The Case of Kevin KC Massey - I Challenging the Interpretation vs. the Wording of a Statute

Canada Free Press ^ | 10/18/2016 | Gary Hunt

[Elderberry]

This last Section only sets the penalties.

On April 29, 2015, Massey filed his “First Supplement to Motion to Dismiss Indictment”. The culmination of research into the wording of 18 US Code § 922(g)(1) led him to conclude that the wording of the statute complies, at least to some degree, with the authority granted to the government by the Constitution. That authority has to do with the “Commerce Clause”, providing powers with regard to “interstate and foreign commerce”. Since then, Massey has referred to this as the “Has/Had” argument.

Though much simplified on the “First Supplement to Motion…” we can begin to understand just what Massey was telling the Court. The pertinent part of the Motion:

18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1), with the pertinent phrase being, “to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce”. The word “has”, as opposed to the word “had” was used in the statute. “Has” is the third person singular, present indicative, verb meaning active in the action just completed, where “had” is past tense and participle of the verb have, meaning in a previous situation. So, if one were the direct recipient, then the word ‚”has” would be appropriate. However, if it were expansive, intended to include any firearm shipped in interstate commerce, then ‚”had” would be the proper verb. The use of ‚”had” would have meant to include any and all that ‚”had” been so transported any time prior.

In a Motions Hearing, on March 30, 2015, Massey’s attorney, Louis Sorola, argued the Motion to Dismiss the Indictment:

Your Honor, because the motion to dismiss the indictment is first based on the claim that 18 USC 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional and that it goes beyond the authority granted to Congress in the commerce clause.