Former National Archives Employee Gives Info (Vanity)

Former NARA Employee | July 20, 2004 | Annon

[End Times Sentinel]

The classified reading room is on the 6th floor of the National Archives at College Park complex - the world's largest and most advanced archival facility in the world. The records vaults (each larger than most people's homes) for classified docs are also on that floor, as are the offices for the archivists and technicians who handle them. Employees can go up to that floor, but once there, everything is super-secured. You can't get out of the hall without the proper clearance and magnetic access badge that doubles as your ID badge. At the time, I had a Secret-level clearance, and that wasn't good enough to get into the vaults or reading room without being escorted by a Top Secret-level employee.

The reading room is considered a SCIF - Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility. They are a pain to work in due to all of the handling and security requirements.

The room has few visual obstructions, and there should be anywhere from 1-3 employees in there at any given time, depending on the number of researchers (who are all cleared at various levels). Standard National Archives handling procedures apply: one box open at a time; only one folder out at a time; no pens, only pencils that are supplied; no paper brought in, but note paper is supplied; no auto-feed scanners or copying, only flat-bed machines are available, plus all documents to be reproduced are examined first by NARA employees. I suspect that due to his stature, Berger wasn't watched as closely as others would be - I mean, who would expect a former Nat. sec. advisor to be stuffing things in his socks. He may have had a private reading room within the main one, as a courtesy due to his position. But, even so, the room has large glass walls and is still visible to the staff and others (its mainly for noise reduction).

There are also security cameras that aren't monitored regularly, but can be reviewed after the fact for gathering evidence. In the main non-classified research room they are monitored sometimes when the room is full to the point where the staff can't watch everything going on.

And like everything else in the federal govt., NARA is never fully staffed due to budget constraints, and as a friend of mine there says, when you pay peanuts you get monkeys (he's a German history and WWII freak specializing in Captured German Records, so he's not going anywhere else). Picture the crew from most any city govt office in Philly in charge of the Archives. The Archivists are dedicated professionals, and some of the lower-ranked staff is as well, but you also have a large contingency that view their job as little more than an extension of the welfare system.

When leaving the reading rooms, any papers carried out are searched by guards to make sure there are no documents mixed in, and in the classified room, to make sure no notes containing classified info are being taken. There are no bags, purses, hats, etc. allowed (anything that can be used to hide docs) - they are all kept in lockers elsewhere in the building.

So, the fact that Berger had a leather portfolio with him was a courtesy not afforded everyone, but it should have been checked thoroughly by an employee or guard when he left. But, if the reports of him stuffing them in his pants, socks, etc. are true, then this is deliberate theft and not inadvertently taking one home in a portfolio.

The Archives staff had already approached him about missing documents, and he returned some they didn't even know he had, so they started marking the ones they gave him. He had to know they were on to him, but he kept stealing them! Either that is sheer stupidity or desperation. I've heard him speak in interviews, etc., and he's not THAT dumb. I think he was really trying to cover up things that were seriously embarrassing and compromising to his reputation and the Clinton administration.

[End Times Sentinel]

I recieved this from a friend this morning and thought it would be interesting.  The friend will be asking current employees for more info, but the employees are always the last to know.

Owl_Eagle

”Guns Before Butter.”

[proud American in Canada]

Wow, this is interesting stuff. Thanks for posting it.

[E. Pluribus Unum]

But, if the reports of him stuffing them in his pants, socks, etc. are true, then this is deliberate theft and not inadvertently taking one home in a portfolio.

More right-wing smears.

I stuff important documents in my socks all the time.

Doesn't everybody?

</sarcasm>

[martin_fierro]

I have a cookie recipe to share....

just kidding.

BUMP.

[rabidralph]

There are no bags, purses, hats, etc. allowed (anything that can be used to hide docs) - they are all kept in lockers elsewhere in the building.

New Archives policy: Nude Reading Rooms.

[js1138]

The Archives staff had already approached him about missing documents, and he returned some they didn't even know he had, so they started marking the ones they gave him. He had to know they were on to him, but he kept stealing them! Either that is sheer stupidity or desperation.

That is the most amazing thing I've read about this case. I guess all those facts are out there, but not the timeline.

[kellynla]

Well then whoever was working that day should be F I R E D !
Because not only was Fat-Burglar allowed to take his briefcase into the reading room but he was allowed to carry out documents and notes!!!! Helloooooooo???

[randita]

Thanks for the info. Answered a lot of questions I had.

Would your friend have any insight as to why Archives clerks notified Bruce Lindsay that the documents were missing?

Also, would your friend have any insight to how the documents were marked? I'd assume they weren't marked with anything obvious--perhaps with some official looking numbered code or invisible ink, I'd think.

[Badeye]

I've been suggesting since this story broke that the CCTV system is comprehensive, and there must be a video of Berger's actions available to investigators.

I suspect thats how its known he stuffed papers down his pants, and in his socks, among other places.

When the tapes are released, thats going to be "must see tv" for us political junkies.

[kellynla]

BTW we are getting conflicting reports as to whether or not there was actual video evidence of Fat-Burglar stuffing notes and/or documents in his clothing...

[browardchad]

There are also security cameras that aren't monitored regularly, but can be reviewed after the fact for gathering evidence. In the main non-classified research room they are monitored sometimes when the room is full to the point where the staff can't watch everything going on.

Interesting.

Byron York, in an NRO column today, reported "There was no surveillance camera in the room in which Berger worked with the documents, meaning there is no videotape record of the incidents."

[trebb]

I've spent 30 years around classified info and can vouch that there are all of the protections mentioned in the article. However, it is also true that personal recognizance and position can make people a little lax, which is why they call background checking and issuance of clearances the Personnel Reliability Program - once a person has been vetted, there is an implied personal trust which, being imperfect, makes it possible for the traitors to do their dirty work.

I can also vouch that anyone with access to that kind of information has been indoctrinated enough that they cannot claim to have accidentally walked off with it or to have inadvertently disposed of it - to be that kind of moron would automatically disqualify you from the access.

[celtic gal]

When I was a custodian for classified materials during my active duty days, when classified material came back from my local holders each and every item was PAGE CHECKED before I accepted it back and if anything was missing I started investigations proceedings and the whole local holder safe would be inventoried.

One time I went into and office and found a classified document on an unattended desk. I took it and secured it in my vault. When inventory time came the local holder nearly stroked out and yes I put this on report to my superiors when it happened and they knew I was going to spring an inventory on that dept.

I don't for a second buy this cr*# about an innocent honest mistake...someone should go to Leavenworth...

[TomGuy]

'Inadvertantly' sticking a paper down one's pants or in one's socks might....[stretching]....might be conceivably an accident once. But not twice, thrice, etc. Berger apparently made upwards of 5 (and one report said 6) such trips with classified documents 'inadvertantly' stuck to his butt down his pants.

No. Five or six times aren't accidents. They are deliberate. As Rush says, he was on a mission.

Berger was cleaning up a Bill Clinton situation for legacy purposes and to remove potential problems for Hillary's run.

Now, how closely Berger, who committed these thefts in Oct/Nov last year, worked with Kerry and provided Kerry with information from the classified documents would be another whole story.

[tang-soo]

I've posted this top a few other threads. Please ignore if you've seen it before ...

I called our local Clear Channel station the night after this story broke and spoke for about 10 minutes describing the procedures used to handle classified information. The following is a basic description of what I said ...

1) A person who wishes to review classified information at a given facility must have his/her clearance on file with the security office that has legal custody of the information.

2) Once they arrive to the facility, they must show their credentials to identify themselves, sign into the facility - maybe issued a badge indicating their clearance and access and escorted to the room where the material will be reviewed.

3) Once in the room, the container (probably a safe i.e. a very heavy duty file cabinet with heavy combination locks with different combinations on each drawer) is opened. This process should be logged by security personnel.

4) The documents are taken from the container. All classified documents are stamped (each page) with items such as a control number, date of creation, level of clearance (top and bottom), program name indicating what access is required and eventual dispensation (i.e. when the material is designated to destruction if applicable).

5) If the documents are classified "top secret", each document has a log on the cover sheet. EACH time a person has access to this information, they must sign and date it.

6) The material is not to be removed (ie stuffed in underwear, socks ... etc) without approval of security personnel. If this takes place, the transfer is documented on both ends of the transaction. If the material is top secret or above, it requires at least two cleared people as an escort.

7) If you travel overnight, the material is not to be kept in your hotel/motel room but instead must be taken to an approved facility. Arrangements are usually made in advance. Security people do not like suprise visits. They like to make them but not receive them.

8) No photocopies are to be made or notes copied without the proper security personnel logging this activity and making appropriate markings (mentioned above) on the documents.

9) This material is frequently audited by internal security agents and is subject to "suprise" audits conducted by military, FBI or other external security personnel.

10) People given access to this type of information are briefed and attend classes on how to handle this material - ie. no excuses for "honest mistakes".

11) As the NSA for the clinton administration, I imagine Berger was personally responsible that this protocol was designed, implemented and enforced by his staff - at least in an appropriately managed administration. This would apply to government employees, officials, military personnel and civilians under contract and extended clearances issued by the DoD, DoE or other intel operations.

12) As such, ANYBODY who has worked in this environment and heard Mr. Berger's comments yesterday about being "sloppy" and "an honest mistake" knows beyond any doubt that he was not only lying, but this was a premeditated act.

13) I left the aerospace business(as an engineer) in 1993 so these comments are based upon the security world of that time. Only Lord knows how the clinton adm changed things during his 8 years.

That summarizes what I mentioned to Steve Cannon of WTVN 610 AM (Columbus, Oh) last night.

The latest word I have heard from this morning is that this material was classified "Code Word Access". Folks, if true, this is "Above Top Secret" ie. John Pollard type material.

So the question comes to mind, why would anybody do such a thing under conditions where he knew he stood a huge chance of being caught? The mission must have been extraordinary for such a risk. The presumption is that he wanted to alter or remove and destroy material that implicated either himself, or quite possibly mr. clinton. The fact that some of the material is "lost" implies that regardless of the consequences, the mission has been accomplished with his current situation collateral damage.

Webb Hubbell's infamous quote "I guess I'll have to roll over again for Hillary" comes to mind. Another example of the clinton whirlwind leaving a trail of destruction in its wake.

[js1138]

Sometimes the boss, or former boss, will not be watched as carefully.

That is obviously why he was given the job.

[Sapper26]

I stuff important documents in my socks all the time.


Does stuffing socks in your pants count? Not me...a friend...really.

[Robert357]

'Inadvertantly' sticking a paper down one's pants or in one's socks might....[stretching]....might be conceivably an accident once. But not twice, thrice, etc. Berger apparently made upwards of 5 (and one report said 6) such trips with classified documents 'inadvertantly' stuck to his butt down his pants.

This is a soul mate of Bill Clinton.

Can't you imagine Sandy going to the national archives and stuffing classified material down his pants, and then going out with a female spy from some other country and asking her to search him? That would be the Bill Clinton kind of thing to do, now wouldn't it?

In such a situation, Sandy wasn't likely tbinking about taking national sucurity documents his "mind" was focus on his "date." I am sure that Bill Clinton would have not problem "parsing" such a situation into "the taking of the national security documents was inadvertant." After all if "is" doesn't mean is and "sex" doesn't mean sex, how can be expect "inadvertant" to mean what he did was not on purpose.

I am sure this is a private matter and should not be subject to public discussion............(/sarcasm!)

[Swanks]

Some interesting stuff: John Loftus on Bachelor last nite noted the documents Bergler was taking were in ref. to foreign policy under Clintoon and specifically the Balkins.

Seems Clintoon had a clandestine policy to USE Al-Quada to balance the strength between the Serbs and the Albanians.

IOW; Clintoon worked WITH Al-Quada in 1997-1999 timeframe. Hardly something the Pervert-in-Chief would want raising to the surface in a 9-11 commission report. Nor Sandy Bergler; as architect of foreign policy.

And this from a Dem named John Loftus. (Don't shoot me; I'm the messenger)

[Republican Red]

Thanks for the post.

The most interesting line:

There are also security cameras that aren't monitored regularly, but can be reviewed after the fact for gathering evidence

Show me the video!