You can't beat terrorists from the bleachers (Canada)

Calgary Herald ^

[exg]

You can't beat terrorists from the bleachers

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On Sunday, ex-diplomat Bill Warden argued the war in Afghanistan was a mistake. Here is a response from an academic who strongly supports Canada's involvement.

Largely because of the pusillanimous regime of Jean Chretien and the soft-power dream world of his foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, few Canadians understand that war is not some unpleasant anomaly in an otherwise peaceful unfolding of the universe.

Accordingly, to understand why it is a source of pride that Canada has deployed around 2,300 troops to Afghanistan, we have to recall some forgotten truths and purge an equal number of corrosive lies from our minds.

The two greatest philosophers of war, Carl von Clausewitz, the 19th century Prussian general, and Sun Tzu, the 5th century BC Chinese sage, are agreed on two matters regarding the essential features of war. The first is that wars are by nature political and thus politics limits or guides the conduct of war. The second is that it is of the utmost importance to know your enemy.

This is especially true when the enemy has a different understanding of war than you do. In the case of the Taliban, their allies in al-Qaeda, and affiliates among the so-called jihadists, war is understood less as a political matter than a religious one.

For such an enemy, war is a struggle on behalf of God and against Satan. What may look to us as a remote political goal, the creation of a worldwide caliphate, turns out to be the imaginary product of a corrupt understanding of God's law. Even so, it is a tremendous motivator and one of the most important factors in this war.

The implications of fighting an enemy who is not undertaking conventional politics, with "an admixture of other means" as Clausewitz put it, also need to be borne in mind.

First, we must recall that we do not choose our enemies. They choose us. This is true whether it is a bar fight on 17th Avenue in Calgary or a firefight in the rocky groves of Panjwaii in Afghanistan.

If somebody plans to fight you, no matter how nice you think you are, he will do it. As Prime Minister Stephen Harper said, "We can ignore the dangers if we want, but the dangers will not ignore us."

Indeed, individuals and countries who want nothing so much as to be nice, are inviting attack.

If your enemy thinks war is doing God's work on Earth, and even more if he considers death in battle to be martyrdom, the fighting is likely to be especially intense.

The new model army of Oliver Cromwell during the English civil war thought of itself as an angelic host, as did any number of other armies during the European Middle Ages, moved by special revelations to prophetic and inspired fanatics.

When one party to a conflict understands war that way, it introduces a problem that can be solved in one of two ways.

After U.S. Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the coalition troops in the first Gulf War, was told that many enemy soldiers were eager to die in battle because they then would see God, he replied with forthright brutality: "That's fine. Our job is to arrange the meeting."

In short, if adversaries will not surrender, they must be killed, a necessity that applies to secular enemies as well.

The alternative is to provide sufficient incentives that the enemy changes his mind and surrenders. In fact, when the enemy is (at least in part) religiously inspired, getting him to change his mind may turn out to be easier than when soldiers are fighting for a secular sense of honour. There is, after all, always the possibility of appealing to scripture.

The conclusion to be drawn from these general reflections is that any war, even spiritually inspired war, can be won for the same reason that it can be lost.

This is as true for the Cold War, which was a historical novelty, as it is for the current global and asymmetric war, one of the theatres of which is Afghanistan. The strategic reason we must win is the same reason we had to beat the Nazis and the Soviets: to defend our admittedly defective political order against the threat of domination by spiritually perverse tyrants.

When Canada intervened in Afghanistan in the winter of 2001-02, it was not the result of an altruistic whim or "human security," but because it served our national interest and the interest of global security.

As Harper later remarked, Afghanistan under the control of the Taliban was an "incubator" of al-Qaeda, the consequences of which "hit home with brutal force on 9/11."

Initially, only JTF-2 was sent to fight alongside U.S., British, and Australian special operations forces. Then, when Kabul was liberated, regular Canadian infantry took on what were chiefly defensive operations in the capital city, along with joint helicopter assaults with U.S. troops. Now, they have a major combat role in the south of the country where the Taliban remain strong.

Despite alarmist headlines, Canada is, in fact, succeeding in both its military and political tasks. Last week, Lt.-Col. Omer Lavoie explained the outcome of a nine-hour engagement, which took the lives of four Canadian soldiers, in the following way: The Canadians were well prepared for battle and, using typical military understatement, he said they ensured the Taliban "had insurmountable difficulties in breaking contact with us."

In ordinary language, the enemy could not retreat in good order and was compelled to stand, fight and be killed.

Politically, Afghanistan has improved remarkably over the past five years. They have held elections and promulgated a constitution. They have demobilized more than 60,000 combatants.

The economy has grown annually since 2002 at a rate of 17 per cent and micro-loans have been provided to 140,000 clients, nearly 90 per cent of whom are women.

Most importantly, unlike the Soviets, the NATO troops want to leave, but the Afghans want them to stay.

We can see what is at stake by considering the other option: a precipitous withdrawal. To begin with, it would not matter a hoot the reasons we came up with to explain our action to the world. As Harper warned, we would be cutting and running. The consequences are entirely predictable.

The Americans would see Canada as having returned to the status of free riders, shirkers, and -- let's face it -- chickens.

This would guarantee a return to the shameful times in Canada-U.S. affairs perfected by Chretien. Harper was right when he said the war against the terrorists cannot be won "from the bleachers."

In addition to damaging relations with our major ally, Canada's NATO partners would be appalled. Even the inconstant French would feel betrayed.

On the other side, the Taliban would claim a victory, which also has some predictable implications. Canada has announced a 3-D policy: defence, diplomacy and development. Without the military, the other two "Ds" are empty words because the diplomats and the development people would simply be killed -- and Canada has already had one senior diplomat, Glyn Berry, murdered by the insurgents.

In the longer term, a craven display of weakness would amount to an invitation for the jihadist militants to visit this country.

The consequences for the ordinary citizens of Afghanistan would be disastrous.

Consider only this: The Taliban would be in a position to make good on their threat to throw acid in the face of any girl attending school.

This is not an endless mission. Canadians will know we have won when the Taliban is incapable of attacking coalition troops.

We can expect to withdraw our troops when the Afghan National Army is capable of providing genuine security for the Afghan government and its citizens. Until then, both duty and national interest require Canadian troops on the ground in that unfortunate country.

Abstinence is sometimes a virtue. This is not one of those times.

Barry Cooper is a professor of political science at the University of Calgary and a Fellow of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute.