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Very much so. I remember taking a highly analytical, and for the most part, very well taught course in Atmospheric Chemistry that explained the various air pollution problems down to the proverbial gnat's a--. We did, however, have one part of the course that was very badly taught.

This was when our instructor became an armchair economist and gave us the theory that market-driven pollution controls could never work because dirty corporations would just buy permits and never clean up. This assumes two fallacious constructs.

1) The dirty equipment either
a) never goes out of service or if it does, the replacements available never improve, or
b)that the polluter company is making so much money off polluting, they can keep urinating money on permits and never face a monetary crunch.

Environmentalists often labor under the illusion that companies are paid to produce pollution rather than manufacture useful products for their customer base.

2) That companies that wipe out their competition will see no reason to keep under limits and stockpile a few permits each year, just in case they accidentally set The Cayahoga River on fire or cause the next Three Mile Island. The insurance motivation could give firms reason to optimize credits as a hedge against the legal punishments that could accompany an unforeseen disaster.
This was several years after the acid rain reductions Easterbrook writes about in the article.