Two Articles You Didn't See In The Current Press. Too Bad, For The U.N.

The Iraq Foundation ^ | 4/14/95 & 10/07/02 | Tish Durkin & The United Nations

[JusticeTalion]

United Nations

S/RES/986 (1995) 14 April 1995

Resolution 986 (1995) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3519th meeting, on 14 April 1995

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions,

Concerned by the serious nutritional and health situation of the Iraqi population, and by the risk of a further deterioration in this situation,

Convinced of the need as a temporary measure to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people until the fulfilment by Iraq of the relevant Security Council resolutions, including notably resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, allows the Council to take further action with regard to the prohibitions referred to in resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, in accordance with the provisions of those resolutions,

Convinced also of the need for equitable distribution of humanitarian relief to all segments of the Iraqi population throughout the country,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Authorizes States, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 3 (a), 3 (b) and 4 of resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions, to permit the import of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq, including financial and other essential transactions directly relating thereto, sufficient to produce a sum not exceeding a total of one billion United States dollars every 90 days for the purposes set out in this resolution and subject to the following conditions:

(a) Approval by the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), in order to ensure the transparency of each transaction and its conformity with the other provisions of this resolution, after submission of an application by the State concerned, endorsed by the Government of Iraq, for each proposed purchase of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products, including details of the purchase price at fair market value, the export route, the opening of a letter of credit payable to the escrow account to be established by the Secretary-General for the purposes of this resolution, and of any other directly related financial or other essential transaction;

(b) Payment of the full amount of each purchase of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products directly by the purchaser in the State concerned into the escrow account to be established by the Secretary-General for the purposes of this resolution;

2. Authorizes Turkey, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 3 (a), 3 (b) and 4 of resolution 661 (1990) and the provisions of paragraph 1 above, to permit the import of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq sufficient, after the deduction of the percentage referred to in paragraph 8 (c) below for the Compensation Fund, to meet the pipeline tariff charges, verified as reasonable by the independent inspection agents referred to in paragraph 6 below, for the transport of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products through the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline in Turkey authorized by paragraph 1 above;

3. Decides that paragraphs 1 and 2 of this resolution shall come into force at 00.01 Eastern Standard Time on the day after the President of the Council has informed the members of the Council that he has received the report from the Secretary-General requested in paragraph 13 below, and shall remain in force for an initial period of 180 days unless the Council takes other relevant action with regard to the provisions of resolution 661 (1990);

4. Further decides to conduct a thorough review of all aspects of the implementation of this resolution 90 days after the entry into force of paragraph 1 above and again prior to the end of the initial 180 day period, on receipt of the reports referred to in paragraphs 11 and 12 below, and expresses its intention, prior to the end of the 180 day period, to consider favourably renewal of the provisions of this resolution, provided that the reports referred to in paragraphs 11 and 12 below indicate that those provisions are being satisfactorily implemented;

5. Further decides that the remaining paragraphs of this resolution shall come into force forthwith;

6. Directs the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to monitor the sale of petroleum and petroleum products to be exported by Iraq via the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline from Iraq to Turkey and from the Mina al-Bakr oil terminal, with the assistance of independent inspection agents appointed by the Secretary-General, who will keep the Committee informed of the amount of petroleum and petroleum products exported from Iraq after the date of entry into force of paragraph 1 of this resolution, and will verify that the purchase price of the petroleum and petroleum products is reasonable in the light of prevailing market conditions, and that, for the purposes of the arrangements set out in this resolution, the larger share of the petroleum and petroleum products is shipped via the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline and the remainder is exported from the Mina al-Bakr oil terminal;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to establish an escrow account for the purposes of this resolution, to appoint independent and certified public accountants to audit it, and to keep the Government of Iraq fully informed;

8. Decides that the funds in the escrow account shall be used to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi population and for the following other purposes, and requests the Secretary-General to use the funds deposited in the escrow account:

(a) To finance the export to Iraq, in accordance with the procedures of the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), of medicine, health supplies, foodstuffs, and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs, as referred to in paragraph 20 of resolution 687 (1991) provided that:

(i) Each export of goods is at the request of the Government of Iraq;

(ii) Iraq effectively guarantees their equitable distribution, on the basis of a plan submitted to and approved by the Secretary-General, including a description of the goods to be purchased;

(iii) The Secretary-General receives authenticated confirmation that the exported goods concerned have arrived in Iraq;

(b) To complement, in view of the exceptional circumstances prevailing in the three Governorates mentioned below, the distribution by the Government of Iraq of goods imported under this resolution, in order to ensure an equitable distribution of humanitarian relief to all segments of the Iraqi population throughout the country, by providing between 130 million and 150 million United States dollars every 90 days to the United Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian Programme operating within the sovereign territory of Iraq in the three northern Governorates of Dihouk, Arbil and Suleimaniyeh, except that if less than one billion United States dollars worth of petroleum or petroleum products is sold during any 90 day period, the Secretary-General may provide a proportionately smaller amount for this purpose;

(c) To transfer to the Compensation Fund the same percentage of the funds deposited in the escrow account as that decided by the Council in paragraph 2 of resolution 705 (1991) of 15 August 1991;

(d) To meet the costs to the United Nations of the independent inspection agents and the certified public accountants and the activities associated with implementation of this resolution;

(e) To meet the current operating costs of the Special Commission, pending subsequent payment in full of the costs of carrying out the tasks authorized by section C of resolution 687 (1991);

(f) To meet any reasonable expenses, other than expenses payable in Iraq, which are determined by the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to be directly related to the export by Iraq of petroleum and petroleum products permitted under paragraph 1 above or to the export to Iraq, and activities directly necessary therefor, of the parts and equipment permitted under paragraph 9 below;

(g) To make available up to 10 million United States dollars every 90 days from the funds deposited in the escrow account for the payments envisaged under paragraph 6 of resolution 778 (1992) of 2 October 1992;

9. Authorizes States to permit, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 661 (1990):

(a) The export to Iraq of the parts and equipment which are essential for the safe operation of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline system in Iraq, subject to the prior approval by the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) of each export contract;

(b) Activities directly necessary for the exports authorized under subparagraph (a) above, including financial transactions related thereto;

10. Decides that, since the costs of the exports and activities authorized under paragraph 9 above are precluded by paragraph 4 of resolution 661 (1990) and by paragraph 11 of resolution 778 (1991) from being met from funds frozen in accordance with those provisions, the cost of such exports and activities may, until funds begin to be paid into the escrow account established for the purposes of this resolution, and following approval in each case by the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), exceptionally be financed by letters of credit, drawn against future oil sales the proceeds of which are to be deposited in the escrow account;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council 90 days after the date of entry into force of paragraph 1 above, and again prior to the end of the initial 180 day period, on the basis of observation by United Nations personnel in Iraq, and on the basis of consultations with the Government of Iraq, on whether Iraq has ensured the equitable distribution of medicine, health supplies, foodstuffs, and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs, financed in accordance with paragraph 8 (a) above, including in his reports any observations he may have on the adequacy of the revenues to meet Iraq's humanitarian needs, and on Iraq's capacity to export sufficient quantities of petroleum and petroleum products to produce the sum referred to in paragraph 1 above;

12. Requests the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), in close coordination with the Secretary-General, to develop expedited procedures as necessary to implement the arrangements in paragraphs 1, 2, 6, 8, 9 and 10 of this resolution and to report to the Council 90 days after the date of entry into force of paragraph 1 above and again prior to the end of the initial 180 day period on the implementation of those arrangements;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to take the actions necessary to ensure the effective implementation of this resolution, authorizes him to enter into any necessary arrangements or agreements, and requests him to report to the Council when he has done so;

14. Decides that petroleum and petroleum products subject to this resolution shall while under Iraqi title be immune from legal proceedings and not be subject to any form of attachment, garnishment or execution, and that all States shall take any steps that may be necessary under their respective domestic legal systems to assure this protection, and to ensure that the proceeds of the sale are not diverted from the purposes laid down in this resolution;

15. Affirms that the escrow account established for the purposes of this resolution enjoys the privileges and immunities of the United Nations;

16. Affirms that all persons appointed by the Secretary-General for the purpose of implementing this resolution enjoy privileges and immunities as experts on mission for the United Nations in accordance with the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, and requires the Government of Iraq to allow them full freedom of movement and all necessary facilities for the discharge of their duties in the implementation of this resolution;

17. Affirms that nothing in this resolution affects Iraq's duty scrupulously to adhere to all of its obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt, in accordance with the appropriate international mechanisms;

18. Also affirms that nothing in this resolution should be construed as infringing the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Iraq;

19. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

__________________________________________

U.N. Oil-for-Food Program Is A Windfall For Saddam (October 7, 2002)

By Tish Durkin National Journal

One madman, 10 UN agencies, 15 security council members, more than 50 billion smackers, and not one audit. In his speech before the United Nations on September 12, President Bush stressed the need for Saddam Hussein to comply with U.N. resolutions designed as deterrents to weapons of mass destruction. The president spoke little, and the media have since spoken less, about U.N. resolutions designed as instruments of mass nutrition. These resolutions created what has come to be known as the oil-for-food program, also known as the largest, richest humanitarian program in history, and they are anything but beside the point of the war-or-peace calculations that are going on right now.

Mother's-milky though it sounds, the oil-for-food program has enough graft, mismanagement, and Saddam-strengthening patronage to turn one permanently against both oil and food. A real critique could occupy volumes -- and does, in fact, occupy much of an exhaustive analysis, titled Sources of Revenue for Saddam and Sons , recently issued by the Washington-based Coalition for International Justice, a group that monitors human-rights abuses around the world.

Strictly in terms of the gauntlet Bush has just thrown down, however, the program deserves scrutiny on at least two levels. First, it illumines the ways in which, quite apart from any weapons development, Saddam has enhanced his stature in the Persian Gulf region and beyond, and thus it explains some of the hesitation on the part of powers, Arab and not, to jump at the chance to oust him. Admittedly, that is pretty old, if persistently underplayed, news. Also old, but even less remarked, is the second part. Given the Siberia-sized gap between what the program is supposed to do and what it actually does, it raises a real question that had better be asked, whether or not there is a war, and whether, when, or under what terms the sanctions are lifted, or aren't. That question is, Where has all the money gone? Or, more oddly, why is there so much money still around?

Make no mistake, we're talking about a lot of money. The oil-for-food program was created in 1995, and first implemented in 1997, as a temporary framework through which Iraq could sell oil in exchange for imports that international experts determined to be incompatible with military use. It has been renewed every six months since, with the ceiling on the permissible level of oil exports rising and the scope of permissible purchases broadening all the time.

Since late 1999, there has been no limit on oil exports. Over nearly six years, more than $50 billion has flowed into the relevant U.N. accounts. There is a formula for how it should flow out into delineated sectors in Iraq, such as education, health, electricity, and agriculture. Fifty-nine percent of the revenue goes to humanitarian goods for south and central Iraq, and is administered directly by the regime in Baghdad. Thirteen percent goes to the three governates of the ostensibly autonomous no-fly zone in the north, known as Iraqi Kurdistan. A little over 2 percent goes to covering the administrative overhead for the 10 U.N. agencies involved. Most of the remainder goes to Kuwait as compensation for the Persian Gulf War. Plug in the numbers, and the riches become embarrassing: There is upwards of $1 billion just to cover the agencies' overhead over these six years. Less than 40 percent of the money designated for Iraqi Kurdistan has been used, and therefore some $4 billion is gathering interest -- and, presumably, dust -- at the Banque Nationale de Paris in New York City while thousands of families are suffering needlessly.

To a vast extent, of course, they are suffering because of Saddam. As the Coalition for International Justice report spells out, Saddam uses the U.N. framework's legal provisions to punish his enemies and reward his friends, and brazenly skirts its legal provisions to those same ends -- all the while successfully decrying the sanctions as the root of his people's misery. From the outset, he has rewarded with lucrative contracts those governments, such as Russia, China, and France, that are willing to carry water for him on the Security Council. In recent years, he has redirected the gravy train to places such as Egypt and Syria, the better to bolster his status as the Arab avenger.

Meanwhile, back in Iraq, the program legally accords Saddam plenty of discretion, and he makes the most of it. Baghdad signs off on food and medications for the entire country, including the Kurdish north. Unsurprisingly, then, much-needed humanitarian supplies -- machines for kidney dialysis, for instance; painkillers for rampant cancer -- are not to be found in those governates. Moreover, Saddam is allowed to import wheat from places such as Australia instead of buying it domestically, and thus is allowed to avoid enriching the Kurdish growers. Of course, during the 1980s, he imported wheat from the United States, but let's not go there. Suffice it to note the variety and agility of economic methods to Saddam's madness.

While Saddam's record on adhering to the sanctions has clearly been odious, the American record on enforcing the sanctions has been consistently inconsistent. Especially after, but even before, September 11 underscored the need for cooperation on various fronts, the United States has proved to be more eager to secure cooperation from countries such as Turkey, Jordan, and Syria than to rein in those countries' sanction-flouting practices.

So much for the powers-that-be. Also at serious fault is the power that oversees: the U.N. itself. It is revealing to consider what Saddam doesn't control -- namely, requisitions for the north that do not involve food and medicine. These areas fall to the management of the U.N. agencies, and they fall hard.

The point here is not that the U.N. is useless. Clearly, the U.N. has many good people doing many good things in Iraq. There is no denying that under this program, millions of Iraqis have been fed, thousands of homes have been built, and so on. The point here is not even that the U.N. is, in some ways, complicit; that its presence can, in practice, serve to shore up the regime, which is well-known to trample established humanitarian policies without hearing "Boo" from the supposed stewards of those policies. In fairness, one could argue that the end of helping Iraqis justifies the means of a certain amount of dictator-palliating. (I would not be the one who could argue that, but it's not the easiest call.) Rather, the point here is that the U.N. is opaque. It neither offers nor demands accountability of any kind. Then again, given the setup, it almost can't.

Let me see if I have this straight: The oil-for-food program involves nine implementing entities that are called United Nations agencies, but they are each autonomous and do not report to the secretary-general. The New York City-based Office of the Iraq Program does report to the secretary-general, but those nine agencies do not report to the Office of the Iraq Program; they report to their respective headquarters, in Geneva, or Rome, or Nairobi. A 10th agency, the U.N. Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, reports to the Office of the Iraq Program, but is not empowered to do all that much coordinating. The OIP is empowered with regard to the agencies' funding, but not with regard to their performance. Thus, the agencies' ability to get funding is in no way tied to their ability to state and meet measurable goals.

Through regular but vague accounting practices, the members of the Security Council are kept apprised of how much money has been earned through the program, and how much has been allocated to each sector. But they do not know how much has been spent, or on what. Incredibly, the oil-for-food program has never been audited. Yes: one madman, 10 agencies, 15 independently self-interested Security Council members, more than 50 billion smackers, zero audits.

At this point, granted, all of this may seem pointless. As talk of war gains momentum, it feels natural for talk of humanitarian-sanctions enforcement to lose momentum. It seems logical to assume that once the dictator is gone, little about the sanctions he incurred will matter. This is a mistake.

Imagine the best-case scenario that can be entertained in the event of a war. Imagine that the U.S.-led forces win easily. Imagine that Saddam is pushed right down the laundry chute of history, and replaced with a reasonably steady leadership structure. Even imagining all that, the near-term running of Iraq is going to entail the dispersal of a lot of resources among a lot of interest groups that won't have a lot of faith in that newborn leadership. In that context, it will be natural to call upon the international community to stabilize the new regime by ensuring, temporarily of course, that Iraq's resources are fairly distributed to Iraq's people. In other words, even after the oil-for-food program, there may well have to be some kind of oil-for-food program.

That doesn't have to be a bad thing.

Saddam or no Saddam, this program could work much better than it does. Saddam or no Saddam, it is in the interest of the United States and the world to figure out exactly why it doesn't. We are already insisting on finding the weapons. Why not ask to see the books?

Tish Durkin is is a columnist for National Journal magazine, where "The Scene" appears.

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I know these are both "old" news but they seem relevent enough to post tonight. God Bless America and all her citizens.

Justice Talion

[King Prout]

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