitution are judicial decisions and academic commentaries. And even those authorities generally give the states much more discretion to abridge people's liberties than Barnett is willing to allow. It is perfectly obvious that the states would be well advised to limit government power and protect important individual rights in their state constitutions.
In fact, all the states have done just that, though not to the extent that Barnett thinks they should. Whatever the merits of his view of the proper scope of government power, and whether or not his is a correct interpretation of Locke, showing that the Constitution enacted his view into law would require far more evidence than Barnett provides.
Restoring the Lost Constitution is an impressive attempt to demonstrate that our written Constitution enacted into law a sweeping and highly libertarian theory of natural rights and limited government.
I have passed more lightly than I would have liked over Barnett's attractively coherent analytical approach, which contrasts with the frequently sloppy Supreme Court opinions that our legal system treats as the authoritative expression of constitutional law. It is sad how much of our fundamental law has gotten lost beneath an obscuring blanket of Supreme Court decisions, and Barnett's effort to recover the lost Constitution is a noble undertaking, even if it is not completely successful.
Give me the second amendment and I'll protect the rest of my rights.
Some crimes don't involve the violation of anyone's rights.
Interesting. Can you explain?
Crimes are prohibited not only because they harm other, but because they're wrong.
You may say the government has no right deciding what's right and wrong, but I say they do.
In fact, that is precisely the government's purpose.
There you go joe, you've explained perfectly why you will never understand our Constitutional system.
Thanks..
You've shown why your anarcho-libertarian amorality will never sway large electorate, because you don't even pretend that your belief system is rooted in morality.
We're done joe. You're getting out of conrol again. Get some rest and call in the morning if you've calmed yourself.
Why do you fear libertarians?
...
I consider myself a small L libertarian because I believe in free markets, limited government and I oppose taxation, regulation and litigation at every opportunity. However I do not support the Libertarian Party because their anti-war stance is not only unrealistic but downright inconsistent if one truly loves liberty. A man who truly loves liberty would be willing to fight for it.
Joe writes:
I will never be under the control of baby-killing faggot commie liberal-tarian junkies.
You may say the government has no right deciding what's right and wrong, but I say they do. In fact, that is precisely the government's purpose.
Borders are already wide open under Jorge Bush.
Under a Libertarian administration, the welfare state would be abolished, which would discourage illegals from coming in the first place.
Great minds see the same ironies.
You mean it wasn't always electing Republicans?
I just love the ad hominem, strawman, red herring, and other sundry fallacy arguments against Libertarians.
To my mind, a republican hasn't been elected since Goldwater was rejected.
No republicans maybe, but lots of Republicans.
Although I'll never vote Democrat, I'd rather see the Dem candidate win over the RINO.
Among all of the penumbras and emanations that creative justices find between the lines there exists a clear pattern in the literal wording of the first ten amendments. They speak to the rights to protection of person and property from government intrusion. I have a right to be secure in my person from government (I, II, V, VI, VIII); I have a right to be secure in my property from government (II, III, IV, VII.) IX and X expressly assume individual liberty.
Libertarian bashing has become an FR art form. Reputations are being made as we watch.
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