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To: MileHi
-- I thought Guccifer 2.0 was the DNC --

Nope. It is a name that popped up and claimed credit for hacking the DNC. Pretty well debunked, but facts don't matter when drafting the narrative.

407 posted on 03/23/2018 7:14:17 AM PDT by Cboldt
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To: Cboldt
It is a name that popped up and claimed credit for hacking the DNC

I recall that and reading stories that left me thinking it was a DNC misinformation job to gin up the Russian hacking narrative.

415 posted on 03/23/2018 7:22:31 AM PDT by MileHi (Liberalism is an ideology of parasites, hypocrites, grievance mongers, victims, and control freaks.)
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To: Cboldt
No official press release up for today's announcement but these from Tuesday are interesting:

Iranian Citizen Sentenced for Conspiring to Facilitate the Illegal Export of Technology to Iran (3/20/18)

"“Jalali and his co-conspirators illegally sent sensitive military-use technology to Iran, where it could fall into the hands of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, in clear violation of U.S. law,” said Assistant Attorney General Demers. “This is a threat to the national security of the United States and our allies, and we will aggressively prosecute those who brazenly violate our export control laws.”

“This multi-year investigation highlights the importance of preventing U.S.-origin technology from being transferred to unauthorized end users. Fana Moj has designed components for the Iranian military's missile systems,” said Acting Special Agent in Charge Bone. “We must prevent U.S. technology from falling into the wrong hands, where it could be used against our military members.”

“A top priority of OEE is identifying and disrupting the illicit export of controlled technology to Iran,” said Special Agent in Charge Clutch. “OEE will continue to collaborate with its law enforcement partners to combat these criminal schemes that threaten U.S. national security.”

“U.S. export controls are in place to keep sensitive technology from falling into the hands of our nation's enemies,” said Special Agent in Charge Cormier. “One of HSI's highest priorities is to prevent illicit procurement networks, terrorist groups, and hostile nations from illegally obtaining military items and controlled dual-use technology.”

According to the defendant’s guilty plea, from 2009 through December 2015, Jalali was a part-time employee of Green Wave Telecommunication, Sdn Bhn, (Green Wave) a Malaysian company located in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Since its incorporation in 2009, Green Wave operated as a front company for Fanavar Moj Khavar (Fana Moj), an Iran-based company that specializes in both broadcast communications and microwave communications.

As part of the conspiracy, Green Wave was used to acquire unlawfully sensitive export-controlled technology from the United States on behalf of Fana Moj. In order to accomplish these acquisitions, Jalali and his co-conspirators concealed the ultimate unlawful destination and end users of the exported technology through false statements, unlawful financial transactions, and other means.

As part of the conspiracy, the defendant’s co-conspirators would contact producers and distributors of the sought-after technology, solicit purchase agreements, and negotiate the purchase and delivery of the goods with the seller. When the goods were received by Green Wave in Malaysia, Jalali repackaged and unlawfully exported the items from Malaysia to Fana Moj in Tehran, Iran. In 2017, Fana Moj was designated by the United States Department of the Treasury as a Specially Designated National for providing financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the IRGC."

Iranian National Arrested for Scheme to Evade U.S. Economic Sanctions by Illicitly Sending More Than $115 Million From Venezuela Through the U.S. Financial System (3/20/18):

An indictment was unsealed today charging Ali Sadr Hashemi Nejad (Sadr) for his alleged involvement in a scheme to evade U.S. economic sanctions against Iran, to defraud the U.S., and to commit money laundering and bank fraud. Sadr was charged with participating in a scheme in which more than $115 million in payments for a Venezuelan housing complex were illegally funneled through the U.S. financial system for the benefit of Iranian individuals and entities.

Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers, U.S. Attorney Geoffrey S. Berman for the Southern District of New York, New York County District Attorney Cyrus Vance Jr., and Assistant Director in Charge William F. Sweeney Jr. of the FBI’s New York Field Office made the announcement.

Sadr was arrested yesterday on a six-count Indictment (the Indictment) and presented this afternoon in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Sadr’s case has been assigned to U.S. District Judge Andrew L. Carter Jr. in the Southern District of New York.

According to the Indictment unsealed today:

Beginning in 1979, the President, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (the IEEPA), has repeatedly found that the actions and policies of the government of Iran constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States and declared a national emergency to deal with the threat. In accordance with these presidential declarations, the United States has instituted a host of economic sanctions against Iran and Iranian entities. This sanctions regime prohibits, among other things, financial transactions involving the United States or U.S. persons that were intended for the benefit of the Government of Iran or Iranian individuals or entities.

In August 2004, the Governments of Iran and Venezuela entered into an agreement (the Agreement), whereby they agreed to cooperate in certain areas of common interest. The following year, both governments supplemented the Agreement by entering into a Memorandum of Understanding regarding an infrastructure project in Venezuela (the Project), which was to involve the construction of thousands of housing units in Venezuela.

The Project was led by Stratus Group, an Iranian conglomerate controlled by Sadr and his family with international business operations in the construction, banking, and oil industries. In December 2006, Stratus Group incorporated a company in Tehran, which was then known as the Iranian International Housing Corporation (IIHC). IIHC was responsible for construction for the Project. Thereafter, IIHC entered into a contract with a subsidiary of a Venezuelan state-owned energy company (the VE Company), which called for IIHC to build approximately 7,000 housing units in Venezuela in exchange for approximately $475,734,000. Stratus Group created the Venezuela Project Executive Committee to oversee the execution of the Project. Sadr was a member of the committee and was responsible for managing the Project’s finances.

In connection with his role on the Project, Sadr took steps to evade U.S. economic sanctions and to defraud U.S. banks by concealing the role of Iran and Iranian parties in U.S. dollar payments sent through the U.S. banking system. For example, in 2010, Sadr and a co-conspirator used St. Kitts and Nevis passports and a United Arab Emirates address to incorporate two entities outside Iran that would receive U.S. dollar payments related to the Project on behalf of IIHC. The first entity, Clarity Trade and Finance (Clarity), was incorporated in Switzerland, and the second, Stratus International Contracting, J.S., aka Stratus Turkey, aka Straturk, was incorporated in Turkey. Stratus Turkey and Clarity were both owned and controlled by Sadr and his family members in Iran. Sadr then opened U.S. dollar bank accounts for Clarity and Stratus Turkey at a financial institution located in Switzerland.

Thereafter, Sadr and others conducted a series of international financial transactions using Clarity and Stratus Turkey for the benefit of Iranian parties in a manner that concealed the Iranian nexus to the payments, in violation of U.S. economic sanctions. Specifically, between April 2011 and November 2013, the VE Company, at the direction of Sadr and others, made approximately 15 payments to IIHC through Stratus Turkey or Clarity, totaling approximately $115,000,000.

Sadr and others directed that payments be routed through banks in the U.S. to Stratus Turkey’s or Clarity’s bank accounts at the financial institution in Switzerland. The majority of the funds were then transferred to another offshore entity located in the British Virgin Islands, which had been incorporated by Sadr and others in 2009. In addition, on Feb. 1, 2012, Clarity wired more than $2,000,000 of proceeds from the Project directly into the United States. Those proceeds were then used to purchase real property in California.

428 posted on 03/23/2018 7:35:10 AM PDT by Steven W.
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