Posted on 05/02/2004 12:29:08 AM PDT by ScaniaBoy
"UK diplomats launch mass attack on Blair policy" was the title covering the letter published by 52 former British ambassadors criticising the Prime Minister's policy in Iraq and alleged subservience to the United States. Other jubilant headlines proclaimed this as the "Revolt of the Establishment". The fact that the letter was not signed by a couple of hundred other former ambassadors, including this one, was thought scarcely worthy of mention.
This was because most of us have an allergy to acting as if we were members of a trade union. For that and other reasons, we have never been tempted to sign a round robin letter on Iraq, or any other subject. Many of the signatories were former Arabists in the Foreign Office, affectionately known as the Camel Corps. Some members of the Corps have shown a tendency over the years to develop a quite passionate attachment to the Arab world that, unfortunately, has not always been reciprocated by the Arabs. They have tended to concentrate on the crimes of the Israelis, rather than those of the Palestinians. Most of us would prefer to be more even-handed.
The other strong lobby within the Foreign Office which has become increasingly detached from public opinion is that of the Euro-enthusiasts. My own attendance at numerous European Councils did not trigger in me a deep urge to transfer more sovereignty to Brussels but, I suppose, chacun à son goût. The thought that the British public should be invited to opine on plans for a European constitution has come as a severe shock to some members of this school, who regard Europe as far too serious a matter to be left to the British people.
This sort of debate has always been conducted quite vigorously within the walls of the Office. In the days when we were trying to help Margaret Thatcher secure a permanent correction to the British budgetary contribution to the EU, I used to encourage my colleagues to try rather harder to see our point of view, rather than interpreting for me that of every other member state. There were and are plenty of them, I am glad to say, who were well capable of doing that and of achieving results that are in our national interests.
Most countries harbour a sometimes well-founded suspicion of their foreign ministries, which want to get along rather too well with foreigners. Not long after Pearl Harbour, President Roosevelt declared:
"The best that can be expected of the State Department in this war is an attitude of strict neutrality."
So, what of the charge of subservience to the Americans? The Anglo-American relationship has been characterised for the past five decades by fierce arguments, many of them about the Middle East. The difference with the French is that we prefer to conduct these privately, as we think we are then more likely to have a chance of influencing US policy. It was in this way that we succeeded in bridging our differences over Bosnia and concerting action against the Serbs - an action which, in the absence of any UN resolution specifically authorising it, was also declared illegal by some at the time. While many in London question whether the Prime Minister has been successful in influencing US policy, the near unanimous view in Washington is that he has been.
Which brings me to the subject of Iraq. It is, to put it politely, not as if no mistakes were made. Nevertheless, many of us believe that it was right to get rid of Saddam Hussein and that it would have been very damaging to our long-term interests for the British government to have permitted an unbridgeable transatlantic divide to have opened up on this subject. Our traditional role and interest has been to help bind together Europe and the United States, which cannot be done by gesticulating from the sidelines.
One of the greatest of the mistakes to have been made in Iraq was the extraordinary US-led decision to disband rather than reform the Iraqi police and army, thereby creating a security vacuum that has never been properly filled since. This was a victory for the so-called neo-conservative ideologues in Washington, led by the political appointees in the Pentagon. We and the Iraqis have been paying a heavy price for this absurdity. The Prime Minister's influence has been directed to bolstering those in Washington who take a more pragmatic view and who believe that the war on terrorism cannot be won without a sustained effort also to work towards an eventual resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. Ariel Sharon, in many people's eyes, including mine, has contributed nothing to that goal, but nor has Yasser Arafat, who continues to connive at terrorism and who turned down the chance of peace in the negotiations led by President Clinton at the Wye Plantation, because he feared for his own safety if he reached any agreement with Israel.
As to where we are now in Iraq, last week's letter from the ambassadors offers a passionate critique but no solutions. As Senator Kerry has been pointing out, we cannot cut and run. We have to go on improving the delivery of power and water. We have to organise as orderly a transfer as we can, with UN involvement, to as representative an Iraqi government as can be established. And, meanwhile, the coalition has to go on dealing with terrorist threats to this entire process. There is nothing dishonourable in what the British Government and its soldiers are trying to achieve in Iraq. Armchair critics would do well to pay more tribute to their efforts.
The Government does need to think, however, harder and more clearly than it has shown any sign of doing to date, about an orderly exit strategy. There are still those in the Pentagon - not the US military, who typically are more sensible than their political masters - who continue to dream of a long-term presence in Iraq. They need to be told that we have no intention of staying there beyond next year. By then we will have succeeded in helping to establish a new Iraqi government. It is hard to see what reason we could have for staying after that. The role of our military then should be restricted to training the Iraqi security forces. They should not be patrolling the streets of Basra.
• Lord Renwick was British Ambassador to the United States from 1991 to 1995
Don't take that statement at face value before you've read this thread, which gives a completely different view on this. Looks like the former ambassador is trying to defend his chums in Foggy Bottom.
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1127955/posts
(Rumsfeld's war, Powells's occupation)
On the other hand much of the back-ground info in this article supports the general drift of the linked thread.
None of this happened, however, because State and CIA fought against Rumsfeld's plans every step of the way.
If I understand you correctly the resistance against Rumsfeld's plans came from DOD not State. Would not Rumsfeld have been able to overturn any objections within his own department?
Or is the truth that there has been a fight over the correct policy to follow vis-a-vis the occupation of Iraq within the whole adminstration, and that State Dept has supported the "neo-cons" within DOD?
ScaniaBoy
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