Iran Capable of Building First Nuclear Bomb by February 2009 [The Ides of February Are Upon Us!]

Iran Capable of Building First Nuclear Bomb by February 2009 Posted on 21 October 2008

US intelligences amended estimate, that Iran will be ready to build its first bomb just one month after the next US president is sworn in, as having been relayed as a guideline to the Middle East teams of both presidential candidates, Senators John McCain and Barack Obama.

The information prompted the assertion by Democratic vice presidential nominee Joseph Biden in Seattle Sunday, Oct. 19: It will not be six months before the world tests Barack Obama like they did John Kennedy.

McCain retorted Tuesday, Oct. 21: America does not need a president that needs to be tested. Ive been tested. I was aboard the Enterprise off the coast of Cuba. Ive been there.)

Military sources cite the new US timeline: By late January, 2009, Iran will have accumulated enough low-grade enriched uranium (up to 5%) for its break-out to weapons grade (90%) material within a short time.

For this, the Iranians have achieved the necessary technology. In February, they can move on to start building their first nuclear bomb.

US intelligence believes Tehran has the personnel, plans and diagrams for a bomb and has been running experiments to this end for the past two years. The UN International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna last week asked Tehran to clarify recent complex experiments they conducted in detonating nuclear materials for a weapon, but received no answer.

What a difference a year can make. Remember I fraudulent NIE Bush allowed the State Department to get away with? I sent around the following note at that time.

The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) titled Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities should receive acclamation for political marketing and condemnation for intelligence value. An intention is a future determination to act in a particular manner. A capability represents possession of sufficient mental and/or physical power to perform an act. Intelligence agencies should contribute information about intentions and capabilities for the policy decision-making tasks of others.

The current NIE becomes a policy determinant by using a data point, belonging to text, and contorting it into the primary judgment. The estimate Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, and had not restarted, states past circumstances representing neither intentions nor capabilities. The NIE does not assume Iranian intention to acquire nuclear weapons, but assertions follow of intentions and capabilities to produce weapons grade uranium, solve associated technical problems, and make subsequent political decisions to proceed with program execution. Potential Iranian policy momentums, and present technical capability estimates continually reflected upon the defining Scope statement. Therefore, political exposition, advocating an accommodated policy toward Iran and its aims, retained primary rhetorical stature. The NIE provided baseless political assertion traditional diplomacy caused Iran program suspension. The document avoided accountable assessments of Iran’s intentions.

The report’s political exposition required studied ignorance towards available intelligence data. General Abireza Asgari who defected March 2007 had extensive access to Iran’s nuclear and intelligence secrets. Nowhere does the document qualify statements to recognize traditional security procedures. After his 2005 employment change procedures should limit access to Iran’s nuclear program and intelligence agencies. Defection then required posting bodyguards of deception around continuing operations. An assessment with moderate to high confidence should always require at least two independent sources. Judgments overturning previous assessments should subject data to special scrutiny and skepticism. Obtaining even one trusted source from behind a new security wall within a closed society becomes very unlikely.

Contrary to report assertions, no traditional diplomatic were underway, but military action offered a key incentive during that period by removing the immediately adjacent Taliban and Hussein regimes. The fact Libya eliminated WMD programs, and the supposition Iran halted their nuclear weapons initiatives should acknowledge intentional or unwitting application of war residing on a continuum of diplomacy. Talks, conferences and economic measures serve as war without bloodshed; war serves as diplomacy with bloodshed. Intelligence and espionage provide a medium invigorating all options.

This latest NIE presents another milepost along the way to complete corrosion of U.S. intelligence. The Church and Pike Committees eviscerated the CIA, which can only provide value when operating powerfully within a cunning and ruthless world. Congress under pretense of “reasserting” authority plundered authority given to all presidents since George Washington to conduct clandestine operations. Congressional blindness seeks interminable briefing requests and micro-manages operations. Presidents suffer petulant demands to confirm ever more intelligence officials. Hearings provide the shallow political theater needed for re-election. Without profound catastrophes, there seems little interest to reinvigorate our short of war capabilities.

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