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I read through your post 82, didn't find anything that rose to the level of binding authority. Most of the commentary cites dealt with the less controversial cases, not the edge cases. None of the case law gets out of the dicta trap. And again, the only time we had operative statutory authority on NBC was when the 1790 Act validated an edge case for NBC under jus sanguinis.

BTW, I did appreciate that your citations were not stuck in the Vattell/Law of Nations universe. However, so long as you are willing to consider the influence of the British framework, Blackstone here accounts for some of those edge cases in a manner favorable to the Cruz theory of jus sanguinis citizenship:

But by several more modern statutes these restrictions are still farther taken off: so that all children, born out of the king's ligeance, whose fathers were natural-born subjects, are now natural-born subjects themselves, to all intents and purposes, without any exception; unless their said fathers were attainted, or banished beyond sea, for high treason; or were then in the service of a prince at enmity with Great Britain.

Available here: http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_4_citizenships1.html

Also notice here there is no artificial boundary between statutory and common law assertions of natural born status. The common law feeds into the statutory corpus and fills the gaps, which is sort of how a lot of statutory law comes into being anyway. It's really more of a historical question. When did some emerging pattern of judging cases (common law) get absorbed up into the statutory schema? And what began in the statutory schema in skeletal form, and migrated down to where judges had to fill those gaps with case-based refinements? At some point it becomes a chicken-versus-egg problem.

In any event, I appreciated your effort on post 82. It was a good read. Thanks for posting it.

Peace,

SR

The exceptions that Blackstone references were just that, exceptions arising as a result of the wars of the three kingdoms (the late troubles) and the English Reformation. The exception to the law is not the law, the law is law. You are posting only enough of Blackstone to support your position but ignoring the broader principle so I'll post the full quote here which does not, in fact, support your position of Jus Sanguinis birth citizenship being the law:

When I say, that an alien is one who is born out of the king's dominions, or allegiance, this also must be understood with some restrictions. The common law indeed stood absolutely so; with only a very few exceptions: so that a particular act of parliament became necessary after the restoration, for the naturalization of children of his majesty's English subjects, born in foreign countries during the late troubles. And this maxim of the law proceeded upon a general principle, that every man owes natural allegiance where he is born, and cannot owe two such allegiances, or serve two masters, at once.

I read through your post 82, didn't find anything that rose to the level of binding authority.

and we all know that no such binding authority exists in US law so we must resort to the historical record which is exactly what the SCOTUS would do.

The fact is, you can not show me anything comparable to what I have provided to support your opinion. My opinion is WELL supported. yours? not so much.

Respectfully. RC1