Posted on 01/09/2012 9:16:41 AM PST by Danae
[My previous report was in three parts, with the first being a rather extensive exposure of a misquote by the SCOTUS in both McCreery v. Somerville and Wong Kim Ark. The second part exposed fraudulent propaganda from Maskell's most recent CRS memo. And the final part examined Minor v. Happersett in light of some of the arguments being offered against its precedent, providing new analysis of key provisions of the holding therein. I am reprinting the section on Minor now as a separate post because it is crucial to understanding the case, and it appears to have been somewhat swallowed up by the first two parts.]
MINOR v. HAPPERSETT REVISITED.
…the only time the US Supreme Court ever did define the class of persons who were POTUS eligible under Article 2 Section 1 was in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874), wherein it was held:
“The Constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners.” Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 168.
There’s a quote for you. It really exists. And it tells you exactly who are natural-born citizens; those born in the country of parents who are citizens. The words are plain-spoken and self-evident. There are two classes of persons discussed in the above quotation. Those born in the country of citizen parents were labeled by the Court as “natives or natural-born citizens”, but these were also further identified as being “distinguished from aliens or foreigners”. The distinction is crucial.
(Excerpt) Read more at naturalborncitizen.wordpress.com ...
It is tremendously important for those of us who support Minor as being legal precedent and binding law today, to be intimately familiar with what Minor says, it's CONTEXT, and the context each and every phrase is IN. You see, Obot's and other naysayers try to obfuscate the meaning of this case by taking sentences out of context. In a SCOTUS case you CANNOT do that, because the context is integral to the meaning of each word.
So don't fall for the contextual trap. Become familiar with the case, read it in full. It isn't all that long, and upon reading it in full, it becomes immediately apparent what the context IS and what it properly means. Leo does a brilliant job of deciphering the legal meanings, and the semantics which might escape anyone not learned in the language of the law.
Minor v. Happersett is LAW. It has never been overturned - the case was decided unanimously. This law states simply that a Natural Born Citizen is one born in the country with two parents who are it's citizens. This LAW means that Obama is a criminal usurper.
He should be dealt with as such, along with his SCOTUS appointees (who are DESPERATE I am sure to bury this and keep their lifetime seats on the court - yes, they should be tossed out as well), his treaties, and his abomination of laws passed along with all the department heads he appointed.
Make no mistake, this is a constitutional crisis. I have been saying this since before the cretin was elected and sworn in. It will only get worse,and be done unto us again if we do not demand that the law be OBEYED.
Ping to the Usual Suspects!
Leo has a new post up, he discusses Minor V. Happersett at length! This is an important post folks, read it closely, soon you may find yourselves needing to defend the reasoning behind why Minor matters, and how this binding law affects the current administration which has caused a very real constitutional crisis.
Love to read it but the company firewall blocks blogs.
BFL
It is the courts who who legislated dual citizenship, NOT the US Congress and it is disingenuous of these legalese to continue to disregard the 1868 Expatriation Act when writing on the subject of the 14th. These 2 pieces of law are connected at the hip and were never to be separated.
Leo makes some good points, but the best way to exploit this case is to simplify the context and the point.
A. Virginia Minor claimed a right to vote on the basis of being a 14th amendment citizen.
B. The court REJECTED this argument because she fit its definition of NBC.
C. The court recognized different classes of citizens by birth, but only ONE was characterized a natural-born: all children born in the country to citizen parents.
D. The other class of citizenship by birth has doubts that must be resolved, but not for natural-born citizens. Thus, in context, natural-born means a type of citizenship that is “without doubt,” otherwise one is naturally considered to be a foreigner or alien.
E. In rejecting Virginia Minor’s 14th amendment citizenship argument, the court says that the 14th amendment does NOT define natural-born citizenship ... and this is confirmed in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark: “In Minor v. Happersett, Chief Justice Waite, when construing, in behalf of the court, the very provision of the Fourteenth Amendment now in question, said: “The Constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens.” “
F. The Minor decision was UNANIMOUS. There was no dissent on how the court defined NBC. The decision and NBC definition was affirmed and upheld by the SCOTUS in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark (in both the majority opinion AND in the dissent). There is NO compelling legal authority that trumps this definition.
Here’s the question SCOTUS agreed to answer in Minor v Happersett (1874):
“The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court.
The question is presented in this case, whether, since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, a woman, who is a citizen of the United States and of the State of Missouri, is a voter in that State, notwithstanding the provision of the constitution and laws of the State, which confine the right of suffrage to men alone. We might, perhaps, decide the case upon other grounds, but this question is fairly made. From the opinion we find that it was the only one decided in the court below, and it is the only one which has been argued here. The case was undoubtedly brought to this court for the sole purpose of having that question decided by us, and in view of the evident propriety there is of having it settled, so far as it can be by such a decision, we have concluded to waive all other considerations and proceed at once to its determination.”
This is the answer the CHIEF JUSTICE delivered to the question presented (Certiorari):
“Being unanimously of the opinion that the Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one, and that the constitutions and laws of the several States which commit that important trust to men alone are not necessarily void, we
AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT. “
Minor v Happersett is a challenge under the privileges of immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Everything else in the opinion is dicta. Only the answer to the question accepted by SCOTUS is precedent.
The 19th Amendment overturn part of the Minor v Happersett Ruling. The Nineteenth Amendment (Amendment XIX) to the United States Constitution prohibits any United States citizen to be denied the right to vote based on sex. It was ratified on August 18, 1920.
The existence of Dual Citizenship cannot be disputed. The State Department recognizes it even as it discourages it.
A child born to Mexican parents in the US is as much a Mexican Citizen as it is an American Citizen. Denying this is insanity.
The existence “CAN” be disputed because ... just because a govt dept “recognizes” it, it does not make it law. Therefore it exists in merely in the "fictional world", not in the world of the reality of law.
…the only time the US Supreme Court ever did define the class of persons who were POTUS eligible under Article 2 Section 1 was in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874), wherein it was held:
“The Constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners.” Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 168.
There’s a quote for you. It really exists. And it tells you exactly who are natural-born citizens; those born in the country of parents who are citizens. The words are plain-spoken and self-evident. There are two classes of persons discussed in the above quotation. Those born in the country of citizen parents were labeled by the Court as “natives or natural-born citizens”, but these were also further identified as being “distinguished from aliens or foreigners”. The distinction is crucial.
On one side are those who have no citizenship other than that of the United States… as distinguished from those on the polar opposite side who have absolutely no claim to citizenship in the United States; “These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners.” Those who fall in between these two extremes make up a third class of persons whose citizenship status, the Court noted, was subject to doubt:
“Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of the parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first.” Id. (Emphasis added.)
Had this third class been contemplated as having any claim to being natural-born citizens, the distinction employed by the court would not make sense. The distinction was employed to more specifically identify the class of persons who were natural-born citizens under Article 2, Section 1, Clause 5. The two classes discussed are in direct polar opposition to each other. Had this distinction not been employed, it might be argued that those born in the country of one citizen parent were also natural-born. But the distinction leads to the necessary conclusion that the Court in Minor was identifying a two-citizen parent rule.
For example, a person born in the US to a British father and U.S. citizen mother would, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution (and at the time Minor v. Happersett was decided), be considered as a natural-born subject of the U.K. Whether this child would be, at his birth, a citizen under the 14th amendment, was left undecided by the Court in Minor. But let’s assume that the child was a U.S. citizen. Where does that child fit into the distinction offered by the Court in Minor? The child is not on either polar extreme, since the child was not exclusively a US citizen at birth, nor was the child exclusively a British subject at birth. He does not fit into the distinction.
By choosing two extremes – those who, at their birth, are nothing but U.S. citizens – “as distinguished from aliens or foreigners” – those who, at their birth, are in no way U.S. citizens – the Supreme Court in Minor provided the necessary criteria to properly discern their holding.
Nothing has been left open as to the Minor Court’s definition of a natural-born citizen. This is further made clear by the Court’s other – somewhat overlooked – federal citizenship holding:
“The very idea of a political community, such as a nation is, implies an association of persons for the promotion of their general welfare. Each one of the persons associated becomes a member of the nation formed by the association…
For convenience it has been found necessary to give a name to this membership. The object is to designate by a title the person and the relation he bears to the nation. For this purpose the words ‘subject,’ ‘inhabitant,’ and ‘citizen’ have been used, and the choice between them is sometimes made to depend upon the form of the government. Citizen is now more commonly employed, however, and as it has been considered better suited to the description of one living under a republican government, it was adopted by nearly all of the States upon their separation from Great Britain, and was afterwards adopted in the Articles of Confederation and in the Constitution of the United States. When used in this sense it is understood as conveying the idea of membership of a nation, and nothing more.”
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 165-166 (1874). (Emphasis added.)
Therefore, when the Court uses the words, “citizen” or “citizenship”, no other meaning may be imputed other than, “membership of a nation”. But Jack Maskell believes he can overrule this specific holding of the Supreme Court by inserting the words “natural-born” where they do not appear. ”Natural-born” only pertains to a requirement for the municipal office of President. Those who are natural-born meet that qualification, but all who are citizens, natural-born, naturalized abroad, naturalized here, at birth or later in life, are members of our nation. The word citizen – according to the Supreme Court in Minor – refers to “membership of a nation, and nothing more“. It’s the “nothing more” that Maskell fails to recognize.
Government departments EXIST because of the laws creating them, and their policies must FOLLOW the statutory laws which govern their existence. I have a hard time believing that you could argue that government departments don’t have to follow laws. That is INSANITY. Government policies devolve DIRECTLY from the laws which govern their existence. They don’t just spring into existence on accident. Your argument here isn’t even silly. Its almost not even worth addressing.
First one must define “membership” in a nation and according to the founders, membership = citizenship. So any legalese that tries to define a “sojourner/foreigner” as a member of the nation just because said “sojourner/foreigner” happens to temporarily reside in the land is being completely disingenuous and therefore upholding the courts ficticious authority to legislate from the bench which is completely unconstitutional.
Works of James Wilson Vol 11 http://books.google.com/books?id=YO4PAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA290&dq=Works+of+James+Wilson+%22citizenship%22&hl=en&sa=X&ei=7DsLT_OGFeOJsgLA7OSQCg&ved=0CDkQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=citizen%2C%20member&f=false
Playing the devil’s advocate in public regarding a popular view can earn one heaps of scorn, but nonetheless:
Minor is susceptible of more than one interpretation.
It could be either:
A. Minor defines natural born citizenship as belonging to only those born in the U.S. of two citizen parents, or
B. Minor defines a particular class of citizens as natural born citizens but does not exclude the possibility of other classes.
Consider this: Suppose we are talking about Irish Setters (born in the U.S. of citizen parents), you might say “these were four-legged animals” (“these were…natural-born citizens”).
Does that mean you believe no other four-legged creatures (citizens) can be classified as four-legged animals (natural-born citizens)? Certainly not.
Would it have been more helpful had the court said, if that is what was intended, that “these were the natural born citizens”? Certainly, it reasonably excludes other possibilities.
Would this have been even more helpful: “these and these alone were natural born citizens”? Most certainly, it expressly excludes all other possibilities.
Is it possible for a politically divided group such as the current USSC to easily find a definition that works against the likely intent of the founders? Certainly.
Minor even acknowledges authority for our present day “anchor baby” problem with this statement: Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their [p168] parents. There are good historical arguments supporting the two citizen parent requirement, but it seems to me there is a risk Minor could muddy the waters.
Minor’s view of natural born citizenship is not binding on subsequent courts.
Virginia Minor’s citizenship was not an issue before the court, thus it was not necessary for the court to consider any form of citizenship beyond that contemplated by the 14th A. The words "natural born citizen" do not appear in the holding (as opposed to the opinion) nor do they appear in the syllabus.
The close to 30 courts that later cite Minor including Ex parte Lockwood, do so for its authority on ordinary citizenship and not its view of natural born citizenship.
Thus, even if some on the present court find a conclusive definition, other members could conclude it was not bound by Minor.
That’s my lunchtime argument.
Via Donofrio from Minor:
“First, on pgs. 165-166, the Court defined the meaning of the word “citizen”. Then, on pgs. 167-168, the court defined the class of “natural-born citizens”. The Court left open the issue of who were “citizens” under the 14th Amendment, which the Court wisely avoided by exercising judicial constraint. Instead, the Court construed Article 2 Section 1, Clause 5, the natural-born citizen clause. In doing so, they defined and closed that class to persons born in the country to parents who are citizens.”
It really is just that simple.
Thanks Frog. It can be singularly frustrating at times. But it is still worth the time and effort. But my part is nothing. Donofrio has done all the hard work and deserves all the credit.
As for Minor, you MUST read the entire case. I have stated before, that the context of the passages within it must be taken in context. Taking them out of context removes their specific meaning.
Leo is correct here:
“In Maskell’s CRS memo, he alleges that the following statement from Minor left open the issue of whether persons born of aliens could be considered as natural-born citizens:
“Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to solve these doubts. It is sufficient for everything we have now to consider that all children born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction are themselves citizens.” Id. at 167-168. (Emphasis added.)
Reading this passage in light of the definition of “citizen” from pg. 166 of Minor’s unanimous opinion, it becomes evident that what is referred to here is membership in our nation, and nothing more. Any attempt to insert the words – “natural-born” – into this passage to imply that the court left open the issue of whether those whose citizenship was in doubt might also be eligible to be President would be in direct opposition to the Court’s very holding of the case. This expression of doubt must be limited to the political status of the person, not to their eligibility to hold a municipal office. Political status is a legal term of art which means, “membership in a nation, and nothing more”. Presidential eligibility refers to municipal status. The holding not only determined Virginia Minor’s citizenship, it directly defined “citizen”, and that definition remains the law of the land today.
First, on pgs. 165-166, the Court defined the meaning of the word “citizen”. Then, on pgs. 167-168, the court defined the class of “natural-born citizens”. The Court left open the issue of who were “citizens” under the 14th Amendment, which the Court wisely avoided by exercising judicial constraint. Instead, the Court construed Article 2 Section 1, Clause 5, the natural-born citizen clause. In doing so, they defined and closed that class to persons born in the country to parents who are citizens.
The Minor Court’s unanimous opinion and definition of natural-born citizen have never been overruled or even questioned. In fact, the very passage defining the natural-born citizen class was re-stated in Justice Gray’s opinion from Wong Kim Ark. Had he intended to take issue with that definition, or to expand it, then his opinion would certainly contain something like this:
‘Wong Kim Ark is a natural-born citizen eligible to be President.’
But no such statement exists. It’s also important to remember at all times that the Court in Minor specifically avoided construction of the 14th Amendment, thereby defining the class of natural-born citizens and identifying Virginia Minor as a member of that class. Virginia Minor directly petitioned the Court to determine that she was a citizen under the 14th Amendment. But the Minor Court declined to construe the 14th Amendment, and thereafter set about defining the class of persons who were natural-born citizens of the United States in determining that she was a citizen.”
There is no such thing as eggs.
Incorrect.
Donofrio addresses this in his post:
“In 1996, the US Supreme Court’s majority opinion by Justice Breyer in Ogilvie Et Al., Minors v. United States, 519 U.S. 79 (1996), stated that when the Court discusses a certain reason as an independent ground in support of their decision, then that reason is not simply dictum:
“Although we gave other reasons for our holding in Schleier as well, we explicitly labeled this reason an ‘independent’ ground in support of our decision, id., at 334. We cannot accept petitioners’ claim that it was simply a dictum.”
The Minor Court’s construction of Article 2, Section 1, Clause 5, of the United States Constitution was the independent ground by which the Court avoided construing the 14th Amendment’s citizenship clause.
Therefore, such construction is precedent, not dicta, despite POTUS eligibility not being an issue. The Court determined it was necessary to define the class of natural-born citizens, and the definition is current legal precedent.”
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.